Nice ferry.

(bangs head on the keyboard)…Nice.Ferry.

It’s also a trimaran hull form which is, indeed, more stable in rougher seas. Notice I do not say HEAVIER seas but refer to the more confused sea states common to littoral areas.

Which of the crop of large fast ferrys has NOT had structural issues a ‘year or two’..or ten..back?

sid, do you mean this one?

The trimaran design will be more stable and yield a larger internal volume, one thing I’m not sure folks have really thought about is if it will be too stable. One problem with a multihull platform is that it can generate so much righting moment that it provides something of a jerky ride. People and equipment do not like jerky. Cruise ships for example have been know to purposefully move weight higher so they have a nice long slow motion. People get less sick that way.

Byron–The Express certainly had problems getting delivered. If I recall correctly, the ship broke it’s (aluminum? Hi techy composite?) stabilizer during trials. Had to be redesigned and rebuilt using steel.

WTH–I thought the trimirans were an easier ride than the catamarans?

Leesea–I thought that the ideal procurement spiral for these things would have been to tie the JHSV, NSC and LCS platforms to a similar seaframe. The flight 0 would serve as a JHSV, moonlighting as a tactics-test-bed for more complex design spirals. That way we could quickly get numbers of ‘em built, figure out stuff we want in these things, and build decent “modules”.

Then-and only if the JHSV model seemed robust enough–we could move into the more complex (and possibly divergent) NSC and LCS requirements–It’d have been a slower yet cheaper route.

LCS2 does appear to have more internal cargo volume, BUT the key thing is LM claims the hull has higher weight reserve.

This is what I was wondering about as well.

Although that big ferry can hold alot of cars, thats not a dense payload. I guess no matter how big, multi-hulls are inherently weight sensitive.

True, it’s not a platform for a dense payload, but (obvious joke aside) just how dense is a small Marine detachment? The thing could carry enough to haul a pretty good raiding party.

It will be interesting to see if the Littoral COMBAT Ships, as it is officially placed in the “Combatant” category by the USN will undergo shock testing…

The development spiral WAS supposed to have been SeaFighter, then HSV Swift, then LCS. But since the ONR design was successfull and it and Swift were cats nether of NAVSEA chosen LCS hulls, that idea sorta flopped.

NCS and most CG rqmts are not consistent with USN. If the Coasties had not been burned by FRC-A and NCS, they might already be using a SeaFighter derivative for OPC? Just speculation here?

JHSV is a morphed set of US Army (LSV) and USMC (HSC) lift rqmts. So while the basic HSV type is same, the detailed specs are quite different.

The Marines are quite happy with the WestPac Express thank you. And if politics had not entered the equation they would have gotten the Austal 125 meter cat HSV design on this last charter, but noooo the Navy wanted only the JHSV. Go figure?

Is it just by happenstance that the warship LCS is similar to the sealift JHSV? I don’t know.

If you want real flexibilty pay Austal to upscale their MRC design.

When it comes to sealift ship specs, my experience says its the cargo consist which counts (not the wishes and desires of ship drivers be they USA TC or USN blue suits). Show me a load list which has NOT been tailored to a specific ship!!

ken, now that NAVSEA recognizes, “there was a fully informed decision process arrived at in the development of LCS”, the number of (quite ill-concieved) current hulls won’t get to five…

I was at the IHS meeting in Sep 04 when the PO briefed the LCS about two yeas into the program. The meeting was attended by AMV engineers, former NAVSEA engineers and program managment types and many industry reps. The consensus of the assembled experts was LCS was a very ambitious program with questionable specs and a convoluted axcquistion plan. So much for NAVSEA’s dream and PR about how they fumbled the ball on the LCS.

goto:
http://www.foils.org/01_Mtg_Pres%20dnloads/LCS_SNAME_IHS041023.pdf

It sounds like new management at the WNY may now be seeing the faults of their design decisions?

A more basic ship design issue which I and Galrahn differ on about the LCS is this: I believe a mothership is primarily a tactical logistics and support ship. He and other believe a mothership should be a warship (I hope I have characterized that properly?).

So I see an LSD as a fine mothership becuase of its following features: helo deck size, wet well for boats, accomodations for crew and embarked dets, superstructure which can support more/higher sensors and C4SI spaces, tankage for POL and storerooms for provisions (i.e. long on-station time).

It should be realized that such a ship has possibilies as GFS support ship, MSO command ship, “pirate policing platform” and probably some other missions I havenen’t mentioned?

The LSDs are particularly appropro because older ones are leaving service, newer ones are needed, their designs are mostly inplace and their acqusition costs are known.

Caveat 1 – I do NOT propose taking any amphib from current force, I am talking about additional platforms.

Caveat 2 – almost all of the above functions can be provided by a sealift ship such as my concept for a dockship as GFS support ship.

Bottom line: the Navy has to decide how to support littoral missions with the most cost effective platform AND that is neither the LCS or a destroyer! to paraphrase FDR “try something”!!

They’re cheaper than the LPD-17, too, right?

ken, you should’ve continued with the good Admiral’s remarks…

“The value of the speed is high, because I need it to go places we couldn’t normally go as rapidly and flexibly, and there’s really some value in that, and maybe that’s the price we want to pay. But I don’t think that there was a fully informed decision process arrived at in the development of LCS, in which somebody answered the question the way we might go after it today,” Eccles said.

“Maybe the right answer is that I need to chase down pirates that I’m going to be going after with those high-speed ships. On the other hand, I could just send my helicopter, so I’m not sure I need to get to that 40-something knots when I’ve got a helo that’ll do better than that. A lot better. Or a missile,” he joked, “which tends to be even faster than a helo.”

Its that whole overvaluation of speed.

Will the paramters of the test fit this definition… “Level I represents the least severe environment anticipated and excludes the need for enhanced survivability for designated ship classes to sustain operations in the immediate area of an engaged Battle Group or in the general war-at-sea region.…which is the survivability level to which the ships are being built?

Or will the test more replicate what can occur in a no joke MIW environment, which sure can’t be defined as the “least severe”?

After all there are shock tests, and then there are shock tests…

we’ll have one more ship in about nine years.

It needn’t be that way Ken. You provide a key here…

plus all the other lard that will be heaped upon it

Been saying it for a few years now. The decision process in defining requirements is fundamentally broken. The most broken its been since the dominance of the moribund Bureau system in the 1880′s. Lots of the same problems then too. Poor designs. Yard problems. Cost overruns. For the same fundamental reason too; the USN couldn’t make up its mind on what to build.

What it took to fix the problem was a fundamental organizational change which led to the creation of the General Board. While not perfect, this organizational system established a coherent shipbuilding plan that served quite well past WWII.

Of course, today there is the DOD and Goldwater-Nichols. However, like then, the USN needs to develop a coherent Strategic and Operational course…one not prone to the sudden zigs and zags that occur after the band gets done playing at the latest Change of Command…before there is any hope that sucessful designs will come down the ways. There needs to be a body that sets that course that is apart from the consuming exigencies of the operational commands stay absorbed in.

if the folks who determine the requirements – N86 – decide that they value economy more than speed.

Here is the expected worth of the LCS’s speed…

As you know from reading the requirements documents, the survivability piece on LCS is different than DDG 51 or DDX or several of our other combatants. And what we’ve chosen to do here is couple high speed and maneuverability and situational awareness in ways that allow LCS to be in the right place at the right time and to be out of the right place at the wrong time. Okay?

1. We need speed to bring combat power to bear, and to avoid a hit.

2. We will have the visibility to ascertain an enemy’s intentions and fully utilize that speed.

From Capt Hughes’ “Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat” (p 60-61):

“The period from 1865 to 1914 rivals even our present age for sweeping technological development in peacetime. Questions of tactics, technology, and command could not be resolved by battle, [and], all became subjects of great debate.

Tactical analysis failed in two significant respects only: overvaluation of speed, and failure to forsee the effects that poor visibility would have on major fleet actions.

Boy-howdy! That shoe sure does fit!!

Springbored did bring up a good point, and there was an answer to his question in the comments. Exercises frequently collect effectiveness data in some form or another.

Where is that wonderful analysis of average–ddg-51 speed? The graphic was just worth a thousand words too…published a few years back in Proceedings, if I recall correctly..

That was a great essay. A real neat piece of work. USNI overlords, scan and post! Scan and post!