The God of The Machine by Isabel Paterson
…..
“The conflict of Greece and Carthage may properly be called a trade war. They were in competition for stations, goods, charters, and customers. In this respect Rome was comparatively negligible at the given time.(p.55)”

“Compared to Greece, just then Carthage probably was ahead in economic organization and technical knowledge, and had the greatest number of ships under single command, monopolizing the most extensive provinces rich in natural resources. The struggle between Greece and Carthage had been going on for centuries, and was still undecided when Pytheas made his voyage. Within fifty years, Rome thrust between the two, commencing the long,bitter, intermittent effort that broke the Phoenician power, razed the walls of Carthage, and left the site a waste. Nor did the Greeks benefit by the ruin of their mighty antagonist; on the contrary, the subjection of Greece was to follow shortly. Economic determinism failed.

The outcome of this particular quarrel was so conclusive that the main issue had grown dim. History is obiged to fall back on geographical terms: Rome and Carthage fought for the mastery of the Mediterranean. Consequently the changing scene of hostilities is taken for granted. Carthage was situated on the north coast of Africa, and lived by its keels. Yet we see the Carthaginian general Hannibal leading an army, with elephants, against Rome by a toilsome march over the Alps.

The most positive proponent of the naval interpretation of world events, Admiral Mahan, told how the idea came to him. Reading Mommsen’s “History of Rome,” he recalled: “It suddenly struck me…how different things might have been could Hannibal have invaded Italy by sea, at the Romans often had Africa, instead of by the long land route.” From that reflection, Mahan wrote “The Influence of Sea-Power Upon History.” He might as well have called his book the influence of history upon sea-power. Undoubtedly things would be different if they were different. Especially if sea-power, a superior navy commanding main trade routes from impregnable bases, were necessarily decisive, Hannibal would never have been compelled to his Alpine detour, and Carthage should have won a generation earlier. Instead, “with the strongest fleet on the seas, and with a naval experience gained through centuries, the Carthaginian admirals lost six out of seven of the naval battles, despite the fact that the Romans had never possessed a quinquireme before this time( the first Punic war), and very few Romans had ever set foot on shipboard.”(p.6-7)*

*CAMBRIDGE ANCIENT HISTORY: “The Fist Punic War. Tenney Frank, Macmillan.”

…..

Is it necessary and practical to compete ship for ship or to have a more dominant “sea-power” when dealing with China? The Cold War showed that when Russia tried to keep apace with the U.S. their statist economy eventually could not carry the burden. As our country slowly descends into statism one bailout at a time, I can only hope that we will recognize our own errors and make the needed corrections.

“In the case of the Soviets, the Chinese have drawn the lesson that they must not pursue military development at the expense of economic development – no traditional arms race. That is the path Deng laid out in the late 1970s and one which they have assiduously followed. Indeed, if one examines their emerging military capabilities in intelligence, submarines, cyber, and space, one sees an asymmetrical operational approach that is different from Western approaches, one consistent with the classical Chinese strategic thinkers.”

It reminded me of a passage from Jean-Baptiste Say’s, “A Treatise on Political Economy.” Say’s “Treatise” was highly regarded by Thomas Jefferson and was the dominant text book on economics in America during the nineteenth century. Its too bad the United States has forgotten these principles. Hopefully, China’s rediscovery that economic development precedes military development will mean China is making the proper steps towards capitalism and not statism. The following quote is long but I believe is needed to provide the full context of what Say meant.

A Treatise on Political Economy

“I.IX.19
It is hardly necessary to caution the reader, that I have throughout been considering maritime industry solely in its relation to national wealth. Its influence upon national security is another thing. The art of navigation is an expedient of war, as well as of commerce. The working of a vessel is a military manњuvre; and the nation containing the larger proportion of seamen, is, therefore, ceteris paribus, the more powerful in a military point of view; consequently, political and military considerations have always interfered with national views of commerce, in matters of navigation; and England, in passing her celebrated Navigation Act, interdicting her carrying trade to all vessels, the owners and at least three-fourths of the crews whereof were not British subjects, had in view, not so much the profits of the carrying trade, as the increase of her own military marine, and the diminution of that of the other powers, especially of Holland, which then enjoyed an immense carrying trade, and was the chief object of English jealousy.

I.IX.20I.

Nor can it be denied, that these views may actuate a wise national administration; assuming always, that it is an advantage to one nation to domineer over others. But these political dogmas are fast growing obsolete. Policy will some day or other be held to consist in coveting the pre-eminence of merit rather than of force. The love of domination never attains more than a factitious elevation, that is sure to make enemies of all its neighbours. It is this that engenders national debt, internal abuse, tyranny and revolution; while the sense of mutual interest begets international kindness, extends the sphere of useful intercourse, and leads to a prosperity, permanent, because it is natural.*97

[97]

[The operation of the British Navigation-acts, like all other restrictive regulations, has been prejudicial to the growth of national wealth, without, at the same time, having contributed in any degree to the establishment of the naval preponderance of Great Britain. "If it can be made to appear," says a highly distinguished political economist, "that the greater wealth which we should, in the absence of these laws, have possessed, would have supplied a revenue adequate to the maintenance of an equal number of seamen in the navy, it would follow that we are no gainers by these acts; and if it further appear that this additional revenue would have been equal to the maintenance of twice or three times as many seamen, it would be clear that we are losers by them. It is acknowledged by many of the advocates for these laws, that their tendency has not been to increase the national revenue, but in some degree the reverse.

"Our national preponderance," says, we believe, Mr. Horner, "rests on a very different basis. Our national energy and wealth originate in our freedom, and in that security of property which is its happy consequence. The number of our seamen in merchant shipping is owing to the spirit and capital of our traders, and to our great extent of coast. The magnitude of our navy is due neither to navigation-acts, nor to colonial monopolies, but to the resources of an industrious country.

"How different are the ideas suggested by such observations, from the narrow theories of those who trace our naval superiority to the operation of a few acts of Parliament! They remind us of the technical philosophy of the judge, who gravely ascribed the lamentable prevalence of duelling, not to the violence of human passions, but to a misapprehension of the law of the land! Besides, our naval greatness, as it is well remarked by Dr. Smith, was conspicuous before our navigation laws were framed. It existed then, as it had done before, and has done since, in a degree commensurate with our commerce, and with the extent of our national prosperity. These circumstances, and not navigation laws, will be found the regulators of naval power in all countries. They determine its extent among the Dutch, to whom, even in the season of their greatest strength, navigation laws were entirely unknown." Vide Edinburgh Review, vol. xiv. page 95.] American Editor.”

That is: if all you want to do is to deny the opponent the use of the sea, subs are all you need. But if *you* want to *use* the sea, you need carriers.

A stronger submarine program is vital for many reasons.

I think the larger question is, what impact does our large and increasingly vulnerable carriers play in this contest??? Should we not invest more resources into our dwindling submarine resources and industrial base???