Observing What Passes as Praise for the LCS

21st

Observing What Passes as Praise for the LCS

January 2009

You can’t make this up. Because the comment is so hilarious, I’ll ignore for a moment why this article ran in Aviation Weekly, only to say that we have finally found someone who is very pleased about the costs of the LCS. Behold, a contract lawyer’s praise.

Commissioned in November, the ship is scheduled to be delivered to the Navy later this year. What was critical, according to analyst James McAleese of McAleese and Associates, is that the ship was commissioned before the Obama administration took office.

Now, McAleese said, the Navy needs to keep the cost between $550 million and $600 million per ship – a far cry from the $220 million the sea service initially contended the vessel would cost. But, McAleese and other observers say, the ship is worth the current and revamped cost. “It’s affordable and operational,” he said.

The article goes on to note that the Congressional Research Service estimates the total LCS price tag for the desired 55-ship buy at $29.4 billion.

$550 million x 53 more LCS = $29.15 billion

By my read CRS has apparently underestimated the total costs. First, imagine what alternative littoral warfare strategies the US Navy could develop with ~$29 billion in shipbuilding.

Now imagine a world where a weapon system is ~150% over cost for every unit and we celebrate the weapon system as “affordable” and “operational” thus worth it. Welcome to the world of the US Navy of today. At least he didn’t call the Littoral Combat Ship a frigate, a description that really annoys me.

Posted by galrahn in Uncategorized

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http://smadanek.blogspot.com/ Ken Adams, Amphib Sailor

What annoys me is analysis that assumes the prototype unit cost will be the flat-line cost of every single production unit. There will be learning and efficiencies developed in a production run, yet everyone commenting on this program is in headless-chicken mode about the first ship cost.
Byron

Ken, the cost was always secondary to me. My point of view was look at what this ship is REALLY capable of, what does it REALLY bring to the table as a warship, and is it really going to be a strong ship to carry her sailors into harms way and then be able to bring them back again. My results were: not much, not much, sucks to be her crew, and way too much money for what the Navy got.

What we need is something that starts with an “F” and ends in “E”, and a shipbuilding program that sets the design in stone before the first plate is cut. Leave a bit of room for growth. Make sure she’s seaworthy (LCS looks like a fat lady in high heels to me, good for standing up for cocktails, dangerous on an icy street).
B.Smitty

Does anyone know what costs remain to finish the 55 ship buy? This would help us understand the expectation for per-ship, recurring costs.
Bill

Byron;

Having got a pretty good calibration of your opinion of the current crop of LCS over the last couple of years from my trolling your posts (some opinions I share and others perhaps not..) I would pose the following ‘framed’ question: If we need something ‘frigate-sized-plus-some’ that is not the horrendously expensive and dubiously capable DDG-1000 (if the model would just quit rolling over…)and we need a capable littoral warfighting craft, but the current LCS sort of falls right between those two roles as a thin-skinned mini-frigate or an expensive littoral FAC on steroids, what DO you think we should be spending those dollars on?
Byron

It has to be able to do three things:

1) Give her sailors a fighting chance to get home
2) Bring the fight to the enemy
3) Accomplish the mission

Which also says that we must design a ship that balances the need for reduced manning with realistic (not pie in the sky) damage control automation, have the teeth to really harm the enemy and defend itself, have excellent sea-keeping characteristics in the littorals (which are prone to really nasty weather), and intelligent mission definitions.

LCS (IMHO) is undermanned for damage control. It looks like she has a way too high metacenter. She is grossly underarmed for both offense and defense. Mission packages? Here is my civilian take on “mission packages”: You will always find yourself in combat with what you brought with you, not with what is sitting on the LPD, or C-17. If you didn’t bring what you needed, sailors will be screwed. And that whole “speed” thing? 40 knots is not faster than the following: missiles, bullets, cannon shells, mortars, and torpedos.

My recommendation might look like this:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formidable_class_frigate
pred

They keep referring to FFG 7 costs and claim that LCS compares favourably. In unit cost it does not I think. CRS has produced figures for the first of class at an inflation adjusted cost of US$670 million, and has separately quoted the average cost of the 25 CORT-equipped FFGs as US$650 million in FY09 dollars. The final Selected Acquisition Report for FFG 7 (1987) states a then year cost of US$9.47 billion for 51 ships, an average of US$185 million. That’s what, US$350 million now?
On the other hand that SAR reports also shows that (in FY87 dollars) the total project cost went from US$3.24 billion to aforementioned US9.47 billion. A near trippling in cost, or am I reading something wrong here?
Byron

Could be that FFG-7 turned out to be more than just a “outer ASW escort (and expendable)” into a Navy workhorse?
Byron

I agree completely, Bill. I did say, “that balances the need for reduced manning with realistic (not pie in the sky) damage control automation”.

My son-in-law is an ADC. I have every interest in making sure sailors lives arent’ wasted.
Bill

Byron:

I am not a big fan of ‘reduced manning’ initiatives in any of their current forms, having seen it in practive, up close and personal. What the technology wonks failed to anticipate was the unreliability (and/or poorly thought out implementation in the first plce) of the automated systems that are supposed to facilitate reduced manning…and the end result in practice has turned out to be a lot of ‘crew overtime’ to babysit the automated systems and a heavy reliance, even dependency, on the ‘sharpest tacks in the enlisted box’. Not good operational doctrine IMHO..and wasn’t paticularly good for crew morale either, as they gained the sense that the complicated ship fought them and not the other way around. And I didn’t even touch on the damage control issue.

It might be of interest to note that the Royal Norwegian Navy, in typical fashion, was way out in front of the USN when it came to exploring reduced manning via increaed automation. They learned quickly that simpler systems with more crew still worked better overall and backed way off of their initial automation ‘schemes’ when the series MCMV and FPB vessels were built.
Bill

“Looks like a rather ugly luxury yacht, actually”

*chuckle*..well why wouldn’t she? ‘Destriero’ was to become a yacht after her record-breaking run(s) were over.
SSG Jeff (USAR)

Is it just me or does it look like that ship in the photo took a couple hits to the side of the hull?

Looks like a rather ugly luxury yacht, actually.
sid

yet everyone commenting on this program is in headless-chicken mode about the first ship cost.

The headless chickens are those claiming this conceptual abortion is a good deal for anyone other than those making a profit off it….

How can you spend $37 MILLION in four weeks and call this travesty, “affordable and operational”…?

The USS “Freedom”, (LCS 1), which was commissioned in October, is going into Colonna’s Shipyard in Norfolk this week for a $37-million four-month overhaul, before undergoing Acceptance Trials. A commissioned ship that hasn’t been through Acceptance Trials yet and already requires a four-month overhaul! What kind of nonsense is this? NAVSEA should be ashamed of itself. Oh and, by the way, the start of this overhaul has been delayed so that the ship can be at the Norfolk Naval Station pier during today’s commissioning of CVN 77, a ship which is even less complete. At least LCS 1 can move under her own power. January 10, 2009.

STOP THE BUY AT THE CURRENT TWO HULLS!!

ctrl-alt-delete all the spiffy powerpoints, and start over….
Big D

IMNSHO, you split the mission.

We need a peacetime ship that can survive going to war. Missions include detecting, tracking, and identifying ships in a mixed or heavy-traffic environment, and housing and supporting (including protection from light AAW/ASuW threats) fast boats for boarding operations.

We need a wartime ship that can support the peacetime ship in peace or war, as well as perform blue-water and independent operations to back up the more expensive ships of the line. Missions include everything the Perrys have been used for, as well as escort and “big brother” to the peacetime ship and her boats.

While I’d prefer to be able to combine these roles into a single ship, if the result is going to be LCS, then I’d like to think about 2 designs–call the peacetime ship a corvette, and the wartime ship a frigate, and give them enough crossover capability that they can operate in each other’s intended environment.

For the boats, picture a large RHIB, or something akin to a Dvora or CB90. For the corvette, FSF-1, Skjold, Visby, or Sa’ar 5. For the frigate… anything from the Oz-style Perry refit/SLEP to Absalon–only, DC and survivability need to be more like a Perry than the various Eurofrigates.

And, of course, to complete the pieces that neither the peacetime ship NOR the LCS as designed can handle, a large mothership is needed.

And if you *can* find a way to combine the peacetime and wartime roles into a single hull that fixes all of LCS’s problems… then buy that in mass quantities.
sid

(correction to post currently in the moderation locker…)

How can you spend $37 MILLION in four weeks and call this travesty, “affordable and operational”…?

Make that four MONTHS…

Still, how can anyone call the LCS a good deal for the Navy or the taxpayer?
B.Smitty

Big D said, “We need a peacetime ship that can survive going to war. Missions include detecting, tracking, and identifying ships in a mixed or heavy-traffic environment, and housing and supporting (including protection from light AAW/ASuW threats) fast boats for boarding operations.”

Do we really need a corvette for this? Or would a commercial-spec OPV work? How much protection does it need?

A vessel like the UK River class or NZ Protector OPV only costs $60 million or so. They carry very light armament, but do support a helo and RHIBs.
Big D

Let me put it this way… if you can sell sid on its survivability, I’ll probably buy it.

The trick is that we are not operating in our own coasts; that’s the CG’s job. Anything painted gray is going to be expeditionary, and needs to at least have a chance to survive a foreign theater going hot with little notice.

As an example, would you feel comfortable with a commercial-spec OPV operating unarmored RIBs to board and monitor dhow traffic in the PG near Iranian waters? For that matter, would you be happy with putting an Absalon on patrol near SOH?
Bill

Having spent an awfull lot of time on board the predecessors to the HSV wavepiercers in their passenger ferry livery…well, I’ll just say that ‘sea kindly’ does not come quickly to mind. Beware of getting all caught up in what simply looks like a ‘really cool’ shape as it relates in reality to a capable and survivable naval asset. Or doesn’t.
B.Smitty

Big D,

110′ Island-class cutters patrol the Persian Gulf today.

Is a 278′ OPV any less survivable?

The Germans paid around $320 million for each of their first batch of 5 K130 corvettes, and that’s with a lot of the development costs shared with the F124 frigate (from what I’ve read).

You could buy five Protector OPVs for that much.

Certainly quantity has a quality of its own.
http://springboarder.blogspot.com Defense Springboard

Don’t forget the HMS Endurance’s experience during the Falklands dispute, too. She started her life as a commercial vessel and did just fine. Got some battle action, too, if I recall correctly.
http://www.amiinter.com AMIGuy

I’m saddened by this choosen topic.

No other naval vessel has been built to the specifications of the Littoral Combat Ship. No other vessel meets the speed and outfitting requirements.

Some over zealous Navy officials came up with a Cost As an Indpendant Variable (CAIV) target estimate of $220M that had no basis of reality given the initial specifications for LCS. When in actuality, compared to other USN historical ship costs (FFG7s), and European Surface Combatant ships costs the estimate was understated by $200M to $300M. That is the only major failure of the LCS Program. All the other elements are minutia comparatively.

LCS is 26 percent cheaper than if our European competitors built it.

I lead a study of the cost of the LCS compared with foreign designs. No ship exists that is designed to handle the mission modules that are the core of the LCS concept, or that provides the speed. So my team “normalized” the design in order to properly compare it with foreign ships.

We used the Lockheed Martin design, because the Lockheed monohull is more similar to foreign designs. In our comaprative estimate we took out the modules and installed permanent radars, a vertical launch system with Standard and Evolved Sea Sparrow missiles, and used a standard frigate like outfit (hull mounted sonars, guns, etc.). We adjusted our comparative designs as well if they were missing elements of a standard frigate like outfit. We took the total cost of this final design and compared it to costs data we have on the following competitive designs;

* From Spain, a design by Izar (now Navantia) for the Chilean Proyecto Fragata program.

* From Italy, the Fregata Europea Multi-Missione (FREMM).

* From the Netherlands, the Luchtverdedigings en Commando FregatbyDamen- Schelde.

* From France, the Frégate multi-mission (FREMM).

* From Germany, Blohm+Voss’ MEKO 200 design.

* From the United Kingdom, a combination of the BAE/Yarrow’s Nakhoda Ragam-class and Lekiu class corvettes.

The LCS was about 20 percent cheaper than the next least expensive ship, the Spanish Proyecto Fragata design, and half the cost of the BAE/Yarrow corvettes built for Brunei and Malaysia.

Surprising isn’t it. Especially given Dr. Winter’s fondness of pointing out how great European Shipbuilders are compared to Americans.

So we need to get off the “extremly overbudget” bandwagon with LCS and get real with what ships cost today.

Competition is relative. We should judge our greatness by how we compare to others.

The real cost drivers of complex surface combatants today are systems, not ship construction costs. Items such as command-and-control systems, advanced radars and propulsion plants are what is driving the costs today. If we want to lower these costs we must remove some of the advanced systems/reduce capabilities.

I’m convinced we can become a Navy with far more activie naval vessels than we have today. First, we need to win back the confidence of the Nation, OSD, and Congress by developing sound/realistic estimates for our future ships. Secondly, we should selectively apply some appetite supressants on capbilities in some of the ships.

We need more numbers and a little less capability.

Cheers!

AMIGuy
sid

No ship exists that is designed to handle the mission modules that are the core of the LCS concept, or that provides the speed.

And I have yet to see a reason…other than survival…for all that quite expensive speed.

Again, I pose the question: What does “40+” kts (new, empty, and on a lake) bring in terms of capability that, say, 33 kts does not?

The concept of a very high speed “mothership” is a multi-billion dollar oxymoron.
sid

110′ Island-class cutters patrol the Persian Gulf today.
Is a 278′ OPV any less survivable?

You ask the wrong question…Borrowing RADM(Ret) Gormley’s remarks on just this point (I took the liberty to slightly modify for context):

In the survivability field, fiscal constraints can lead to a hyperfocus on susceptibility reduction since hit avoidance is without question the first thing one should do to enhance combat survivability. So, the logic might then go, let’s not attempt to improve damage resistance and damage tolerance of new (ships). Or alternatively, why not relax vulnerability requirements in order to save on development and procurement costs?
I urge caution here. It seems to me that those who determine requirements and characteristics would do well to avoid being too quickly dismissive of vulnerability considerations.
They need to look carefully at the full range of possible tactical employment scenarios for proposed new platforms, giving weight to the historical combat usage record. And before making a final decision on characteristics, into which the affordability factor must clearly weigh, requirements and acquisition officials should ask themselves two key questions relating to survivability:

“If hit, do we really want this new ship to be more likely to be lost than the one it is to replace?” And, “Is there a need for it to be less vulnerable than the predecessor system?”
sid

Don’t forget the HMS Endurance’s experience during the Falklands dispute, too. She started her life as a commercial vessel and did just fine. Got some battle action, too, if I recall correctly.

She got lucky…unlike others.

Just a few more breaks the other way, folks would be hard pressed to remember the name “Falklands” today….
sid

Don’t forget the HMS Endurance’s experience during the Falklands dispute, too.

Yes, lets not…By deciding to withdraw her the Brits emboldened the Argentines to embark on their effort to retake the islands…

Cautionary tale for these times…
Byron

AMIguy, I won’t comment on the validity of your numbers, not because I disbelieve them, but because they don’t matter. What matters to me is your last sentence: “We need more numbers and a little less capability”. That’s exactly the kind of reason why our shipbuilding program sucks right now. Right now, LCS is nothing but a very expensive gunboat. It has no ASW, ASuW, MIW, or AAW capability. The “module” concept has yet to be translated from scatches on paper to operational reality. And we paid this huge amount of money for a gunboat that doesn’t have the manpower to save itself!
Bill

Something just occurred to me..a question of perspective that should have been asked and answered a long time ago and maybe it has. What is the ‘cost of speed’ as it relates to the LCS designs? Even though the brute force approach was chosen over the more efficient SES options in the final down-select, even then how much money is really attached to the high speed objective? I don’t see much. What? a couple of gas turbines and the required gearbox to manage a CODAG arrangement and the machinery controls to go with. As a percentage of the total vessel cost..a pittance really. Do you know how many megyachts use the same propulsion configuration?

I only throw this out there to poke a stick in the ‘speed is expensive’ bees nest, not to argue whether 40+ or 50+ knots has any specific tactical benefit. Or look at it another way..I’ll wager that the total cost of the turbine install in LCS-1 Freedom was less than the 37 million dollar ‘overhaul’ currently underway…
B.Smitty

sid quoted, ““If hit, do we really want this new ship to be more likely to be lost than the one it is to replace?” And, “Is there a need for it to be less vulnerable than the predecessor system?”"

Part of the problem here is, there really is no current USN vessel that meets Big D’s “peacetime ship” concept. IMHO, Coast Guard cutters come closest. They are built for peacetime operations, but are regularly used in wartime. These are the vessels that an OPV would supplant.

Given this, I don’t think an 85m OPV will be more likely to be lost than a 33m Island. They are less vulnerable, IMHO, than the ships they would replace.

If a new FFG(X) cost us $1 billion, for $1.3 billion, would you rather have,

a) one FFG(X) and one K130-equivalent corvette (at ~$300mil)?
b) one FFG(X) and five 85m OPVs?

Personally, I think b) provides far more peacetime capability, even in hot spots like the PG and SOH.

Does the corvette really add that much to warfighting situations to offset its disadvantage in peacetime?
Byron

If I told you once’t, I told you twice’t: When the shooting starts, you go to war with what you have, rather than the building program you wish you had funded. This is the US Navy; other than RHIB boats, do we really want to turn into a gunboat Navy?
B.Smitty

Bill,

The true cost of speed go beyond the powertrain. They extend down to the selection of hull form and hull materials and, most importantly, overall capability.

For the same amount of money, we could have a 33kt ship with greater seakeeping, better slow-speed ride (important for USV and boat launch/recovery), and most importantly, greater payload and endurance.
Bill

I was pretty warm to the whole idea back when I thought LCS (or Streetfighter, to be more precise..what we thought LCS was going to be and not what it has become) was going to be an ‘in addition to’ rather than ‘instead of’ ship building program when it came to our overall naval capability.
Bill

B. Smitty;

Of course I understand that and I oversimplified my hypothetical on purpose..I design such fast ships after all and have for many years. But when it comes to cost, a hull is still a hull (another oversimplification..but steel and aluminum cost x$ per ton regardless) and you will be hard pressed to show huge cost differences between a displacement hull and a hard-chined semi-V semi-planning hull when it comes to construction cost and outfitting of hull alone.

I guess what I’m saying is..what really would be the cost difference in LCS if the hull scantlings were increased, organic weaponry added and the turbines tossed out? That would not get it back to 220 mil a copy, of that I’m pretty sure.
B.Smitty

Bill,

I doubt it would too. A significant portion of the cost blowout was due to program mismanagement (e.g. deciding late in the game to adopt NVRs), and a lot was just hopeless optimism.

Certainly, though, high speed requirements complicated the design and caused greater overall risk to the program. (This manifested itself with delays in receiving key powertrain components and shortages of high-strength steel, IIRC)
Bill

B. Smitty;

I agree. However, I would also postulate that most of those same issues are endemic thoughout ALL naval shipbuilding these days.
B.Smitty

Bill,

Yes, it seems like we do a terrible job of managing risk. If a program isn’t “transformational” (read “risky”), it isn’t deemed worthy of funding.
Bill

Speaking strictly from my own perspective and experience with ANY naval ‘advnaced ship’ program going back many years..this is ‘deja vu all over again’. Historically, the single largest risk to advanced ship building (or call them ‘transformational’ if you wish..new term for an old game)has been the participation of NAVSEA and closely linked contractors. ‘Sunk by the weight of combined requirements’, ‘rice bowl’ project teams (everyone needs a piece of the pie and space/volume/weight allotments in every program) and the like have characterized past programs resembling the LCS for..a very long time.
sid

As a percentage of the total vessel cost..a pittance really.
As a summation of design compromises to enable that speed?

…of the operating costs of 50 hulls?
sid

I don’t see much. What? a couple of gas turbines and the required gearbox to manage a CODAG arrangement and the machinery controls to go with.

Sounds a bit more complex to me. this from a Nov ’07 CDR Salamander post:

(the) LCS 1 engineering plant … is a CODAG. It has 29 line shaft bearings with a forced lube system…and that is the least complex aspect of the plant.
Bill

Some dollars to be saved here and there?..sure. But some really significant percentage of curent costs?..I do not think so.

FWIW, the rather complex CODOG diesel/gas turbine plant in the prototype Skjold (very similar to what is now in the USN Sea fighter btw) was dumped for an all gas trubine COGAG solution in the series production. Maybe an apples to oranges comparison, but no money was saved…”only’ some weight. (Only is in quotes because weight is so very important on a fast vessel design…needless to say).
Bill

LOL..two posts in a row comparing fruit. Hmmm…is it lunchtime yet?
Bill

The comparison with a ‘bigger Skjold’ was done in depth during early phases of LCS design…I belabored that point in another thread I believe. IF (a contentious ‘if’ to be sure) speeds in the 40-50 knot range and beyond are desired/required, then a scaled-up ‘Skjold’ gets you that capability far more cheaply than an overpowered monohull or displacement catamaran/trimaran ever could. But so many other mission factors are in play, AND I have little confidence that the USN design community could successfully manage building a ‘big Skjold’..based on past failures to manage weight in such vessel types. More risk..risk, risk everywhere.
Big D

O.K., AMIGuy, I am totally not an expert on shipbuilding costs… but I have to ask a gut-level civvie question here. How does this all add up?

If I am understanding the gist of your analysis right, you added the cost of “real” sensors and weapons systems (a la LCS-I or LCS-MMC) to LCS, and you added the cost of making 50 knots and carrying modules (which, to a civvie, it looks like STANFLEX and the MEKO modules provide a basis for) to the Eurofrigates, and compared the two.

If my understanding is correct, then I would say that you have successfully compared apples to kumquats, because the key complaint we’ve had here is that LCS as designed sacrificed far, far too much to achieve that speed, and it makes perfect sense that a traditional monohull Eurofrigate would face even steeper cost and performance issues *if you tried to push it over 50kts*.

I also find it very interesting that you did not include Skjold or Visby. While they are both far too small for what you’re trying to cram into LCS, they happen to be the only warships afloat with similar speed and technology to LCS. Wouldn’t it have made more sense to do the math against larger versions of them rather than up-engined MEKOs?
Bill

Galrahn;

I don’t say this to belittle your (accurate) observations nor experience, but I measure the time I have spent on board vessels like the ‘Sea Fighter’, ‘Skold’, ‘Oksoy’ class SES minhunters, B&V MEKO SES Corsaire and many, many others, in months, not days, and the time I have spent helping design and build such vessels in terms of decades. Yes, weight is far and away the enemy of high performance and drives all decisions. You might be astonished to find to what degree the Norwegians (just one example) have gone to manage the weight of their advanced craft. But..manage it they did, and succcessfully.
http://informationdissemination.blogspot.com/ Galrahn

Bill,

The true ‘cost of speed’ goes well beyond money. I spent four days on Freedom, and you wouldn’t believe the sensitivity regarding weight, it drives every decision and is the restriction that prevents the platform from being more than it could be. This platform is born with a zero weight growth metric, meaning 25 years of capability that can only mature as long as replacements match weight of existing pieces.

When the ship came out overweight, people played this down in public as no big deal, but seeing firsthand how big a deal every bit of extra weight is, how it is calculated to meet the almighty speed metric that many see as a determination of success, the costs go well beyond money.

The ‘cost of speed’ is better measured by the emphasis for speed, and what is gained or lost in that measurement from the design of hull form all the way to what the ship can grow into. The ‘cost of speed’ may also carry a monetary value, but I don’t actually see the cost of the LCS as the real problem. I see the belief that the LCS is somehow a jack of all trades solution to littoral warfare, when it is appears well designed for only some areas of littoral warfare while also appearing very poorly designed for others, as the real problem.
Bill

I must apologize for my posts showing up out of the order in which they should be…I have no idea what the heck is up with that. ?
http://informationdissemination.blogspot.com/ Galrahn

“I’m convinced we can become a Navy with far more activie naval vessels than we have today. First, we need to win back the confidence of the Nation, OSD, and Congress by developing sound/realistic estimates for our future ships. Secondly, we should selectively apply some appetite supressants on capbilities in some of the ships.”

I agree with your first sentence, but disagree where to start.

Sound estimates may help credibility, but credibility begins with requirements with believability. Speed and stealth driving requirements for surface combatants? 3,000 ton corvettes to fight speedboats and 14,500 ton land attack, littoral destroyers?

Even a perfect FY2010 estimate for LCS cost doesn’t raise the credibility of the Navy, because you are not going to have a hard time finding a naval officer ready to advocate that any ship built to fight at close range was designed with proper requirements when the bridge is surrounded by glass.

And btw, the $37 million dollar overhaul is intended to remove even more hull and replace with more glass. You can’t make that up.
Bill

Galrahn;

Your impression was a good one..and certainly not surprising to me, although for LCS, the cat was long ago out of the bag with repect to her being overweight.

Generous service-life weight growth margins will never be a part of fast ship design…IIRC we typically used a 10% lifetime growth allowance in the RNoN pograms and through strict mangement, that has worked. But it ain’t much, thats for sure.
http://informationdissemination.blogspot.com/ Galrahn

Bill,

My intent was to suggest the impression regarding weight i got from that crew regarding that ship, not in general. It was a serious consideration in every discussion regarding any aspect of the ship itself. My point was more in regards to being such a short time aboard, I should not have been given that impression.
Bill

Another dim recollection..the weight growth that ocurred with the ‘Cyclone’ class PCs was, I believe, on the order of 70% (!!) calculated relative to the baseline design weight in the beginning. Ewww..and sadly typical, I’m afraid.
Big D

Bill: It’s happening on several threads. I’m not sure what’s causing it; I’d say it was a result of storing and sorting posts only down to the minute, but I’ve seen posts that were apparently backwards with timestamps well apart. It’s got to be a bad DB sort somewhere, though.
sid

I don’t think an 85m OPV will be more likely to be lost than a 33m Island. They are less vulnerable, IMHO, than the ships they would replace.

You may well be right, but at this point its an assumption…Point I try to continually keep in the light is that “Vulnerability Reduction” is not a throwaway aspect of warship design. Nor need it be “too expensive”, if it is fully inlcuded in throughout the design and acquisition process.

Indeed, in an era when attrition can longer be quickly replaced as could happen at Okinawa where Nimitz remarked he, “has more planes and ships than the enemy has bullets”, its is the most Affordable path….

Observing What Passes as Praise for the LCS

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