Comments on: Blogosphere, Meet Establishment. Establishment, Blogosphere. http://blog.usni.org/2009/01/28/blogosphere-meet-establishment-establishment-blogosphere/ The Naval Institute’s taken its independent forum to a new level - with you in the middle of it. Fri, 19 Mar 2010 18:59:52 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.9.2 hourly 1 By: UltimaRatioReg http://blog.usni.org/2009/01/28/blogosphere-meet-establishment-establishment-blogosphere/comment-page-1/#comment-1987 UltimaRatioReg Thu, 05 Feb 2009 02:36:00 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=931#comment-1987 Harry Flashman, you said a mouthful. Harry Flashman, you said a mouthful.

]]> By: Flashman http://blog.usni.org/2009/01/28/blogosphere-meet-establishment-establishment-blogosphere/comment-page-1/#comment-1984 Flashman Thu, 05 Feb 2009 02:25:29 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=931#comment-1984 VADM Harvey, It would probably suffice to say that I'm an intelligence officer. I've worked tactical to strategic issues and have been in the field in southeast Asia, southwest Asia, and central Asia. I deal in a part of the Navy that continually wrangles with the issue of candor, in that intelligence analysts and intelligence officers can easily be ignored and relegated to irrelevance if their assessments and positions do not appeal to a commander. Very rarely have I had a naval commander that desired candor, and all too frequently I've worked for a senior intelligence officer who valued "ensuring we don't annoy the operators" before he valued the candor. In a perfect world, such things wouldn't happen - but it does, and it does so routinely. Perhaps that lends a little more perspective to my worldview on senior officers and the Navy. Indeed, I've seen slightly more candor on strictly operational and manpower issues, which are normally slightly more empirical than delivering assessments regarding insurgent activity, or describing and legally defining specific yet occasionally contentious authorities regarding intelligence collection. In the course of my career, I've found that maintaining integrity and encouraging junior folks to be competent, candid, and professional in their assessments has been the #1 technical challenge in being an intelligence officer. Integrity is normally the first thing that is compromised as part of the analytical process - which can lead to catastrophic failure. Although the point is almost self-evident, the emphasis on conformity and appealing to 'the operator' begins in A school and the officer basic course. VADM Harvey,

It would probably suffice to say that I’m an intelligence officer. I’ve worked tactical to strategic issues and have been in the field in southeast Asia, southwest Asia, and central Asia. I deal in a part of the Navy that continually wrangles with the issue of candor, in that intelligence analysts and intelligence officers can easily be ignored and relegated to irrelevance if their assessments and positions do not appeal to a commander. Very rarely have I had a naval commander that desired candor, and all too frequently I’ve worked for a senior intelligence officer who valued “ensuring we don’t annoy the operators” before he valued the candor. In a perfect world, such things wouldn’t happen – but it does, and it does so routinely.

Perhaps that lends a little more perspective to my worldview on senior officers and the Navy. Indeed, I’ve seen slightly more candor on strictly operational and manpower issues, which are normally slightly more empirical than delivering assessments regarding insurgent activity, or describing and legally defining specific yet occasionally contentious authorities regarding intelligence collection.

In the course of my career, I’ve found that maintaining integrity and encouraging junior folks to be competent, candid, and professional in their assessments has been the #1 technical challenge in being an intelligence officer. Integrity is normally the first thing that is compromised as part of the analytical process – which can lead to catastrophic failure. Although the point is almost self-evident, the emphasis on conformity and appealing to ‘the operator’ begins in A school and the officer basic course.

]]> By: virgil xenophon http://blog.usni.org/2009/01/28/blogosphere-meet-establishment-establishment-blogosphere/comment-page-1/#comment-1787 virgil xenophon Mon, 02 Feb 2009 01:09:01 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=931#comment-1787 Addendum: I should add that yet another built-in structural problem which constantly needs to be "worked" (and of which Sr. officaldom is well aware) is that of the Command&Staff/War Colleges where often the permanent-party instructors are well aware in presenting their views that in the future they could be working for some of the attendees. I realize increased use of outside instructors has been utilized to ameliorate this situation somewhat, but it too is, imo, while separate,part and parcel of the problem as a whole as well. Addendum: I should add that yet another built-in structural problem which constantly needs to be “worked” (and of which Sr. officaldom is well aware) is that of the Command&Staff/War Colleges where often the permanent-party instructors are well aware in presenting their views that in the future they could be working for some of the attendees. I realize increased use of outside instructors has been utilized to ameliorate this situation somewhat, but it too is, imo, while separate,part and parcel of the problem as a whole as well.

]]> By: virgil xenophon http://blog.usni.org/2009/01/28/blogosphere-meet-establishment-establishment-blogosphere/comment-page-1/#comment-1786 virgil xenophon Mon, 02 Feb 2009 00:49:12 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=931#comment-1786 As ex-USAF and ret. PhD in Int Rel. specializing in bureaucratic decision-making, I have enough time on my hands to keep up with the state-of-play and toss in my 2-cents occasionally. My only comment to the Admiral would be that this initiative is laudatory indeed, and well past due not only for the Navy but the other branches as well. My concern for years has been (and confirmed by military sociologists who study such things such as Moskos at N'western, Van Doorn, et al,) that the old Soviet Union actually encouraged it's Jr. officers to publish in prestige professional journals to a greater extent than we did--to such an extent that in the SU then and the Russia of today failure to publish is actually a career ender/limiter whereas the reverse definitely once was, and still is all too often today. That the land of the 1st Amendment and freedom of speech would see an Armed Services whose encouragement of professional discourse among not only active duty personnel but ret. and well-wishers as well, trails the Soviets/Russians is not something to contemplate with pleasure. As ex-USAF and ret. PhD in Int Rel. specializing in bureaucratic decision-making, I have enough time on my hands to keep up with the state-of-play and toss in my 2-cents occasionally. My only comment to the Admiral would be that this initiative is laudatory indeed, and well past due not only for the Navy but the other branches as well.
My concern for years has been (and confirmed by military sociologists who study such things such as Moskos at N’western, Van Doorn, et al,) that the old Soviet Union
actually encouraged it’s Jr. officers to publish in prestige professional journals to a greater extent than we did–to such an extent that in the SU then and the Russia
of today failure to publish is actually a career ender/limiter whereas the reverse definitely once was, and still is all too often
today. That the land of the 1st Amendment and freedom of speech would see an Armed Services whose encouragement of professional discourse among not only active duty personnel but ret. and well-wishers as well, trails the Soviets/Russians is not something to contemplate with pleasure.

]]> By: CDRSalamander http://blog.usni.org/2009/01/28/blogosphere-meet-establishment-establishment-blogosphere/comment-page-1/#comment-1742 CDRSalamander Sat, 31 Jan 2009 12:53:21 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=931#comment-1742 Good ... good .... Good … good ….

]]> By: Chap http://blog.usni.org/2009/01/28/blogosphere-meet-establishment-establishment-blogosphere/comment-page-1/#comment-1712 Chap Fri, 30 Jan 2009 02:06:09 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=931#comment-1712 Sir, Thanks for taking the time to read and respond, especially when enduring a tough and thankless job like DNS. --<em>Army's done this and we should learn from their experience, good and bad. So has Coast Guard.</em> I've been on the web for a while, and the Army leadership had had to go through a process of evolving its understanding and response that Navy hasn't yet done. You and a few other flags are taking the lead, which is sorely needed. As I see it, USNI should have had a better web presence earlier and been up with a blog years ago--and they lost out to other web-based organizations because of it. <em>"Working within the lifelines": be careful what you ask for.</em> If Big Navy decides to tell enough guys to shut up and color, two things will happen: they'll lose in the public sphere when they squash a guy unless they're very careful, and they'll lose learning from good voices that are out there. One thing that will not happen is stopping the discussion--emails and Sailor Bob and backchannel notes to Navy Times and impertinent letters from retired flags getting into your "made decisions" will still go on; you'll just lose the ability to see or influence as much of it. <em>Navy's challenge is to get our writers writing.</em> It won't take too much to have that chilling effect mentioned above. We still culturally remember that the nail that sticks out gets hammered; that's why ADM Stavridis is pushing to get our field grades talking in public. We also know that in a generic bureaucracy, the normal response to an irritating piece in the media is to squash the writer, remove his standing, and attack him personally. Here's an example of how badly Navy guys are worried right now: I'm the only active duty Navy guy here who is blogging under his own name (and who isn't a four star). I'm taking a real career risk to do so, at least as I perceive it. <em>The costs of refusing engagement in this space are not zero.</em> I'm firmly of the opinion that the milblogs in 2004-2006 had a strategic effect that helped keep us from losing. In addition, one reason the SWJ guys are mature and good is that they had to engage to get the COIN manual and culture change implemented. Large companies hire twentysomethings, and they deal with this phenomenon too. Again, thanks for checking in and engaging on this thread, and I very much appreciate the time you took to do so. Sir,

Thanks for taking the time to read and respond, especially when enduring a tough and thankless job like DNS.

–Army’s done this and we should learn from their experience, good and bad. So has Coast Guard. I’ve been on the web for a while, and the Army leadership had had to go through a process of evolving its understanding and response that Navy hasn’t yet done. You and a few other flags are taking the lead, which is sorely needed. As I see it, USNI should have had a better web presence earlier and been up with a blog years ago–and they lost out to other web-based organizations because of it.

“Working within the lifelines”: be careful what you ask for. If Big Navy decides to tell enough guys to shut up and color, two things will happen: they’ll lose in the public sphere when they squash a guy unless they’re very careful, and they’ll lose learning from good voices that are out there. One thing that will not happen is stopping the discussion–emails and Sailor Bob and backchannel notes to Navy Times and impertinent letters from retired flags getting into your “made decisions” will still go on; you’ll just lose the ability to see or influence as much of it.

Navy’s challenge is to get our writers writing. It won’t take too much to have that chilling effect mentioned above. We still culturally remember that the nail that sticks out gets hammered; that’s why ADM Stavridis is pushing to get our field grades talking in public. We also know that in a generic bureaucracy, the normal response to an irritating piece in the media is to squash the writer, remove his standing, and attack him personally. Here’s an example of how badly Navy guys are worried right now: I’m the only active duty Navy guy here who is blogging under his own name (and who isn’t a four star). I’m taking a real career risk to do so, at least as I perceive it.

The costs of refusing engagement in this space are not zero. I’m firmly of the opinion that the milblogs in 2004-2006 had a strategic effect that helped keep us from losing. In addition, one reason the SWJ guys are mature and good is that they had to engage to get the COIN manual and culture change implemented. Large companies hire twentysomethings, and they deal with this phenomenon too.

Again, thanks for checking in and engaging on this thread, and I very much appreciate the time you took to do so.

]]> By: Mudville Gazette http://blog.usni.org/2009/01/28/blogosphere-meet-establishment-establishment-blogosphere/comment-page-1/#comment-1707 Mudville Gazette Thu, 29 Jan 2009 23:32:50 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=931#comment-1707 <strong>Milblogging Conference and Such...</strong> Would you like to see one of the world's largest privately-owned collections of military vehicles, including 70+ operational tanks? The National Museum of Americans in Wartime (NMAW) is inviting interested MilBlog Conference attendees to experience vi... Milblogging Conference and Such…

Would you like to see one of the world’s largest privately-owned collections of military vehicles, including 70+ operational tanks? The National Museum of Americans in Wartime (NMAW) is inviting interested MilBlog Conference attendees to experience vi…

]]> By: VADM J.C. Harvey, Jr DNS OPNAV http://blog.usni.org/2009/01/28/blogosphere-meet-establishment-establishment-blogosphere/comment-page-1/#comment-1694 VADM J.C. Harvey, Jr DNS OPNAV Thu, 29 Jan 2009 18:17:47 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=931#comment-1694 For Flashman - I continue to be fascinated by the comments I read analagous to yours above that the senior officers in the Navy do not value critical thinking and routinely reward and reinforce conformity. Now in any military organization, a certain amount of conformity, in action and thought, is required to maintain the good order and discipline necessary to ensure mission accomplishment under conditions of great stress. An example - an alongside refueling in high winds and rough seas is not the time for a Rig Captain to suddenly get a better idea on how to do business and decide to change the tried and true procedures that have enabled his team to successfully seat the probe under very difficult conditions in the past and for which they are very well-trained. Inducing chaos and uncertainty under these conditions is not helpful. But I certainly expect, indeed demand, that when the evolution starts going to hell in a handbasket, that same Rig Captain needs to take decisive action, on his own initiative, to ensure tha safety of his crew and the well-being of his ship. Critical thinking is what enables the Rig Captain to understand the difference in the two situations I have described. And so, critical thinking is one of the essential qualities we need in our leaders at every level in our Navy, afloat and ashore. Let's bring the situation to where I am on the OPNAV staff - part of a large bureaucracy charged with assisting CNO in the execution of his Title X "man, train and equip" responsibilties. We deal in large issues, with literally billions of dollars in play and the future structure of our Navy hanging in the balance. Expectations are high and, given what's at stake, rightfully so. Why then would someone in my position look for anything other than people who can think critically and have the courage to espouse their convictions even when those convictions may at times run counter to conventional wisdom? My ability to do my job is incredibly dependent on the people I work with and I want the very best I can get. And that includes those who disagree with me when their analysis of an issue leads them to a position different than the one I may hold. At that time I apply my judgement to frame my recommendation to CNO and VCNO. Perhaps I accept the alternative view, perhaps I don't - those are decisions I get paid to make and I will certainly make them. And be accountable for the results. But the fact that I may not take the recommendation should not lead to the conclusion that I did not value the critical thinking, and integrity, that led the individual to see the issue differently than I did and have the courage to make that clear to me. Now, do I describe a situation that only I see while others see an organization where "group-think" is valued and flabby thinking rewarded? Obviously, I have an opinion; others will have theirs. Also, I'm not totally naive - I do indeed value, and reward, loyalty. But I also believe the highest form of loyalty is to keep your boss from making a mistake. And I don't think I'm alone in that belief. I also expect that once we establish a Navy position on an issue that those in the Navy publicly support that position; if someone believes that the position is wrong, I would expect that individual to continue to work inside the lifelines to change it. That attitude is not designed to stifle critical thought, innovation or contrary views, but to recognize that in a military organization sustaining a strong chain-of-command is fundamental to both our overall effectiveness and maintaining the trust and confidence of those we lead. And a strong chain-of-command can, and does, handle vigorous internal debate. A properly focused internal debate certainly does not make for a great deal of public "hand-to-hand" in the blogosphere, something many bloggers really don't seem to be able to accept. As others have stated or implied, this medium has some evolving to do, as does the reaction of a military chain-of-command to it. We will evolve together. All the best, JCHjr For Flashman – I continue to be fascinated by the comments I read analagous to yours above that the senior officers in the Navy do not value critical thinking and routinely reward and reinforce conformity.
Now in any military organization, a certain amount of conformity, in action and thought, is required to maintain the good order and discipline necessary to ensure mission accomplishment under conditions of great stress.
An example – an alongside refueling in high winds and rough seas is not the time for a Rig Captain to suddenly get a better idea on how to do business and decide to change the tried and true procedures that have enabled his team to successfully seat the probe under very difficult conditions in the past and for which they are very well-trained. Inducing chaos and uncertainty under these conditions is not helpful.
But I certainly expect, indeed demand, that when the evolution starts going to hell in a handbasket, that same Rig Captain needs to take decisive action, on his own initiative, to ensure tha safety of his crew and the well-being of his ship.
Critical thinking is what enables the Rig Captain to understand the difference in the two situations I have described.
And so, critical thinking is one of the essential qualities we need in our leaders at every level in our Navy, afloat and ashore.
Let’s bring the situation to where I am on the OPNAV staff – part of a large bureaucracy charged with assisting CNO in the execution of his Title X “man, train and equip” responsibilties.
We deal in large issues, with literally billions of dollars in play and the future structure of our Navy hanging in the balance. Expectations are high and, given what’s at stake, rightfully so.
Why then would someone in my position look for anything other than people who can think critically and have the courage to espouse their convictions even when those convictions may at times run counter to conventional wisdom?
My ability to do my job is incredibly dependent on the people I work with and I want the very best I can get. And that includes those who disagree with me when their analysis of an issue leads them to a position different than the one I may hold.
At that time I apply my judgement to frame my recommendation to CNO and VCNO. Perhaps I accept the alternative view, perhaps I don’t – those are decisions I get paid to make and I will certainly make them. And be accountable for the results.
But the fact that I may not take the recommendation should not lead to the conclusion that I did not value the critical thinking, and integrity, that led the individual to see the issue differently than I did and have the courage to make that clear to me.
Now, do I describe a situation that only I see while others see an organization where “group-think” is valued and flabby thinking rewarded? Obviously, I have an opinion; others will have theirs.
Also, I’m not totally naive – I do indeed value, and reward, loyalty. But I also believe the highest form of loyalty is to keep your boss from making a mistake. And I don’t think I’m alone in that belief.
I also expect that once we establish a Navy position on an issue that those in the Navy publicly support that position; if someone believes that the position is wrong, I would expect that individual to continue to work inside the lifelines to change it. That attitude is not designed to stifle critical thought, innovation or contrary views, but to recognize that in a military organization sustaining a strong chain-of-command is fundamental to both our overall effectiveness and maintaining the trust and confidence of those we lead. And a strong chain-of-command can, and does, handle vigorous internal debate.
A properly focused internal debate certainly does not make for a great deal of public “hand-to-hand” in the blogosphere, something many bloggers really don’t seem to be able to accept.
As others have stated or implied, this medium has some evolving to do, as does the reaction of a military chain-of-command to it. We will evolve together.
All the best, JCHjr

]]> By: Byron http://blog.usni.org/2009/01/28/blogosphere-meet-establishment-establishment-blogosphere/comment-page-1/#comment-1681 Byron Thu, 29 Jan 2009 12:36:39 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=931#comment-1681 How about just the beer? ;) How about just the beer? ;)

]]> By: Chap http://blog.usni.org/2009/01/28/blogosphere-meet-establishment-establishment-blogosphere/comment-page-1/#comment-1678 Chap Thu, 29 Jan 2009 11:04:30 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=931#comment-1678 Funnily enough, I and other bloggers contributing here have been known to write for different publications, and to be also able to follow the tone and intended subject of that publication, closely enough to get occasionally paid for it. How <em>about</em> that. I don't get paid here, though! Not even a free subscription or a monogrammed beer mat... Funnily enough, I and other bloggers contributing here have been known to write for different publications, and to be also able to follow the tone and intended subject of that publication, closely enough to get occasionally paid for it. How about that.

I don’t get paid here, though! Not even a free subscription or a monogrammed beer mat…

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