Posted by Defense Springboard in Soft Power, UncategorizedTags: By Defense Springboard
You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.
The USS Port Royal (CG 73), the youngest cruiser in the fleet, went aground just outside Pearl Harbor Thursday night. This summarizes what is out there and available from open source and adding a few comments, just to get conversation started about this incident. Given Proceedings was sounding the alarm regarding surface warfare officer training as late as January’s outstanding issue, the matter is both timely and distressing.
But before we get started, let’s just take a moment to consider that an earlier Congress mandated that all future large surface combatants were to be nuclear powered. One can only imagine what would be happening now if the poor USS Port Royal was a nuclear-powered “CGN” instead of a conventional “CG”. Let’s just suggest Hawaii (and the Navy) would be worrying about more than an oil spill or the state of a coral reef! The prospect of a nuclear vessel grounding outside Pearl (or anywhere else) should enough to make any Navy person break into a cold sweat, so, as we move ahead, keep this incident in mind. Particularly when debating the CG(X) or the nuclear-powered DDGN-51 or while considering future Congressional demands for nuclear-powered amphibious vessels.
Here’s a summary:
Please keep in mind that these are from news reports, and that the facts are not yet established:
–Ship ran aground at about 8:30-9:00 PM Thursday. (actual time aground vs. the time the incident was reported may…change.)
–Vessel appears to be stuck in about 17-22 feet of water; minimum draft is 33 feet. Note the draft of an FFG, the captain’s prior command, is about 22 feet (See below). Also, note that the attending salvage vessel, the USS Salvor (T-ARS 52), has a draft of…16ft, 9 inches. Just imagine having to rescue the rescuers…
–Next attempt to free the ship will take place very soon. Tow lines broke during prior attempts to free the vessel. Hopefully we’ll be celebrating come morning.
Here’s some speculation: 
Please keep in mind you can take this or leave it.
–The USS Port Royal was undergoing the first day of what were to be several days of post-maintenance sea trials. Which took months to complete and were $18 million dollars over budget. Interestingly, this was a two-ship, one dry-dock project; the USS Crommelin (FFG 37) went into drydock alongside. If the grounding was due to some sort of engineering casualty, might the pressure to free up the USS Crommelin sped up the maintenance on the USS Port Royal?
–Ship was conducting some sort of personnel transfer to a smaller boat. Could doing this just off the harbor have distracted the commander? Is this normal practice for a new skipper?
“Officials said the guided missile cruiser left port yesterday for several days of sea trials after leaving drydock about a month ago for routine maintenance. Shore-based Navy officials were being transferred to Hickam harbor by small boat when the grounding occurred, the Navy said.”
–Ship was moving very slowly or dead in the water at the time of the grounding (from video). Why? Engineering casualty or a consequence of the small boat operations?
–Navy may wait for more help to arrive. Help from where? With only four salvage assets (two based East Coast, one in Japan and one in Hawaii) apparently even the luck of having a salvage asset nearby was not enough to guarantee a quick recovery. So…What else is available? What local commercial salvors could help? What are these “resources” you speak of, Captain?
“We’re certainly working on bringing to bear the resources we have to move her off the current position. We’re still putting that plan together,” Navy Capt. W. Scott Gureck, a spokesman for U.S. Pacific Fleet, said this morning. “Obviously, the high tide gives us an opportunity to do that.”
–The poor Captain (photo below) is new, and…his last time skippering a vessel (a Frigate with a draft of 22 feet, ahem..note grounding depth..) was from 2002-2004. Given the maintenance–which started in mid-October and only recently completed–was this one of the first times Captain John Carroll had operated his vessel underway? Was offloading just offshore–presumably under the eye of superiors–a wise task for a new skipper to undertake? What was he doing, at dusk, off a harbor entrance? Isn’t that kind of an odd time to put a new skipper in an unfamiliar platform into harm’s way? My prior comments about Surface Warfa
re Officer training still stand:
“The Port Royal has been under the command of Capt. John Carroll since October. Carroll commanded the frigate Rodney M. Davis out of Everett, Wash., in 2002, and deployed to the Arabian Gulf as part of the Nimitz strike group in support of operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.
He was the reactor officer on the aircraft carrier George Washington, and more recently graduated from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Officials said the crew was still aboard, along with other Navy officials, including Rear Adm. Dixon R. Smith, commander, Navy Region Hawaii and Naval Surface Group Middle Pacific.”
And here’s some extra information that makes for good copy:
Again, you can take it or leave it. Up to you!
–Even worse for Captain Carroll, Navy CNO Admiral Roughead was a past skipper of the USS Port Royal:
While he was in command, Port Royal was awarded a Meritorious Unit Commendation and received the Golden Anchor Award for excellence in retention and crew support programs.
–And yes, other vessels have run aground at Pearl Harbor. Even nuclear ones. Here’s Admiral James Holloway III, in his memoir Aircraft Carriers At War, recalling his 1966 experience docking the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) at the Ford Island ammunition pier (after having taken over the con from a drunk harbor pilot):
…One year later the Enterprise, under command of its next captain, ran aground attempting to moor at the ammunition pier. In his efforts to extricate the carrier, the ship’s engines were used at a high-power setting that sucked mud from the bottom into the ship’s condensers, fouling them to the extent the exhaust steam from the engine was not condensed into feed water. This loss of feed water to the boilers resulted in seven of the eight reactors scramming. A scram occurs when the reactor automatically shuts itself down because the reactor instrumentation perceives an emergency situation that could cause a nuclear accident…
So…even if this whole situation looks grim, let’s just be glad it wasn’t worse. Or isn’t worse…yet. Let’s hope this thing gets unstuck tonight!
Posted by Defense Springboard in Soft Power, UncategorizedTags: By Defense Springboard
You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.
134 Responses to “USS Port Royal (CG 73) Grounding Thread:”
Leave a Reply
Recent Posts
Subscribe
He was Vittorio Veneto-ed…
And the grounding of the Vittorio Veneto in 1997 was even worse, as the captain was supposed to be one of the top dogs of the Marina Militare, and the Adriatic is our own backyard…
February 7th, 2009 at 7:02 amThis is shallow analysis.
–Proceedings has had periodic calls “sounding the alarm” for surface officer training since about forever; one of those things that surface officers like to do is complain about how the new guys can’t shiphandle like they can, and you can find innumerable examples in the archives.
–Your “analysis” of nuclear powered ships is lousy. You might note that the nuclear-powered USS Guardfish ran aground on a Christmas Eve on nearly the exact same sandbar. It’s not as if this isn’t thought through by the engineers and designers and you imply a lack of safety that isn’t true.
–I finally gave up on the article after several connections of unconnected items.
How about we have someone with some time driving a ship writing about this? Is it too hard to focus on things on which we have some expertise when we write?
February 7th, 2009 at 7:45 amI was on a nuc carrier once that ran aground and was stuck until the tide changed…Talk about press, this happened after a 7 month deployment and 5000 civilians waiting at the pier!
Outcome: Believe it or not, that CAPT not only made Admiral he eventually got 4 stars!
On the other hand Shoes eat their own. Did you read that story about 2 Hornets “touching wings” the other day? There would be no 1310 LCDRs if’n aviation had that zero defect mentality.
b2
February 7th, 2009 at 8:53 amb2:
“I was on a nuc carrier once that ran aground and was stuck until the tide changed…Talk about press, this happened after a 7 month deployment and 5000 civilians waiting at the pier!
Outcome: Believe it or not, that CAPT not only made Admiral he eventually got 4 stars!”
Are you referring to Enterprise grounding off NAS Alameda? If so, I too was there that day, ashore watching from the hangars paralleling RWY 31 . CO had already been selected and Congressionally approved to promotion to one-star. He was indeed promoted and then immediately retired. IIRC (and someone correct me please if I’m in error here) the Board held him responsible for listening to bad advice from the SF Harbor Pilot that his bridge crew told him was in error.
VR,
February 7th, 2009 at 10:28 amAndy
I have crossed that sand bar at Pearl several times.
It is a tricky bit of navigation, but the narrow hazardous point is quickly passed.
I don’t understand why they would be offloading personnel to a small boat near the sand bar, that should be done in the channel. But since it appears the Port Royal was outbound, I guess the boat operation took longer than planned.
Yes, the Surface community demands zero defects when it comes to safe navigation. A grounding in a well marked harbor, especially, your homeport, in decent weather – should not happen, and the CO has known his entire career, that putting your ship aground is a career ending event.
February 7th, 2009 at 12:26 pmI’m a former JO from a CG out of Pearl. A few comments:
-PAX transfer by small boat in the vicinity of Reef Runway is routine. There’s a small marina between Reef Runway and the PH channel that is very convenient. Of course, with small boats, there’s no need for the ship to get very close to shoal water… maybe a mile or two. That area is also used for anchoring practice (although that appears not to be the case here).
-Small boat ops can be very distracting for the CO (especially now, since there was a fatality in CentCom just a few days ago that occurred when the boat flipped while being lowered). It’s reasonable to think that he and the OOD were out on the Bridgewing watching the boat while less experienced personnel (Conn, etc) kept an eye on navigation.
-Seems to me that there are three possible causes: Engineering casualty (one news report mentioned the ship is dark… seems suggestive) caused the ship to lose propulsion and drift into shoal water; Navigation error (maybe wrong GPS datum as in that grounding off of South America a while back); Human error caused by some mix of inexperience, inattention, or distraction.
February 7th, 2009 at 12:29 pmMore on why the Surface Community demands zero defects.
Unlike a Naval aviator, who is alone at the controls,
this CO has several other qualified SWO’s there to advise him, plus the enlisted watchstanders to warn him of danger.
CO – SWO qualified
XO – SWO qualified
OOD – SWO qualified
Dept Hds – SWO qualified
some JO’s – SWO qualified
A bridge and CIC nav teams to warn him.
Granted, the situation can go south in a hurry
Granted the CO had not been to sea for 4 years, previously on a FFG which draws less water, and has less freeboard (wind direction and speed have a much greater impact on a CG.)
But the CO is responsible.
February 7th, 2009 at 12:53 pmAttempt to get the ship off the bar failed.
Looks like it’ll be hung up a tad longer than the Guardfish was.
I suspect Chap was not around the Guardfish when they found a WWII-era bomb, nearby, in the mud. There weren’t some sweaty palms then, eh? Thankfully the bomb turned out to be inert, but, you know, the world exists to, in part, test safety margins.
That’s what groundings do…
And, keep in mind that there was precious little media coverage of that Guardfish incident. Today, these things happen on the global stage. And if anybody in the Navy believes that, with any future nuclear vessel grounding, the media won’t be latching onto the nuclear safety aspect…Heh…Since I’ve got no expertise on examining heads…I guess I’d best not comment.
February 7th, 2009 at 1:06 pmSpringboard,
You have my permission to keep blogging away as you see fit!
Jim
February 7th, 2009 at 1:07 pmShip going dark? CGs have three separate ships service turbine generators, which are completely independent of the four main engine turbines. “Going dark” would have no connection with propulsion.
February 7th, 2009 at 2:38 pmByron,
February 7th, 2009 at 2:47 pmIf memory serves, there are a lot of propulsion-related systems that rely on electricity: the rudder control units, lube oil service pumps, fuel oil service pumps, CRP, etc. I don’t think that a powerless ship is going very far or for very long.
That said, it’s not clear that they lost power, or that the power loss occurred prior to rather than after the grounding. The news reports just indicate some power loss, no A/Cs, no running water, etc. Could just be that various seawater intakes are filled with sand?
Chap–
First, outing a fellow blogger is a really uncool thing.
Second, it happened in 1967, and didn’t even make the New York Times (the paper of record at the time). Nowadays we’ve got CNN and these here internets, so the dynamic is very different.
February 7th, 2009 at 2:49 pmSo, first/few underway(s) since maintenance with a new skipper.
Conduct sea trials, maybe they are a bit late for perstrans. Takes place in dusk vice daylight. Nav plan is for a quick drop off of some riders to small boat. Near ‘PH’ to keep the small boat ride short. Some small delays in the transfer, due to inexperience, cause the ship to move farther towards land than planned. Perhaps there aren’t sufficient tripwires in the plan. New skipper, crew doesn’t know his style or temperament. We’ll just get them off, then turn around. Suddenly, it’s too late.
Every bit of the above is speculation, but plausible. But it is the kind of scenario that crews in maintenance plan to avoid. Just for the fact it could happen just that way.
February 7th, 2009 at 3:01 pmLessea, I stand corrected. My aged brain did not think that far. Reason for “dark” could be that sea water suction for cooling might have been fouled by sand/coral from the bar.
February 7th, 2009 at 3:06 pmThe USS Guardfish (SSN 612) grounded not far from this site on 24 Dec 1967, coming back from deployment. She and her crew spent Christmas Day on the rocks, although her captain was not fired, probably due to the spectacular Cold War deployment she had had. Can’t find my original source for this, but http://www.guardfish.org/stories/GUARDSTORIES.htm gives an account from the deckplate level.
February 7th, 2009 at 3:22 pmAndy,
You’re wrong. For a moment you had me scratching my head..o’course I was only an airwing aviator…
Admiral Robert J. “Barney” Kelly, USN (Ret.) – former Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
That’s a four star billet ‘JD.
You’re probably thinking of the next CO who hit Bishops Rock in SOCAL in ’85. He only got 2-stars. LOL.
b2
b2
February 7th, 2009 at 3:31 pmMarvin,
You’re generally correct, but what about that CO who got relieved crashing that “P-3″ in Bagram recently?
We cashier aviators every day after spending millions training ‘em..it’s called a Phe-Nab! How many watchstanding Shoes do they disqual every day?
Gotta ask though. Were all them eyes on the bridge looking at TVs for the truth not the plot or were they just watching the Skipper because, well, he’s “G” ain’t he?
Once a long time ago I worked on a numbered staff where one of our subordinate commands was a PHIBGRU. There was this Admiral P. in command who cashiered every one who touched the bottom, I can remeber at least 3 and I know there were more..regardless of the circumstances..Some of his firings were pretty unfair in my view, though he was consistent..but then again, what do I know about Shoe justice, I slept in the day they offered OOD underway training! Only on my Whaler did I ever get command-at-sea! LOL.
b2
February 7th, 2009 at 3:44 pmB2, that’s only because you’re a brownshoe slacker
February 7th, 2009 at 3:52 pmbyron:
those beasts do not use seawater for cooling engines or if they do it comes from the cooling water main. about the only sea suctions on them are fire mains, electronics and ac cooling water no condensor mains (the big 36-96″ versions on the steamers).
also about loss of power (elect not propulsion) what about the emergency diesels. those are supposed to light off and be at governor in what 6 seconds and with enough capy to handle all of the ESSENTIAL nav aids as well as main engines and rudders.
might have lost time with a sand crab going into the water instead of the boat and standing by getting him from the water into the boat ….. has been known to happen. thats why the extra pay code for ENTERING AND LEAVING SMALL BOATS AT SEA (actual time engaged) applys to this situation for the crabs.
C
February 7th, 2009 at 4:05 pmHadn’t realized you were still anonymous. My apologies and it’s been addressed.
The post is still a shallow analysis and assumes that somehow the nukes haven’t thought about this in the half century or so they’ve been doing this, or that any of the connections you make are pertinent without any supporting evidence.
February 7th, 2009 at 5:02 pmB2:
Hey, I was already feet dry LMAO when it happened! Yep, I’m remembering the April ’83 event. I didn’t know Barney’d done more than been a tombstone Commodore, but from the worm’s-eye JO POV, what happens to the elephants is of no big importance, at least at that time. I do seem to recall that the Board focused on the issue of the requirement to follow the harbor pilot’s directions and what the CO does and does not have the authority to over ride in that case. Hey, I’m Just Another Dumb @$$ Airdale, too. In the current case, I do not know if a harbor pilot was aboard and had the con at the time, if that makes a difference; which I kind of doubt.
VR,
February 7th, 2009 at 6:14 pmAndy
These ships only have three gas turbine generators and seawater plays a mojor part in cooling the engine. If those seawater strainers get clogged faster than you can clean them out you will go DIW.
February 7th, 2009 at 6:14 pmUm, I see what you mean, but PK, I’ve crawled around a lot of spaces on a CG, don’t think I’ve ever seen a diesel.
February 7th, 2009 at 6:17 pmIf I recall correctly there are 8 diesels on board, PORT and STBD RHIB, 4 P-100′s, and 2 EBAC’s. You are correct though none for power.
February 7th, 2009 at 6:31 pmshould be tucked in a space up near the chain locker and another back aft of after steering.
could be wrong and if i am sorry.
February 7th, 2009 at 7:09 pmc
The USNS Salvor is only the PH first responder. By now SUPSALV has placed an order against its West Coast Salvage contract for additinal salvage support or some specialist assets to help with this task which sounds like its getting tougher all the time?
http://www.supsalv.org/00c1_procurement.asp?destPage=00c1&pageId=1.3
February 7th, 2009 at 7:15 pmI was on FFG-45 (first 24 hours of permanent duty) in early 1988 when we ran aground in Gitmo bay. We ripped the sonar dome completely off.
Our Co, Skid Hayward (son of former CNO Adm Hayward) had only been onboard for a short period of time. Similar situation: going through RefTra with new CO. Essentially the officers and chief QM let him down, in my opinion. Regardless everyone paid in professional career blood: CO, XO, OOD (the Cheng), JOoD, CICO, QM.
The surface navy has ZERO tolerance. My prayers are with the officers and crew tonight. Trust me fellows – life goes on and life is good. Do not let it destroy you. No one was killed, and far more money will be wasted on “stimulus” than what this will costs any taxpayer.
Keep your head-up and may you have fair winds and following seas in your civilian lives.
February 7th, 2009 at 7:24 pmPK, don’t think so. I’ve been all over aft steering, and chain locker as well. As many times as we’ve worked on CGs, I’d have found a diesel by now
I just spent 10 minutes doing some googling, and still can’t find a reference to an emergency diesel generator about that class. I keep thinking about a spot in Main 1 on the port side though, very dark, very ugly memories there…
February 7th, 2009 at 7:37 pmYes, all the ‘qualified help’ does in some cases contribute to the problem rather than solve the problem.
If ship went dark, lost helm control/or propulsion —
February 7th, 2009 at 8:36 pmWhy didn’t they drop an anchor?
The hawaii newspaper has the position of the ship and I compared it with the overhead view on google earth. I looks like the ship came out of the pearl channel and was paralleling the shoal on a easterly course. The news report says the ship was doing small boat ops and that it was going very slowly when it grounded. Not having a chart in front of me I can see that the shoal/reef parallels the airport but starts jutting out to sea at about the gounding point.
From the picture the ship is beam into the reef, the absolute worst case. The port side of the ship is high out of the water except for the bow, so it is either dug in or it popped over a high point and settled into a deeper pocket. In either case, that is why the first attempt to get it off failed. Also, because it is clear from the picture that the whole ship is resting on the shoal… no cooling water because all the intakes are blocked. Luckly its not storm season.
My guess is that they were too close to the shoal when they started the small boat transfer and just got set down on it by tidal action. It was a low speed grounding so no structural damage but it is still going to be very hard to get off. They are going have to get as much weight as possible off and get more tugs for the next attempt.
February 7th, 2009 at 11:51 pmJust to pose a question here, as I am not a Shoe of either Brown or Black (civilian wingtip thank you). But was the pilot still on the CG at the time? Or was this the “small-boat-ex” taking place? Off-loading the pilot.
Also, you Blackshoe SWO’s out there can correct me at your leisure but as CO of this vessel (ANY Vessel) wouldn’t you damn well know your draft and minimum sounding required for safe navigation? Just saying, I think pointing to the previous history of commanding a ship with only a 22′ draft is a bit weak for justification in this case.
-JC
February 8th, 2009 at 1:25 amThis grounding of CG-73 should be a wake up call for the Navy Brass. Sailors don’t spend that much time aboard their ships. The 3 times a week physical training, living ashore and make believe drills consume so much of thier lives that seamanship has degraded the ships crew ability to perform the basics.
February 8th, 2009 at 2:20 amI am a shipyard worker who visits these vessels every day and in perspective of my 26 years of naval service (beginning in 1972 as a seaman and then Chief Quartermaster) I have concluded that the erosion of of good seamanship is the fault of the culture of consolidation.
My recommendation is to minimize the interaction between the enlisted and officer community as follows.
1. Mussle the MACPON
2. Let the Chief run the show.
3. Keep the Officers in the wardroom.
4. Put ordinance on target.
G.M Sutherlin
CG-73 is grounded at least 4,000 yards 090 degrees from the area that PAX transfers occur. I drove out to Hickam beach friday evening expecting Her to be near the channel. I caught sight of Her but had to drive to lagoon drive at the east end of the runway to see Her still east of my position.
February 8th, 2009 at 3:13 amPax transfers are not conducted in this area.
John,
-Usually no pilot for a small boat personnel transfer to shore (at least at Pearl). No need to enter the channel.
February 8th, 2009 at 3:46 am-Your second point makes sense, especially with the new XO to CO rotation. The CO has probably been on board for a while now, even if he only just took command.
To All,
February 8th, 2009 at 4:12 amSadly SWO’s eat their own, as the environment of zero defects can be so negative, one wonders why SWO’s stay for 20+ years, as I did.
I was on board the PORT ROYAL when ADM Roughead was CO and the ship ran well, but the emphasis was more on the weapons technology and testing than deck seamanship. Of course the ship didn’t go aground during his tour.
I believe that once the full story comes out, we will hear about a series of problems/failures that led to this grounding. Rarely is such a surface ship “event” due to a singular reason. I agree with Sam Dowell and will light a candle for the officers & crew of the PORT ROYAL.
A correction F.T.A. the Port Royal is not the newest cgm in the fleet. Her keel was laid I believe, in 1995. She is the last of the Ticonderoga class cruisers,witch were replaced by the Arley-Burke class. As an interesting side note, both the C.O. and rear admiral Smith (whom was on board at the time), both had just recieved their commands the same day in october, 2008. The admiral Smith was previously the C.O. of the San Diego naval base.
February 8th, 2009 at 5:22 amI wonder if The admiral was actually giving the orders at the time.
I would like to correct my correction. The USS Port Royals keel was laid in 1991, She was commissioned in 1994, and she was first deployed in 1996. I would like to apoligize for my faulty memory.
February 8th, 2009 at 6:00 amHonolulu Advertiser reports:
“The Port Royal ran aground directly north of a spot called “Anchorage Delta,” where civilian ships anchor, Enos said. The site is just ‘ewa of “Navy Anchorage” where American fighting ships anchor or train in “Navy designated waters,” Enos said.”
Like Gary said, starting to sound less like a PAX transfer and more like a missed anchoring attempt. It’s not clear to me why a ship would try a precision night anchoring on it’s first day out of a long avail… ORM, etc.
February 8th, 2009 at 7:26 amIn response to the concern about how different this would be if the ship were nuclear powered:
What specific concern do you have about the nuclear propulsion plant? Do you believe that a nuclear powered ship grounding will lead to a meltdown, or spewing radioactivity? My personal assessment is that the nuclear propulsion system would be no more affected by the grounding than any other propulsion/electrical system – possibly clogging of the seawater suctions which results in the need to shutdown the system, but no major nuclear problems.
Recall the grounding of USS SAN FRANCISCO in Jan 2005. This was certainly a tragedy, with one man killed and many others injured, both physically and mentally, and was not a proud moment in submarine force history. But despite essentially running the ship into a mountain at full speed, what was the adverse impact to the nuclear propulsion system – absolutely nothing!! It is a tribute to the ruggedness and resiliency with which these systems are designed and built. The ships are designed to go into combat, take near misses, and keep on fighting!
February 8th, 2009 at 9:37 amAll the wire service stories keep getting their “USS” and “USNS” confused when mentioning SALVOR. Military Sealift Command now operates the ARS-class salvage ships, so it’s USNS SALVOR. SALVOR’s response on Thursday night was pretty impressive: got the word late evening on Thursday, re-called crew before midnight, ready for underway at 0400HST, and on station ready to work before mid-morning.
February 8th, 2009 at 9:48 amScuttlebutt from the ship(remarks taken from a site commenting on the grounding):
February 8th, 2009 at 10:44 am“I was stationed on that ship and have several good friends on there. Word on the street when talking to my friend who is on there right now, is that the CO wouldn’t take recommendations from the navigation team and told them it was his ship, he knows what he’s doing. Apparently not so much. Navy ships have several resources to prevent what happened, including a gyro-compass, a fathometer, GPS inputs, along with charts. We’ll see what the investigation says. From the way things are looking, they damaged the sonar dome, the props and rudders are done, the main reduction gear is toast, and they sucked sand into the water intakes. This along with the fact that the keel is damaged to an unknown extent and from all of the rocking from the last couple of days the antenna mast are starting to get damaged. I guess we will find out when they go back to dry dock next week.”
That’s bad…real bad. Especially the red gear being damaged. You basically have to build the ship around those things, there’s no easy way to get them out. And you’re talking two sets of red gear. Might have to salvage them from the de-comm’d Tico’s. Sonar dome expensive too, bottom shell and centerline CVK bulkheads sound like they will need attention as well. This ain’t gonna be a paint job, it’s going to cost a lot of millions in damage.
February 8th, 2009 at 10:56 amAh, well, maybe we shouldn’t have been so quick to reef Valley Forge (CG-50)…
Subcenter–My concerns are less safety than PR. First, a nuclear ship (of the CG(X)/nuke-powered LPD-17/DDGN-51 ilk would be far higher profile than this. Second, there’d be plenty of opportunities for the fearmongers to get out of hand. Third, imagine if this sort of thing happened in Japan or someplace out of the US. (I’m cringing just to think of it..)
Fourth, what if the ship, ah, got holed and actually sunk? This is not some far-off, sub-on-a-seamount someplace thing. These surface ship mishaps happen within easy CNN reach..and god, the environmental monitoring alone would be a bear.
And then a quiet fifth, I’d imagine any commander in a grounding situation would, ah, try his damnedest to get off, irregardless of what his engineers said. So you’ve gotta take the potential for some pushing at the safety margins in a rather stressful situation. A recipe for not good.
What I want to insure is some proper prep-work! Before we go to a nuclear (which we are going to do) surface fleet, get commands likely to see nuke surface combattants–at a minimum–start doing some pre-emptive “public” familiarization work. For example, show a little leg and talk a bit about the, ah, close-to-shore work done by SSNs. Reveal some of the more harmless mishaps (and start getting rid of the people who use the “there’s been a X-year record of no mishaps evah” excuse to fob of realistic risk assessment).
Get nearby community leaders/media likely to be impacted by a grounding familar with nuclear power concept. On the longer term, table-top some scenarios out with the locals. Then consider boosting organic quick-response salvage assets–and make sure that nearby commercial salvage assets likely to be tapped in a worst-case emergency are both prepared and certified to lend a hand.
Operating nuclear surface combattants (outside of the CVNs) will be a sea change for us. We’ve not thought about them for some time, and we’ve either lost (or are about to loose) the folks who worked on the smaller surface nukes. Couple that with the change in the strategic dynamic (hey! We’re all going littoral!) and I see us using nuclear powered vessels in ways that are waay different from the fast carrier escorts of old. And with a population of nuke folk who are used to deep water CVN or sub operations set to lead the shift, we’re going to have some operational teething pains anyway. Better safe than sorry.
Some of you nuke types get your shorts in a bunch waaaay to easy.
February 8th, 2009 at 1:59 pmbyron:
on the reduction gearing- pray for the bull gears.
if they aren’t tweaked then they can drag every thing else down passageways getting it in or out but if the maingears are tweeked or have broken/mangled teeth they’re screwed.
C
February 8th, 2009 at 2:01 pmDespite being a Master (CO) in the Merchant Marine (and not an SWO) I am a veteran of both submarine operation and design, as well as a former instructor at Naval Nuclear Power School. I find the original post’s comments about the perils of nuclear power to be shallow, shortsighted, unrelated and completely baseless. Frankly, I find them to be offensive – particularly on a USNI website.
While my nuclear powered days operation ended on USS GATO (SSN 615), and while my nuclear propulsion plant design days ended in the preliminary design of the S9G plant for the VIRGINIA Class, there is nothing about this grounding – or any other mishap in the era of nuclear powered ships – that would make me believe Reps Roscoe Bartlett and Gene Taylor are on the wrong track with their push for nuclear power surface ships. They have got it absolutely right. And as far as safety goes – a similarly grounded CGN with all sea suctions out of the water would have absolutely no reactor safety issues. You’d have to be more than a bit naive to think that we didn’t engineer that into the ship’s safety design . . .
From a Master’s perspective – you have to have a heart for the guy. His past command record looks impressive. But the bottom line is that he hazarded his ship and has taken it out of service for many more months – at a yet to be determined cost. In case you haven’t been looking, there are not a great number of spare ships out there. . .
Command at sea is relentless. Exhilarating, but relentless. If the scuttlebut above is correct, he seems to have been a bit full of himself in trying to impress the Admiral on his first underway period. Eerily reminiscent of the USS GONZALEZ (DDG 66) grounding off St Maartin on November 12, 1996. In that case, the ship’s commissioning CO grounded on a reef about 10 minutes after getting underway from a liberty stop (returning from the ship’s commissioning city to homeport). That CO was good on the party circuit – not so good with the Rule of the Road. Repairs cost almost $100M, including the replacement of both Reduction Gear sets. Like that first GONZALEZ CO, and sadly many others, PORT ROYAL’s CO has now joined that sad club of mariners who will forever wish they could have those few minuts back. . .
My point – focus on the right message: the sea is unforgiving, so don’t be reckless with her. At the same time, keep the unrelated drivel (like blindly attacking nuclear propulsion when there is absolutely no basis for the attack in the event at hand) separate from the main point. Finally, never seek to change the zero tolerance standards, for the sea – and the case of a warship, the enemy – both will have no tolerance for failure.
February 8th, 2009 at 2:11 pmAP is reporting that the attempt to dislodge the ship after offloading ~220 tons of water, fuel, etc. was unsuccessful.
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jbdZTVOfhpMNklJUwcq6GePEDEXgD967I1280
Lowering peak high tides over the next few days will exacerbate the issue.
February 8th, 2009 at 2:26 pmI enjoyed the comment about RADM Smith onboard. If he was smart he’d have gone to the far side of the bridge, kept his mouth shut and observed.
My guess is there was a delay for some matter of import as some have already suggested, some one forgot his brief case; ops needed to get something ashore at the last minute; a boat crewman, SA Tanglefoot, had a dirty hat or didn’t have his name tag on and the XO made him go get a fresh one. And, of course, there’s the possibility of the GIF (Good Idea Fairy) getting in on the boating act, too.
It’s amazing how priorities swing back and forth from year to year in the Pineapple Fleet.
February 8th, 2009 at 2:36 pmCan anyone find a single comment in the original post where I actually talk about the “perils of nuclear power”? I think the only portion that even mentioned a peep about safety was the Admiral Holloway quote. So…If anybody offended would just be so kind as to direct me towards my offending passages…I’d be grateful
I’m saying that the public response to a nuclear grouding would be a very different PR animal than a conventional grounding. And to think otherwise is foolish.
February 8th, 2009 at 2:36 pmI’m surprised by the audacity of the author of this blog. And I’m surprised that it finds itself here, on the USNI website. It is simply irresponsible of any individual to make assumptions and innuendo about whether or not a Captain was acting recklessly based on only partial and incomplete facts. Since many of the assumptions about what the ship was doing and why was simply incorrect (offloading personnel just off the harbor IS normal and routine), it is clear that the author does not have enough experience or awareness of these operations to make any kind of judgments on the skipper. Command a ship yourself, gain the experience of a seasoned skipper, then you can pass judgment! Beyond that point, any innuendo made by the author can simply be ignored!
February 8th, 2009 at 2:55 pmSpringboard – you are missing everyone’s point. Why bring up nuclear power at all? This ship is gas turbine powered.
Was it because the offending CO was Deputy Force Nuclear Propulsion Officer and Officer-in-Charge of the Pacific Surface Nuclear Propulsion Mobile Training Team or Reactor Officer on the USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN 73)? I hope not – these things are about as relevant as a supposed PR problem for a grounded nuclear powered cruiser.
The PORT ROYAL problem – at least until proven otherwise – is one of poor seamanship.
The USS ENTERPRISE Alameda grounding was pretty public and in view of the pier in San Francisco harbor (think COSCO BUSAN grounding). The USS SAN FRANCISCO accident was covered worldwide. On the other hand,the (perhaps many) submarine groudings and collisions during the Cold War were pretty well undisclosed. Nonetheless, in none of these cases did the existence of the ship’s reactor play into the problems.
And, once again, it is both naive and gratuitous to “suggest” that a nuclear ship CO would somehow make matters worse by endangering his reactor(s) to provide some extreme power to pull him off. There are a dozen people on watch, each with both the responsibility and the power to say NO to such foolishness – even if the active and passive safety design features somehow did not exist to prevent such actions if someone actually tried to do it. Such a comment reveals a complete lack of education on how a nuclear propulsion plant actually works and is operated. Such ill-informed comments as this only weaken any legitimate comment or objection that you might have. The fact is that in more than 50 years of operations nothing has ever happened – including collisions/groundings/etc – that would justify your attitude. Moreover, when the few very public events have happened there has never been a PR problem because there has never been a reason for the public to be alarmed. Are you trying to rewrite history and alarm everyone about the supposed dangers of a well-designed, well-built, well-maintained and well-operated nuclear propulsion system ???
Stay on point. This guy, driving his 4 gas turbines, hazarded his ship and most likely his (seagoing) career is over. What are the real lessons learned here? Will real lessons learned be developed and published as was the case with the GONZALEZ grounding (google “GONZALEZ grounding” to read about it). That would be the best outcome for a bad event. And keep the baseless attacks on nuclear propulsion to yourself – or to another forum dedicated to that subject!
February 8th, 2009 at 3:10 pmI hate small boat transfers while underway from a combatant. There just is no really safe way to do them except in the most calm of seas. Too far out for the small boat is too far in for the big ship. Here’s yet another reason.
As Sunday morning’s attempt failed, and as each day goes by she gets pushed further towards shore by the prevailing seas it looks like its going to be some time. Pearl no longer has the assets it once did
February 8th, 2009 at 3:14 pmMerchant Master/Subvet:
I understand what you’re saying (being a currently serving Navy nuke w/ 25+ years of experience); however, I think it might be appropriate for all participants to cease with the argumentum ad hominem (i.e., all parties stay “on point”).
As for whether the CO’s background as a SWO(N) was relevant, I’d invite all interested to refer to an article in the latest Harvard Business Review (“Why Good Leaders Make Bad Decisions”) and draw your own conclusions.
http://hbr.harvardbusiness.org/2009/02/why-good-leaders-make-bad-decisions/ar/1
Among other things, it discusses how experiences influence current decision making. So, the CO’s decisions–both correct and incorrect–were influenced by a career’s worth of training, decisions made by himself and others, etc.
Formal (JAGMAN) and informal (second-guessing, Monday AM QB-ing) will occur and we’ll likely never identify the underlying causes or have the resources to fully correct. I submit that the all the lessons from the GONZALEZ grounder were not captured (as well as those being captured not being corrected).
Bottom line: Regardless of whether one agrees with the CO’s being fully accountable (and I believe with absolute authority goes absolute responsibility), a nation at war has lost some valuable resources. Some temporarily (e.g., the ship) and some permanently (e.g., those whose careers come to an early end).
Regards,
Jim
February 8th, 2009 at 3:59 pmWhy not bring up the prospect of a possible incident with a future surface combattant? What on earth is wrong with bringing up a matter that may impact the future Navy? One can learn all kinds of lessons from an incident like this. It’s kinda the point of discussing the matter.
I would suggest reading accounts of the last time a nuclear submarine got hung up outside Pearl. Seems the CO back then drove his reactor pretty hard–to the point where there was some worries about the plant–that’s not coming from me, but from the crew aboard at the time. And recall the nearby discovered WWII “ordinance”, too. That(the really off-the-wall unexpected) is something not exactly engineered into the tolerances of even the best of plants…or the best disaster response team, either.
“The fact is that in more than 50 years of operations nothing has ever happened – including collisions/groundings/etc – that would justify your attitude,” is baloney. The tiny (insignificant) leak from the USS Houston (discovered in 2008) was a tremendous diplomatic headache–and we’re still dealing with the diplomatic–even operational–ramifications of that “less radiation release than from your average bag of fertilizer” sort of incident. A grounding (particlarly a long-term one like this) would be a very different deal (And…I won’t mention that we lost two nuclear subs less than 50 years ago…I’ll just follow you and forget that stuff.)
Supporting nuclear power is fine, but to do so while forgetting that nuclear power comes with some built-in public “fear factor” is not wise. Considering and discussing likely contingencies, is, in my mind, never the wrong thing to do.
February 8th, 2009 at 4:01 pmWe replaced the gears in four of the DDG’s in early 2000. We did an access cut and replaced the gears. Reason was when the gears were hobbed the bottom of the tooth had a step which was a stress raiser.
February 8th, 2009 at 4:09 pmSo gear tweak no problem just throw some money at it. These were done in a 12 week psa.
SB, you gotta admit the leap was a big one. I’ve read your comment a few times, and I’m having the same sort of confusion. Wrong thread, maybe the one posted today?
February 8th, 2009 at 4:11 pmByron–I dunno, man…I was just responding to Subcenter’s comment from 0930.
But following JIM’s suggestion to cease-fire (sorry, I was writing before your post popped up)…
February 8th, 2009 at 4:22 pmSo what happens if they can’t get it off?
February 8th, 2009 at 4:39 pmI’m just a dumb old NFO, but I really have trouble understanding how this can happen. In the age of GPS, reliable fathometers, and (I assume) reliable charts, how does someone run a ship aground in good weather and calm seas while moving not even as fast as most people can jog? Also, we’re not talking about scraping a shoal and moving on, this ship is almost a permenant fixture on this reef, sandbar, or whatever.
I don’t buy that because this CO’s last ship drew 22 feet, that he’d “forget” that his cruiser would sit a bit lower in the water.
I also don’t buy that an O-6 CO could be so full of himself that he’d ignore a warning from the Nav team. If I’m wrong, he should have more happen to him than relief from command.
In the airplane I flew, we often flew low, VERY low. There was someone (typically me) responsible for saying something if the plane got TOO low. That was something we talked about ahead of time. There was also a radar altimeter that could be set for a particular altitude, and a warning tone would go off if we went below it. Warnings were always acknowledged and heeded. That’s why I’m able to write this.
On a surface ship during this type of evolution, WHO is in charge of keeping the ship from touching the bottom? Yes, I know the CO is accountable and responsible, but who’s the guy (or gal) looking at the GPS, teh chart, and the depth-o-meter? Is it the Navigator? The OOD? Who?
Further, are there any bells, whistles, or recorded voices that say “danger, Will Robinson, danger” if the depth under the keel gets into single digits?
February 8th, 2009 at 5:08 pmPaul, they’ll get it off, have to, hazard to navigation and all that. The question is how ugly will it be, and how much will the repairs cost.
February 8th, 2009 at 5:12 pmWhy is it uncool to out an anonymous blogger? I think it’s great!
February 8th, 2009 at 5:36 pmRetSwo, because some of these bloggers are active duty, or have jobs that require a degree of anonimity. Besides, in the internet communications world, it’s been bad manners for for a long time. I knew Lex’s name for a while, never once breathed a word. Don’t know CDR Salamanders name, wouldn’t think of asking. If they want you to know, they’ll tell you.
February 8th, 2009 at 5:54 pmRumor Control Time!
JL quoted a third party: I was stationed on that ship and have several good friends on there. Word on the street when talking to my friend who is on there right now, is that the CO wouldn’t take recommendations from the navigation team and told them it was his ship, he knows what he’s doing.
Steer away from this kind of commenting, PLEASE. The “rumor mill” in the Navy when it comes to this kind of stuff has a gift for spinning tall tales. Having done seven sea tours on ships, I can tell you from experience that this could be ground truth, or it could be the equivalent of saying, “My imaginary friend told me…”.
Talk about the salvage process, talk about how ships are run, talk about the effects of the grounding and media coverage on the Navy’s image, but please refrain from spreading rumors. If you don’t have first-hand knowledge or experience to ground your assertions, save it for the smoke pit!
February 8th, 2009 at 5:56 pmTo the point of repair – while replacing a reduction gearset in these ships can be/has been done, there is an issue with procuring new gearsets. GE Lynn, MA is where all of these gearsets were manufactured – and because of low demand they are pretty much shut down. It has been one of the issues with restarting the DDG line – the cost to either restart GE Lynn or move production to Northrop Grumman Sunnyvale, CA. Given the slow speed grounding, however, it is likely that the gearsets will be fine. The GONZALEZ grounding, which wiped out both gearsets, was at much higher speed.
To the point of how this could happen – we’ll know when the investigations are complete. Like I noted above, take a look at the Gonzalez grounding in 1996 (Google “Gonzalez grounding” to see) and you’ll understand how these things can happen.
One thing that probably could use some extended discussion and mature thought is how to avoid this happening again. When I served on a new construction submarine crew, as well as during an overhaul, we sent several key folks out to sea on other similar ships as we approached our initial trials. With a 4 year lapse since his last sea duty, why wouldn’t the CO (as well as key others who hadn’t been to sea on the ship) to spend a day on local operations on another CG? It is practical in the Navy where similar ships routinely operate. Unfortunately, I believe that it would – in the current culture – be frowned upon if anyone suggested that. Why is that?
I know that for myself that when I have been ashore for a while I take some time for some extra personal preparation even before taking the same vessel out. In my case, it is not practical (as it would be in the Navy) to get underway on another ship for proficiency purposes. But let’s face it, even the Captain has to keep his/her personal proficiency up. I argue that it is even more important for those of us in command at sea – given our individual position. What do all of the experienced SWOs think of this idea???
February 8th, 2009 at 6:17 pmmm/sv
a step in the tooth form on the bull gear???? just where in the he$$ were the inspectors???? USN used to be pretty anal about that stuff because it was so expensive to repair it.
this is super strange as the hob that generates the tooth form also cuts all of the elements of the form when it makes the last pass. if they were shaving or grinding the teeth as a finishing operation then somebody really #$%@#d up and it was inside of the gear cutting building.
this is one of those deals where the setup people demonstrate to the inspector the dial indicator readings of the blank in the machine before and after cutting the teeth as well as the hob indications before and after the last cut. then the bluing of the pinion to the bull gear is witnessed and the whole thing recorded in paperwork with a copy in the chengs safe, navsea archievs, manufacturers qa files……
if there is a gear hob still in existance big enough to do the work then they can take the gears with the step in the tooth form and rehob them. probably have to make a new hob but thats the way to do it. if it makes the chordal thickness to thin then they will cut the outer ring off of the gear and replace it and recut the teeth. however in both cases they will have to rehob the pinion gear in the same machine…..
this is a common repair in the gear sets used in sstg’s. main reduction gears generally don’t get this done because they are so hard to get out of the hull.
they used to do that kind of stuff on the hob right next to the machine i ran when i was at the tools. its one of those things that if you close the plant and the people go away you have a terrible time getting it going again as its the people that are important in that world.
C
February 8th, 2009 at 7:29 pmnow that my rant is complete on that subject (gears)at least:
i have heard no coments, speculations, sea stories on just how the current two lcs ships would fair in these circumstances. after all its fairly shallow water near a coastline near a harbor entrance.
i mean the response to grounding with the equipment currently on those boats not the fact that they have a much shallower draft to start with.
or is this the elephant hovering in the background that might be embarrasing to see.
C
February 8th, 2009 at 7:47 pmRoger ceasefire on nuclear power issue.
February 8th, 2009 at 8:00 pmAs noted throughout the thread, we all know there are some cultural characteristics within the SWO community that should be addressed in the Navy. Nobody knows the cause of this incident yet, but it is a great opportunity to think about some things we might want to address in our SWO community. Among the most dangerous are an apparent affinity by some for pain (for pain’s sake) and a hierarchical nature that dismisses the notion that junior personnel have something valuable to offer (these don’t only afflict the SWO community). Though the vast majority of SWO officers are good ones, it only takes a small percentage to perpetuate these stereotypical behaviors.
SWOs might benefit from procedures used by other professions (military and civilian) including the requirement to be well rested before evolutions needing critical thinking and judgment. All of us who have served at sea on Navy ships have heard SWOs brag about how little sleep they’ve had. Fact is, despite their machismo, humans don’t perform well under pressure when they are tired. Crew rest requirements like those used by aircrew might help ensure the watch is performing at 100%.
Crew resource management (CRM) is another tool that bridge teams might benefit from (assertiveness by someone who saw things going awry might have prevented this grounding). The most fundamental aspects of CRM basically state that the senior guy should be open to listening and the junior guy should be open to saying something. As the senior guy in my air wing, I tell every young guy I fly with that I can kill him in a heartbeat and that if he sees something wrong or has a question, he’d better speak up and tell me. You bet there are times when I might have to tell the other pilot to trust me but, more often than not, the dialogue we have in the cockpit improves our chances of accomplishing the flight without hurting anyone or wrecking any airplanes. (Of note, hospitals have approached Naval Aviation for information and advice on crew resource management.)
Finally, focusing on the task at hand is also something we can do better Navy-wide. Throughout my career, I’ve been amazed (and disappointed) at how much of our time and effort is spent on things other than what we are actually supposed to be doing. PowerPoint is perhaps the worst manifestation of this perpetual desire to be coming up with something “new and great” instead of concentrating on conducting the tasks at hand to a successful outcome. It really is good enough to just accomplish the mission. Doing so can, and most often should in the case of military operations, account for near 100% of our effort. This is particularly important for our junior officers who are supposed to be building the tactical expertise necessary for their warfare specialty.
February 8th, 2009 at 8:02 pmWow, the Greenville hit the Ehime Maru on Feb 9, 2001, that’s is 20 days after the brand new President Bush in office. They say the Greenville was trying to perform back flips for the VIP’s in order to push funding for the subs and the Navy in general. We are exactly 20 days into the Obama administration…almost 8 years to the day?
February 8th, 2009 at 8:39 pmi have heard no coments, speculations, sea stories on just how the current two lcs ships would fair in these circumstances.
Oh…I’ve waxed eloquent a few times previously pk…
Regardless of the specific causes of this latest grounding, two surface ship groundings at the approaches to their home port strongly point to some systemic issues going on…
I really have to wonder how well the LCS would fare in a stressed combat environment, at 40 knots, at night in the Bight of Biafra…
February 8th, 2009 at 8:54 pmi thought that i would see them in this particular thread.
c
February 8th, 2009 at 9:07 pm@Retired SWO: My misunderstanding of his status was a breach of etiquette. It’s not cool to out an anonymous blogger when both of you are on the same blog and the other has requested it. I have been, if not anonymous, coy about my identity on my own blog but because USNI is important I use my own name and defend my own posts and comments in that way. The magazine isn’t full of anonymous folks, so I think I should not be anonymous. That said, that’s my free choice.
I dislike the way that “Defense Springboard” has acted in the past to slag active duty officers serving, and have a low opinion of his analysis when the analysis touches subjects I know a little about. I think he likes to take random items about things of which he knows little and connect them for sensational speculation. I’ve never piloted an airplane so my ability to critique is limited; DS apparently works under no similar restrictions in criticizing sailors. But I won’t out him here on purpose; that would be socially wrong and I put his first name by accident up here on a comment that was quickly deleted.
Now on my blog, that’s a different issue. The etiquette point is that I’m here in this group; so I did something wrong without intent.
@Steamshovel: You’re getting close to an issue that should be more prominent in any grounding analysis and often isn’t: how often do these things happen? Do they come in bursts? How many per year? Decade? Is there a trendline? I think you’ll find the informed answers to that will change the discussion somewhat. The uninformed answer is sort of like the periodic Navy Times articles whenever a cluster of COs get fired. Maybe it’s still random, but it sells newspapers to make connections from randomness.
@Subcenter: Alibi fire follows.
“Drove his reactor pretty hard”? What, to 1.21 Gigawatts? Eleven megaphotons? What does that mean? Perhaps maybe there exists a finely trained sense of what the engine can do and can’t, and a means of considering the risk assessment under stress? Is it possible we’ve beat that pretty heavily into the nukes and perhaps engineered some, you know, safeguards into the system?
But perhaps a return to another point would be useful. From the post:
This is alarmist nonsense. The clear implication from these words is that the post author thinks a grounding of a nuclear powered vessel would cause something bad “more than an oil spill”. This is a perception that isn’t just wrong but also, with the USNI imprimatur, will give uninformed ammunition in the public affairs sphere against naval nuclear power. That’s irresponsible. We have enough work in the Navy keeping people from being irrationally worried about photons and some such without this kind of assertion.
This is fearmongering without information to back it up. We’ve had nuclear powered vessels run aground, as mentioned above. Note that nowhere here, in either excerpt, does the author discuss or frame this as a public affairs challenge such as what the Navy has when things go wrong with a reactor or not. Instead, the author’s saying it should be “enough to make any Navy person break into a cold sweat”.
Oh, by the way, is it possible we train for that public affairs challenge? Ever talk to any of the people who do that to get a sense of how hard that is?
February 8th, 2009 at 9:58 pmHey Guys,
Keehi Lagoon….just outside of which PR went aground….is not PH (Papa Hotel) entrance…it is a small boat drop off/pick up. And as a former “shoe” that did quite a bit of 1310 stuff….let me say 1310 stuff is not 1110 stuff and vice versa.
For you 1310′s speculating….who’s at fault when your aircraft goes in the nets trying to park after a 3 wire on a rolling deck oil covered at the end of cruise when the deck is as slick as cat stuff……does it end a 1310 career? Nope….it does in the 1110 community.
February 8th, 2009 at 10:02 pmDave Price-
Your comments (posted 2/8/09, 8:02 pm) are outstanding – the last paragraph in particular. It applies not only to the issues you addressed, but also towards allowing “perfect to become the enemy of good enough” (when perfection isn’t necessary), as well as having to deal with the increased admin burdens associated with centralization, “force shaping” (or whatever the continuous improvement phrase de jour), etc.
Regards,
Jim
February 8th, 2009 at 10:06 pmGosh, reading some of these comments I’m sure glad I’m retired. Believe it or not, ships run aground daily. Thankfully haze-gray ships don’t do it very often, but from my experience groundings occur for the same reason that airplanes crash. Sometimes it is mechanical (loss of thrust) but more often than not it is a combination of unjustified overconfidence and lack of situational awareness. Having sat at long green table without the ashtrays myself, I think we need to let the board do its job before we keelhaul the skipper or crew.
Anyway, the more they pull, the larger the wall of sand they create between the vessel and the channel. My guess would be that her draft was more like 29′-30′ because she is heading out for sea trials, not war patrol, and would not have a full ordnance load aboard. Even if they can take off enough consumables to get her to 22′, you will have to wash her off the bar, pulling isn’t going to work now. A couple of shallow draft amphib’s placed on the side opposite the channel, with anchors set astern, and at reasonable power would probably provide enough water under the Port Royal to bounce/rock her up, and a tug could pull her to the channel. Seen it done to larger tankers using smaller tugs in my port. But this being today’s navy they will probably keep pulling into the commercials get there and get it done.
February 8th, 2009 at 10:45 pmDespite the embarrassment, I hope that someone independent of the Navy is filming this accident from all angles. It’s a story that needs to be told. Maybe we can all learn something from this. This is a good story for The Military or History channels.
February 8th, 2009 at 10:47 pmTO the 1310′s – there is a big difference between a Lt/Lcdr screwing up and a Capt/Cdr screwing up.
To the earlier commenter asking who was keeping an eye out to help the CO.
XO – SWO – is to supervise the navigation teams on bridge and in CIC. Should have warned CO.
OOD – SWO – is to watch everything, should have warned CO.
Navigator – SWO – is responsible 24/7/365 for the safe navigation of ship, should have warned CO.
CICWO/TAO – SWO – is in charge of the CIC watch team, which has its own nav plot. Should have warned CO.
The investigation will determine if these officers gave timely and proper advice to the CO.
It takes teamwork to safely navigate a ship.
I was in a couple of near misses, and some officers won’t speak up and make recommendations to the CO, or will make incorrect recommendations.
February 8th, 2009 at 11:24 pmAll this wild speculation is not useful work. When all the facts are disclosed, then perhaps connecting the dots will be easier. For the moment, keep in mind that Captain Carrol was not the senior Surface Warfare Officer onboard.
February 9th, 2009 at 12:34 am“For you 1310’s speculating…who’s at fault when your aircraft goes in the nets trying to park after a 3 wire on a rolling deck oil covered at the end of cruise when the deck is as slick as cat stuff……does it end a 1310 career? Nope….it does in the 1110 community.”
Excuse me but…Aviation certainly has some quirks, but WHAT does that have to do with anything? What does an airplane sliding off a flight deck (7 cruises and I NEVER saw it happen) have to do with a CO and NAV team running their ship onto a big rock/coral reef/sand bar on a clear day just before low tide (and in slow motion)?
“…let me say 1310 stuff is not 1110 stuff and vice versa.”
Again…WHAT? It’s all machinery, it all moves, it must be properly controlled and navigated, and usually requires a group effort. The most pertinent differences being that the velocity of the “1110 stuff” never gets out of the low double digits, and unintentionally running aground with the “1310 stuff” is typically fatal to everyone onboard.
Re: what “marvin” says…it is incredible that there could be that much “brainpower” at work and not one qualified Surface Warfare Officer could see the need, or have the nerve, to say something…LOUDLY. Again, I’m assuming that the CO isn’t CAPT Queeg.
I’ve been around some darned fine Surface Warfare types in my time, but this reignites just about every possible negative stereotype.
February 9th, 2009 at 1:03 amWith the usual caveat: “Not For Navigation”…
http://www.charts.noaa.gov/OnLineViewer/19369.shtml
February 9th, 2009 at 1:31 amAnd another…
http://www.charts.noaa.gov/OnLineViewer/19366.shtml
February 9th, 2009 at 2:04 amThis ship is a writeoff. Spare parts. Not worth it to repair the ship.
February 9th, 2009 at 3:19 amGreat comments, all. No 1310 speculation on this case by me. There will be an in-depth investigation into the causes of this grounding as in all Navy incidents.
I also concur that at the tactical level 1110 stuff is not 1310 stuff. Both are dangerous and unforgiving and can cost us lives and treasure when things go wrong. But command is command. Those in command (ship, aircraft squadron, shore installation) are responsible for the conduct and performance of their people, individually and collectively, and held to account for failures. Lots of individuals in any command can go “all in” with the CO’s chips. The great thing about Navy command, which is unique in extent amongst the services, is the absolute accountability of it. No, we aren’t a zero defect organization, but we are an organization that has a tradition of Command with a capital C. That tradition states that a CO will be held to account for failures regardless of whether the cause was bad luck or incompetence, specific or general in nature. Of course that accountability covers a spectrum, from statements of caution to relief. This is good for the whole organization as it reinforces professional discipline and focus, and instills an acceptance of personal responsibility for one’s actions (and for the actions of those under your charge) in every Sailor, whether in command or not. Having served on ship’s company as well as in squadrons and staffs, I’ve seen a seemingly fair spread of this tradition. I’ve also seen cases in which what happened was truly beyond the control of the CO and/or his crew and command was retained (1110 and 1310). I’m hopeful that will be the case for the good ship Port Royal.
February 9th, 2009 at 6:23 amA question to the sailors: I read that they are removing 800 tons of water and the anchors to another vessel. Can’t the ship just pump its water into the sea and drop the anchors and chains etc. where it is?
February 9th, 2009 at 7:05 amI think the recent death of a sailor caught in the rudder-ram of the USS Nebraska SSBN 739, more specifically how the accident event report blamed the causal of the accident on the victim….I think the USS Port Royal and the USS Nebraska events are related. If you can’t write a fatality report without blaming a 21 year old victim, it questions if any accurate information is getting to the head of West Pac command or the CNO. I even requested a IG investigation on the Nebraska accident report.
Even the fatality on the USS San Antonio questions if the Navy is lackadaisical about human life. Did this come from a shipyard defect, as the USS San Antonio is known for?
It just question the amount of chaos in the Navy…is the bad news going up the chain of command and acted on? Is there a wider problem with a insufficiency of Navy skills or adequate quality of ship components and systems?
How deep are we into the post Vietnam military syndrome…I mean the Post Iraq era?
Everyone knows who Steamshovel is.
February 9th, 2009 at 7:06 amGosh, that sounds a lot like the guy who just got disinvited from commenting at The Stupid Shall Be Punished. Here’s the thread where “steamshovel’s” comments match commenter “Mike Mulligan’s”.
Sockpuppetry, anyone?
February 9th, 2009 at 7:22 am@ Dave: Nicely put CAG. Because my 11XX days were so ancient and I as junior as possible, I was ignorant beyond belief of anything other than a vague knowledge of BoI’s and JAGMAN’s. Can you or anyone here illuminate if there is an analog to the Aviation Mishap Board which happens parallel to, but wholly independent of the JAGMAN investigation for surface and subsurface mishaps? (BTW, my spouse is a retired Army MD and has followed our CRM development since the 80′s with interest.)
@ GBS: As others have alluded to, there was a lot of opportunity, at least as the system is structured, for nav input to the CO or whomever had the con. I will not speculate on what the Inquiry will reveal. When we were flying Intruders you and I had the old adage that “it takes two to descend and one to climb.” That’s all it took, communication was direct and immediate and even if we had the Skipper, XO, Ops O or CAG on our wing, what we did was without the huge (by our standards) crowd and plethora of inputs all coming at us. Plus, as I know you’re aware of, an aircraft reacts a lot faster to input than a vessel, so we were able to get our butts out of trouble very quickly once it was recognized. (And yes, if your career path was the usual, we both went to a lot of memorial services when that didn’t happen.) I would submit that like the overwhelming number of aviation mishaps in both the military and civilian environments, this one was more than likely a human factors issue. What those factors are will hopefully come to light and will a real “teaching moment” within the ship handling community, regardless of designator.
VR,
February 9th, 2009 at 7:57 amAndy
Andy,
February 9th, 2009 at 8:11 amNot CAG but commodore.
Dave:
Aw hell, there I go, thinkin’ like a JO again! LOL. Like it would’ve killed me to look you up, but what’s the fun in that? Nonetheless, thanks for your perspective and taking the time to hit the blog; understand you only have so much bandwidth in your day, your participation and those of your peers here and on a couple of the other blogs will greatly enhance and elevate discussion.
VR,
February 9th, 2009 at 9:06 amAndy (off to remind Tommy Kilcline that he and I have a 40th HS reunion coming up!)
I did a leading QM tour on CG-52 when she was homeported in Yokosuka. This incident sounds like the ship was doing bare steerageway, conducting a small-boat hoisting/lowering/transfer operation and got set-down on shoal-water in close proximity. CO was unable to manuever out of danger because of the small-boat evolution. Definately poor seamanship in that set-drift distance was not estimated vis a vis proximity to shoal water and time to conduct evolution.
February 9th, 2009 at 12:41 pm“Ever talk to any of the people who [train for the nuclear power public affairs challenge] to get a sense of how hard that is?”
What seems to be unappreciated by too many is that this post and the subsequent comments are an ad hoc part of meeting that challenge. Springboard was irresponsible to tease that a nuclear powered vessel in the same situation would pose special hazards, despite his protests ex post facto that he was only talking about a PR problem. This sort of assumption is already far too common among the general public, not just with regard to Naval nuclear propulsion but the technology itself. Why do you think that when Pres. Obama talks about energy independence he gives solar and wind the top billing but only mentions nuclear power as an addendum “after we deal with its concerns.”
Personally, I find it disappointing that both NAVSEA O8 and Big NavyTM PAO apparently don’t seem to be keeping an eye on even semi-official Navy publications to counter misleading/wrong minded assertions like this. I put this in the same category of “Big NavyTM not being engaged in the conversation” comments you’ve made before, Chap (esp to Admiral Harvey).
February 9th, 2009 at 1:58 pmI was stationed aboard the USS Antietam (CG 54) from ’98 – ’03 and was a senior OS1, and also a qualified piloting and shipping officer on the CIC Nav Team.
I am extremely interested in learning about what the Piloting Officer and Shipping Officer may have recommended prior to the grounding, as well as what the nav plotter may have seen. I don’t know if the bridge was a “paper-free” bridge, but I’m sure the CIC team still had the good ‘ol paper charts and handy pencils.
In my personal experience, it takes some time for the CIC team to indicate they hold the current (or past) position within shoal water, and it also takes time to get the bridge team to admit to caring what CIC has. Not to mention if the bridge was even paying attention to where the ship was, or what was going on with the small boat ops. I can only speculate that the CIC team was either ignored, or was just not doing everything possible to bring attention to the fate of the Port Royal.
Needless to say, I’m sure all the ships’ logs and charts are now someplace very secure and being treated as legal documents admittable in a court of law, as every Operations Specialist is told from day one in OS”A” school.
My heart goes out to all the Nav Team on the P.R.
February 9th, 2009 at 3:10 pmAs a former Aegis Cruiser CO, with tours on two other Aegis CG’s and command of a DDG-51 as well, 15 years on my sea duty counter, and 27 years of commissioned service, I offer the following comments:
1. I get tired of aviators thinking that since we shoes don’t speed around at 400 knots, there is no danger. The best response to that is what a CV CO once told me: “I have been more scared going 2 knots on a ship than 400 knots in an airplane, and I can’t get these young aviators to comprehend that.”
2. I am also tired of the “shoes eat their young” BS. The CO of a cruiser is not “young” and has at least 22 years commissioned service. I have served under seven superior CO’s (all 1110) as well as three flag officers (two 1110). All were super teachers, mentors, and when required, hard as nails. Any success I have had is rooted in the lessons about seamanship, leadership, and professionalism they taught me.
3. Anyone who has not been in command at sea (meaning the first letters of your command are USS) wouldn’t understand that command carries with it both absolute authority, and absolute accountability. A Figther squadron CO is really not in command at sea, nor is CAG. Who is responsible for feeding the squadron…not the CO. Who is responsible for medical care for the squadron…not the CO. I could go on, but you get the point. Command of a SHIP at sea is the ultimate in both authority and accountability. After your ship runs aground is when you get to experience the “accoutability” part. Aviators have a REAL hard time with that one. “It wasn’t MY fault, it was a ‘hook skip’” is a prime example.
4. Idle speculation on what happened does no one any good. The CO in question was selected for this job after successfully completing an entire command tour, and through brutal competition at the major command board (selection rate of about 50% of those officers who ALREADY succeeded in command at sea). In short, he is a worthy professional and did not get the job by accident.
5. The bottom line is that the CO will now be asked the question that no CO wants to have posed: “Captain, how could you let this happen?” There are never any good responses to that, which is why he will (or already has been) relieved.
February 9th, 2009 at 3:23 pmAs a former senior navigational team member on submarines; operations within close proximity to shallow waters must be taken with great seriousness by ALL members of the navigation team which include the CO, XO, OOD, JOOD, Navigator, Assistant Navigator, and all other members of the team. If this team was stationed and every member doing there job, the CO can leave momentarily with confidence to oversee other operational committments. Now it has left the CO with no confidence in his navigation team, and perhaps causing him his job.
February 9th, 2009 at 5:21 pmUnfortunately, as in all mis-haps, someone will fall under the umbrella of “blame.” The CO, the XO, whomever. Bottom line, this is a life changing event, and not in a good way either. Although no life was lost, thank the good Lord, millions of dollars are lost. I am not in the military now, nor have I ever been. I am a lowly Police Officer in a suburban town. I don’t know half the stuff you gentlemen are talking about when you abbreviate terms, but I do know this: whether you are in charge of a billion dollar ship, or a $30,000 squad car, you’ve chosen to put your life on the line for others, so that the others may sleep well in their beds at night. CO Carroll was in charge of the ship, there is no doubt about that. And it appears the Navy is quite the opposite of my department, when something goes horribly wrong, the @;$:)@ will roll up hill, not downhill like the PD. Light a candle for CO Carroll, he didn’t wake up Thursday thinking, “I’m going to run this ship into the ground, and ruin my life” He has months, if not years of questions to answer. With all that being said, I wish to, in public forum here, thank each of you that served in the United States Armed Forces, now or in the past, for allowing me to sleep in my bed safely at night.
February 9th, 2009 at 5:50 pmCO relieved of duties:
http://kgmb9.com/main/content/view/13938/76/
Damn shame. One of these days, the Navy is going to cashier their next Nimitz or Burke or Spruance. And yes, BB, I understand where you’re coming from.
February 9th, 2009 at 7:09 pmWell Said Barnacle Bill,
Command At Sea remains an Absolute Responsibility and is different from anything else the Navy has to offer be it a Sailboat or a CVN.
Modern communications continues to reduce CAS authority!
Why weren’t you my skipper….probably because I was ahead of you in date but certainly not in intellect, understanding and leadership.
I use my Name because…well thats me….and some of you Submariners may know the name and understand my upbringing. Guys like Frank Kelso, Earnie Till, Bob Long, etc still resonate in my raising my own kids.
I’m glad PR is off the sand bank…I’m sorry it happened to an obviously fine Officer and his crew. But, to stir conversation, it was my experience that the “Nuke” SWO officers were much less intensive in running a wardroom that the straight 1110′s which was probably due to the quality of personnel they had worked with over their career. Hows that for controversy?
Harv
February 9th, 2009 at 7:34 pmI never made it to a navigator tour. Why didn’t someone say, “Recommend all stop, Captain, we’re headed into shoal water!”?
There were at least five people that I can think of off the top of my head that should have made that call. Could it be that they were afraid to piss off the Captain? It happens, you know.
February 9th, 2009 at 8:08 pmWhoa BB. I wholeheartedly agree that no Naval Aviator worth his salt should dismiss the intense nature of driving a ship based on that old worn out comparison of speed. And having never commanded anything that starts with USS, I’m not qualified to comment on the difference in degree of difficulty you imply exists between squadron, wing and surface command but… Please don’t dismiss us airdales as incapable of understanding ultimate accountability for our actions. Too many of our winged Sailors have paid the price for misjudgments with their lives to make such a simple and sweeping claim. And plenty of aviator COs have experienced the same accountability represented by relief for cause you seemingly argue is only reserved for ship captains. OBTW, I too have served under great COs; aviators, SWOs and submariners. One team, one fight. wr/Dave
February 9th, 2009 at 8:10 pm3500 hours and 525 traps and nothing, repeat nothing in all my seagoing career raked my guts and turned what little hair I had left grey than the time I spent as Navigator on the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower. I called it my SWO appreciation tour…
That said, one thing I haven’t seen addressed above (96+ comments tends to do that) was minimum rudder authority – IOW, while slowing to conduct what turned out to be a prolonged small boat drill, did the PR drop below the minimum effective speed for her rudders? Something similar happened to IKE back in the 80′s when, returning from a highly successful deployment (no personnel or a/c losses) she struck a Spanish freighter, in broad, clear calm daylight in the Hampton Roads channel.
The case read like a Grampaw Pettibone nightmare. DV action on the nav bridge, helo ops to offload DVs w/CO’s presence on the flightdeck, nav team that wasn’t paying attention, got 30 minutes ahead of schedule and sucked major speed off, unwittingly dropping the good ship below minimum rudder authority, missed a pernicious drift that was subsequently set up until the CBDR anchored freighter crashed through their consciousness – but it was to late.
Lots of press on board too – local press that had a fondness for tweaking Big Navy’s nose. Still, no hand wringing over the nuke aspect of Ike was forthcoming.
Finally, for my brown shoe brethren (and sisters too) – if you haven’t had a ships company tour – do so. Your appreciation of what it takes to man, equip and train a fleet of these things is incomplete otherwise. Besides, grey hair notwithstanding, it’s kinda cool to come roaring up with 95,000 tons of stuff to put it in precise formation alongside the AOR with a greyhound on the other side or bring her into port through a difficult sea and anchor evolution. You know – that’s why we’re called Naval Aviators and Flight Officers…
February 9th, 2009 at 9:54 pm- SJS
a civilian in Hawaii watching the story for the last few days and pulling for that ship and her crew to get unstuck
lot of criticism flying around, from my standpoint — no matter what happens to the officers on that ship from the standpoint of the Navy — I will be always grateful for their service — aloha
February 9th, 2009 at 9:54 pmAs the spouse of a member onboard the USS Port Royal, I have to say that both my husband and I have the utmost respect for Capt. Carroll. He is an experienced officer and a fine man. Disregard any negative comments you hear about him, as my husband says, he’s the “kind of CO you dream of”. He is a fine Captain and good with the crew. We both wish him well and hope the investigation settles his mind and clears his name.
February 10th, 2009 at 2:04 amWhy isn’t there anything on the Navy’s website? They had articles on
February 10th, 2009 at 3:31 amthe GW fire & P-3 unit CO being relieved, but notta on this? Can you
salts out there help this poor ex-reservist who tried to go active
explain why they’re silent?
While the incident is regrettable and painful to everyone’s professional pride, most of the speculation so far is premature.
I hold a current Master Oceans Any Tonnage (DECK) Merchant Marine ticket and have served as XO AS, Navigator AS, Nav SSBN, and qualified in Submarines on a Pearl Harbor home ported SS. Qualified for command in submarines and qualified SWO, plus numerous voyages on MSC contract USNS vessels as Second Mate. I know that channel and I know navigation. I’m not interested in gossip.
I will say this. First sea trials after any significant time in the shipyard, with a new skipper on board, is the most dangerous time. Usually all of the teams have been shuffled and have had precious little time to practice or train together. Flag officers would be wise to require some dedicated time for sorting things out through very basic and elementary drill and practice of fundamental skills by the ship by itself (what boomer sailors call “fast cruise”). The sea trials schedule should be very slow and easy to start, since the fumble factor will be high and unpredictable and that will eat time (… ask me for anything but time).
You will spend plenty of time to pull the ship off the reef, but it’s better to invest it beforehand (uh, like be forehanded(?)) and skip the salvage fees and publicity. My opinion.
The rest will come out with the investigation. Matt Hayball
February 10th, 2009 at 7:23 amAnother Bill…maybe I need to chang my blog name…
February 10th, 2009 at 8:07 amI see that someone (Matt Hayball) has picked up on (or simply noted on his own) my comment above that there is perhaps a lesson learned here about preparation in a case like this. New CO, long time since he (really long time for him) and his crew have been to sea – bad combination. Above I noted that perhaps observer rides on other CG’s would have been appropriate for the CO and his key people. As in Matt Hayball’s comments above – planning and preparation time is key. And cheap compared to what this is going to cost.
What really surprises me (well, not really. . .) is that it is a pair of Merchant Masters who are also submarine veterans that make this point. Lost in all of the anti-nuclear power (still I don’t understand that rant) and aviator vs. SWO comments and debate above is the basic point – in all likelihood we have a case of poor seamanship that most likely was contributed to by a lack of solid navigation team dynamic (no experience together) and no recent experience at sea by the key team members.
Why, my dear interested friends, doesn’t this seem to matter to the rest of you? The CO has a fine record – until this incident – but it has been four years since he went to sea in command. That is an eternity. Could it possibly be that any CO in a highly competitive environment who admits his lack of recent sea experience would be labeled as somehow “weak” or “defective” if he wanted an observer ride on another CG before taking his own ship out for the first time? Anybody who thinks that shipdriving is “like riding a bicycle” and “it comes right back to you” ignores the importance of recent experience and the whole concept of proficiency.
Rather than arguing about whose community is better than another’s community wouldn’t it be a more useful, more powerful use of this great blog tool to honestly talk about how – especially given all fo the near misses we have all witnessed/experienced ourselves (you don’t get here without stubbing your toes a few times. . .) we could make some institutional changes to help prevent this kind of tragedy from recurring? Pay the price once, it hurts. Pay the price twice, it makes you wonder. . .
February 10th, 2009 at 11:50 amThe ship hasn’t had any real time at sea since July 08, when it participated in RIMPAC. It also returned from a 6 month deployment May 08.
February 10th, 2009 at 12:00 pmWay to go MM/Subvet. Thanks for bringing us back to the basics. No idea if this was a factor in this case but you are absolutely right about proficiency. We are suffering a similar dynamic in the aviation business and have had recent mishaps to prove it. It is easy in the Navy to get sucked into all of the other (admittedly important) duties we need to do for a successful career and lose the tactical edge we enjoyed as JOs who almost exclusively applied the skill sets of our warfare specialty. Though the experience of a career gives us better judgment and broader perspective on how to apply naval force to the mission, the basics of seamanship or airmanship can only be kept honed to a sharp edge through routine and recent practice.
February 10th, 2009 at 7:02 pmOne note, more of a macro level observation here… No matter how un-informed or illogical the original post by Defense Springboard may have been on the subject before us, the topic has certainly driven home both the positives and negatives associated with Blogs and Blogging in a professional environment.
This post has resulted in numerous well thought out comments that have done nothing but better serve the navy community at large, and inform visiting professionals and interlopers alike. Many of the comments also serve to identify the wannabe’s and wish they were’s. Which at worst are entertaining in a knee biting sort of way.
Seeing the comments from pearlharborwife brings the human factor back into the equation and reminds us that a probably good man’s career, long worked for, may indeed have come to an unexpected and unwished for end. And for that our hearts go our to the Captain.
And also as welcomed are the professional commentary from active duty masters as well as our MV friends, all are sailors and professionals through and though, and while refraining from irrational conclusions on extremely limited data, provide great insight to what could be and serve to remind us of the challenges of sea service.
I especially respect the cool heads of BarnacleBill and SteelJaw Scribe in their contributions to the dialog. As the offspring of an Aviator who claims his greatest commands (in order) were USS Midway (CV-41), USS Ponchatoula (AO-148) and then VA-115, all of SJS insight rings true in the echo of tales woven and intently listened to by YHS.
Thanks for the lessons.
-JC
February 10th, 2009 at 11:50 pmCaptain Carroll was a great CO for the short time he was with us. The crew is really upset with the loss of him and we hope that the investigation will show that he is not at fault. There are so many variables that occured that night and will definately be investigated to the fullest. Many people should be relieved of duty over this. Unfortunately when you assume command you assume the responsibility of things like this. It’s just ashame that a brand new Ensign and an undermanned operations division has the power to wreck a Stellar CO’s career.
Please keep Captain Carroll and the crew in your thoughts as we are going through a tough time right now.
February 11th, 2009 at 12:52 amHow was it that the OS division was undermanned?
Was this due to the personnel transfer, which might have created a distraction? What about the QM Nav team and the maneuvering watch?
I hope Capt Carrol is able to live through all of this career wise.
Good luck to the PRL crew as well.
CS1 Kelly.
February 11th, 2009 at 3:08 pmDoes anyone recall the story of Colin Powell losing his service pistol during a road march early in his career? I believe he talks about it in his book “My American Journey” I don’t recall all the details, but the point of the story is that there are times when the “unforgivable” should be forgiven. There could be several reasons for doing this, but a long history of exemplary service should be high among them. I know that I am whistling in the wind, that he has already been relieved, and this is a tragedy for one of the finest men I have ever known. One thing I am sure of though, Captain John Carroll will have a legacy that will far outweigh this accident. His character and work ethic will have touched and influenced hundreds of people, people who will be far better off for having known him.
I am a former Marine who served in Iraq in 1991 and Somalia in 1993. After leaving the Corps I joined the United States Border Patrol and became a member of their National Special Response Team. Much of my life’s course was influenced by John, and I haven’t seen or talked to him since he was a teenager. But even then I could see a man of integrity and grit, and from a very early age I knew I wanted to be like him. I hope that in this darkest of times he can somehow see that the world is a far better place because of people like him.
My name is Chuck Smith, and I am Capt. Carroll’s cousin.
February 11th, 2009 at 3:46 pmCS Kelly,
Not to Hijack PRL Crewmember, The division isn’t undermanned overall but they decided to get underway with only 7 OS’s. There are 5 positions at a minimum on the bridge alone for OS’s during a MOD NAV Detail. The 6th was on FSA Duties and don’t know what the 7th was doing. I don’t know if that was a Command Decision or a MIDPAC Decision to allow inadequate manning but will hopefully get addressed during the investigation.
Also, the Fathometer had a Major CASREP placed on it a few days prior to getting underway stating that it was not operational with a faulty transducer. Why we would get underway with this CASREP? Why would we approach shoal water without it? Those are my two questions that I keep asking myself.
I think we were too rushed to get out to sea to become certified. In my opinion this is due to the higher up’s being too worried about hosting the Admiral’s reception on the 13th in Kuai. That’s all they pushed out to the crew was this reception and making it mandatory for all onboard and having to be on time.
But as we all know everything will come out eventually with the investigation like it always does but the ship wasn’t set up for success prior to our departure.
February 11th, 2009 at 8:51 pmSubj: Hobson, proposed interim change 1…
I do not believe the best interests of the Navy, the officer commanding at the time of the incident or the ship are likely to be served by summarily relieving the skipper before the ship is off the reef or the board of inquiry convened.
I’m not saying he shouldn’t stand at the wrong end of the long green table looking at the point of his sword. I’m saying he’s entitled to a measure of due process. Else why convene the board?
Indeed, since nobody died, it might (rarely) be more productive to suspend his sword over his head by a single hair and send him back to work, if mercy seems to possibly warranted by the findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations of the Board of Inquiry? Could a belief that the Navy takes care of it’s own, after careful consideration, be a boost to the morale of the sea dogs who risk life, limb and divorce on those gray things defending life, liberty and practicing the pursuit of those who threaten them (or anyway straining to be let off the leash like the good ratters they are?).
There are certain forms that should be observed. Fire, ready, aim might not be performing all steps in the correct order.
Such a thing might take a measure of daring on the part of the 3-5 flag officers in sequence supervising any given ship, since they would risk the fire of higher and higher higher. Is that all that bad for junior Flag Officer development?
What would Arleigh Burke do? Or Halsey? Or Chester Nimitz? Or George Dewey. Or David Porter? Or his ward, uh, oh right, David Farragut. Or Preble?!
Just a modest suggestion from a modest old retiree who takes modest pride in a modestly successful career, long long ago.
My John Hancock, gentlemen… Matt Hayball.
February 11th, 2009 at 9:27 pmThat’s the one thing I hate about having FSAs serve in the mess & galley. Most of the E2s-E4s serving their time as an FSA don’t want to be there in the first place (completely understandable). The newbies want to stand watch and train in their own rate. At present, I’m a CS1 on a ship assigned to DESRON 21. I try and keep FSA duties to a minimum. Give the kids a chance to relax and have time to study for their next advancement exam. I don’t want them in my skullery scrubbing away or swabbing the mess deck for hours on end. I want them concentrating on their rate and job at hand.
That’s why I try and return my assigned FSAs back to their divisions ASAFP. Our newest sailors won’t learn jack shit about ship board operations and safety while draining and cleaning my tilt fryer or scrubbing my griddle & grill along with peeling and cutting carrots, tomatoes and potatoes. I’ve got brand new CS E1s-E3s for all that “fun stuff.”
Nevertheless, I just hope the officers and crew of the PRL will be okay once the investigation is completed. I have a feeling the Nav-team will have alot to answer for.
I hope all turns out well.
Kelly.
February 11th, 2009 at 10:47 pm[...] U.S. Naval Institutes blog (always worth the read) posted valuable information about the incident. Of even greater interest is that the entry garnered well over 100 comments — [...]
February 13th, 2009 at 3:48 pmA hundred and twenty some more comments over at The Stupid Shall Be Punished, with more details and food fights and so forth.
February 16th, 2009 at 9:07 amThe surface nukes never cease to impress. Too bad for this skipper, guess he didn’t have the same support the 2000-2002 USS Detroit surface nuke skipper had (collision at sea, major oil spill NY Harbor, emergency anchoring VACAPES, etc.). Or maybe this guy took one for the team, unlike the Detroit CO who gobbled up all of his younglings.
February 19th, 2009 at 7:24 pmI am a past PRL JO and have done the exact same evolution out of dry dock. A naval cruiser with a history of excellence, and I mean excellence, like CG73 is a high pressure atmosphere. It is one of the proving grounds for a SWO CO to prove he is Admiral worthy. With the Admiral present, the CO would have tread a fine line in trying to present a well exectued, nigh on perfect evolution and may have taken risks accordingly.
February 22nd, 2009 at 7:14 pmWithout a fathometer, they probably just drifted in too close and the tide may have pulled them into danger without them knowing.
Unfortunately, SWO’s do eat their own and this is obviously no exception. In the Surface Navy, you are held to account. No exceptions. I know it is hard, I was present for the Ehime Maru incident. I had met the sub CO and he was also a great guy who was relieved of command. They say the Captains of ships are the last kings left on earth. They hold ultimate power and also ultimate responsibility.
On a side note, cruisers will never go Nuke. There is no way the Navy can get enough Nuclear engineers to man that many reactors.
Heard something today: Rumor is that Port Royal, instead of repairing damage, is going into Ready Reserve, aka, decom. Any other info on this? Again, rumor is…
February 23rd, 2009 at 11:22 amAnon:
February 23rd, 2009 at 1:33 pmYour rumor is tough to believe unless the damage was much greater than what’s been publicly announced. After all, the fleet is struggling to maintain numbers while virtually all new construction crashes and burns… Getting rid of an asset that everyone knows will be called upon to perform well past its anticipated decom date just doesn’t compute unless the ship is in really bad shape.
Not saying it’s true…or even been decided on. But that plan is on the table right now. And I did hear this from a pretty good source. And you’re right, it’s stupid, but like I’ve said many times as a Navy contractor, if we did it the right way, the common sense way, instead of the Navy way, half of us would be out of a job.
February 23rd, 2009 at 1:58 pmFWIW, an 02Mar Navy Times article claims the damage to CG-73 is a lot worse than original thought (although some blog commenters seem to have anticipated this possibility, including damage to components well above the waterline).
Another Navy Times article published the same day reports on the intention of the state of Hawaii to ask the Navy to pay for fixing the damage to the reef.
Fun times.
March 3rd, 2009 at 4:18 amhttp://www.kitv.com/news/18874610/detail.html reports that “It will cost some where between $25 million and $40 million to repair damage to the USS Port Royal…”.
Also, the top ship handler (for COMPHIBRON
from the USS Kearsarge in Norfolk will be the next navigator for the USS Port Royal, reporting in April. He will reportedly be competing in the 2nd Fleet Ship Handling competition in late March.
March 7th, 2009 at 12:43 pmA few points.
I?m saddened that the quality of training and due diligence appears to have declined precipitously. Yes, I can make the assertion, even without reading any more ?facts?. The USS Oklahoma is another recent example of failed training and discipline.
As an officer aboard destroyers and as the OOD (officer of the deck) for special sea detail, e.g.; entering and leaving port, the navigator, the senior quartermaster and I would always review the planned track in great detail including speed, direction, turns, navigation aids, hazards (fixed and mobile, e.g.: ferries). Everyone knew their assignments and responsibilities. If we were anchoring out, going alongside the pier or taking a position is a nest of ships, the ship?s 1st lieutenant was updated as to the plans.
Thus we were all entirely familiar with our transit plans.
Let me mention that the Combat Information Center team was also briefed and the crew in CIC marinated our track in parallel with the bridge navigation team. Two teams, sets of many eyes, but always working as a true combined team with one purpose: safe transit at all times. The CIC team could and would announce if we were heading towards a hazard.
Our navigator was so anal that he had a dozen #2 pencils sharpened to a dart?s point so that he could plot precise points; about the size of a period at the end of this sentence.
Today with GPS and electronic navigation systems, some of the ?old school? stuff has fallen by the way side.
And, did I tell you that we would practice gyro casualties and navigate the real old fashioned way, by magnetic compass.
Sometimes in broad daylight we would cover the windows of the bridge with paper to simulate heavy fog.
So we had trained teams, we had disciplined teams, we had cohesive teams, but it didn?t mean that we would abandon mirth or a quip, if it seemed appropriate, from seaman to captain — we were a team
March 7th, 2009 at 8:06 pmSuggesting that the CO would forget that a CG’s draft is a lot deeper than 22 feet is one of the stupidest things I’ve ever heard. I needed to say that, I don’t care if you think it’s rude: I’m just saying it like it is. If you honestly think a CO would forget the draft of his vessel, you’re an absolute idiot and hve no business posting on this forum.
March 14th, 2009 at 12:27 pmA story broadcast on Friday (13MAR) on local Honolulu TV (KGMB-9) discusses possibly extensive reef damage from CG-73′s grounding. Story with video (2:50) here. This originated with a couple locals who say they fish and dive in those waters, and who took UW video of the affected reef just outside of restricted waters. Neither USN nor the state is talking, so I reckon there will continue to be a market for this sort of independent reporting on the part of the always hungry media.
[For whatever it's worth, Patgb, I for one appreciate your input. The idea that a CO wouldn't know such a basic thing as the draft of his own ship seems quite improbable. Anything's possible, I suppose, but on a list of possible explanations arranged in order of decreasing probability, this scenario would be very near the bottom.]
March 14th, 2009 at 11:44 pmStupidity and incompetence surfaces once again.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-bahrain-navy21-2009mar21,0,4188709.story
I rest my case.
March 20th, 2009 at 7:11 pm[...] Surface ships will remain tethered to their piers for more days. Their sailors and aircraft crews will undergo more training with simulators instead of taking to the sea or sky. SUBSUNK points out that you fight like you train. Absolutely. There is no replacement for getting out there and doing the job. Simulators are good, but they never simulate the “well….shit” moments that happen in real life. Perhaps more importantly, the money that we think we’re going to save by cutting down on operations will inevitably be spent on repairs as people who, through no fault of their own, go to sea and make the mistakes that tend to happen at sea. Unfortunately, the less we go to sea to train, these mistakes will change from the tiny and recoverable to the large and much more expensive. [...]
May 12th, 2009 at 9:48 amThe honolulu advertiser today has a summary of the Safety Investigation Board’s findings. It is difficult not to fault seamanship, training and leadership in view of the findings and the number of Article 15′s handed out to senior members of the crew.
July 7th, 2009 at 12:06 pm[...] No one was injured when the ship grounded and no oil was seen on the surface following the incident. Information Dissemination has an update on the initial salvage efforts HERE and the US Naval Institute Blog has a running thread HERE. [...]
July 15th, 2009 at 1:54 pmAs one person so kindly put it, this is a very shallow analysis. There are usually a minimum of five people working the bridge & five people in the back working radar on a ship of this size. Given this, any one of them could have made an error causing the ship to run aground. Unfortunately, rather than hold the erring person responsible, the Captain is held accountable for everyone on board…and thus his career is negatively impacted from this moment onward. The buck stops at the Captain, whether he is at fault or not. I personally know Captain Carroll and he is an accomplished, honest, cautious career Navy officer with a great deal of integrity, who has devoted almost 30 years to protecting our country, as well as his fellow shipmates. I hope his stellar record is taken into consideration when the U.S. Navy tries to hold him accountable for other people’s mistakes.
October 21st, 2009 at 2:38 pmRe the problems of the USS Port Royal, which could happen to other ships too, my understanding of what happened and why is as follows. Please correct me should my understanding be wrong.
For some reason or cause, the ships electronic navigation system had become inoperative. Additionally, the ship lacked basic tools for celestial navigation, sextant(s) and charts. Also, watch standers had not been trained in the use of such, reliance having been placed entirely on the ships electronic systems.
Story ends with the ship running aground on a reef, the location of which was charted. One would think that this information would have allowed the ship to avoid the reef, had celestial navigation equipment, sextants and charts been available, along with people trained in the use thereof.
One can obtain extremely accurate lat and long coordinates via GPS equipment, much more accurate that that obtained from sextant shots, and the coordinates can be obtained much more quickly too, however absent the electronic data, even a relatively sloppy sextant fix might have saved the day, by enabling the ship to avoid the reef. It seems that sextants weren’t available, nor where there people who know how to use them. Curious.
January 24th, 2010 at 2:25 pmDear Sirs,
July 5th, 2010 at 8:41 amYour case of unsafe Nuclear Powered surface ships or submarines is faulty thinking. I was trained in Admiral Rickover’s nuclear program and assigned to the USS Guardfish SS(N) 612. On Christmas eve 1967 the USS Guardfish ran aground in about the same area at night. The reactor and nuclear trained crew preformed as designed and trained. We never lost reactor power and the crew was not off loaded. The reactor and crew operated for several days, after completing an exhausting 60 day deployment, while men and ships were mustered to pull the Guardfish off the sand.
Respectfully
Robert Michael Cailor EM1(SS) USS Guardfish SS(N) 612, 1967 to 1971
Mr Schultz:
“Please correct me should my understanding be wrong”
Your understanding is wrong.
The failure was one of training, supervision, and the misassignment of qualified people. While the electronic navigation systems had significant problems, including no working navigation radar display on the bridge, one functional pelorus driven by an accurate compass,a bearing circle or alidade, two functional sound powered headphones on the JL (lookout) circuit, two 45/90 triangles or a one armed protractor, or one set of parallel rulers, a sharpened #2 pencil and a spare, and an artist’s gum eraser – combined with the harbor entrance chart – and a trained plotting party under the supervision of a Navigator with a modicum of experience and a trained “seaman’s eye” would have been more than enough. Distraction and overconfidence by the command element combined with inattention to mantaining fundamental skills by whatever means necessary while in the shipyard, lead to the condition known as failure to navigate. Overwork, undermanning, and not knowing the ship,or the crew, combined with a eagerness to please the ISIC and shipyard commander, as well as an on board training team unrelated to navigation,to lead the CO ship and bridge crew to waltz down the primrose path and into a tender trap. Too many things got informally delegated below the level of knowing what to do.
Celestial navigation, while doubtless absent, had nothing to do with the actual grounding error chain, except as a footnote.
Situational awareness by an alert, able, proactive OOD would have saved the day.
One was on the way to the bridge (likely at a flat run with a nonfunctional handheld transceiver in his hand) from a small boat, but too late.
There but for the grace of God go we all.
July 6th, 2010 at 12:19 pm