From Defense News: http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3935896&c=AME&s=SEA

Note the italicised comments regarding the LCS and the removal of guns from the DDG 1000…

As the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L), John Young oversees the vast panoply of the Pentagon’s weapons-buying programs. While he’s held other Defense-related positions, he was previously the Navy’s top acquisition official. In that job he frequently advocated for and vigorously defended what was then called the DD(X) destroyer program, now known as the DDG 1000 Zumwalt-class advanced destroyer.

Young still strongly believes in the new ship, even as the Navy seeks to “truncate” the number it buys from seven ships to three and return to building Arleigh Burke DDG 51-class Aegis destroyers, which the Navy leadership claims are needed to combat new threats like ballistic missiles that the DDG 1000s weren’t designed to defeat.

A memorandum Young wrote on Jan. 26 recently was leaked to the press. In the memo, Young examined a range of funding options for Navy surface ships, specifically the DDG 1000, DDG 51 and a new, as-yet-undefined ship called the Future Surface Combatant (FSC). The memo contained various price formulations, including data that showed how truncation affected the cost of the DDG 1000 from its 2005 baseline price – figured at a total of 10 ships – to the currently proposed three ships.

Among the figures listed is a box showing how the total cost of the lead ship, including all the research and development costs, was $3.1 billion if figured for 10 ships, but if spread over only three ships the program acquisition cost would hit nearly $6 billion. While that figure is not a reflection of cost growth, the change would automatically trigger a Nunn-McCurdy breach and require the program to be recertified by the Pentagon as essential to the national defense.

Young, who has been asked by Defense Secretary Robert Gates to remain in the AT&L position until a successor is chosen, spoke with a group of reporters Feb. 5 at the Pentagon about his frustrations with reporting on the memo and the public discussion of the DDG 1000 program. While providing an explanation of the figures in the leaked memo, he also gave what amounted to a near-soliloquy on the DDG 1000 and the controversies surrounding it. Here is an edited version of what he said.

“The first thing I would do is correct some numbers – everybody wants to talk about DD(X) costs and DDG 51. There’s procurement acquisition cost, which takes all the money spent on the program, including the development, versus the average procurement unit cost.

“The average procurement unit cost for the lead DDG 1000 is about $3.3 billion. But the lead ship carries the design cost, the costs to produce the production drawings and implement the process in the factory. The ship itself is estimated to cost about $2.5 billion – and then on [with] the learning curve the costs would come down. That’s obviously if you buy in quantities. If you don’t buy quantities, you don’t get down the learning curve, and you also have very high costs of the ship when you divide the development cost into a small number [of ships]. And that’s what I think is inaccurately reported and leaves the wrong impression. There are very few things that we look at in those terms.

“It’s the nature of shipbuilding. With most programs – aircraft programs, other programs – we pay for the production drawings and production process in research and development. Shipbuilding is unique – we pay for the production process and drawings in the procurement of the lead ship.

“You take that out, DD(X) is about $2.5 billion and projected to come down to $2.3, 2.2 billion.

“For the record, restarting the DDG [51] program, it’s estimated that the lead ship in fiscal 2010 could cost $2.3 billion. And it’s estimated if we bought two ships in 2011, which is at least in one budget draft, those ships would be $1.7 billion apiece. …

“The discussion the [Navy] Department needs to have is if DDG 51s at one a year are $2.1 billion, and DDG 1000s at one ship a year are $2.3 billion, would I pay $200 million more for stealth; an X-band radar – because DDG 51 can’t carry both an X- and an S-band, DDG 1000 carries both; an acoustically quiet ship, which gives you some protection against most threats; a magnetically quiet ship, which gives protection against mines and those threats? I don’t the answers to these questions. I just know there’s a difference in capability and a difference in price, and you need to do a warfighting analysis, make some decisions that inform you about whether you would pay more or pay less.

“I would tell you, for example, that X-band radar is very important if you’re going to operate in a near-shore, littoral environment. That’s why that ship (DDG 1000) has an X-band, because it was supposed to operate near shore and be able to work in an area where land masses cause clutter in your radar, and X-bands are better at dealing with clutter.

“Also important to this discussion is that [the DDG 1000], because it could operate in a closer-to-shore environment and provide air defense capability, was intended, always in the strategy, to provide air defense capability for the littoral combat ship.

“If you stop building DDG 1000s and you have a DDG 51 that really doesn’t have that X-band and isn’t intended to operate close to the shoreline and in that cluttered environment, it’s not clear how you provide air protection for the littoral combat ship (LCS).

“So there, you’ve got to ask yourself what the strategy is that has us wanting to buy 55 LCSs, which don’t have any air self-defense capability, and I don’t really have a ship that helps provide the air cover for that ship. Because when [the LCS] was envisioned by [former Chief of Naval Operations] Adm. [Vern] Clark and others, that was the strategy, the way it would hang together.”

Young recently visited the shipyard of General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, Maine, which is set to begin construction of the first DDG 1000. During the visit, Young was shown the computer graphics and plans to build the new ships.

“The design of DDG 1000 is near-complete, so for the first time, we’ve actually designed the ship before we’ve started building it. The design of the ship lets people sit through a computer simulation of the ship’s assembly. Bath’s mantra is that they want to have built this ship dozens of times in the computer tool, so that the first time they build it is not really like the first time and the ship’s not like a lead ship. And they’ve already built the first prototypical modules and proven to themselves that they can do better than lead ship performance on the ship. …

“Right now I would tell you, everything I can see, there’s no basis for any projection that says this ship is going to cost five or six or seven billion dollars. I appeal to you to stop printing that kind of stuff and let us all work off of facts. …

“Both on the LPD 17 [San Antonio amphibious ships] and on LCS, we essentially started building the ships without final designs and then we were changing the designs as we went. And we didn’t have the quality of this design tool. …

“In DDG 1000, things have gone well. This is a development program that has gone essentially perfectly to budget and schedule. In a world where frequently stories are written about programs that aren’t properly developed, this program – because it had engineering development models, essentially prototypes of the key subsystems, and used the computer-aid design tool – has gone extremely well.

“And every evidence is the ship will build for these prices. … ”

Young then addressed the question of how far – and for how much – the DDG 51 and 1000 designs can be developed. He called proponents of increased DDG 51 construction members of “the church of DDG 51.”

“I see a lot of press about 51s versus 1000s, which I don’t want to get into too far. But DDG 1000 was designed with a radar that you can, solely by putting in more transmit/receive modules, give it significantly more radar capability at a modest cost, just by populating that system.

“There are a lot of reports that you can upgrade 51s, but I will tell you, you cannot do that without significant changes in that ship. You will have to add cooling capacity, you will have to add electrical generating capacity, and this ship has already gained weight because it’s like [20] years into its service life. And ships are designed with a certain amount of weight-carrying capacity. Putting more radar will definitely add more weight, eat up more of its [design] margins, and – oh by the way, the ship prices I gave you [for the first ship of a restarted DDG 51 production line] of $2.1 billion and $2.7 billion are not ships with more cooling, more electrical generating capability and more radar. That will push the price up of that ship significantly close, if not beyond, 1000.

“All I’m trying to tell you is the [Navy] enterprise needs to sit down and have an analytical discussion about the warfighting capability, the production process and the likely cost of these ships and let the enterprise make those decisions.”

Young also discussed the new Future Surface Combatant, discussed at a recent meeting of the Defense Advisory Working Group (DAWG), a top Pentagon review panel.

“The DAWG decision agreed that there’s a possibility that we will have a future surface combatant in ’15. And that ship could be based on the DDG 51, could be based on the DDG 1000 hull. There is not enough analytical work done to make that decision right now. Too many decisions are being made on gut feel or what religious shipbuilding school you went to. And I think we need to go back and have that discussion. …

“The [Navy] department – and this was specifically discussed at the DAWG – has not decided the future hull for the future surface combatant. It could be 51s, could be 1000s. And so, if you possibly build additional 1000s but take the guns off and put missile cells on and make it a heavy destroyer or a light cruiser, those ships could make it nine hulls and be part of the 1000 program. And that would potentially not create the Nunn-McCurdy. This memo is solely me trying to be as honest as I possibly can inside my own family – it wasn’t intended for you all, it was something we could share with the Congress – and say we are not, at this time, going to take this program Nunn-McCurdy, until a decision can be made on which hull is this for the nation for our future surface combatant.

“If you prejudge that decision and assume there will only be three 1000 hulls, then you would need to go Nunn-McCurdy right now. …

“It will not go Nunn-McCurdy based on the average unit cost. But if you take all the development and divide it into a small number of units, this program is going to go Nunn-McCurdy.”

Young explained some of the figures in his leaked memo.

“You know what those numbers say? First, that’s build year 2005 numbers. I tried to be honest with you and inflate those to today dollars, which is more like $3.3 billion instead of $2.9 billion. That’s the lead ship, it has all the design cost. So it has about $800 million of production drawings and process and tooling to build the lead ship. So that cost in no way reflects the recurring cost to buy the next 1000 and the next 1000. … The second ship should cost $2.5 billion or less. …

“Right now, having visited the shipyard that’s going to build the lead ship, I have no reason to believe this ship will cost anything more than what’s budgeted. I have a signed contract to build the ship for $3.3 [billion]; if I back out the production costs, it’s two and a half.

“They’ve [General Dynamics Bath Iron Works] demonstrated to me they have the design, they have the tools, they are simulating the process, they’ve built some pilot modules. And I have every hope and reason to believe a yard that is actually doing a great job in finishing their DDG 51s has every possibility of building this ship to budget.”




Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Maritime Security


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  • Byron

    Take the guns off? Thought that AGS thing was a main selling point: “Hey, we can provide NGFS too!”.

    Rule of thumb when buying a new car, is if the salesman is too eager to sell you the car, there’s gotta be something wrong with it. Wonder if there’s a lemon law with DDG-(?)?

  • Big D

    Does anybody *other* than John Young accept these costs as fully reliable?

  • Byron

    I’m tempted, but I won’t. You can assume my vote would be “Hell, no!”

  • UltimaRatioReg

    Wow! Thanks Byron and Big D! I was gettin’ lonely on this blog. Guess it can’t begin to match the excitement of a warship hard aground.

    And Byron, roger on the AGS. Once upon a time it was a big selling point, wasn’t it?

  • SeniorD

    DDG-51 can’t carry X and S band radar? Most fire control illumination radar (i.e., AN/SPG-51) are X band. S band radar is used for ATC and moderate range tracking. AN/SPY-1D is more than capable of doing S band work.

  • doc75

    “Both on the LPD 17 [San Antonio amphibious ships] and on LCS, we essentially started building the ships without final designs and then we were changing the designs as we went. And we didn’t have the quality of this design tool. …”

    And now we all know why the first LCS vessels went way over budget. It’s a little hard to keep costs down when you keep changing the designs!

  • Byron

    About 10 years ago, I was shipfitter/welder foreman on a 500 ton inter-island tanker project. We had a conference about when we should start building the engine room module. I went to the meeting with pretty good intel, and just sat and listened while project managers, purchasing agents, reps from the marine architect, and other craft foreman went back and forth. Finally I raised my hand:

    If you don’t have every damn piece of equipment from junction boxes to distribution panels to pumps to main engine set in stone, we ain’t building no engine room. I want to see all the equipment foot printed, all the wiring, all the piping, the whole thing. When you get that, send me a drawing, and we’ll start cutting plate. Otherwise, we’ll just wait on you.”

    Got a lot of ugly stares, except from my GM, who just gave me a little smile. Moral of the story? If you want a nice clean build, have all your ducks in a row. LPD-17 did NOT. And with todays software, you can “footprint” all that stuff, add it to the model, and hit one button and it will tell you if you’re right or wrong, and where it’s wrong at. No excuse for shipbuilding goat ropes.

  • B.Smitty

    SeniorD,

    He probably means the DDG-51 can’t carry an X-band radar of the size and power of SPY-3, in addition to carrying SPY-1D.

  • Professor R.

    I think Young makes a very good point, and I have been asking myself this all along. The DDG-51’s the Navy has ordered to replace the 1000’s don’t include the costs of upgrading for the ABM defense. Moreover, the 51’s have only 1/10 of the power generating capacity of the 1000’s, and nowhere near the growth capacity for new weapon/radar systems. And that ignores the myriad of other benefits of the 1000 design, including a far more advanced radar. Little of what the Navy Department has done has made any sense lately; they’ve been behaving more like Brad Pitt in 12 Monkeys. If I had to deal with consistency like that, I would be having a soliloquy too. It’s probably time for new management, and I am not referring to John Young.

  • Bill Aston

    Shall We bow our heads in Prayer…2009 the Year of Change

  • UltimaRatioReg

    Professor,

    You raise the salient point, it would seem. No, the DDG-51 estimates do not include the cost of the ABM upgrade. And likely the growth capacity of the 1000 greatly exceeds that of the older design. But is the generating capacity and growth capacity mission-critical for the foreseeable future? Would you rather have a sufficient number of less sophisticated platforms, or a scant number of high-value ones to try and accomplish all the missions required of the six competencies espoused by the USN?

  • Professor R.

    Hey, did you bother read Young’s above? The incremental cost of the DDG 51 is 2.1 billion, and the DDG 1000, 2.3 billion. If were only talking a $200 million dollars, I don’t think there will be any difference in the number of DDG 51’s built. And that is for a plain vanilla without the advanced ABM capability–which could easily eat up that extra 200 million.

    Here’s a little finance lesson: the reason were seeing a price tag of 3+ billion is because of the amortized R&D. Even if we canceled all of the DDG 1000’s, we’ve already spent that money; it’s called sunk costs–you can’t get it back–that’s John Young’s point. The incremental cost of building a DDG 1000 is not much greater than building a plain vanilla DDG 51. Applying that same logic, we should restart the F-15 line, instead of quibbling over more F-22’s. Or better, had we followed your train of thought in World War II, instead building the Iowa class, we should have built more Colorado’s or Arizona’s.

    Like it or not, we have already spent R&D money for the new ship. It’s not the way I would have spent it, I think the Navy tried to create a supership that could do everything well, instead of focusing on specific mission areas (e.g. NGFS, and btw, I don’t think the Zumwalt does it that well), but we’ve spent the money. I’m with Young, given slight cost advantage of the much less capable DDG 51, we might as well build the 1000.

  • Byron

    I’d feel a lot better about the 1000 if only it didn’t have that silly looking bow. That ship get’s in heavy seas, it’s gonna be able to qual the crew for dolphins ;)

  • UltimaRatioReg

    Why, yes, professor, I did read the above. However, several discussions here and elsewhere tag the incremental cost Young cites for DDG-1000 ($2.3 bil) as being exceedingly optimistic, whereas the DDG-51 cost he states ($2.1 bil) is the wrong figure to be used in comparison. It should be the $1.7 bil figure, which would tend to continue to drop for large scale production runs. If Young’s estimate is even 20% too optimistic for the 1000, and unit cost is in the $2.8 bil neighborhood, then the “slight cost advantage” is more in the $1 bil range.

    Thanks for the lesson on amortized R&D costs. I did get that part. Perhaps we might be able to apply the R&D from this project to future efforts when technology and manufacturing techniques are more mature and less expensive. But we shall see.

    Your analogy with the Iowas is off the mark, IMHO, as well. The argument would be more like building more North Carolinas, instead of Iowas. And, had we needed 12-15 units in 1940, we would have done just that. We had the margin for error to design and build the Iowas because we had the older battleships still in service, and had not retired and scrapped them (“re-capitalized”) while they were still needed and had effective service life remaining.

  • Professor R.

    If you think Obama is going to buy more than one destroyer per year, you haven’t paid any attention to his politics, the party in control of congress, or our current economic situation. 1.7 billion is for production of two ships per years–as Young stated above. Moreover, the Colorado Analogy is a good one; the DDG-51 is twenty year old design technology–or in WWII terms, a Colorado vs an Iowa. I’ll bet the 1000 could wipe the floor with 51’s. And that ignores the ability to upgrade it with advent of new systems; the DDG 51’s are tapped out. Again, they don’t have the space, and nowhere near the power generating capacity.

    We could fight about this all day, but the 51’s you’re going to get won’t have the ABM capability (if they do they are going to cost considerably more, approaching that of the 1000), and are unlikely to be built in any greater numbers. And if that’s going to be the case, hands down, I want the 1000. And that is Young’s point. It is quite unlikely were going to build more than one of anything per year for quite some time. This is almost fun.

  • Professor R.

    Btw…check out Wilkipedia, citing the 2/22/09 Washington Times. Apparently former CINCPAC Admiral Lyons, said that the new radar systems in the 1000 are essential to future boost phase intercept capability. In other words, the DDG 51 which cannot physically support the new, heavier radar on the 1000, does not provide the technology we will need for a future ABM capability. So are we gonna buy grandpa’s old car, or are we going to spend our money on something new?

  • UltimaRatioReg

    Professor,

    I didn’t post the article because I agree with all its premises. It is to spur discussion. Which it has done.

    A couple of points: The DDG-51 is fifteen to twenty year old design, true. But the 1000 design is now almost a decade old. As to the relative combat power, even if your assertions are correct, I would argue relevance. The key question is whether the DDG-51 can defeat enemy surface and SS units, not the next generation of US warships. I would hardly describe the DDG-51 as grandpa’s old car. More like a last model year instead of what Detroit (!) still has on the drawing board (if Detroit still has a drawing board).

    The ABM capability is a very different argument. If that becomes the driving force in warship development, then the landscape changes dramatically. As does the mission of the entire USN.

    Two points I would make:

    The first is that a 14,000-ton vessel with ABM capability is NOT a destroyer. It is a capital unit that has a very different mission. Should the Navy decide to build an up-gunned version of the USCG National Security Cutter (with about 4 knots more speed) in the 4,000-ton 400-foot range, then they have a new class of DDs.

    The second point is that the 51 and 1000 are much closer in technology than the Iowas and the Colorados, as the twenty years between 1920 and 1940 saw an incredible advancement in machinery. The Colorados speed of 21 knots was the limiting factor, whereas there is no such disparity in speed between the 51 and the 1000. Both are more than capable of keeping station with the CSG. Therefore, the North Carolinas, whose design began in the early 1930s, are the appropriate comparison.

    I don’t know what this administration will do, though I have my thoughts. Whatever, Young and Adm Lyons call the DDG-1000 “essential”, the same word ADM Kline used to describe the new CVN-78. I would wager that a submariner would describe the latest and most expensive SSN/SSBN classes the very same way. Somebody ain’t a goin-ta get what they are certain they MUST have. Someone higher is going to have to determine the appropiate “hi-lo” spread of technology and capability among US Navy warships, and we will hope that the civilian leadership finds accordingly.

  • UltimaRatioReg

    *Burma Shave*

    That should read “funds accordingly”.

  • UltimaRatioReg

    *Burma Shave*

    That was Admiral Kilcline speaking of CVN 78 (at USNI West). Not Admiral Kline. Yeesh. Too many tackles without my helmet.

  • Professor R.

    One other consideration to add to your thoughts…there is one hell of a lot of lobbying being done by Lockheed, they have a lot to lose. The articles I’ve seen indicate that Raytheon’s SPY-3 has far greater capability than Aegis. If the DDG-1000 is produced in significant numbers, and the SPY-3 gets adopted, Lockheed will not only lose US but overseas sales. Don’t think for a minute this hasn’t had influence on the near-schizophrenic decision making of the Navy, it could be at the root of it. Good luck, lately I’ve been wishing I stayed in the Navy. Teaching sucks.

  • UltimaRatioReg

    Professor,

    You said a mouthful. It would not be a stretch to say that there are many who contribute here who believe that huge defense contractors, while producing this nation’s high-end military hardware, exacerbate our problems (ship design and building especially) with acquisition of platforms that are too expensive for the numbers in which we need them. Eisenhower’s “military-industrial complex” for a new century. Actions such as the classifying of INSURVs for our Navy’s ships, and the gag order on senior military officials don’t help that perception either.

  • Byron

    Sort of makes you think of a stacked deck being shuffled right now. And no one can tell me or any of the other readers of this and other blogs different since we don’t have transparency.

    Turn the lights on gentlemen.

  • UltimaRatioReg

    Transparency. Seems I have heard that word recently someplace….

  • GunDog15

    I would imagine that when the first of the Zumwalt’s ties up pierside in Norfolk or San Diego, and the Navy brass gets a first hand look at these ships, they’ll start asking “Why was it that we only built three of these things?” The fact is that every time the Navy attempts to make a significant leap in technology, there will be those who try to hold on to the days of old. I suspect that Captain Wayne E. Meyer may have met similar resistance during the early days of development of the Aegis Combat System. The Leahy Class ship CO’s probably thought their 48C search and 55B track radars were far superior to any new fangled “phased array radar” that those RCA folks were trying to build in the cornfields of New Jersey. Now we face similar resistance from the Aegis Mafia and their godfather, ADM Gary Roughead, who has commanded both CG 47 and DDG 51 Class Aegis ships. I have nothing against Aegis, which was designed for blue water battles with the former Soviet Navy. Now that Aegis has been modified (at significant cost) to support missile defense, the CNO is hanging his hat on the ABM capability to kill off the next leap in US Navy technology, all in the hope of building a few more circa-1980’s Arleigh Burkes. That’s about as reasonable as bringing back the Dodge K-Car in hopes of salvaging Chrysler motors.

  • Byron

    Damn, Dog, I’d just about forgotten about those damn Dodge POS!

  • sid

    The Leahy Class ship CO’s probably thought their 48C search and 55B track radars were far superior to any new fangled “phased array radar” that those RCA folks were trying to build in the cornfields of New Jersey

    As an erstwhile 48C/55B kinda guy, I would say that we looked forward to the increased capability of Aegis. We knew we couldn’t keep up in an AS-4 world. Don’t remember anybody resisting the change to better things.

    The major issue with the DDG-1000 is the idea that the supposed efficacy of stealth in the littorals -which in turn drove the use of the hullform and myriad other crimping design requirements- is going to prove worth all the expense and limitiations imposed on the design.

    I for one don’t think it will pan out as hoped.

  • Byron

    Let’s not forget that silly looking semi-submersible foc’sl. I’ve heard more than one SWO say that they thought they will probably qualify for Dolphins after one good storm.

    Concur with Sid regarding the stealth.

  • GunDog15

    “The major issue with the DDG-1000 is the idea that the supposed efficacy of stealth in the littorals…”

    I seem to recall that DDG 51 Class also has “stealth” as part of it’s design.

    I for one would much rather present a smaller vice larger target (RCS) to a threat weapon; either that, or we need to revert back to the days of BB’s and armor (don’t forsee the IOWA Class being recommissioned any time soon).

    “Let’s not forget that silly looking semi-submersible foc’sl…”

    The hull form has been tank and scale tested in varying sea states and from what I’ve heard, performs to spec. True the bow will be a “wet” area, there should be no personnel out there while underway (no lifelines for RCS purposes) and the hull will slice through waves vice rise and fall like traditional hulls.

  • Byron

    Tested under what condtions, Gun Dog? Gulf of Mexico? Can it steam and fight in the winter North Atlantic? Will the missile tubes work when they are semi-submerged, because for sure, they’ll be under water in any kind of serious seas.

  • GunDog15

    “A 1/20 scale, 30-foot scale model has been taken it up through Sea States 8-9 [hurricane-force seas and winds], based on the standard US Navy requirement for stability in ships is a 100-knot wind and using a model of 1969’s Category 5 Hurricane Camille. A 150-foot, 1/4 scale steel hull has also been built and tested for stability, and the arm’s-length US Naval Technical Authority has determined the Zumwalt’s design to be safe.”

    “The DDG-1000’s flight deck is 10 feet higher off the water and can therefore be used for full flight operations in a sea state (i.e., sea condition) that is at least one step higher (i.e., rougher) than is possible for the flight deck on the DDG-51.”

    Also note there are VLS cells in the after part of the ship alongside the flight deck that can be used when sea conditions prohibit the use of the forward VLS cells.

    Some more interesting DDG 1000 facts:

    – “The firm track range of the DDG-1000’s dual-band radar — the range at which it can maintain firm tracks on targets — is 25% greater for most target types than the firm track range of the DDG-51’s SPY-1 radar. The DDG-1000’s AAW combat system would be able to maintain about 10 times as many tracks as the DDG-51’s Aegis system. The DDG-1000’s radar has much more capability for resisting enemy electronic countermeasures and for detecting targets amidst littoral “clutter.”

    – “The DDG-1000’s bow-mounted sonar includes an instride mine-avoidance capability; the DDG-51’s sonar suite has less capability for detecting mines.”

    – “The gas-management (i.e., heat-management) system of the DDG-1000’s VLS tubes can accommodate a hotter-burning missile than the gas-management system of the DDG-51’s VLS, so the DDG-1000 might be more capable of using future missiles if they are hotter-burning.”

    – “The DDG-1000’s flight deck is larger than the DDG-51’s and can accommodate all joint rotary-wing aircraft, including the MV-22, the CH-53, and the
    H-47.”

    – “The DDG-1000 has additional berthing for 20 SOF personnel (i.e., a platoon), as well as a space for SOF mission planning and spaces for stowing SOF gear. The DDG-51 lacks these features.”

    – “The DDG-1000 can embark two 11-meter boats and four rubber raiding craft that are deployed and recovered with a stern ramp, which permits faster and safer launching and recovering, and launch/recovery operations in higher sea states.”

    – “The C4I and networking systems on the DDG-1000 would have five times as much bandwidth as those on the DDG-51.”

  • sid

    I seem to recall that DDG 51 Class also has “stealth” as part of it’s design.

    Sure, it may facotr into increased countermeasures effectiveness…but when operating in the littorals where the Mk1 Mod 0 Eyeball serves as a primary targeting tool, stealth proves a bit less useful in Susceptibility Reduction

  • Professor R.

    Something we forgetting about: the DDG-1000’s expansion capacity for weapons upgrade is enormous in comparison with the 51 (due to sheer volume, power generation, and cooling capacity). We may save 20% up-front buying DDG-51’s, to find ten years from now it is obsolete.

    Put another way, if you were buying a computer, would you go backward in time and buy a single core Pentium IV for $2000 or buy a new quad core for $2500? If those were your choices, I doubt there would be a question, yet that is exactly what the Navy appears to be doing in purchasing 51’s.

    (Oh btw, those prices don’t even include the BDM systems the Navy is supposedly desperate for, and is not planning to order.)

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