That was exactly the mission FSF-1 was being considered and being made ready for..right out of the shipyard.

What is an ‘optimized platform’ in this context? I’m probably guilty of not making my thoughts clear on this topic. I’ve nver said, and do not believe, that any of the existing array of Scandinavian fast combatants is ready ‘off the shelf’ for any USN role. But in terms of simply the capabilites of the platforms..we have a lot to learn if we want similar platforms, at similar cost, with similar capabilites (or different capabilites that are still compatible with those platforms). In very simple terms, we have nothing afloat like they do, we seldom ever have in our ‘recent’ history (PHM excepted) and yet we make a lot of noise that we ‘should’have vessels with those kinds of capabilites.

When I observe the operations related to the Iraqi oil terminals today, and consider a similar scenario could be required in the future along much larger coast lines, I question whether the Navy has enough assets and the right capabilities to meet the tasking demands sure to be present. The tactical situation related to Somalia piracy suggests we currently have gaps in our littoral approach not likely to be filled with ‘a one ship fits all profiles’ LCS approach.

I left out the disclaimer, but I’m certainly not an advocate of continuing to build nothing but >3,500-ton platforms. If we’re serious about executing littoral security and stability, and training other nations on how to conduct them, I think we need a mix of corvette & coastal patrol craft with some sort of support platform to support them; but, I want to head off any discussion of whether a Visby-style configuration is an optimized platform and whether the Scandinavians have all the remedies to the problems.

The problems Galrahn points out—that our current platforms are too few, ill-configured for the task and stand out like sore thumbs—are spot on, but I’m not sure we can remedy all the problems with a new platform. If the Navy decides littoral security and stability ops are a high, long-term priority (which it seems like we want to, but are afraid of the impact on our blue water capability given our resource constraints) we can certainly acquire platforms that are more numerous and better adapted to the task.

Whether we can significantly counter the anti-scouting capability that concerns Galrahn in an era where every fisherman with a cell phone or radio can be an anti-scouting asset, I’m doubtful. We’re still going to stand out like sore thumbs, the only difference being the thumbs are smaller and more numerous.

The first part of that is certainly accurate and true. My question, however, relates to your assertion in the second sentence. IF we (USN) are really interested procurring and operating small, capable, fast littoral combatants..then don’t we have a lot to learn from the Scandanavian experience as it would apply to what we are trying (and failing) to do? Or was this whole exercise in “Streetfighter gets fat and slow and expensive and gets named LCS” simply a complete waste of resources and a bad idea altogether? If that is so, and all we really need are vessels frigate-sized and larger, then I agree we have little of nothing to learn from the Scandinavians. Although I already know that the SpecWar boat community has other ideas about that…but that is a diffent mission set and a story for another day, so I should not digress.

I don’t believe a “bobtail” SLEP offers sufficient return for the investment given remaining service life on the FFG-7s and their current mission set.

All the best, JCHjr

So do I! Having spent most of my design career (well ..still spending it ‘over there’, really) assisting both the RNoN and RSwN puruse their particular sets of littoral ship requirements, it has seemed to me that we (‘we’ as in USN design community..without ‘me’ in the ‘we’) have walled off the valuable knowledge and experience those two navies have in this area. That virtual ‘wall’ might even explain why the prototye ‘Skjold’ prototype deployed here for almost unlimited USN evaluation and tire-kicking..and nobody bothered to appropriate any funds to do it after she arrived. Her crew got a nice extended vacation out of the deal..we got little of nothing, nothing technically valuable anyway, for their trouble. The standard reaction to the vessel’s outstanding performance from the average observer can be summed up as :”Wow..impressive boat!..but of course we could never build something like that here”..as if it was some sort of ‘magic’ that created such a capable platform with so few dollars spent. Magic that we do not possess nor seem to want to understand..much less embrace. I beg to disagree.

We have a long and sorry history in that particular area too. Its not like our Scandanavian friends have not tried to help us out with their unique ‘littoral’ expertise. The failed Cardinal MSH program (undertaken with the help and technical assistance provided by the Swedes..that we then ignored during design execution), the autonomous SAM II ACV shallow-water mine countermeasure platform..that we abruptly withdrew funding and participation in..the Umoe (Norwegian Skjold builder) LCS design that achieved the obective long range transit at more than twice the speed of either of the selected concepts..and so on. Well..OK..we did get the ‘Nastys’ from Batservice (Norway) for ‘Nam service…

Great observations, sir. I wish we would see more like them.