Comments on: Midway 67 Years Later – Lessons Learned http://blog.usni.org/2009/06/05/midway-67-years-later-lessons-learned/ The Naval Institute’s taken its independent forum to a new level - with you in the middle of it. Fri, 10 Feb 2012 21:43:10 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1 By: Robedrt (Andy) Anderson http://blog.usni.org/2009/06/05/midway-67-years-later-lessons-learned/comment-page-1/#comment-152243 Robedrt (Andy) Anderson Thu, 24 Sep 2009 19:34:28 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=3130#comment-152243 I've always wondered to what extent the lack of combat training by the "8" squadrons and commanders contributed to their "poor" performance at Midway. The Hornet squadrons had been kept below deck during the entire cruise from Hawaii and run-up to Japan for the Doolittle raid and were only available to fly in combat after the B-25s had launched. There was no time or opportunity for squadron training and the all important combat raid missions that the Yorktown and Enterprise crews had conducted. The Midway carrier strike was the first combat mission for VS, VB, VT, and VF 8 and the results may have shown that. They had the guts but not the skills. Those would show later. I’ve always wondered to what extent the lack of combat training by the “8″ squadrons and commanders contributed to their “poor” performance at Midway. The Hornet squadrons had been kept below deck during the entire cruise from Hawaii and run-up to Japan for the Doolittle raid and were only available to fly in combat after the B-25s had launched. There was no time or opportunity for squadron training and the all important combat raid missions that the Yorktown and Enterprise crews had conducted. The Midway carrier strike was the first combat mission for VS, VB, VT, and VF 8 and the results may have shown that. They had the guts but not the skills. Those would show later.

]]> By: Byron http://blog.usni.org/2009/06/05/midway-67-years-later-lessons-learned/comment-page-1/#comment-129086 Byron Wed, 22 Jul 2009 20:39:14 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=3130#comment-129086 It was serendipity, for sure. Something I forgot to mention, back when this first came out. Yes, Marc Mitscher had a hand that day...but made up for it later at the Turkey Shoot when he turned all the lights on. It was serendipity, for sure.

Something I forgot to mention, back when this first came out. Yes, Marc Mitscher had a hand that day…but made up for it later at the Turkey Shoot when he turned all the lights on.

]]> By: chad rane http://blog.usni.org/2009/06/05/midway-67-years-later-lessons-learned/comment-page-1/#comment-129060 chad rane Wed, 22 Jul 2009 18:27:27 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=3130#comment-129060 Yorktown damage control had another affect on the outcome... it probably spared Enterprise or Hornet from attack. After the first successful attack by japanese units, Yorktown was hit & burning. When Japanese commanders from Hiryu briefed pilots for the second attacks (after the other three IJN carriers were out of commission), they emphasized to the pilots that they should attack the carriers that had not been damaged. By the time those attack groups made there way to the us task force, they came upon Yorktown again. By this time, the men on yorktown had suppressed their fires and battle damage from the morning--yorktown was limping but still in the game. The IJN pilots thought she was one of the undamaged US carriers and attacked. Though this resulted in the loss of Yorktown, the result was that she occupied to full air group attacks, when the Japanese might have been better off attacking Hornet or Enterprise. At the very least, I don't think they would have poured their entire attack force if Yorktown had still been burning and showed herself to be wounded. Yorktown damage control had another affect on the outcome… it probably spared Enterprise or Hornet from attack. After the first successful attack by japanese units, Yorktown was hit & burning. When Japanese commanders from Hiryu briefed pilots for the second attacks (after the other three IJN carriers were out of commission), they emphasized to the pilots that they should attack the carriers that had not been damaged. By the time those attack groups made there way to the us task force, they came upon Yorktown again. By this time, the men on yorktown had suppressed their fires and battle damage from the morning–yorktown was limping but still in the game. The IJN pilots thought she was one of the undamaged US carriers and attacked. Though this resulted in the loss of Yorktown, the result was that she occupied to full air group attacks, when the Japanese might have been better off attacking Hornet or Enterprise. At the very least, I don’t think they would have poured their entire attack force if Yorktown had still been burning and showed herself to be wounded.

]]> By: Sea Links « New Wars http://blog.usni.org/2009/06/05/midway-67-years-later-lessons-learned/comment-page-1/#comment-115480 Sea Links « New Wars Fri, 12 Jun 2009 09:49:20 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=3130#comment-115480 [...] Battle of Midway Lessons Learned. (US Naval Institute) [...] [...] Battle of Midway Lessons Learned. (US Naval Institute) [...]

]]> By: UltimaRatioReg http://blog.usni.org/2009/06/05/midway-67-years-later-lessons-learned/comment-page-1/#comment-114469 UltimaRatioReg Sat, 06 Jun 2009 01:17:41 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=3130#comment-114469 THIS is why there are times where I just love this blog. Learning something all the time. (Not easy for a Marine with a smallish brain!) Excellent point on both damage control and urgency of the repair yards. I have a very interesting book of transcripts of prisoner interrogations of senior IJN officers in the 1945-46 time frame. They seemed very reluctant to talk about damage to Shokaku from Coral Sea and whether or not they could have repaired her damage in the nearly eleven days in between her arrival at Kure (May 18th?) and when she would have had to depart to participate in the action at Midway. THIS is why there are times where I just love this blog. Learning something all the time. (Not easy for a Marine with a smallish brain!)

Excellent point on both damage control and urgency of the repair yards. I have a very interesting book of transcripts of prisoner interrogations of senior IJN officers in the 1945-46 time frame. They seemed very reluctant to talk about damage to Shokaku from Coral Sea and whether or not they could have repaired her damage in the nearly eleven days in between her arrival at Kure (May 18th?) and when she would have had to depart to participate in the action at Midway.

]]> By: SteelJaw http://blog.usni.org/2009/06/05/midway-67-years-later-lessons-learned/comment-page-1/#comment-114468 SteelJaw Sat, 06 Jun 2009 01:04:18 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=3130#comment-114468 <i>who knew, another NASCAR fan</i> ...since '84... - SJS who knew, another NASCAR fan
…since ’84…
- SJS

]]> By: Byron http://blog.usni.org/2009/06/05/midway-67-years-later-lessons-learned/comment-page-1/#comment-114459 Byron Fri, 05 Jun 2009 22:35:55 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=3130#comment-114459 @Andy: well said. "The Big E" politely walks around that situation, but also makes it plain that someone didn't have it together, and that with all three carriers, a killing blow on the first strike could have been dealt, and the loss of Yorktown averted. @SJS: who knew, another NASCAR fan ;) @Andy: well said. “The Big E” politely walks around that situation, but also makes it plain that someone didn’t have it together, and that with all three carriers, a killing blow on the first strike could have been dealt, and the loss of Yorktown averted.

@SJS: who knew, another NASCAR fan ;)

]]> By: Chuck Hill http://blog.usni.org/2009/06/05/midway-67-years-later-lessons-learned/comment-page-1/#comment-114448 Chuck Hill Fri, 05 Jun 2009 21:08:11 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=3130#comment-114448 Nicely done. Nicely done.

]]> By: Andy (JADAA) http://blog.usni.org/2009/06/05/midway-67-years-later-lessons-learned/comment-page-1/#comment-114439 Andy (JADAA) Fri, 05 Jun 2009 20:14:23 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=3130#comment-114439 SJ, Some additional thoughts from the cheap seats in the back of the Ready Room: --Kido Butai demonstrated a heretofore advanced capacity to launch multiple, coordinated strikes from a Task Force, wherein air groups from each carrier planned and operated together. At this point in the game we were only able send CAG-sized strike packages which operated independently of one another, thus limiting the size of the package and the potential advantages of large, coordinated groups of aircraft arriving over a target in a planned sequence to visit maximum violence upon the enemy. --Hornet's utterly dismal performance has historically been laid at feet of the Air Wing Commander, Stanhope Ring, with no small amount of justification. Yet many casual historians fail to account for the fact that at that period of time the CV CO also had a huge say in how the Air Wing was tactically employed. (See above) Who was Hornet's CO? None other than the subsequently officially revered Marc Mitscher who backed his CAG's dodgy strike plan despite vigorous and vocal opposition to the plan and it's execution from the skippers of his VF and VT squadrons. To the credit of both Mitscher and Ring, they learned from their mistakes; Mitscher went on to celebrated success as a TF commander. Ring also learned and had subsequent better results and displayed better judgment later in the war. Nonetheless he was dogged by his performance and judgment that fateful day both professionally and personally until his death. As I have remarked elsewhere, we seem to be fated to repeat the bitter lessons of history over and over. Until such time as those who help define our naval culture recognize that technological excellence needs the tempering of such disdained disciplines as History, the story will remain much the same and blood and treasure will be spilled to, as the song goes "go back, Jack, and do it again." VR, Andy SJ,
Some additional thoughts from the cheap seats in the back of the Ready Room:
–Kido Butai demonstrated a heretofore advanced capacity to launch multiple, coordinated strikes from a Task Force, wherein air groups from each carrier planned and operated together. At this point in the game we were only able send CAG-sized strike packages which operated independently of one another, thus limiting the size of the package and the potential advantages of large, coordinated groups of aircraft arriving over a target in a planned sequence to visit maximum violence upon the enemy.

–Hornet’s utterly dismal performance has historically been laid at feet of the Air Wing Commander, Stanhope Ring, with no small amount of justification. Yet many casual historians fail to account for the fact that at that period of time the CV CO also had a huge say in how the Air Wing was tactically employed. (See above) Who was Hornet’s CO? None other than the subsequently officially revered Marc Mitscher who backed his CAG’s dodgy strike plan despite vigorous and vocal opposition to the plan and it’s execution from the skippers of his VF and VT squadrons. To the credit of both Mitscher and Ring, they learned from their mistakes; Mitscher went on to celebrated success as a TF commander. Ring also learned and had subsequent better results and displayed better judgment later in the war. Nonetheless he was dogged by his performance and judgment that fateful day both professionally and personally until his death.

As I have remarked elsewhere, we seem to be fated to repeat the bitter lessons of history over and over. Until such time as those who help define our naval culture recognize that technological excellence needs the tempering of such disdained disciplines as History, the story will remain much the same and blood and treasure will be spilled to, as the song goes “go back, Jack, and do it again.”

VR,
Andy

]]> By: SteelJaw http://blog.usni.org/2009/06/05/midway-67-years-later-lessons-learned/comment-page-1/#comment-114438 SteelJaw Fri, 05 Jun 2009 20:13:41 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=3130#comment-114438 <i>And in the NASCAR world, luck means, “if you ain’t cheatin’, you ain’t tryin’”</i> That's only what they say on their way *out* of the big black and yellow trailer... ;) - SJS And in the NASCAR world, luck means, “if you ain’t cheatin’, you ain’t tryin’”
That’s only what they say on their way *out* of the big black and yellow trailer… ;)
- SJS

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