LTJG Mabus

LTJG Mabus

In trying times, you have to find your guilty pleasures where you can (and in keeping with the right spirit, of course).

Along those lines, over the last few days we have had some fun over at my home blog with the new SECNAV’s political background. Make no mistake, that is a very important skill to have, and one we all hope the SECNAV will put to very good use. However, sometimes you need to hit the rewind button, diagram and parse a sentence to get the meaning.

Heisman or fried air, you decide. One way or another, nice verbal juke.

Levin had just finished remarking about the LCS program’s cost growth. Although he did not mention that one of the first two ships had passed the $700 million mark, he questioned if the service can meet the $460 million cost cap imposed by Congress on the ships the Navy is asking for in 2010.”Is there a realistic prospect that you’ll be able to do it?” Levin asked.

I think there’s a realistic prospect we can strive toward that goal,” replied Navy Secretary Ray Mabus, who cited the lack of a cost escalation provision in the congressional spending limit on LCS, despite rising labor costs and inflation, which “have frankly made that less realistic.”

You need to go back and read that again to fully soak in the Beltway Beautiful of it all.  Do you think the warhorse Sen. Levin really knew that once that was over, that from the other side of the room the SECNAV was holding the good Senator’s jock under the table?

I’m not sure what a good comeback by Sen. Levin would be, but one of my readers “Old H-2 Guy” gets about as close as you can get.

Do, or do not….there is no strive.”
(With apologies to Yoda)

Remind me not to argue with the new SECNAV face-to-face; I don’t think I have the skilz.




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  • Byron

    Another 670 tons, you’ll have an FFG ;)

  • Scott B.

    Byron said : “Another 670 tons, you’ll have an FFG”

    Another 670 tons and she’ll be a submarine.

  • Larry Schumacher

    “The replacement for the frigates will be the Littoral Combat Ship…” That is appalling. I do not understand why the Navy planners see a reduced need for escorts in an era of capable diesel subs in the hands of countries whose leaders need major doses of Prozac. LCS 1 can only sustain 15kt under diesel. If she has to escort a 20 kt ship she will either have to use a sprint- cruise profile or augment her diesels with the turbines causing major logistical considerations. As for LCS2 she might very well be suited as to cruise but will her complex hullform allow her to keep up with her charges in the confused heavy seas following a typhoon? Historically escort sailors spend as much time under the water as on top in heavy seas and the abrupt transition from the stilleto bow to the sponsons on LCS2 might be an issue. Lets get her in the water and see what she can do before we bet the farm on her. Until then: SLEP THE FIGS!

  • Natty Bowditch

    So much misinformation, so little time.

    Where did the $225M price tag come from? That’s the number the USN came up with to sell the LCS to Congress. That’s also the number LM and GD agreed to build the ship for. So, you have two sides not being completely honest.

    A lot of speculation about handling systems in the RMZ and inclining experiments that’s baseless and do little except expose the ignorance of its purveyors.

    SLEPing the FFGs? Uh uh. One question: which helos do you intend to fly on and off your SLEPed FFG in 2015? Guess what? It won’t be the 60B. And it won’t be the new 60R ’cause it won’t fit on the SLEPed FFG. I suppose you could get 1 Romeo onboard. But when that goes down, your stern section becomes ballast.

    Don’t fear change, embrace it.

  • http://xbradtc.wordpress.com XBradTC

    A Romeo won’t fit on a FFG? How?

  • Bill

    “Regarding the 130% overweight. The devil is in the details. How much margin did the original design have? Are you sure that the hull and propulsion plant have not changed to account for the growth? Are you sure that the hull and propulsion plant did not have any margin for growth in the original design? I don’t have the answers for any of these questions”

    Sorry for long reference copy..

    To his credit, Don Blount’s hull design is/was very forgiving when it comes to weight margins BUT the parent hull design had a huge installed power and power margin when comparing the original deisgn to LCS using simple Froude scaling. Modern single-stage mixed-flow waterjets are quite unforgiving of overload..their cavitation boundaries are very often quite close to the drag curve at moderate speeds, especially when it comes hull like LCS-1 where there is a break or ‘hump’ in the speed-drag curve.

    LCS-1 went in to detail design for construction at 2250 tons full load. I do not remember what the service life growth margin was on that..but guarantee you it was nothing remotely close to 1000 tons.

    I’ve been around this stretch of ‘boat design; race track many times…and won more than a few too.

  • sid

    Slow the LCS down, and you take away what (specious) little sliver of Survivability that the original design speed was supposed to afford.

    Time to bring this back above the fold….

    RADM Hamilton: As you know from reading the requirements documents, the survivability piece on LCS is different than DDG 51 or DDX or several of our other combatants. And what we’ve chosen to do here is couple high speed and maneuverability and situational awareness in ways that allow LCS to be in the right place at the right time and to be out of the right place at the wrong time. Okay?

    We have some modeling and simulation of the designs and know what effects different weapons might bring to those particular designs. But again, because our desire for speed gets us to alternative and lighter materials, the damage tolerance for large cruise missiles for example are not the same as those on a DDG 51.

  • Benjamin Walthrop

    Bill,

    Do you view the coming cavitation erosion problems or any other issues associated with waterjet cavitation to be a fatal flaw in the design? I ask because you seem to have some valuable insight on this subject, and I really don’t know.

    V/R,

  • sid

    What I said about the LCS just shy of a year ago over at Galrahn’s place is still worth slappin’ a Jackson on the table over…

    It is a ship that can’t be bought in adequate numbers because it is too big and expensive (largely due to the silly speed “requirement”), and is not adequately survivable as an individual unit to engage in “Littoral Combat”…its supposed primary mission.

    And it will most likely be miscast (an be put at significant risk) as an ersatz Frigate.

    Any takers?

  • Benjamin Walthrop

    Bill,

    I went over to the DLBA website, and did a quick scan of his paper titled “Design of Propulsion Systems for High Speed Craft.” I am not an expert, but if I am reading the paper correctly, your concern regarding the weight issues on LCS-1 relate to the fact that the thrust margin of the waterjets when transitioning from displacement to planing (and any cavitation thrust losses) may not be sufficient and could result in an LCS-1 (at full load) that may not be able to get up on plane. Is this a correct read?

    V/R,

  • Bill

    Ben;

    To both questions you raised..since they are related.

    The jet sizing is not a ‘fatal flaw’ necessarily but it certain is a major one given that the problem canot be fixed by changing impeller pitch and requires a larger overall jet diameter.

    For a fully-planing monohull, hydrofoils and surface effect ships, the cavitation limit as nearly 100% all about getting past hump without more than intermittent or brief period of cavitation at worst..and none preferred. The magnitude of the hump for any of the aforementioned vessels is very (VERY) sensitive to weight exceeding critical loading on whatever means of sustention we’re talking about.

    For a semi-planing hull like LCS-1 is..it can and does get a little uglier because the hump is not as distinct and you don’t get a clean break and digression between WJ cav limit and the drag curve as functions of speed. So when you miss your sums in the jet selection or overload the design you based you selection on..you can cross in to the cav zone and sorta just ‘stay there’ even as your speed increases.

  • Scott B.

    RADM Hamilton said : “We have some modeling and simulation of the designs and know what effects different weapons might bring to those particular designs.”

    If I am not mistaken, RADM Hamilton made this statement during the Q&A session of LCS Media Forum on 14 June 2004.

    However, despite all the modeling and simulation (hint : PPT slidewriting doesn’t qualify ;) ), the DOT&E noted in his annual report for FY2007 (dated December 2007) that :

    “The Navy still needs to complete the risk assessment to confirm that Level I survivability is sufficient for a class of small combatants”

    I didn’t get a chance to read the DOT&E annual report for FY2008. Is this recommendation (first made by DOT&E in FY2005) still in there ?

  • sid

    I didn’t get a chance to read the DOT&E annual report for FY2008. Is this recommendation (first made by DOT&E in FY2005) still in there?

    I’m not sure Scott. You are better at sleuthing these sources out than me ;-)

    However, the CRS Report from last Nov. had this to say…

    The survivability standard for the LCS was increased as part of the issuing of NVR to one that would be sufficient to save not only the ship’s crew, but the ship as well. (Other U.S. Navy combat ships are built to a still-higher survivability standard that is sufficient not only to save the crew and the ship, but to permit the ship to keep fighting even though it has sustained damage.)

    So, it still appears the LCS designs are bascially still Level I ships even after the incorporation of NVR.

  • Scott B.

    Sid said : “So, it still appears the LCS designs are bascially still Level I ships even after the incorporation of NVR.”

    Well, what the GAO says in its latest report on Major Weapon Programs, is exactly this :

    “In fact, an inclining experiment performed during acceptance trials showed LCS-1 may not meet Navy stability requirements for the damaged ship condition.”

    So as it stands currently, LCS-1 may not even achieve Level 1.

  • Byron

    And did that inclining experiment (which are a pain in the ass to do) add in the weight of NLOS PAM modules? If it did not then the situation is even more problematic.

  • Byron

    P.S: Sid, glad to see you back ;)

  • sid

    And did that inclining experiment (which are a pain in the ass to do) add in the weight of NLOS PAM modules? If it did not then the situation is even more problematic.

    Glad to be back amongst friends Byron…

    So…How much weight will NLOS add?… Will there be any splinter protection for the system?… Like perhaps armored power cables to the box?… Any kevlar blankets for the module huts?…What will happen when splinters find that cluster of hydraulics tucked away there starboard aft?…Or they find the barrels of lube oil?

    And what is the need of semi-planing hull if the ship is too slow to get on a step?

    Just askin’…

  • UltimaRatioReg

    So, lemme get this straight….

    We have a ship that, when sufficiently armed, has severe stability issues, doesn’t even meet the survivability requirements to save the crew and ship (let alone, *gasp*, remain in the fight), costs more than three times initial estimates, but is designed to venture into the most lethal of envelopes to perform its primary mission? A Littoral Combat Ship that should avoid both the littoral AND combat?

  • sid

    i would recommend taking a gander at the reports here

    The most catastrophic instances of battle damage, and a consistent factor in ship losses, occurred when internal ammunition stores were breached by splinters.

    For you folks who want to arm the less than Level I Survivability LCS hulls with all kinds of neat stuff like NLOS and helo launched torpedoes…

    Where are you going to put this stuff where it can be adequately protected?…

    And what will that protection cost in terms of weight?

  • UltimaRatioReg

    Sid,

    No matter. Put me down for 55!

  • Systems Adict

    Greets folks !

    Lovin this “discussion”, so had to join in….

    “SLEP THE FIGS!”…. ??

    ‘Tis a “viable” option, but do YOU really wanna throw squillions of bucks on extending the life of a 24 yr old hull, so it will last 6-10 years ?

    I’m sure that the European navies will willing flog you some of their ex-FFG’s & DD’s, instead of punting them to our colonies in the Asian Pacific, or South America, but you’ll have to do a lot of begging to jump the queue…

    After all, they ARE better ! (watching Leanders / Type 21 FFG’s being sold onto their 3rd owners after 30 – 40 years service is proof of that !)

    BETTER idea, come to Europe, BUY the designs to say the UK’s Type 23 Hull, or the German Type 124′s, take them home & BUILD em !

    Yes, the designs are getting on for 30 yrs or more old (1st Type 23 was built & launched in the mid to late 80′s), but take them, fit US equipment for commonality with the rest of the fleet, (x2 Diesels / x2 GT’s – BUT DON’T FIT AEIGIS! / Buy a European Radar like SMART-L or Sampson).

    Hull designs are capable of over 30 kts, would accept the Mk41 Gun & there’s plenty space for VLS, a crew of 170 approx & a Sea Hawk Helo.

    However, they’re limited in the Littorals, esp. if ya fit the Hull Mounted Sonar dome !

    But getting back on Topic…

    LCS / Aluminum / Corrosion – speak to our friends from Oz.

    WHY ?

    Haven’t they been running fast ferrys & CAT’s for years.

    Oh, that’s where the Austal idea came from….

    Then again, maybe you should have learned from the Swede’s, the Norwegian’s & the Brits, going down the “composite” route for a light hull, then corrosion wouldn’t be an issue (GRP doesn’t rust !). After all, the Brits learned the hard way in 82, that Aluminum hulls + fire = DEATH.

    As for weight vs costs…

    Mmmm.. you’re in a right tight bind there, & the recession isn’t gonna help. LCS 3 onwards WILL NOT cost less the $500M (in my opinion), unless someone, somewhere cooks the books….

    …& as for comments about “issues” with Design/Build/Testing, all being run in parallel, well, it works on paper, is hard to achieve WITHOUT additional costs / delays / design problems, but in the end you get a hull that will be in the water with sailors onboard in LESS THAN HALF the time of a 1960′s or 70′s contract(3 – 5 years, instead of 7 – 12 years).

    Only way you’ll improve on it, is by having another WWII scenario, where the designs were forced thru, modifying hulls “on the hoof”, so you have a batch of 3 – 6 hulls, all using the same hull form, but each with minor improvements / changes over it’s predecessor. (& YES I KNOW that’s wot’s “happenin” with the Burke’s, but not on the same scale / level!)

    Anyways, that’s enuff of a rant from Blighty’s shore’s, I’ll be back in a day or 2 to see what y’all are saying…

    Systems Adict

  • Scott B.

    UltimaRatioReg said : “No matter. Put me down for 55!”

    Here is what Robert O. Work suggested in his report for the CSBA dated February 17, 2009 and entitled The US Navy: Charting a Course for Tomorrow’s Fleet, page 73 :

    “By continuing to produce four LCSs per year after reaching the TFBN requirement of fifty-five ships, replacing the oldest four LCSs on a one-for-one basis, and then selling or transferring the decommissioned ships to US allies, the Navy will have a small combatant shipbuilding plan that is perfectly suited for its new maritime strategy.”

    In effect, what this potentially implies is that, on average, each LCS would have a service life of about 15 years in the US Navy.

    In other words, assuming a cost of $550 million for one seaframe + one mission package, what this recommendation means is that each LCS would require a $1.1 billion investment over a period of 30 years. (you might be able to recoup some of this sum IF you manage to sell, rather than simply transfer, the decommissioned ships to US allies).

    As most people here already know, Robert O. Work was confirmed as the Under Secretary of the Navy on May 19, 2009.

  • sid

    As most people here already know, Robert O. Work was confirmed as the Under Secretary of the Navy on May 19, 2009.

    An exchange I with “evenmorework” over at Springbored’s place.

    That the good Colonel -now UnderSecretary- didn’t blow me off like an (emotional, ankle-bitin’) insignificant piece of lint says alot about the man’s patience…

  • sid

    An exchange I with “evenmorework” over at Springbored’s place.,/i>

    Oh yeah…

    Didn’t realize until after the fact who I was sparring with.

  • UltimaRatioReg

    Sid,

    He’s (Col Work) a smart cookie, ain’t he? (Of course he is, he’s a Marine Artilleryman!) Made some good points, as did you.

    The proof will be in how the sensor-shooter “network centric” approach stretches the fundamentals of war at sea.

    Perhaps this IS a new age where 300 ships can dominate the blue and brown waters. But the enemy is much better at finding our vulnerabilities than we are, and with less to lose, much quicker and more willing to adapt. They have/will have sensor networks, too. Maritime denial assets, anyone?

  • sid

    The proof will be in how the sensor-shooter “network centric” approach stretches the fundamentals of war at sea.

    Point I was trying to make was vividly illustrated here just weeks after that exchange.

    And SJS’s post above, along with the what happened to the Pueblo and the EC-121 the next year, all speak to the dangers inherent to network nodes with little “Staying Power”…

  • UltimaRatioReg

    Sid,

    You got that right, re: Pueblo and EC-121. All the sensors in the world don’t help you when you haven’t got enough shooters to go around. And if your eyes are your strength AND your vulnerability, it won’t take the enemy long to figure out how to poke ‘em.

  • http://engineerinsurance.blogoak.com/ Michele E. Graham

    You can’t operate a company by fear, because the way to eliminate fear is to avoid criticism

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