Surface Warfare Still Searches for 21st Century Ideas

24th

Surface Warfare Still Searches for 21st Century Ideas

June 2009

“Gentlemen, of the 313-ship fleet — we’re really just giving lip service to that, aren’t we. I mean, there’s been no proposal to achieve a rate that would get us there. As a matter of fact, it seems that we’re actually falling away from that based on the rate of ships being decommissioned outpacing the rate of production.”

- Sen. Roger Wicker (R-MISS), Senate Armed Services Seapower Subcommittee, June 16, 2009

In the same hearing (video here), Vice Adm. Barry McCullough made the following statement in specific reference to the number of ships in the fleet.

“While the Navy can always be present persistently in areas of our choosing, we lack the capacity to be persistently present globally. This creates a presence deficit, if you will, where we are unable to meet combatant commander demands.”

Sean Stackley also stated in that hearing the Navy would need at least a 10-ship per year build rate to reach the 313-ship fleet benchmark in the 2020 time frame. Unfortunately, the Navy is only buying 8 ships in FY2010, meaning the Navy will need to buy 102 ships between FY 2011 and FY 2020 to reach the 313-ship mark. The timing couldn’t be more challenging for the Navy. For a look into the planning challenge, the FY 2010 Navy SCN budget is $12B; with $3.4B in RCOHs, EROs, and NDSF, for a combined $15.4B annually.

Current plans call for the Virginia class submarine procurement alone to consume an estimated 33%, $4 billion SCN annually, of the Navy SCN budget for the next decade. Additionally, with a recent CBO estimated cost to be around $10 billion for new CVNs, which are built and paid for over a period of 5 years, an additional estimated $2B will be spent on aircraft carriers over the same period of time. That means that $6B, or half, of the SCN budget from FY11-FY20 will be used to procure 20 submarines and 2 aircraft carriers; only 22 ships of the 102 needed to reach the 313-ship threshold. Where will the other 80 ships come from, and what will they look like?

Presumably, 48 of the ships will be the Littoral Combat Ship at an estimated $460M each, or a total cost just over $23.1B SCN of the remaining $60B for the decade. Also presumably, the Navy will buy 1 LPD-17 (FY11), 2 JCC(R), 2 LHA(R), and 1 LHD(X) over the next decade at minimum, which combined will cost around $1.7B, $2B, $3.5B and $3.5B each respectively, or $16.2B SCN total. That would give the Navy 53 of the 80 ships with $20.7B SCN to spend the remainder of the decade.

Over a ten year period, based on FY 2010 budget numbers the Navy would have $34B to spend on RCOHs, EROs, and NDSF. The question though is how far that goes, and how many hulls can the Navy afford. In previous planning documents, the Navy had indicated over that period 13 JHSVs, 3 Maritime Prepositioning Ship-Cargo variants, 3 Maritime Prepositioning Ship-Dock variants (also known as the MLP), 1 T-AGOS(X), 3 T-AO(X), 1 T-ARS(X), and 1 T-ATF(X) would be built. Is this affordable? It is unclear, RCOHs are expensive, but if it could be achieved the Navy would get an additional 25 ships.

Between the SCN totals described above for 20 submarines, 2 CVNs, 53 other SCN purchased ships, and the 25 support ships, that would give the Navy 100 of the 102 ships necessary to meet the 313-ship fleet, with a total of $20.7 billion to spare. Unfortunately, the list above contains purchases for zero major surface combatants. While it is true the Navy will not retire a single cruiser or destroyer during that entire time frame, at best a strategy for building DDG-51s which run at a cost of around $2B each will allow for only 10 destroyers to be purchased with the remaining $20.7B SCN. That would mean no CG(X) replacements, and obviously will not provide enough work to sustain the shipbuilding industry.

The point of this exercise is to highlight 4 points that can be drawn from the data.

1) The Navy is not in a terrible position to reach 313-ships by FY 2020, even as the challenges are obvious. The Navy is in a very terrible position towards sustaining 313-ships beyond 2025 due to the rapid retirement of surface combatants beginning in 2025. Replacing surface combatants beginning in that time frame will be very difficult, because at the same time the Navy will also need to replace retiring platforms including amphibious ships, logistics ships, and ballistic missile submarines. Unless amphibious ships or logistics ships are replaced over the next decade, the rate of retiring surface combatants beginning in FY 2025 will greatly outpace capacity to replace those large, expensive hulls.

2) A SLEP Program for the FFG is not a solution, as a FFG SLEP program would consume funding for new ships to get the fleet to FY 2025. In playing with the various possible options, I have been unable to outline any conherent plan where a FFG SLEP wouldn’t compound the surface combatant numerical challenges that begin in 2025. I don’t believe any legitimate argument exists for a SLEP FFG program towards addressing the Navy’s surface combatant numerical challenges.

3) The Littoral Combat Ship represents $23.1B of the available $60B for SCN spending options and alternatives over the next decade. The LCS accounts for around 38.5% of the available SCN funding. It is legitimate to question whether this platform represents a cost effective investment for the capabilities delivered and expected over a 30 year hull life. Obviously unmanned technology is the future, and modularity is a critical technology for the future Navy, but the Littoral Combat Ship is a relatively small platform for modular payloads, and it is still unclear how big the Navy may desire unmanned technologies to be for combat operations over the next 30 years. It is also very debatable whether the Littoral Combat Ship is well designed for combat in the littorals, considering the LCS was designed with the survivability rating of a logistics ship. The Navy has not determined yet how much flexibility the LCS brings to the fleet. Is the LCS too big for littorals? Is the LCS too small to be an effective unmanned mothership? Does the LCS have enough crew to effectively support manpower intensive operations like fighting piracy? Does the LCS have enough endurance to meet combatant commander requirements? What if the LCS turns out to be only part of the solution to the many requirements this ship is touted to meet? The LCS is more of a question today than it is an answer, but the Navy touts the platform as if the reverse was true.

4) Vice Adm. Barry McCullough stated in testimony the places where this “presence deficit” is identified includes “with new partners in Africa, the Black Sea, the Baltic region, and the Indian Ocean.” McCullough also went on to say “Africa Command capacity demands will not mitigate the growing European Command requirement” and “Southern Command capacity has consistently required more presence that largely goes unfilled.” All of these places suggest the “presence deficit” is specific to presence of the surface combatant force, but most of those places suggest the “presence deficit” is not in regards to high end combat capabilities, but the necessity to engage in littoral places and ungoverned spaces where local Coast Guards are largely incapable of meeting the regional maritime security requirements.

In my opinion, all signs suggest the Navy needs to substancially increase the quantity of surface ships to meet emerging trends and forward commander requirements, but it appears fiscally impossible to do so when the only two surface vessel options includes only two options, the $460M LCS and $2B DDG-51. Of all the discussions to be had in the QDR process, not to mention when taking the long view of the future and accounting for the history of naval construction since the end of the cold war, surface warfare is in dire need of new fleet ideas, new logistics models for sustaining forward presence, and new technologies to meet the challenges of emerging trends in naval combat. With each competing fleet model proposed, tested, and evaluated as part of the QDR process, the Navy would be very wise to study all of these ideas carefully and find the best ideas in surface warfare that can be applied to building a larger, more cost effecient 21st century fleet that contains the kind of capabilities the trends suggest will be in demand in the future.

Posted by galrahn in Uncategorized

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Scott B.

Galrahn said : “That could mean a number of things, but I got the impression based on what I know about LCS-1 the report is talking about water in the large mission bays.”

I’m willing to speculate that the overweight is not in the large water bays.

And I don’t take much risk with this speculation…
Byron

It’s a launcher like any other, with the exception that it can be mounted to a deck and then…connected by cables for both power and to a console that will read on-board conditions and to upload data. If the cable breaks, if the electricity goes out…That’s where damage control teams come into action. Walk around a typical Navy ship. You’ll see these whacking thick cables with odd connectors on the end. They’re casualty power cables, designed to brige around a break in the cable system. Absolutely part of damage control training, and no automated system can work around this. Is anyone willing to tell Sid, Scott and myself, that all critical piping and electic lines are built redundantly?
http://www.informationdissemination.net/ Galrahn

And, since WWII, carriers have only operated in uncontested bastions.

Based on the no-go rule for the Navy to concede the 25nm out from shore, I’d say the CONOP of the Navy is to operate where there are fewer contested bastions, regardless of ship type.

It will be far different for the LCS. They are expected be present in the littorals prior to, and during the very initial stages of conflict.

I understand this is a CONOP assumption.

As recently as last week, I am 100% sure the CONOP for the LCS is being written in pencil and with a big eraser. I have the impression they are still working through exactly how to operate this ship, and I think they have discovered some of the criticisms people have been saying regarding the “Littoral” aspect of the LCS.

To make matters worse for these fragile ships, all that running to and fro at high speed, then stopping to launch and retrieve those valuable offboard assets, and all the radiating it will take to “wrangle” them, will make these ships juicy targets indeed for an enemy in waiting.

This is another CONOP assumption. I assure you that this has not happened yet in operational testing with LCS-1. They haven’t even refueled the ship enough at sea to try this yet.

So, how many robots will a commander be willing to lose when an LCS is very quickly rendered mission incapable by even a minimal attack? And any deployed robots are abandoned or lost (and potentially exploited by the enemy)?

I think you are too easily assuming a condition of mission incapable after a minimal attack. We don’t know enough to assume that. I would assume recovery of robots will be a factor determined by the on scene commander, and to the degree of risk in the recovery factoring in the need. Some of these systems are intended to be throw away, although I don’t see us producing them at a rate to suggest we have reached that point yet.

Your second question is a good question I don’t have answers to. It should also be pointed out that the LCS can only perform limited repairs to all its ‘robot’ technology.
sid

I think you are too easily assuming a condition of mission incapable after a minimal attack.

Can’t find it in Ewing’s blog just now…but remember that lube oil casualty?

Also, all the unprotected electrical and hydraulic systems draped along the sides of hull seen here suggest it would take little effort to disable this ship…
http://www.informationdissemination.net/ Galrahn

Being a mothership for manned and unmanned systems doesn’t describe a role, it merely describes a technical solution implemented to accomplish a mission, i.e. SUW, ASW and MIW in the case of LCS.

Once you get this bit of narrative right, the question is whether LCS can accomplish any of these missions effectively, whether LCS can do it cost effectively or not and whether another design could do it more economically and/or more effectively.

Fair. Role was the wrong word, but suggesting ships are built to meet specific missions isn’t right either. In WWII, every ship except mine craft was designed to perform one mission, and by the end of the war was used in a different role.

I think you are asking the wrong question. What function does the Navy need provided from its smaller ships. Clearly ASW, MIW, and ASuW of small ships are some of these functions, but we have already seen other proposals for modules to fill other functions necessary.

Is the LCS being asked to meet that requirement because it is designed well to do so, or because it is the only small ship available to potentially do so?

At a higher level, what does the Navy need, and are smaller ships the way to meet that need because of design or because of costs?

I think the frigate vs LCS debate at the high level and detail level would be a fun discussion.
sid

Note how a similarly placed electrical junction box on the hull interior aboard the USS Crockett allowed an RPG round to disable her 3 inch mount during a firefight…
sid

More pics here…

Mighty little hole for such a big impact…
sid

Dang it…

Oh well, try this.

As I said. Mighty little hole for such a big impact.
UltimaRatioReg

Sid,

Yep, RPG impact, or a 23mm cannon shell (or even a 14.5 or 12.7 SLAP) bouncing around in there, in an aluminum hull, with little compartmentation….

Like the Steve Martin scene in “My Blue Heaven”; ..it goes in one side and bounces around like Pac Man till you die.”
Scott B.

URR said : “Yep, RPG impact, or a 23mm cannon shell (or even a 14.5 or 12.7 SLAP) bouncing around in there, in an aluminum hull, with little compartmentation….”

It’s even worse !

Here is what Norman Friedman wrote about the incident that involved USS Worden off Vietnam in 1972 :

“The Worden case is in some ways for more sobering, since it involved a type of damage to be expected in wartime : a Shrike anti-radar missile with a fragmentation warhead was accidentally dropped on the ship off Vietnam.

The fragments cut all topside waveguides and cable leads, and even damaged the wheelhouse; the ship lost all electric power for a time and for some hours was credited with less than 40 percent of her normal fighting capacity.

Her aluminium superstructure acted to multiply the fragments produced by the missile; every pellet from the missile produced two or more in the superstructure, so that instead of a shield it became a deadly instrument in its own right.“
Scott B.

Regarding Aluminum, here is what I posted somewhere else not so long ago :

—————————————————————–
Aluminum doesn’t burn, except in the form of finely divided powder or flaxe, in which case it will oxidize exothermically, much like other finely divided materials such as iron and titanium.

However :

a) aluminum alloys have a low resitance to temperature, with a softening point @ 200°C and a melting point @ 600°C, meaning aluminum structure will suffer structural collapse much faster than steel structures, ceteris paribus.

b) aluminum alloys exhibit a high thermal conductivity (aluminum conducts heat 2.5 to 9 times faster than steel), meaning that once a fire has taken hold of a compartment, the bulkheads surrounding that compartment will heat faster when made of aluminum (again ceteris paribus), eventually igniting the contents of surrounding compartments by radiant heat.

And that’s the crux of the matter : once a fire has taken hold, a ship is going to be in a world of hurt, and this is going to happen much faster when the ship is made of aluminum (again ceteris paribus).
Scott B.

Regarding Aluminum,

Regarding Aluminum, here is another post I made somewhere else not so long ago :

——————————————————————
Another problem with LCS-1 is that interactions between the steel hull and the aluminium superstructure are not without major *challenges*, e.g. :

1) Aluminium is difficult to join to steel structures (you need to use either explosion bonding or biweldable strips).

2) Aluminium can lead to galvanic corrosion with steel.

3) Aluminium has a coefficient of thermal expansion almost double to that of steel, which may cause distortions with temperature variations in service.

These *challenges* are not just hypothetical : for instance, in 1991, when USS Princeton detonated an acoustic mine under the ship’s quarterdeck (the blast detonating another mine 300 yards off the starboard beam), a 6-inch crack opened in the Princeton’s aluminium superstructure running up one side and down the other, with more than 10% of the superstructure separating from the main deck.
Scott B.

Galrahn said : “Based on the no-go rule for the Navy to concede the 25nm out from shore,”

I seem to remember I already posted this following comment on your website :

1) The 25NM stand-off has been around for about 15 years now, meaning it predates LCS by about 10 years or so (e.g. the 25NM stand-off was included in the USMC NSFS requirements established in November 1994 and has been of the NSFS pedigree ever since).

2) LCS wouldn’t operate inside the 25NM range band in anything but the most mundane environments.

3) There are LOTS of reasons why the 25NM stand-off exists.

4) Implementing this stand-off DOESN’T necessarily mean that you concede the 25nm out from shore, as you suggest.
Scott B.

And BTW, the stand-off is much more than 25NM for the carriers.
Larry Schumacher

G in answer to your question: “Show me one instance where a frigate would be optimal over LCS”, Assuming LCS1 vs OHP with tasking to escort fast Cruise ship or Merch with high value cargo. OHP is able to match speed with its charge throughout its range while LCS1 can sustain a little over 15 kt on diesel only. Lighting the turbines to match the 20kt of a Cruise ship is problematic due to the “Hump” of a Semi Planeing hullform plus other logistical and operational concerns. LCS could maintain coverage with sprint/cruise profiles and helos but would lack the deterrent factor of having a Warship on station.
A few points:
The Req. for blue water escort has not gone away.

Although a SLEP on OHP class will not help us in 2025 the ships are so useful now that a bobtail SLEP to keep them operational until their replacement is fully operational would be very prudent.

Seaworthyness and Persistance always give good value in the long run.

I am not an LCS detractor, I see as many potential advantages as I do potential hazards with the concept, but we need ships for the present while we are building the future. SLEP the Figs!
UltimaRatioReg

Byron,

You need to send Larry S. a free “SLEP the Figs!” souvenir T-shirt!
Benjamin Walthrop

Yes! Excellent. SLEP the FFGs and condemn the DDG-51s (disregarding the impacts to the rest of the fleet) to a 25 year service life. Good plan. Perhaps we can convince Byron and the rest of the maintenance providers to work for free in the interest of national security.

V/R,
Larry Schumacher

Ben, I fail to see how maintaining our OHPs adversly effects our Burkes. My thoughts on funding are as stimulus, pushed by Congress, with potential application to our DDG51s as well. I am sure you have noticed just how little of the Trillion+++ ia allocated to the military. If we want to fund anything we are going to have to get creative. Besides, every OHP in service frees up a Burke to be a Battlecruiser instead of an escort. From reading your posts I imagine that you could think up plenty of missions for an extra Burke.
Byron

Ben, one last time: kill ONE LCS, and you can fund a bobtail SLEP to 20 Figs. High school diploma math. No fear, either of causing a shortfall on the Burkes.
Benjamin Walthrop

“From reading your posts I imagine that you could think up plenty of missions for an extra Burke.”

I should have probably pursued a career as a fiction writer.

I can also imagine many uses for a SLEPed OHP. I just can’t see how funding it over other priorities makes any sense at all. I’m a little like Byron in this regard. If you can figure out a way to fund it, there are very few problems that cannot be solved through engineering and hard work.

I work within the constraints of the funding and national will. Not imagined funding, but what is actually appropriated (the national will part). If you cannot see the impact to the rest of the fleet by SLEPing the FFGs in the current environment, I cannot help you. The fiscal and technical realities don’t support this view. The fact remains that there would be extremely detrimental impacts to the rest of the fleet if my assumption of maintaining the current OM&N and OPN lines at the current levels while choosing to SLEP the FFGs remains correct.

If constraints (current O&MN and OPN funding as an example) change, I will certainly modify my view of the future. Depending on the funding (and national will) that modification of my view may or may not include SLEPing the FFGs.

One of the reasons I challenge the detractors of the LCS is that I have come to the conclusion that in the near term (3-5 years) the LCS is the platform (among others) that the USN will be required to make work in executing the national will. There is no easy solution in the cue despite what many believe. More effort is needed to determine what the national will is, and more effort is needed to figure out how to make the fleet work to support the national will than spending time critiquing past decisions. Realistically, the USN is at least 5 years away from reversing the decisions that influence our reality now. The USN (like all bureaucratic organizations) is constrained by history.

V/R,
sid

One of the reasons I challenge the detractors of the LCS is that I have come to the conclusion that in the near term (3-5 years) the LCS is the platform (among others) that the USN will be required to make work in executing the national will.

Added some emphasis to your words there Ben…

This is what I have been saying for several years. Under current plans, the LCS will become the default surface combatant. And despite G’s desires to see it only employed as an APD or DSM, will be thrust into main battleforce roles they were never designed for…Because there will be no choice.

Borrowing from Barron Brassey’s concerns for the battlecruisers a century ago…

An admiral having Freedoms and Invincibles in his fleet will be certain to put them in the line of battle, where their comparatively light protection would be at a disadvantage.

The Barron was talking about the Invincible Battlecruisers. His words sure did turn into a sad “I Told You So…
Byron

So no matter that the evidence before is is beginning to sound damning, just forge ahead because we have to? Ben, that’s exactly why I want to keep the Figs around a bit more! Scrap the LCS, buy a design from Europe if NorGruGenDyMcDon can’t come up with a better product themselves! For the love of God, you’re going to use a STEEL hull to hunt mines? Its lunacy! And don’t give me all the gas about the stupid little robots, Princeton thought she had lot’s of clearance on mines too, lot of good that was.

Stop the train of thought that says “we have to keep LCS because it’s the only idea we have”. That kind of thinking is just plain stupid.
Grampa Bluewater

“Aluminum can lead to galvanic corrosion with steel”

Wrong verb, WILL.
Grampa Bluewater

One of the unforeseen consequences of the early 90′s decision to keep the new contruction and sacrifice servicable ships in mid life is that the officer corps has lost the lore of keeping old ships in acceptable repair.

Additionally, the black art of tender repair of ships alongside is rapidly becoming one with the contents of the library in Alexandria.

As a result the young officers among us see ships repair as an intermittent treatment done in civilian yards at high cost, rather than something more akin to respiration (if you stop, even for a minute, you die).

Thus the “you can’t” vs “you must” exchange going on.
UltimaRatioReg

The “wrong funding pot” argument is pure semantics, when one gets down to brass tacks. The foolhardy and wasteful retirement (and disposal) of a great number of surface combatants with more than half of the service life remaining on them (Virginias, Spruance, first five Ticos) has left us devoid of the “presence” that ADM McCullogh refers to in Gal’s post.

This is also not an argument about “high-low mix” or platform capabilities. The replacements for these early retirements has been so far, next to NOTHING. They don’t necessarily have to be one-for-one. I get that. Combat power of newer units is usually greater than those they replace. But they can’t be the exorbitantly priced ones and twos as has been so far. Since 1991 we have lost more than two hundred ships from our Navy’s end strength, even with the commissioning of the fifty-odd DDG-51s.

Whether we like it or not, a FFG-7 and DDG-51 that has been modernized with a SLEP/FRAM (as would a SLEP Spruance, if we had not disposed of them) is far preferable to empty ocean. Which, with current attrition and our shipbuilding problems, we are fast headed for.

The official line always seems to be that we don’t like to SLEP/FRAM. It is undesirable, costs too much, not enough bang for the buck, etc. Yet, having observed for some time the Navy’s public and not-so-public statements about end-strength and mission requirements, I have not seen or heard of a single course of action that would not have our Navy shrink well below current strength. A 200-ship Navy, regardless of the mix, would be insufficient for our global commitments and interests.

The concern and debate about the relative merits of either of the LCS types may seem excessive. But if the LCS is going to be one of the three or four backbone ship types, built in relatively large numbers for the USN, the perceived shortcomings and vulnerabilities of the design and concept take on added import.

Should we have kept the numbers of surface combatants we ought to have, we might have had some leeway for a much more comprehensive proof of concept for the LCS design, instead of weaving the still-experimental vessels so centrally into our Navy’s future force structure.

What’s the solution? We need to keep shipbuilding going, it is true. How about a proven design, modernized, to bridge the gap between the perceived apocalyptic 2025 date and future successors to the current combatant types (with time to test and prove)? A design based on DDG-51, hull and engineering plant, with updates to weapons systems and electronics suites. And a modified CG-47 design, same principle. A LIMITED number of LCS, with an opportunity to run them through their paces, incorporate design and operational lessons learned, and THEN build the numbers desired.

In the mean time, the ships we have (FFG-7, DDG-51, CG-47) we keep. Service live extensions and modernizations as required. They are the most capable ships of their type extant. Do NOT make the mistake of early retirement again.
sid

An admiral having Freedoms and Invincibles

Make that “Independences”.

Other points…

At a time when the USN needs to look at fuel conservation as a significant Strategic and Operational consideration, the surface combatant fleet will be predominately made up by what could well be the most fuel inefficient ships produced in a century.

I ask…Again…How is 50 knots so much more a benefit than 35?

Other than the fact it makes for a cool picture in a commercial, and will will impress visitors on the “Ohh-Ahh” tours.

And that “impressive” 20 foot rooster tail does little good in the employment of the ships main battery.

All it does is showcase how the LCS concept -as currently built- is but a multi-billion dollar oxymoron.

I brought up the RPG burst on the Crockett to show that its the little design details that matter most. Moving that junction box off the hull to an interior location, perhaps provide an alternate box and cable run, and providing them with even minimal ballistic protection, would have allowed the ships main batter to stay functional.

Survivability in ship design is NOT synonymous with tons of armor, or tons of money.

Oh, here is a little another PG in action story…

From 28 June to 14 July, CANON patrolled its designated area. Ship operations during this period involved the usual Market Time routine of board and search coupled with a few instances of harassment and interdiction gunfire. On 9 July, CANON patrolled the Bo De/Cu Lon Rivers for the first time. Five days later, on 14 July, while on patrol, CANON was ambushed by enemy forces near the mouth of the Bo De River. A rocket hit in the port engine room placed the hydraulic system out of commission, rendering the pitch system inoperative, and CANON drifted aground on the river’s right bank. Accomplishing emergency repairs, CANON was dislodged with the assistance of two PCF’s and its own starboard shaft and returned to Sea Float. Ordered to Cam Rahn Bay for repairs, CANON proceeded to that port under its own power.

With repairs completed by 27 July, CANON returned to its patrol duties, this time to Market Time Operation Area 8B. Again, routine operations were a matter of course with escort duty serving as a secondary responsibility. On 9 August, CANON returned to the Bo De/Cu Lon Rivers and the next day escorted USS BRULE (AKL-28) to Sea Float. After spending the night as naval gunfire support ship for Sea Float, CANON returned to the river to conduct routine patrol. At 0920 CANON encountered hostile forces for the second time and received fire from both banks of the river. The crew responded quickly and inflicted heavy damage on the enemy, employing both the ship’s main armament and small arms fire. This action by the enemy resulted, in part, in the following:

*Eight B-40 rocket hits to port and starboard;
*Extensive rocket damage to the bridge;
*Fourteen personnel casualties, including the Commanding Officer, of whom five were medevaced.

For this action, members of the crew were rewarded for their heroism with three Silver Stars and five Bronze Stars.
Chuck Hill

The LCS is not the only game in town. There is the Coast Guard’s National Security Cutter

http://www.uscg.mil/acquisition/NSC/features.asp

and the the planned Offshore Patrol Cutter

http://www.uscg.mil/acquisition/OPC/features.asp
Benjamin Walthrop

“What’s the solution? We need to keep shipbuilding going, it is true. How about a proven design, modernized, to bridge the gap between the perceived apocalyptic 2025 date and future successors to the current combatant types (with time to test and prove)? A design based on DDG-51, hull and engineering plant, with updates to weapons systems and electronics suites. And a modified CG-47 design, same principle. A LIMITED number of LCS, with an opportunity to run them through their paces, incorporate design and operational lessons learned, and THEN build the numbers desired.”

If one observes critically, this is exactly what is going on.

“In the mean time, the ships we have (FFG-7, DDG-51, CG-47) we keep. Service live extensions and modernizations as required. They are the most capable ships of their type extant. Do NOT make the mistake of early retirement again.”

I have not advocated early retirement ever (and I don’t think the USN has either). The opposite is true. 40 year service life for the CGs and the DDGs is being openly advocated with little technical analysis as to whether this is feasible or responsible.

Scott B. has many good points. Speed for the LCS was not well thought out. That being said, some of the speed capability is now inherent in the platform. How do you use it to best effect?

V/R,
UltimaRatioReg

“I have not advocated early retirement ever (and I don’t think the USN has either)”

I beg to differ. All 31 Spruances were retired (and disposed of) before reaching their 35 year service lives. Seven had served twenty years or fewer. In essence, nearly new, modern ships. Why? The altar of “operating costs”. And what was the savings annually of losing 5-6 modern units a year until they were gone? Not even the cost of a single DDG-51. All four Virginias (CGN-38) were retired with fewer than twenty years of service. One (CGN-39) having served a mere 15 years in commission.
The first five Ticonderogas went out of commission because the USN would not install the VLS in these nearly new ships, again due to “costs”. So five $1.5 billion warships are decommissioned, and NOT mothballed, but stricken for disposal. Only one had served as many as twenty years.

Forty modern, capable combat vessels, gone. And not replaced. And with them went a significant portion of the “presence” ADM McCullogh speaks of.

“If one observes critically, this is exactly what is going on”

It doesn’t appear so at all. The numbers planned for additional DDG-51/CG-47s or their derivatives are far short of making up for the losses of the above vessels or the retirement of the FFG-7s, if that winds up being a course taken.

The time when the COCOMS will have to begin re-writing OPLANS (if it hasn’t happened already) because the US Navy cannot perform the missions currently assigned to it will be the official abdication of control of the maritime domain. If the USN becomes little more than ten or eleven CSGs with the AEGIS platforms to protect them, with some SSN/SSBNs mixed in, it will have become the “self-licking ice cream cone”. Extreme parochialism (“If you ain’t carriers/AEGIS, you ain’t crap!”) has steered us in that direction, and it needed to stop long ago.
Benjamin Walthrop

URR,

The Spruance class ships are mostly about 1 nm below the surface of the ocean. Re-hashing that debate will not raise them to the surface.

What I have correctly pointed out is that in order to reach the arbitrary (as far as I can tell) 313 in 2020 and beyond the DDGs and CGs have been magically extended to 40 year service life ships.

Much of the surface ship debate in the USNI space (comments as a shining example) has been focused on the past that cannot be changed or solutions that don’t make any sense (either strategically, fiscally, or operationally).

I am as guilty of the previous observations as the next commenter, but I think it is time to shift the debate to a forward looking bias rather than and aft looking bias. I agree with you in principle, but many of the comments to date fail to recognize that the USN is really constrained by history.

V/R,
UltimaRatioReg

Benjamin,

Everything is constrained by history. Or damned well should be. And what I speak of is not ancient history, but very recent history. It represents a continuing mindset that there is a bottomless pit of resources and money. It is important to examine the decision processes that put the Spru-cans where they are. Ditto the CGN-38s and the Ticos. THAT represented thinking “not constrained by history”, with the wasteful decommissioning of valuable assets. Purchased at significant taxpayer expense. The US Navy for many decades understood that warships were a valuable asset bought with national treasure, and cared for and preserved them as so. The departure from that approach has been a disaster.

As to your comment about solutions that don’t make sense, that is your opinion, which you are certainly entitled to. However, what is deeply concerning to many is that the USN/SECNAV and DoD have offered no solution whatever. In fact, some of their statements are to the effect that there IS no solution, save a dangerous and perhaps permanent weakening of the US Navy. At least there is no solution they are willing to consider or pay for.

My comment about the COCOM OPLANs is very much a forward-looking observation. It reflects a BIG future problem, getting ever closer to being a current problem, if it is not one already. The Maritime Component Commander is assigned certain missions as a part of a campaign plan, and must be able to accomplish those missions with the forces apportioned, attached, or assigned. In certain areas and scenarios, the margin is already paper-thin. Soon, very soon, the CFMCC/JFMCC will NOT be able to accomplish those missions, even before accounting for enemy action and combat losses. That is mission failure, plain and simple. Brought about as a result of the mindset of the recent two decades. Such is the difference between winning and losing a fight.
Byron

Ben, history teaches us how to prepare for the future. US Navy history shows us the mistakes and the successes and how to learn from both. You talk about the future when the COCOMs won’t have the platforms to accomplish his mission. You talk about affordability. The only real truth to this is that you must carefully consider how you spend your money today, for the nations treasure, its’ members of the Armed Forces will be the ones to pay the price of fiscal short-sightedness. We’ve raised many questions about the LCS, and almost all the answers have been completely un-related to an actual combat mission. Combat is the ultimate purpose of warships, whether they be a frigate or an aircraft carrier. The Navy must chose wisely if it is to be able to prevail in the next war.

All we have asked is to reduce production of LCS. Keep the production low, to maintain skill base (people like myself) and let the existing ships actually perform the missions envisaged for them. Put them through their paces, try them hard. At the same time, start a SLEP for the Perry’s. You can halt it at any time. This allows you to have options, while not breaking the bank. And God knows, there’s enough wasted in the Navy’s bankroll we can get the money to do what we need to do.

Anyone out there that knows of Navy installations in silly places that Congress has decided to bestow upon the taxpayers?
Grampa Bluewater

At this juncture I would like to point out that the FFG’s transferred to, or built for, allied navies are being SLEP’ed.
All we would have to do is pick the plan we like and have it done to the USN FFG’s. The RAN plans are even in english, although there is nothing much to criticize about the others.
capospin

Well, after all this good information that has been posted we know understand the LCS has no mission. The LCS fits no mission the US Navy must do in a war at sea. We also understand the LCS has much the political class wave or push behind it. Although it is on its points a bad idea from the start we still have the LCS. Also it has been posted that we do not have a navy the size or shape we need to fight the next war or conduct current missions we have now. The plan t save money be scraping entire classes of modern warships in the last two decades has not saved any money or helped the combat ability of the Navy in any way. This policy has damaged the Navy in a major way. Can we stop the LCS? Is it to late to make it into something less bad? We need to build a fleet of big and smaller warships. DDs DDGs and DEs. These ship should have (n) power plants. You know that Rickover was and is right on this point! Money should not be an issue, the political class will make it so, so we should go for a high-low mix like back in the 70s and 80s. SLEP and FRAM programs are a part of this. The LCS is not. The Navy must start fighting for Sea Power in Congress now.
Benjamin Walthrop

OK. I’LL BITE. What (SPECIFICALLY) does a SLEP FFG look like. Feel free to include cost estimates and trade-offs.

Good luck.
Grampa Bluewater

BW: If you want a white paper on what a SLEP for the FFG’s, fully
justified down to the last item in the package and the last dime, in twenty five words or less, I can’t help you. Nice throw away line to go for debating points, though.

Me, I like to be tight with the public’s money until I know what I’m doing, then go for the volume discount. Or I did, way back when I could, to the tiny extent I had the power to do so. Also, I don’t think ships pop like soap bubbles on the 30th anniversary of their keel laying. Maintenence and update can go a long way to retain and gain capability if you work smart. A lot of good work was done by the humble Guppies I and II and the FRAM cans for a very long time.

Point is not every nation buys the theory of “throw it away if it’s 20-25 years old and you don’t have the priority (“national will” if you like a fine 1930′s-ish ring of irreversible inevitability) to replace it one for one”.

Just to freshen up the debate, take a look at the land of Oz’s take, for instance:

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/australias-hazardous-frigate-upgrade-04586/
Benjamin Walthrop

The RAN experience is one of the reasons that I don’t think a SLEP of the FFGs is a good use of the taxpayers money. As the link you provided shows, the project is now running on 15 years long, 4 years behind schedule and at a cost of $360B per ship the RAN has purchased 10 years of extra service life for essentially 1970s technology. I would dearly love to hear the rationalizations that would argue for this being a “good deal.”

V/R,
Benjamin Walthrop

That last post should have read $360M per ship rather than $360B per ship. My opinion that this is not a “good deal” remains unchanged by the typo.
capospin

Ok Ben so the LCS is a good deal? How can a SLEP FFG be 70s technology? Is not the point to put updated systems in the ship? So she would be on older ship with new or updated systems. The point is the LCS as she is today is a bad idea. Scrapping mid life warships to save operational money is not the way to build the combat fleet the navy needs to do the job. New ships in many more numbers concurrent with a SLEP/FRAM program is what we need.
Benjamin Walthrop

“Is not the point to put updated systems in the ship?”

This is precisely why I asked the question about what a “bobtail SLEP” looks like to the advocates of this position. I have not asked for a white paper or any other such non-sense. I have only asked that the true believers regarding the efficacy and economy of SLEPing an FFG provide at least some level of detail as to what that would entail so those points can be rationally debated.

Based on Byron’s estimates of $20M per hull to execute his vision, I can tell you from experience that it will not buy a great deal more service life for the hull, electrical, and mechanical systems of the FFGs that are not really mid-life warships as you claim, but are actually coming very quickly to the end of their design service life.

I also don’t think that same $20M will be stretched to improve the legacy (and closed architecture) combat and C4ISR systems to a level that the advocates seem to believe. The price for a docking selected restricted availability (far smaller in scope than any FRAM or SLEP as far as I can tell) is running in the $7M-$10M price range.

Examples of 70′s technology that may still exist after a SLEP are the machinery control consoles, the switchboards, the 400 Hz generators, the desalination systems, the internal communication system, etc. I am left to guess because the advocates for such a course of action have simply refused to provide any level of detail regarding their vision. A bullet list of systems that you envision to be modernized would be just fine.

The fact that the RAN effort ran $360M per hull should at least cause any serious participant in this debate some uncomfortable thoughts regarding the what the cost for a FFG SLEP would be and if the cost is worth the investment. Ironically, this is the example that an advocate provided to educate me.

I have never advocated scrapping mid-life ships. You seem to be the one defining 24 year FFGs as having the characteristics of a mid-life platform without any basis at all from a technical perspective for that claim.

V/R,
sid

Examples of 70’s technology that may still exist after a SLEP…

Well, at least that old stuff gets underway more often than not…
Benjamin Walthrop

“Examples of 70’s technology that may still exist after a SLEP…

Well, at least that old stuff gets underway more often than not…”

You are correct to an extent. I interperet the recent INSURV results from active ships to indicate that many of the same problems probably exist in the mature technology and mature HM&E systems fieled. They are just being ignored in order to support the OPTEMPO. How’s that gonna work out if the level of presumed survivability is not quite what has been advertised?

V/R,
Grampa Bluewater

Perfection is the death of affordable adequacy.

One hates to reiterate, but HM&E do not vanish like a soap bubble popping when a installed digital clock reaches an arbitrarily established design service life. Class B (repair to installation specs) or Class C (repair by replacement or repair of inoperative or worn beyond max spec components) overhauls may be accomplished comparatively economically by SIMA or (alas, foolishly deleted) Tender sailors and shops. Functional components can be stripped from inactive ships of the class. While failure to spend pennies on “mothballing” has had a repair opportunity cost of dollars or hundreds in terms of repair opportunity, H,M & E components are robust. Most or much of it is still good, or less worn and cheaper to repair than equipment in service. Particularly if you can make one out of two.

Excuse the following digression into basic good practice that follows, but the postings that are up show that many don’t understand that execution of the fundamentals is a key to long, effective ship life.

Preventative maintenence (clean, preserve, lubricate, test, analyze, align, adjust, calibrate) must be done. If filter housings, access panels, zirc fittings and the like don’t have tool scars on the paint covering the bolts and nuts, it’s not.

Minor corrective maintenence must be done promptly, lest it grow into a major repair. INSURV publishes (still, hopefully) a list of common and repetitive deficiencies for every ship class extant. The measure of state of repair is best measured by how much of a preponderance of minor items outweighs the show stoppers in the report. Part I (serious) Safety and Mission Degrading items are more often than not correctable in short order given the increased command attention brought to bear and high level expertise freed up from NAVSEA’s Engineering Centers.

The experienced and wise XO’s send their wardroom and CPO’s out looking for the common and repetitive deficiencies as part of an active zone inspection program,and then follow up. Every defect is logged with a job sequence number in the equipment deficiency log. The Captain goes through that log with the Department Head once a week. Standard questions: Casrep needed?; drafted and sent?; Gear troubleshot, parts on order?; RQN Number and status?: Work Request submitted?; JSN/PRI?. (Suggested order of sequence: NavOps Monday; Engineering Tuesday; Weapons/Combat Systems Wednesday; Supply Thursday; Friday Field Day/PB for T, Zone inspection,Fish Dinner.)

XO checks a chunk of Heads & Beds each day, Captain goes walkabout every day and looks at something, no notice, HARD. The EDL goes to every drill critique to log emergent items.

Timely and appropriate submission of “minor” CASREP’s MUST be viewed as evidence of due diligence and engineering/technical competence by superiors in the chain of command.

(Back on topic)

That’s before SLEP. SLEP gets the hard to reach, replaces/updates obsolete weapons and fire control, adds new countermeasures for new threats,installs major shipalts, A&I’s, Field changes, junks the headache hangar queen Mk 1 with a solid reliable Mk 4. SLEP uses proven systems being purchased, reducing per unit cost by purchasing additional units. Let the words “redo the wardroom wallpaper and furnishings” never be breathed aloud.

I could go on (and on, and on), but you get my drift.

This, while requiring very hard work and expertise by ship’s force, in the long run, lowers maintenence costs and extends vessel life. A lot. Just don’t cut the manning to minimum levels, it’s a false economy for repair, training, and survivability.

But that’s another post.
Benjamin Walthrop

GBW,

I get your drift regarding basic maintenance. I understand completely what a SLEP is intended to do. I have recent experience with all of the above.

What you are describing is how you wish (and I wish) things to be. That is a longer term problem that needs to be addressed, and I would dearly love to see someone offer some solutions to the maintenance disaster that is currently unfolding in the surface fleet. Unfortunately, you are not describing the current reality.

There are only two tenders left. As much as we would like to reverse those decisions, that is water under the bridge. There are zero SIMAs left. Again, water under the bridge. Sailors (in the surface force) do not really do deep maintenance, and the zone inspection program is failing if the INSURV results are any indication (and they are). Beyond the ability to do maintenance, it appears that the surface force has largely lost the ability to even identify and diagnose MAJOR problems.

More to the point, a SLEP program for the FFG class would be throwing good money after bad at this point and is not a technically or economically viable alternative. It cannot be done for $20M per hull as suggested, and the OQE for that are the costly RAN efforts to date.

V/R,
Grampa Bluewater

BW:
I am well aware things are not as one might wish. Put my little rant down as instruction for the young. Advice for the perplexed, if you wish.

You are just a little too accepting of the inevitability of decay and decline. Pushing back has its risks, but what’s the point of making CNO of a 100 minus ship, no fleet auxiliaries, no viable escorts, four (maybe zero) carrier navy that can deploy (sort of) about three barely adequate battle groups. Which is where the current crop of JO’s will be in about two decades, at the current rate of decline. Faint heart and foolish policy did not win the cold war, or prepare (barely) the fleet for WWII.

Jefferson’s Coastal Gunboat policy was folly made manifest. While took the embarassment of a burnt out Capital to get the ball rolling, it got reversed.

Besides this isn’t a national problem, it’s a Navy problem. We had similar problems in the early seventies and fixed them. Most of what I digressed about in my little rant on good maintenence practice falls squarely on the shoulders of the CO/XO/Dept Heads. The rest is on the Commodore and his Material Officer and ultimately, the type commander.

The first step to fixing a problem is documenting it, which is something any division officer can do. If he doesn’t know how to inspect his own gear, she needs to pick the brain of his/her Chief/First Class.

At the other end, command interest at the flag level is essential. Fortunately, we pick new flag officers every year.
Sooner or later some of them will realize they are going to inherit the mess, and get more proactive about pushing back against the tide of poor decision making that is eating the ROV and OMN money, not to mention the Navy’s credibility.

If the Air Force can lose a Secretary and a Chief of Staff to failure to execute the fundamentals on nuclear weapons safety and security, the Navy had best clean its own house on basic maintenence and ship design. I hope the rot isn’t deep enough to get higher than Navy involved, but if the top few rows of the stack of boxes poster think their good names aren’t on the line, they will soon enough.

As far as the RAN SLEP or FRAM or whatever, at least we have an approximate upper bound on cost that has some foundation in reality. Don’t forget it should be cheaper to use an existing solution than pay the upfront costs to develop one.

As an aside, there are tender hulls in the reserve fleet (I think, it’s hard to keep up with the march of folly). There are lots of skills in the Ready Reserve. Man one up, put it to work on breaking itself out. Then put her to work. Repeat.

Enough for now. Out of the loop old men need their rest, so they can rise and rant again.
Benjamin Walthrop

GBW,

It was a good rant and filled with great advice. I think a blog post here at USNI on those historical lessons would be of value. I do not believe in inevitable decay, and if you think about it you will realize that what I have been doing (fairly consistently now) regarding an FFG SLEP is pushing back on what I believe is a foolish idea (SLEP for the FFGs).

I am not happy with the LCS (for a number of reasons), but it is what the Navy has now, and I believe that there should be some mental capital spent on figuring out how to make it work for the USN. That would be orders of magnitude more productive than the pages of ink spilled about the ship’s shortcomings and wild-eyed ideas about how to return to the past (from a platform perspective).

The maintenance article would be good too.

V/R,
LCDR Luke Schmidt

Excellent data analysis, however your blog does not take into consideration future defense spending cutbacks, which are already being seen with the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) proposing the closing of Joint Forces Command. I understand your analysis was written before SECDEF warned all services to prepare for future cutbacks in defense spending. With the budget in mind and only two surface combatant options, I think we will see many more LCS ships being built than DDGs.
Agree that a FFG Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) would be a terrible option, despite any argument that the Florida congressional representatives can make in hopes of saving jobs in Mayport, FL. As a former FFG Combat Systems Officer, I can assure you that the Oliver-Hazard Perry-Class frigate is an extremely outdated surface combatant with very limited and sometimes unreliable combat capability. Additionally, the maintenance cost for an increased sustainment life would outweigh any possible benefit of maintaining these ships in the fleet. We should be more concerned about having the right type of ships to meet the current and future mission demands and threats vice just trying to reach a 313-ship Navy on the books.
I believe the current number of FFGs in USN service is 29. I have not heard any plans to build 48 LCS ships in order to replace the current fleet of FFGs. Latest plan, which has been proposed, to Congress is for authorization to build 20 additional LCS ships, 10 additional LCS per hull design. This doesn’t even match the current number of FFGs in service.
For survivability in the littorals, the LCS is just as survivable if not more so than the FFG which also operates in the littorals to some extent. With the FFG being replaced by the LCS that has minimal manning, I also question if the LCS is going to be capable of filling the same missions as the FFG such as Counter-Narco Terrorism (CNT) operations, piracy operations, and even just conducting a replenishment at sea due to manpower demands.
As far as utilizing the LCS as an unmanned mothership, that probably would not be feasible nor has there ever been a need for the Navy to operate motherships. Therefore, your question concerning the use of LCS as an unmanned mothership is not exactly relevant.
Did the Navy get it right with the LCS design? I believe they possibly did design a ship, which is capable of meeting the various mission demands. I only question the minimal manning requirement since I have not personally seen nor heard how the FREEDOM and INDEPENDANCE have fared in day-to-day operations.

V/R,
LCDR Luke Schmidt

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