Frank Hoffman has an article in Armed Forces Journal titled Striking a Balance, where he articulates the various lines in the sand of emerging theories for military threats and force structure in the QDR debate. Expanding upon the simplistic “conservatives” and “crusaders” model previously articulated by Andrew Bacevich in his Atlantic Monthly article from last year titled The Petraeus Doctrine, Hoffman describes four schools of thought and breaks them down in detail. The four schools of thought, according to Frank Hoffman, are:

1. Counterinsurgents, who emphasize the high likelihood and rising salience of irregular adversaries.
2. Traditionalists, who place their focus on states presenting conventional threats.
3. Utility Infielders, who balance risk by striving to create forces agile enough to cover the full spectrum of conflict.
4. Division of Labor, who balance risk differently by specializing forces to cover different missions to enhance readiness.

This article is great, because it does pro and con of each school and offers opinions, but intentionally does not offer a recommendation. In more detail, I quote Hoffman to better articulate what each school stands for:

Counterinsurgents
This school argues for a transformation based on today’s fights. The advocates here believe that Iraq and Afghanistan represent far more than a passing blip in the evolution of conflict. They contend that massed formations comprised of traditional arms and large-scale conflict between conventional powers is not a realistic planning scenario. They contend that the most likely challenges and greatest risks are posed by failing states, ungoverned territories, transnational threats and radical versions of Islam.

Traditionalists
The Traditionalists sit at the opposing end of the spectrum of conflict. This school seeks to re-establish the traditional focus of the armed forces on “fighting and winning the nation’s wars.” Its members focus on major, high-intensity interstate wars. They advocate against reorienting forces, especially ground forces, away from their traditional emphasis on large-scale, industrial-age warfare against states or an alliance of states.

Utility Infielders
The third and most prevalent school, at least among American ground force commanders, is the Utility Infielder school. This school recognizes the need to deal with strictly conventional tasks and irregular threats. It seeks to cover the entire spectrum of conflict and avoid the risk of being optimized at either extreme. Instead, it seeks to spreads this risk across the range of military operations by investing in quality forces, educating its officers for agility in complex problems, and creating tough but flexible training programs.

Division Of Labor
There are a number of analysts that reject the fundamental premise of the Utility Infielders school. This alternative school argues that irregular and conventional warfare are markedly different modes of conflict that require distinctive forces with different training, equipment and force designs. This camp places a great emphasis on preventing conflict, on stability operations and on investing in indirect forms of security forces with a greater degree of specialization for security cooperation tasks and war fighting. Because this school specifically divides and specializes roles and missions between the services, it can be labeled the “Division of Labor” option.

The article concludes with Hoffman claiming “the current bifurcation of the spectrum of conflict between irregular and conventional wars is a false choice and intellectually blinds us to a number of crucial issues.”  I don’t disagree with that conclusion, but in a period of debate that accounts for the wars we are in, and the wars of history that suggest the wars we may find ourselves in,  I think the debate is very healthy.

After reading the schools of thought, I began wondering how these schools would break down among those looking at force structure from purely a Navy point of view. Who are the counterinsurgents in the Navy today? Who are the traditionalists? Are the Utility Infielders that are prevalent among ground force commanders also prevalent among naval commanders? What is the division of labor crowd look like in the Navy.

I’m going to take a shot at matching a category into Navy terms, feel free to suggest where I am going wrong.

Counterinsurgents
Today’s counterinsurgents in the Navy debate are the “go small” and/or “go underwater” crowd. This school argues for a transformation based around numbers, with a premium on numerous lower cost platforms. Aircraft carriers are too big, cruisers are too big, destroyers are too big, and even the LCS is too big. This school tends to argue that surface ships in large quantities make up for lack of quality, and  submarines will control the sea during future wars. Stealth, precision, and mobility represent constants of naval warfare. Well known Navy blogger Mike Burleson represents this school over at New Wars.

Traditionalists
Today’s traditionalists believe aircraft carriers, major surface combatants, and submarines represent the most effective way to win war, and war at sea will primarily be conducted vs other state naval powers. Its members focus on major, high-intensity interstate wars and emphasizes superiority of the electronic battlefield spectrum. They advocate against reorienting forces, especially surface combatants, away from their traditional emphasis on large-scale, industrial-age multipurpose warships optimized to fight against states or an alliance of states.  Most of Navy leadership today attends the traditionalist school.

Utility Infielders
Utility Infielders recognize the need to deal with strictly conventional tasks and irregular threats. It seeks to cover the entire spectrum of conflict and avoid the risk of being optimized at either extreme, defining the extremes as blue water and littoral waters. This school is open to reducing carrier fleets, open to building conventional submarines, open to building more smaller ships while sacrificing larger ships, and tends to emphasize the utility of amphibious ships and logistics ships as a solution to a wide range of operational requirements. Commander Henry J. Hendrix’s Proceedings article earlier this year, Buy Ford, Not Ferrari, represents this school well.

Division of Labor
There are a number of analysts that reject the fundamental premise of the Utility Infielders school. This alternative school argues that irregular and conventional warfare are markedly different modes of conflict that require distinctive forces with different training, equipment and force designs. This camp places a great emphasis on preventing conflict, on stability operations and on investing in indirect forms of security forces with a greater degree of specialization for security cooperation tasks and war fighting. One will find a Global Fleet Station specific ship and numerous varieties of single purpose platforms in the fleet designs of this school. An example of the Division of Labor school is Wayne Hughes’ New Navy Fighting Machine, although it should be noted that each Division of Labor example will be different.

When laid out this way I think Hoffmans comment regarding how “the current bifurcation of the spectrum of conflict between irregular and conventional wars is a false choice and intellectually blinds us to a number of crucial issues” becomes readily apparent as a warning. When I think of naval forces, I see several false choices, like Small Ships vs Big Ships, or Blue Water vs Brown and Green Water to name a few examples.

Despite the apparent public friction and debate raging among the ground forces, who argue based on actual war experience, the Navy is at a disadvantage in such a debate. There have been so few sea battles fought in the last half century that it is difficult to claim with any certainty that any one school has the advantage over others. That raises important issues, for example, not only must QDR analysts determine the positive and negative influences of untested technologies, but must define what naval warfare will even look like in the 21st century. The second part is a much greater challenge than the first.

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• Bill

  What Intergalactic Fleet is this proposed Navy to fight ?
  What Timeframe ?
  What is the likely source of funding ?
  But a great chuckle!

• virgil xenophon

  Grampaw Bluewater hit the nail on the head up thred on 14 JUL 9:41 post when he talked to the aspect of political will in shaping the Navy’s budget. As an Air Force jr. birdman I’ll not speak to the exact composition of the fleet here (although I have my own quite obviously brilliant ideas) but instead emphasize that what I believe ails the Navy equally as much as poor planning and decision-making in the forming of the composition of the fleet against some sort of strategic vision based on probable threats both future and present is it’s supine unwillingness to use the resources and good-will it has to shape public opinion to not only influence votes in Congress vis a vie naval budgets in the appropriations process–but elections as well. For unless we elect enough people who take defense matters seriously–as opposed to the those who hold an anti-military bias–all the “sharp” thinking in the world inside the Navy is simply going to be another exercise in re-arranging the deck-chairs on an ever-shrinking Navy budget ship.

  What people have been slow to realize–mainly because it has taken a while for the old incumbents to die off–is that the “Southern strategy which saw the white, conservative southern democrats like Sam Nunn replaced with Republicans means that the moderating influence of pro-military key senior democrats (senior because they had longevity due to being in previously un-challenged “safe” seats) in the Democratic Party are GONE. Which means that now–unlike in the past–when the Donkey Party controls things there is ALMOST NO ONE in the that party who takes almost ANY threat seriously–as witness the slashing of the budget under Obama and a Democrat controlled Congress even as the threats proliferate.

  Seen in the above light, I firmly believe that we are in historically un-charted political waters not seen since pre-WWII.
  The ultimate answer to the Navy’s woes lies in an arena it’s traditions shy away from–political action. Unless the Navy marshals every PR and lobbying effort it can legally muster–and unless it’s alumni/veterans began organized campaigns to influence elections of those of both parties favorably disposed to the armed services and the national defense–the ship will continue to take on water. What the Navy is doing now is trying to more effectively “manage/tend” the pumps, but until and unless it patches an every expanding budgetary hole in it’s hull (the budgetary throw-off of the workings of the political class) even the most efficiently tended pumps will be over-whelmed even as the Navy watches billions of budget dollars siphoned off for the likes of “community organizing” outfits like ACORN. ACORN–and those who think it is a nifty organization–are the Navy’s REAL, MOST DEADLY AND IMMEDIATE enemies. Unless the Navy can manage to help elect those who oppose ACORN–as opposed to those who would (and currently ARE) budget billions (thats Billions with a “B”) for it–the ultimate fate of the Navy–and this nation–is in grave danger.

• Grampa Bluewater

  Virgil X.

  Whoa, big fellow, whoa.

  You’re outside my lifelines, my friend. Military professionals
  in a democracy in the form of a federal republic are party neutral. Military and strategic advice to the Executive and Legislative branches are based on ground truth and must be the same to any member of any party.

  I’ll give my befuddled old man’s opinion on just about anything, but in this forum I mean to keep it to naval affairs, national defense, leadership, integrity, and common sense (as I see it)
  within the DoD or mebbe the NCA. In house Navy, I’ll call ‘em as I see em regardless of rank, designator, or sacred cow.

  Sometimes I’ll take a more extreme position than I might actually hold for purpose of arguement. I learn most from a lively discussion. Mispent youth, fell in amongst ruffians, you know.

  Partisan Politics and ideology, not on this site, not under this handle.

  I recommend the same to all.

  If I talk about national “will”, I am indulging my Mahanian side with reference to educating the citizenry at large. Lili whats-her-name I am not.

  Breakers ahead, recommend reverse course NOW with full rudder.

• Grampa Bluewater

  Capospin:

  Thanks for leading off. If anybody differs, show us your list and say why.

  Bill:

  The aim is to preserve the peace. Crush the first miscreant while having enough on tap to crush the one who thinks we don’t have enough whup ass left in the can to deal with another tiff half a world away. Deterrence if possible, detergence if necessary. The idea is to keep the USA safe and international conditions scrupulously polite and proper.
  polite. Or that how this old thunder lizard sees it.

  How many do you recommend?

• Grampa Bluewater

  Oops, well just delete the second polite.

• Grampa Bluewater

  Well, what capabilities do you see as needed, and then which are needing remedial attention?

• capospin

  Grampa Bluewater, Steel on target! For my 21st century fleet I use the eleventh edition of the USNI’s “The Ships and Aircraft of the US Fleet” as a base guide. The types/class and approximate number of ships reflect what the USN had on hand in 1978! (I added to some types based on what the USN would up to in the 1980′s, but the over all base line force is 1978) To get a Navy this size we can build new, SLEP and FRAM. Should take about 10 years if we get building!

• virgil xenophon

  Grampa Bluewater/

  Perhaps you overlooked the “…every PR and lobbying effort it can LEGALLY muster.” part. My point was simply to urge the Navy to do something which it has long done–only more effectively and with greater intensity. Nowhere did I say that young uniformed Ensigns should pace thru the Halls of Congress personally button-holing Senators and Reprsentatives for votes. Are not the Blue Angles part of the PR effort–as are speeches/talks made by the CNO before think tanks, newspaper editorial boards and the likes of the National Press Club all part of that legal PR/lobbying effort? My point is that discussions here “in-house” about the ideal composition of the force, tng standards, etc., are all well and good and certainly necessary–but hardly sufficient unless everyone here enjoys simply re-arranging the deck-chairs. My objective in my post was/is to alert the “big kids” who read this thing that they had better get their PR and outreach acts together and coordinate with those Veterans groups able to actively advocate in political campaigns–else the breach in the hull will continue to expand even as those manning the pumps (i.e., the active duty Navy) are working furiously away.

• Bill

  I believe Virgil is close to the target . The essential Mahanian concept of “National Will” is at the heart of the matter. During my lifetime I have seen a large erosion of National Pride of ownership of such things as a worldclass and clearly dominent Navy.

  Today’s Congress as a whole does not enjoy spending money for large chunks of most any type of military hardware. I have no doubt that the Anglo-Saxons of the world have been too successful in manipulating their way in important world matters. The Public has grown used to important successes earned by some strong leadership and the considerable dedication of many military persons to hard duty over long years.

  Today’s LONDON TIMES has a piece showing the poor financial support being provided for the Afgan War. The RN may fade away soon. Needed helos may not make it to the Afgan terrain. Unless the Public understands and is indoctrinated to support a sensible Grand Strategy the US military may easily face the same situation within a few years. The US is hung far and wide with a small number of professionals fighting a good fight with uncertain hardcore suport of John Q Public.

  The Blue Angeles can’t do it all. But who can and who will ?
  That’s a line of discussion that might be fruitful. In my opinion, Sirs, we need to focus on the development and strethening of National Will. Anything less is games.

  I can only see some few new pieces on the chessboard, here’s a quick salvo:

  6 –”new” modified Shoot and do good battleGroups. Each to have at least two a/c decks for the a/c of the moment. Amphib capability with a battalion of Marines aboard with gear and means to get ashore and get settled into varied terrain. Hospital and Public Health units part of the capability. Deploy to South and Central America, Africa and SE Asian Island areas.

  All the usual other stuff as funds permit. I see the CVs shrinking to 8 in the not too distant future. Cost will Rule.

• UltimaRatioReg

  “I see the CVs shrinking to 8 in the not too distant future. Cost will Rule.”

  Please, God, let’s be smart enough to mothball the others instead of cutting them up. Heaven knows, sometimes we’ve had to build them in a hurry.

• Grampa Bluewater

  Virgil X.

  No question Mother Navy has been far too coy the last couple of decades. I’m for anything strictly non-partisan to get the word out about the need for and value of the sea services.

  I just don’t want any right/left, rep/dem, them/us foolishness.
  Defense of the Republic, the Constitutional requirement to maintain a Navy, why sea power matters, overarching stategy, the Mahanian enduring geopolitical facts of life among nations, that word has to be gotten out.

• UltimaRatioReg

  Grampa,

  Solid advice. And besides, the kinder, gentler nonsense didn’t begin on 20 Jan 2009. It goes back a long way before that, and has been pushed by both parties along the way.

  Time to reorient on what we want to do on the seas, and just who would want to stop us, and how.

• capospin

  Well our country has been down this way before just not on the scale and scope. The National Will erosion is hand and glove with the attach on the family and the individual. This is not rep/dem or them vs. us “foolishness”. I restate the point about socialism and collectivism Vs. American liberal conservatism or the ideas of the French Revolution vs. the ideas of the American Revolution. This has been going on in our country for over 100 years now. One must understand the political forces at work in the history of own own country. Well all that comes down to the fact the political elite’s and the political class do not always see a need for the military (any size). The current state of affairs is just such a moment. No one seems to understand air power/air-space power as well as sea power. The need for a Navy is an after thought at best. Bill estimates the 8 CVs is about all we get. I say we will be lucky if we have that many. So this is what we most likely will see as a Navy over the next 12 to 20 years:

  CV 6 (four CV in PACFLEET) also not the CAG may or may not have F35, Navair is broken as well
  CG 0
  DDG/DD 35
  FFG 0
  LCS 12
  SSN 24
  SSBN 8 (could be at of the fleet do to SALT/START with Russia)
  SSNG 12
  LHA/LHD 8
  LSD/LPD 8

  That is the right size fleet we are building too. I may have it to big is size. This size force is based on the idea that founds will be set up to do all the upkeep and yard work.

  What can we do on the seas with a fleet this size? The PRC (China) and a new bad boy Russia will come looking to stop us or fight us. Iran and North Korea will take a pice of that action as well. India might “stop” us from time to time. Will will need to concentrate the fleet in one ocean at a time to have mass so not to be “stopped” by a regional navy. The USN will, do to it small size be organized into a battle force. The battle force will be concentrated or focused in one ocean with a limited number of task forces averrable for action. The Panama Canal will be vital for the swing fleet concept to work. Intel and space based intel will be more vital for orienting the battle force. We can be stopped by lose of space intel and communication platforms. In any sea fight we will have no depth of force. The enemy need only to bleed us (sink or badly damage ships and kill men) to curtail our actions. The USN will be limited in what it can do in any action or operation. The United States be loose sea power or sea control at times. This will jeopardize our national strategy. And so it goes.

• Bill

  Please try to keep in mind that the future I see will be much different than the past 60 years. Forget about the USA being the world’s policeman. We can’t afford it, the need is no longer quite so urgent and the natives will no longer tolerate our effort.

  We will see China emerge as a naval power. It has a need for assured freedom of the sea because of its vast need for imported raw material. It is reasonable for China to protect its sea routes through the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia. China and the USA should be close friends if only because of the similarity of our needs as established major trading partners. I hope the present effort at establishing mutual relationships between the senior naval officers will bear fruit. It makes good sense. Ditto India . (Could we really sell them a surplus aircraft carrier ?)

  Think of a sustained effort to be the friends of a large number of governments/people who populate the developed/rising world. Even more than China the USA is likely to continue to be a trading nation, dependent on freedon of the seas and peaceful trade routes. We must never place that at risk. We must have the ability to deploy ships to great distances and operate for extended periods. Just like the early days of our Navy.

  I know of no American naval officers who have raised the issue of the stability and success of South America. Geography shows this to be part of the US natural sphere of influence. We should no longer encourage other powers to work their way in this area. I believe that this is a good place to make friends through continued naval efforts on the soft side of diplomacy. Show me some more hOSPITAL sHIPS! Inexpensive and productive. No need for Carrier Battle Groups to have substanial positive results. Even if the USN suffers the loss of some CBG there will remain much good work to accomplish close to home.

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