Comments on: The Solomon’s Campaign: Status of the United States Fleet and Plans After Midway http://blog.usni.org/2009/07/16/the-solomons-campaign-status-of-the-united-states-fleet-and-plans-after-midway/ The Naval Institute’s taken its independent forum to a new level - with you in the middle of it. Sat, 11 Feb 2012 23:43:34 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1 By: Steeljaw Scribe http://blog.usni.org/2009/07/16/the-solomons-campaign-status-of-the-united-states-fleet-and-plans-after-midway/comment-page-1/#comment-286002 Steeljaw Scribe Tue, 27 Sep 2011 23:45:09 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=3620#comment-286002 "One thing that keeps sticking out of the facts: US torpedoes. They sucked. Sub launched, air launched, ship launched, 90% were duds. I feel that theater of war could have been shortened by 6-9 months with operable torpedoes." Which, BTW, speaks volumes about operational test and evaluation during peacetime -- food for thought as we find the competition for resources even tighter and start making cuts in areas like OT&E... w/r, SJS “One thing that keeps sticking out of the facts: US torpedoes. They sucked. Sub launched, air launched, ship launched, 90% were duds. I feel that theater of war could have been shortened by 6-9 months with operable torpedoes.”

Which, BTW, speaks volumes about operational test and evaluation during peacetime — food for thought as we find the competition for resources even tighter and start making cuts in areas like OT&E…
w/r, SJS

]]> By: Byron http://blog.usni.org/2009/07/16/the-solomons-campaign-status-of-the-united-states-fleet-and-plans-after-midway/comment-page-1/#comment-285977 Byron Tue, 27 Sep 2011 18:37:43 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=3620#comment-285977 Strongly suggest you read, "Neptunes Inferno". It's an excellent book that covers all the naval and amphibious action surrounding the Solomons campaign. Strongly suggest you read, “Neptunes Inferno”. It’s an excellent book that covers all the naval and amphibious action surrounding the Solomons campaign.

]]> By: Brownshoe http://blog.usni.org/2009/07/16/the-solomons-campaign-status-of-the-united-states-fleet-and-plans-after-midway/comment-page-1/#comment-285966 Brownshoe Tue, 27 Sep 2011 15:39:53 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=3620#comment-285966 Theank you Steeljaw, and thank you all commenters. After reading everything I can on the Solomons Campaign and the USN in 1942, Guadalcanal was that point in time that influenced a change in IJN strategy and certainly influenced morale in a needy US. The loss of USMC/USA on the island and the loss of USN ships in Iron Bottom are not forgotten. One thing that keeps sticking out of the facts: US torpedoes. They sucked. Sub launched, air launched, ship launched, 90% were duds. I feel that theater of war could have been shortened by 6-9 months with operable torpedoes. Theank you Steeljaw, and thank you all commenters. After reading everything I can on the Solomons Campaign and the USN in 1942, Guadalcanal was that point in time that influenced a change in IJN strategy and certainly influenced morale in a needy US. The loss of USMC/USA on the island and the loss of USN ships in Iron Bottom are not forgotten.

One thing that keeps sticking out of the facts: US torpedoes. They sucked. Sub launched, air launched, ship launched, 90% were duds. I feel that theater of war could have been shortened by 6-9 months with operable torpedoes.

]]> By: Byron http://blog.usni.org/2009/07/16/the-solomons-campaign-status-of-the-united-states-fleet-and-plans-after-midway/comment-page-1/#comment-133864 Byron Fri, 07 Aug 2009 09:55:55 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=3620#comment-133864 I agree with URR. Attempting a landing in France, whether it be the south of France through Vichy controlled areas, or at Normandy, would have been a bloodbath. George Marshall wasn't about to take the chance that Hitler was with his Sea Lion operation. Also agree on going for Guadacanal. Too many strategic imperatives not make the assault and control that patch of ocean. I agree with URR. Attempting a landing in France, whether it be the south of France through Vichy controlled areas, or at Normandy, would have been a bloodbath. George Marshall wasn’t about to take the chance that Hitler was with his Sea Lion operation. Also agree on going for Guadacanal. Too many strategic imperatives not make the assault and control that patch of ocean.

]]> By: UltimaRatioReg http://blog.usni.org/2009/07/16/the-solomons-campaign-status-of-the-united-states-fleet-and-plans-after-midway/comment-page-1/#comment-133692 UltimaRatioReg Fri, 07 Aug 2009 01:33:18 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=3620#comment-133692 David, You will get my respectful disagreement on that point. The amount of manpower and resources expended to land the First MarDiv on Guadalcanal was insignificant to any effort in Europe. Additionally, allowing the initiative to pass back to the enemy when one has a chance to seize it is always a mistake. Japan was overextended after Coral Sea and Midway. But had they had another few months to complete a Rabaul-like base on Tulagi and Guadalcanal, the effort to build up US combat power in the Pacific would have come at a far higher cost. A landing on the coast of France in 1943 would have required far more amphibious shipping, including LST/LCT/LCI and Higgins Boats, than we had produced to that point in the war. That is assuming we had the airpower to control the skies over the invasion beaches, a questionable assumption in 1943, before Kursk and its aftermath began to drain the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe effort. David,

You will get my respectful disagreement on that point. The amount of manpower and resources expended to land the First MarDiv on Guadalcanal was insignificant to any effort in Europe. Additionally, allowing the initiative to pass back to the enemy when one has a chance to seize it is always a mistake. Japan was overextended after Coral Sea and Midway. But had they had another few months to complete a Rabaul-like base on Tulagi and Guadalcanal, the effort to build up US combat power in the Pacific would have come at a far higher cost.

A landing on the coast of France in 1943 would have required far more amphibious shipping, including LST/LCT/LCI and Higgins Boats, than we had produced to that point in the war. That is assuming we had the airpower to control the skies over the invasion beaches, a questionable assumption in 1943, before Kursk and its aftermath began to drain the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe effort.

]]> By: david kerr http://blog.usni.org/2009/07/16/the-solomons-campaign-status-of-the-united-states-fleet-and-plans-after-midway/comment-page-1/#comment-133544 david kerr Thu, 06 Aug 2009 20:50:35 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=3620#comment-133544 In retrospect, it was a strategic mistake to abandon the Europe first plan. The allies should have invaded France in 1943. The troops and ships lost in the Solomons could have made that possible instead Churchill's "soft underbelly of Europe" Italian campaign which cost the allies so much more than the Germans. The Japanese had "victory disease" and were over-extended. The U.S. could have waited until massive naval superiority in submarines, Essex class carriers and escorts. In retrospect, it was a strategic mistake to abandon the Europe first plan. The allies should have invaded France in 1943. The troops and ships lost in the Solomons could have made that possible instead Churchill’s “soft underbelly of Europe” Italian campaign which cost the allies so much more than the Germans. The Japanese had “victory disease” and were over-extended. The U.S. could have waited until massive naval superiority in submarines, Essex class carriers and escorts.

]]> By: Chuck Hill http://blog.usni.org/2009/07/16/the-solomons-campaign-status-of-the-united-states-fleet-and-plans-after-midway/comment-page-1/#comment-126383 Chuck Hill Fri, 17 Jul 2009 03:58:30 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=3620#comment-126383 This was the only campaign in the Pacific where the Navy had more casualties than the Marines--and that is saying something. This was the only campaign in the Pacific where the Navy had more casualties than the Marines–and that is saying something.

]]> By: Byron http://blog.usni.org/2009/07/16/the-solomons-campaign-status-of-the-united-states-fleet-and-plans-after-midway/comment-page-1/#comment-126320 Byron Thu, 16 Jul 2009 22:56:10 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=3620#comment-126320 No doubt that this was a long and hard fought campaign, Grampa, especially compared to the island hopping in the next two years. The first MarDiv fought one hell of a battle taking the island and keeping out of the enemies hands. The US Navy also had a hell of a fight. Damn good thing that Chet Nimitz, Bull Halsey, and Gen. Vandergrift weren't faint of heart, either. No doubt that this was a long and hard fought campaign, Grampa, especially compared to the island hopping in the next two years. The first MarDiv fought one hell of a battle taking the island and keeping out of the enemies hands. The US Navy also had a hell of a fight. Damn good thing that Chet Nimitz, Bull Halsey, and Gen. Vandergrift weren’t faint of heart, either.

]]> By: Grampa Bluewater http://blog.usni.org/2009/07/16/the-solomons-campaign-status-of-the-united-states-fleet-and-plans-after-midway/comment-page-1/#comment-126319 Grampa Bluewater Thu, 16 Jul 2009 22:54:33 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=3620#comment-126319 Make that "Valley Forge" Make that “Valley Forge”

]]> By: UltimaRatioReg http://blog.usni.org/2009/07/16/the-solomons-campaign-status-of-the-united-states-fleet-and-plans-after-midway/comment-page-1/#comment-126318 UltimaRatioReg Thu, 16 Jul 2009 22:34:41 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=3620#comment-126318 To Byron and Grampa's discussion, A prominent German Panzer commander on the Eastern front, commenting on the relative effects of Stalingrad and Kursk upon the Wehrmacht and its situation said: "After Stalingrad, we were afraid we might not win the war; but Kursk confirmed we would lose it". Similar can be said of the Japanese regarding Midway, and the Solomons, respectively. To Byron and Grampa’s discussion,

A prominent German Panzer commander on the Eastern front, commenting on the relative effects of Stalingrad and Kursk upon the Wehrmacht and its situation said: “After Stalingrad, we were afraid we might not win the war; but Kursk confirmed we would lose it”.

Similar can be said of the Japanese regarding Midway, and the Solomons, respectively.

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