Archive for August, 2009
In a story on the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence’s website:
“The world is ready to share our Naval experience”, says Secretary of Defence.
Sri Lanka Navy is one of the best Naval wings in the world.
The world is ready to share the experience of the Sri Lanka Navy’s capability of defeating terrorism. The Sri Lanka Navy is considered one of the most powerful Naval troops in the world to have defeated and disabled the LTTE sea wing.
Speaking at the ceremony in tribute of the gallant Naval personnel at the Navy Dockyard in Trincomalee, yesterday (Aug 28), chief guest Defence Secretary Mr. Gotabaya Rajapaksa said the Naval troops were dedicated to protect the nation and had made an immense contribution in defeating terrorism.
“I praise their efforts and dedication in protecting the territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of the motherland,” he added.
He observed that the Naval troops were the main obstacle to the LTTE cadres in bringing arms and weapons via sea.
“The Navy destroyed eight of the LTTE floating stores (vessels) in the local and international seas. This prevented the LTTE from bringing in arms and face severe shortage of arms and weapon during the last battle against the Security Forces,” he added.
Secretary Defence said the Naval troops maintained logistic needs and lifelines to the North. When the Sea Tigers attempted to attack the Jet Liner ship carrying unarmed troops, it was foiled by the sailors in action.
The LTTE’s strategic move to take over the Trincomalee harbour and attack the Security Forces installations was thwarted by the Naval troops.
Her further asserted that the Sri Lanka Navy is one of the best Naval wings in the world which destroyed the terrorist movement in the sea with its limited resources and technology.
“The Navy using its Special Boat Squadron (SBS) destroyed many of the LTTE suicide boats and movements in the sea. There are countries which possessed high sophisticated sea power but were unable to prevent terror movements.
Many countries had requested the Defence Ministry to let them share the experience of the Sri Lanka Navy. Foreign defence delegations wanted to come to Sri Lanka and acquire techniques of the Sri Lanka Navy,” he said.
Sri Lanka Navy members will be sent abroad to enlarge their experience and acquire more knowledge in Maritime work, he said.
Mr. Rajapaksa emphasized that the Sri Lanka Navy will have greater responsibility in the future to protect our territorial waters and prevent illegal activities.
He also thanked the Indian Government for facilitating the acquisition of this vessel for the Sri Lankan Government. “The gesture of goodwill by the Indian Government will strengthen the bilateral relations and build better cooperation between the two neighbouring countries,” he added.
Lots of lessons to learned here for sure.
Scratch one non-state actor Navy. I remember years ago, I wanted to write an article entitled non-state actor navies in review but did not because of security concerns. I am glad the Sri Lankan Navy helped to write the last chapter of the Sea Tigers.
Early last week over at the HomeBlog, we were discussing ADM Harvey’s manning data call. In the comments to his post at his CFFCBlog, there was a quote about the Navy’s failure to fill the gaps in the manning document resulting from the impact of IA’s – that brought to my nogg’n a very touchy subject. At the same time, an article in NavyTimes about that touchy subject was on my desk. From the NavyTimes article most of you probably read last week,
… pregnancy in the ranks is rising—especially among those in deploying units. That’s because the service does track—as a group—female sailors who have been sent to shore duty after their 20th week of pregnancy or those on an “operational deferment”—the guaranteed time the Navy gives women while they recover from childbirth.
These women are put on shore duty during their 12 months of deferment, then return to sea duty.
The Navy increased this deferment time in June 2007 from four to 12 months. As a result, the number of women leaving deploying units to have children has increased steadily from 1,770 in June 2006 to 3,125 as of Aug. 1. Junior enlisted women make up the bulk of those redirected to shore duty. Sailors in grades E-3 through E-5 account for 2,852 of the 3,125.
The tie in to the comments from CFFCBlog is a well described example of complete professional malpractice where almost eight years into the war we still put Commanding Officers on the spot because Big Navy DOES NOT have a system to,
Reflect clearly in manning documents (and in readiness reports) Sailors who are on IA assignment and therefore unable to fill critical mission roles within the parent unit.
Likewise, we do not adequately address pregnancy.
Early on in the article, this brought a chuckle.
Pregnancy in the Navy is on the rise—but exactly how much isn’t exactly clear. That’s because the Navy says it doesn’t have the means to track exact pregnancy statistics servicewide.
Of course it doesn’t – institutionally we are terrified of even discussing it. One of the greatest secrets held at the Strike Group Commander level is the pregnancy rate. Oh, and don’t dare ask how many of the mothers-to-be are single.
We also tell little lies to ourselves and our Sailors,
‘The Navy strongly believes that having children and a career in the Navy don’t have to be at odds,” she said.
Lack of clear conversation.
Anyone who has children knows that having them, except for very rare cases, is at odds with a fully competitive career for women. You can make it work, but it is very hard and requires a great partner that is also willing to make sacrifices. That usually requires a stay at home Dad or that you spend almost all your career on shore duty. If you are a single mother, then you can double the challenge as add a needle-gun to the inside of your skull as you try to make it work. Otherwise, if you don’t have that super-partner and are a warfare qualified officer executing a Line Officer career that taxpayer expects you to – someone else is raising your kids for you. Fact.
Facts prove that you cannot do both well (see Jack Welsh) unless you are the outlier exception. This is especially true if you want to have more than one child and/or are a single parent. Being a single mother in the Navy is not like being a single mother at Bank of America.
Fair? Life isn’t fair …. but the most valuable and precious things you will ever have in what little time you have on this earth are your children. They are also the most important thing you can invest your time in with your partner. Full stop.
This is not an anti-woman thing; this is about mature people talking bluntly with each other. Some of the best leaders on the Enlisted side of the house I have known have been female. Here, I think, is one.
A senior enlisted woman from the destroyer Ross said her ship was having an epidemic of pregnancies in the crew, with 15 women becoming pregnant in the past year among a female population that averaged 36 over the same period of time.
Another said that she’s seen too many women elect to get pregnant to avoid making deployments of six months or longer—swapping that for an 18- to 21-year commitment to raise a child. Another said she still sees too many young male sailors eyeing newly reporting female sailors as targets of opportunity more than shipmates. More counseling in responsible behavior, she said, was needed immediately after these young sailors get to their command.
Have a few of them holding “high demand, low density” NECC and/or in supervisory positions – and you are in a pickle.
There is also a background story with this that isn’t talked about much. A tragedy I have seen too often.
A young woman joins the Navy at 18. Gets pregnant by her 19th birthday and MILPERSMAN’s her way out following birth. She then winds up back with her parents with a child by age 20 having done nothing for 2 years for herself professionally – or for the taxpayer. She is on her own because she won’t identify the father – he is a married E5 with two kids, etc.
How do you address that? It is a tough problem that requires tough, mature leadership. We don’t address it enough with our Sailors, I think. I always get a kick (not in a happy way) out of the expression on the face of that E4 when I tell him how much money we are going to take out of his paycheck for the next 18 years. Then he tells me another female E2 is pregnant by him …. and I tell him the new number.
People are mammals. You need to find a way to get the higher brain functions to override the lower brain functions – then you might get some success.
Oh, before I leave – let me put a wobble on this mindless spin.
“We see a decline in pregnancy rates on ships where there is a strong presence of females in leadership roles at the command,” she (Stephanie Miller, head of women’s policy for Chief of Naval Personnel ) said. “It’s only been 15 years or so since the combat exclusion was lifted, and it’s taken time to grow these women.”
Bravo Sierra on the time issue. Many parts of the Navy have had women fully integrated from day one. Heck, as a LTJG, the best Senior Chief I had the honor to serve with was a female – and she was more of a mean old goat than her Master Chief husband. She was also worth her substantial weight in gold. (BTW, some of you who deployed with the USS EISENHOWER on her first girl-boy-girl-boy cruise know who I am talking about)
That, Stephanie, is a bogus excuse, and I hope that comment doesn’t represent the depth of knowledge that informs the advice you provide to the CNO. You are right about the leadership – but like all leadership, you have to grow the right ones with the right ideas – like that Senior Chief I mentioned in the early 90s (i.e. a female senior leader almost 20 years ago, ahem). The Oprahesque stuff we are putting out there does not work in the Fleet except for those hot-house flowers who spend their career on shore duty.
Anyway, women having children will, thank goodness, always be with us. If Big Navy wants to have a high percentage of females in its ranks, it needs to find a better way of dealing with it while being fair to all her Sailors – male and female – with and without children.
Let me offer some help as a foundation to begin the discussion; the servicemembers need to find ways to adjust to the requirements of the armed service, not the other way around.
Crossposted here from the HomeBlog by popular acclimation.
CINCLAX checks in with a strategic summary of where the players stand at this point in the Solomons Campaign. As we will see here and in detail later ths week with the Battles of Santa Cruz and Guadalcanal I & II, this is still a very close run deal with either the Japanese or Allied forces in a position to come out on top. How close is it? See below… – SJS
In his State of the Union message in January 1943, FDR would note:
“The Axis powers knew that they must win the war in 1942–or eventually lose everything. I do not need to tell you that our enemies did not win the war in 1942.”
He was correct. All IJN commanders, especially Yamamoto, knew that Japan’s only chance in the Pacific War against the United States was to win a “decisive battle” and hopefully bring the United States to a negotiated peace. Assuming this strategy would have succeeded, which is, of course, a huge assumption in view of American bitterness over Pearl Harbor, it meant Japan had to win it early-on before the vastly greater American war production capacity could be brought to bear, presumably by mid/late-1943. Japan had simply not prepared for a protracted naval war.
Inescapably this meant the IJN had to take chances, just as they had with the Pearl Harbor attack in the first place. Would they?
Six months into the war, Yamamoto’s first decisive battle attempt failed completely at Midway, largely because he underestimated his opponent and needlessly divided his forces with an almost impossibly complex plan. As a result, some nine battleships, one fleet carrier, three light carriers, nine heavy cruisers and 30 destroyers actually put to sea but took no part in the main Midway action. Here was a force capable of pulverizing Midway all on its own, leaving Kido Butai to deal directly with TF-16 and TF-17 without worrying about having to bomb the atoll.
Now, several months later in the Solomons, Yamamoto would get his second-and perhaps final-opportunity for that decisive battle. If the Japanese could hand the U.S. Navy a crushing defeat and force the American troops to surrender or withdraw from Guadalcanal, they would stand their best chance of achieving that negotiated peace. So far the IJN had not sought that battle. They had committed their surface forces piecemeal at a critical time when the Americans were relatively weak and the “Cactus” air force still small.
Still, by mid-October 1942, most of the signs were still favorable for a potential Japanese victory:
- American senior naval leadership to-date was irresolute, notably Ghormley and Fletcher.
- The American Joint Chiefs had already diverted large amounts of Army and Navy assets to the upcoming Torch landings in North Africa. The British continually pressured their ally for increased operations in the Mediterranean Theatre and would continue to do so throughout 1943.
- The IJN had proved its superior skills and weaponry in surface night actions.
- The Cactus Air Force was largely unable to stop the “Tokyo Express” fast re-supply and troop transport convoys. The new TBFs with their old MK-13 torpedoes hardly ever made hits, the SBDs had great difficulty scoring on anything but slow transports, and the B-17s were useful only for reconnaissance. Thus Japanese surface warships underway were largely immune from American attack planes. (Note: We’ll be seeing more about this in the near future – SJS)
- American submarines-and torpedoes-had been singularly ineffective, and to-date there had been no disruption of the delivery of oil and raw materials from the Southern Resources Area. In contrast, Japanese I-Boats had been doing solid work against American warships.
- The opening of the new airbase at Buin (Bougainville) cut the flight time to Henderson Field almost in half (compared to Rabaul) and allowed the Japanese to come closer to maintaining air superiority over Guadalcanal because they could now employ their shorter range Zeros (model 21s).
- The floatplane base at Rekata Bay (on Santa Isabel and only 130 miles from Henderson Field) continued to provide a modicum of air reconnaissance in the waters around Guadalcanal.
- The IJN had substantial heavy surface units at anchor in the Home Islands and Truk, including superbattleship Yamato. If ever they were going to play a truly key role and not simply collect barnacles, this was their time to get into the fight.
- After the Battle of Santa Cruz (October 26-27), for nearly a month the Americans would have no operable carriers in the Pacific.
But time was limited, and Yamamoto’s window of opportunity was closing fast. The handwriting was on the wall for all Japanese to see.
- On Guadalcanal, the 17th Army was in dire straits. While the fast destroyer transports of the Tokyo Express were having some success in landing new troops, they could not carry much in the way of heavy equipment, ammunition, food or medicine. Within a month, over 100 soldiers a day would be dying of starvation and/or disease, and combat effectiveness would be down to 20-30%.
- The costly failure of Gen. Hyakutake’s October offensive had exhausted the army to the point where it could no longer strongly defend the west bank of the Matanikau River. Soon, land-based shelling of Henderson Field would no longer be possible because the Japanese guns would be out of range.
- Since Midway, the carrier air groups and the IJN air fleets were already under strength and steadily running out of their most experienced air crews due to combat and operational losses. The replacement pipeline wasn’t doing the job; people were available, but the training hours weren’t.
- In New Guinea, the Japanese attack down the Kokoda Trail had been stopped by the Australians, and Port Moresby remained in Allied hands as an important air base from where constant attacks could be launched eastward against Rabaul as well as northward towards the Bismarck Sea.
- New American warships (or repaired vessels, notably carriers) and additional transports could be expected in-theatre within 4-8 weeks.
- New model American fighter aircraft could be expected to replace the tired and outclassed F4Fs-and in greater numbers. Soon an air raid on Henderson Field would be an impossibly costly venture.
So what did Yamamoto eventually do? We’ll see in the coming week’s posts…
(Crossposted at steeljawscribe.com)
This story in from Reuters late Friday/early Saturday:
28 Aug 2009 22:38:46 GMT
UNITED NATIONS, Aug 28 (Reuters) – The United Arab Emirates has seized a cargo of North Korean weapons being shipped to Iran, which would have violated a U.N. embargo on arms exports from the communist state, Western diplomats said on Friday. The weapons seized on Aug. 14 included rocket launchers, detonators, munitions and ammunition for rocket-propelled grenades, they said. The ship, called the ANL-Australia, was Australian-owned and flying a Bahamas flag. Diplomats said the UAE reported the incident, which occurred two weeks ago, to the Security Council sanctions committee on North Korea. The committee sent letters to Tehran and Pyongyang on Aug. 25 informing them of the seizure and demanding a response within 15 days. “Based on past experience … we don’t expect a very detailed response,” one of the diplomats said on condition of anonymity. The diplomats said the Australian firm whose ship was seized is controlled by a French conglomerate and the actual export was arranged by the Shanghai office of an Italian company. The diplomats did not name any of the firms involved. “The cargo was deceptively labeled,” said a diplomat “The cargo manifest said that the ship contained oil boring machines. But then you opened it up and you found these arms.”
Under UNSCR 1874, the specific proviso was that the nK vessel had to agree to be boarded and searched.
Para 12 says, in part:
“Calls upon all Member States to inspect vessels, with the consent of the
flag State, on the high seas, if they have information that provides reasonable
grounds to believe that the cargo of such vessels contains items the supply, sale,
transfer, or export of which is prohibited…”
The news article doesn’t mention (nor do any others I came across) whether the vessel ANL Australia was seized on the high seas or boarded at a UAE port. Are there any more details as to when and where this seizure took place?
Now that this has occurred, how do we think this affects UN and Western actions toward North Korea and Iran, both theoretically heavily sanctioned by the UNSC?
And does the arms shipment in clear violation of UNSCR 1874 (NK) and UNSCR 1803 (Iran, as expanded) confirm suspicions of desire to transfer nuclear technology, material, and equipment?
What role does the US have in this situation?
Let’s go to the phones….
A while back Saturday Night Live showed a sketch called “I’m On A Boat”. Not to be outdone, some bored creative young officers recently produced their own version of the video: “Navy I’m On A Boat” [note: explicit language]
Have a good weekend.
During and after the dramatic Easter Sunday rescue of Captain Phillips (a heahty Vahmontah!) of Maersk Alabama, there was considerable discussion here and at other venues regarding whether or not the actions of the US Navy SEALs in popping the three pirates would do more harm than good. There was fear that this would somehow “escalate the violence”. That somehow, despite binding and gagging their prisoners and threatening them with the ubiquitous AK-47s, the pirates didn’t really have evil intent.
Now, this from the Associated Press:
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates – Somali pirates holding a hijacked ship off the coast of Somalia fired at a U.S. Navy helicopter as it made a surveillance flight over the vessel, the first such attack by pirates on an American military aircraft, the Navy said Thursday.
The helicopter, which is based on the USS Chancellorsville, was not hit and there were no injuries, the Navy said.
The copter was flying on Wednesday over a Taiwanese-flagged fishing vessel, the Win Far, which pirates seized along with its 30-member crew in April and were holding south of the Somali port town of Hobyo.
The helicopter was about 3,000 yards away from the ship when the pirates opened fire with “a large caliber weapon,” the Navy said in a statement. The helicopter did not return fire, it said.
Since seizing the Win Far in the Gulf of Aden, the pirates have used the vessel as a base for attacking other commercial ships, including the U.S.-flagged Maersk Alabama. Four pirates seized the Maersk Alabama in April, taking its captain Richard Phillips hostage. He was held for five days in a sweltering lifeboat off the coast until U.S. Navy snipers shot three of his captors dead.
I wonder if the helicopter pilots would agree with the rather silly and naive assertions that the pirates really mean no harm, and are just trying to provide for their families. Let’s hope this is an argument-ender for such nonsense. Appeasement of bullies does nothing but make the problem worse, the bullies bolder.
We need to get it through our heads that sometimes, some people need to be killed. A pirate on the deck of a rogue ship banging away at a Navy helo with a heavy machine gun fits nicely into that category.
On July 20, 1997, as part of JTFEX 97-2, USS Nimitz with Commander, Carrier Group Seven (CCG-7) and Carrier Airwing Nine embarked began a high intensity strike campaign. When they completed flight operations four days later, they had generated 771 strike sorties and had put 1,336 bombs on target.
The Surge, as it has come to be known, was unprecedented. It demonstrated the entire process required to put bombs on target in a littoral warfare scenario; it incorporated all facets of strike warfare – from weapons buildup in the magazines to bombs on target. In the post-Vietnam era, no other carrier and embarked airwing have ever generated as much firepower in ninety-eight hours.
The Center for Naval Analysis monitored JTFEX 97-2 and carefully studied the scenario described above, which comes from the introduction of this CNA paper USS Nimitz and Carrier Air Wing Nine Surge Demonstration dated April 1998. “Surge 97″, as it was called, was preceded by six days of an intense, event-driven scenario in which the entire Nimitz battle group conducted offensive and defensive operations. During these six days USS Nimitz and CVW-9 generated about 700 fixed-wing sorties.
Following that six-day period, operations paused for 16 hours, and USS Nimitz and CVW-9 made several preparations for “The Surge” including personnel augmentation, planning augmentation, and replenishment to insure the carrier was fully prepared for the exercise. The resulting average of 192 sorties was touted by the Navy as the benchmark for carrier operations. At the time, this was very important, because naval aviation had taken a hit following the 1991 Gulf War with critics citing low aircraft carrier sortie rates as a reason to reduce the number of aircraft carriers.
While there were obviously agendas at play for the exercise, the lessons learned from that exercise have clearly been demonstrated in Kosovo, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom in which, during these operations naval aviation has certainly redeemed itself of the skepticism that may have lingered from the Gulf War. In fact, it was “Surge 97″ that highlighted the remarkable reliability of the F-18 Hornet, a significant metric that highlights the high durability and high sustainability of the aircraft. However, in order for the USS Nimitz to achieve the daily 197 sortie rate sustained for 5 straight days of 24/7 flight operations, almost all sorties were conducted a range less than 200 nautical miles, with a large number conducted under 100nms. As real world operations have since demonstrated, that is not realistic. Regardless, sortie rates under strict conditions remain very useful for comparison purposes.
For “Surge 97″ USS Nimitz had 14 F-14As, 36 F/A-18Cs, 4 EA-6Bs, 8 S-3Bs, 2 ES-3As, and 4 E-2Cs, but of those aircraft only 9 F-14As, 32 F/A-18Cs, 4 EA-6Bs, 5 S-3Bs, 0 ES-3As, and 4 E-2Cs were mission capable on the first day. I think it is important to note that in real world operations, in this case an aircraft carrier that had been engaged in six days of intense operations, an aircraft carrier could have 20% of her CVW unavailable for operations. I think it is also noteworthy that the older aircraft, F-14s and S-3s, suffered the higher downtime rates.
Aircraft carrier sortie rates have varied since 1997. In 2001 the Navy claimed that Nimitz class carriers can support 207 sorties per day, and in 2004 the Navy claimed Nimitz class carriers could launch 230 total surge sorties per 24-hour flying day for four days. These sortie rates are limited to 200 nautical miles, require some preparation, and cannot be sustained beyond only a few days. Current doctrine and planning operates 2 CVNs together, each carrier supporting 120 sorties per 12 hour flight day, combining for 240 sorties over 24 hour days for extended periods of time.
Why is this important? Because sortie generation is one of, if not the most important metric for naval aviation capabilities, and seems to be one of the first aspects of carrier aviation ignored by critics of big deck nuclear aircraft carriers. For example, take the idea of a CVL, a 30,000 ton light carrier alternative supporting 20 F-35Bs. Let us be super optimistic, and suggest the F-35B is as reliable as the F/A-18C from a maintenance perspective (maybe a very patient aviator can explain to the peanut gallery why this is a super optimistic suggestion). In Surge 97, the F/A-18C achieved the eye popping sortie rate of 4.5 sorties per day, but N88 planning factors for the F/A-18C is 2.0 sorties per day. For the purposes of this exercise, let us assume the F-35B can support 2.0 sorties per day on a CVL.
If we assume 20% of the aircraft are not mission capable, and we should because that is how Murphy’s Law works on an aircraft carrier, we now have a CVL supporting 16 F-35Bs capable of conducting 32 sorties per day at a 2.0 sortie rate, and doing so without the services of carrier based E-2D or EA-18G. If a Nimitz class can support 120 sorties per day, we would need 4 CVLs to match the number of sorties a single CVN can support, and a CVN comes with E-2Ds and EA-18Gs built in. The Ford class, which is not only less expensive to operate than a Nimitz, but is specifically designed to support higher sortie generation rates, is probably going to average $8.5 billion over its lifetime (I am guessing, but using CBO numbers to guess). That means the Navy would have to build 30,000 ton CVLs at a cost under $2.2 billion each, which would be at a cost less than the 9,800 ton DDG-51 destroyer in the FY2010 budget, in order to be less expensive and equally capable in sortie generation as a Ford class.
I hate to break it to the CVL / Small Carrier crowd, but it is 100% MYTH and FUD when it is claimed that big deck nuclear aircraft carriers are somehow inferior to alternatives, including on the cost metric. They are in fact, superior in every costing, capacity, and capability metric one can find. The only consideration where CVLs have a good argument is in terms of risk, because CVNs put a lot of eggs in one basket. It all comes down to the level of risk that is acceptable vs the level of cost, capacity, and capability desired for your naval force. I’ll take the big deck, at least 10 if possible, with its associated conventional launch capability and with the E-2D and EA-18G, I’ll whip any 4 VSTOL CVLs every single day of the century.
Additional reading for those interested in sortie rates, see Langford, CVW Strike Sortie/Aimpoint Improvement, and Dave Ahearn, “Clark Says Each Carrier Can Take Out More Targets,” Defense Today, March 31, 2005, and Range, Persistence, Stealth, and Networking: The Case for a Carrier-Based Unmanned Combat Air System, Thomas P. Ehrhard, PhD and Robert O. Work, CSBA, April 2008
Recently, the US Navy hospital ship USNS Comfort returned from a four month humanitarian deployment to Central and South America. The mission was the idea of Admiral James Stavridis, considered by some to be “the next Petreus”. While we will know more after the release of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), it is a good bet that health diplomacy missions like the Comfort’s are going to play a more central role in Navy operations in the future.
War reporter (full disclosure: and friend) David Axe recently completed a ten part interview series on the USNS Comfort’s deployment. In each part, Axe interviews a member of the ship’s crew (and riders). Be sure to check it out:
- Part One: The Commodore
- Part Two: The Commodore
- Part Three: The Commodore
- Part Four: The Doctor
- Part Five: The Doctor
- Part Six: The Nurse
- Part Seven: The Coastie
- Part Eight: The Master
- Part Nine: The Master
- Part Ten: The Aviator
By Jim Dolbow
From ISRIA.com, “The July-September 2009 issue ‘Indian Defense Review’ carries a detailed article on the Eight Fundamentals of Victory or the ‘Rajapaksa Model’ of fighting terror by V. K. Shashikumar. These are listed as the ‘Rajapaksa Model of fighting terror’ and are described as:
• Unwavering political will
• Disregard for international opinion distracting from the goal
• No negotiations with the forces of terror
• Unidirectional floor of conflict information
• Absence of political intervention to pull away from complete defeat of the LTTE
• Complete operational freedom for the security forces -Let the best men do the task
• Accent on young commanders
• Keep your neighbors in the loop.”
Full article here. I am thinking about moving to Sri Lanka. Want to join me?
Nice art work onboard the SS John W. Brown, an operational World War II Liberty Ship.
For information about tours and cruises of the John W. Brown, click here.
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