Announced today:

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The Navy announced today it will down select between the two Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) designs in fiscal 2010.  The current LCS seaframe construction solicitation will be cancelled and a new solicitation will be issued.  At down select, a single prime contractor and shipyard will be awarded a fixed price incentive contract for up to 10 ships with two ships in fiscal 2010 and options through fiscal 2014.  This decision was reached after careful review of the fiscal 2010 industry bids, consideration of total program costs, and ongoing discussions with Congress.

“This change to increase competition is required so we can build the LCS at an affordable price,” said Ray Mabus, secretary of the Navy.  “LCS is vital to our Navy’s future.  It must succeed.”

“Both ships meet our operational requirements and we need LCS now to meet the warfighters’ needs,” said Adm. Gary Roughead, chief of naval operations.  “Down selecting now will improve affordability and will allow us to build LCS at a realistic cost and not compromise critical warfighting capabilities.”

The Navy cancelled the solicitation to procure up to three LCS Flight 0+ ships in fiscal 2010 due to affordability.  Based on proposals received this summer, it was not possible to execute the LCS program under the current acquisition strategy and given the expectation of constrained budgets.  The new LCS acquisition strategy improves affordability by competitively awarding a larger number of ships across several years to one source.  The Navy will accomplish this goal by issuing a new fixed price incentive solicitation for a down select to one of the two designs beginning in fiscal 2010.

Both industry teams will have the opportunity to submit proposals for the fiscal 2010 ships under the new solicitation.  The selected industry team will deliver a quality technical data package, allowing the Navy to open competition for a second source for the selected design beginning in fiscal 2012.  The winner of the down select will be awarded a contract for up to 10 ships from fiscal 2010 through fiscal 2014, and also provide combat systems for up to five additional ships provided by a second source.  Delivery of LCS 2, along with construction of LCS 3 and LCS 4 will not be affected by the decision.  This plan ensures the best value for the Navy, continues to fill critical warfighting gaps, reduces program ownership costs, and meets the spirit and intent of the Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009.

LCS is a fast, agile and modular warship designed to complement the Navy’s multi-mission platforms with warfighting capabilities from littoral irregular warfare to mine, anti-submarine and surface warfare.  There are two different LCS hull forms: a semi-planing monohull and an aluminum trimaran.  The seaframes are designed and built by two industry teams led by Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics.  Of the planned 55-ship program, LCS 1 is commissioned, LCS 2 is undergoing sea trials, and construction has started for LCS 3 and LCS 4.

The Navy remains committed to the LCS program and the requirement for 55 of these ships to provide combatant commanders with the capability to defeat anti-access threats in the littorals, including fast surface craft, quiet submarines and various types of mines.  The Navy’s acquisition strategy will be guided by cost and performance of the respective designs as well as options for sustaining competition throughout the life of the program.

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What does this scurvy band of cutthroats (and others who dare venture here) think?   Which did we see as the wiser choice?  Advantages and disadvantages in comparison?    What say you?




Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Navy

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  • Scott B.

    Bill said : “one of those lessons is the incredibly low allowable stress levels that we must design with..and live with..in an aluminum ship structure”

    Excellent post.

    If I may repost some of the comments I made back in June 2009 :

    ——————————————————————
    Another problem with LCS-1 is that interactions between the steel hull and the aluminium superstructure are not without major *challenges*, e.g. :

    1) Aluminium is difficult to join to steel structures (you need to use either explosion bonding or biweldable strips).

    2) Aluminium can lead to galvanic corrosion with steel.

    3) Aluminium has a coefficient of thermal expansion almost double to that of steel, which may cause distortions with temperature variations in service.

    These *challenges* are not just hypothetical : for instance, in 1991, when USS Princeton detonated an acoustic mine under the ship’s quarterdeck (the blast detonating another mine 300 yards off the starboard beam), a 6-inch crack opened in the Princeton’s aluminium superstructure running up one side and down the other, with more than 10% of the superstructure separating from the main deck.

  • Scott B.

    Another repost from June 2009 if I may :

    ******************************************************************

    Aluminum doesn’t burn, except in the form of finely divided powder or flaxe, in which case it will oxidize exothermically, much like other finely divided materials such as iron and titanium.

    However :

    a) aluminum alloys have a low resitance to temperature, with a softening point @ 200°C and a melting point @ 600°C, meaning aluminum structure will suffer structural collapse much faster than steel structures, ceteris paribus.

    b) aluminum alloys exhibit a high thermal conductivity (aluminum conducts heat 2.5 to 9 times faster than steel), meaning that once a fire has taken hold of a compartment, the bulkheads surrounding that compartment will heat faster when made of aluminum (again ceteris paribus), eventually igniting the contents of surrounding compartments by radiant heat.

    And that’s the crux of the matter : once a fire has taken hold, a ship is going to be in a world of hurt, and this is going to happen much faster when the ship is made of aluminum (again ceteris paribus).

  • Byron

    Mea Culpa: six months is 4300 hours…finger-itis. It’s still a lot of hours on a frame, and if you multiply that out 20 years..

  • Bill

    A practical anecdote to Scott’s post about the difficulties associated with the structural fire protection of aluminum: I was involved in a large SWATH build that was driven in to the ground (so to speak) by the weight of the structural fire protection required to achieve the USCG cert for that particular sized vessel..the largest of a series that had yet been produced by the yard involved. With the benfit of hindsight, steel would have been the better (i.e. lighter) choice of construction material in that case. And of course..the vessel suffered later from the usual problems with nuisance cracking of the aluminum structure…aggravated no doubt by the imposition of unplanned additional weight for the structural fire protection.

    I’m certainly not ‘anti aluminum’ across the board and know how to work with that hull material. There have certainly been many a successful yacht, ferry and the occasional naval hull built with aluminum. But the tradeoffs need to be conducted with real-world knowledge..just saying.

  • Byron

    Scott, don’t forget the wonderful affect that high velocity salt air (rushing through various ventilation inlets) has on aluminum.

    And I bet that crack was just aft of the main mast, or just forward of it…

  • doc75

    Scott B., think fire barriers. Bill, yes you have to consider fire barriers. The ones today are pretty light.

    “I’m certainly not ‘anti aluminum’ across the board and know how to work with that hull material. There have certainly been many a successful yacht, ferry and the occasional naval hull built with aluminum. But the tradeoffs need to be conducted with real-world knowledge..just saying.”

    Bill, bingo. Reflexive anti-aluminum talk doesn’t help build ships that are effective or affordable.

  • Byron

    Doc, given what I do for a living, which is ship repair/construction, I will tell you that the life cycle cost for aluminum is much higher than steel. Period. Dot. End of sentence.

  • Bill

    “Bill, bingo. Reflexive anti-aluminum talk doesn’t help build ships that are effective or affordable”

    Reflexive, I’m not. Point of reference only, not trying to puff: I’ve been directly involved in the construction of more than 100 aluminum vessels, high-speed types and/or advanced hull form stuff like SWATH’s and a couple tri’s,.Cats, SES’, monohulls.from 23m LOA to 120m LOA, ..and that does not include the LCACs in the count..which would practically double that number. I personally comissioned over 50 of those…and some LCACs to boot.

    I know a ‘little’ about how aluminum works in practice…just saying. I’m no structural expert, but the hands-on experience with that many vessels has given me a certain perspective, having also built many such in steel and a very large number in composite as well, particularly in Norway and Sweden. Each material clearly has its palce and good use.

  • Byron

    Doc, do you have any idea as to what it costs to work with aluminum? The special restrictions applied by NAVSEA quality assurance? NDT requirments?

    Here we go:

    In the “critical zones” (which are the areas most affected by stress in a ship, the mid-body), these restrictions take affect. In the fitting process, plasma arc is not allowed for cutting purposes with respect to the final cut…which means if you plasma cut (the most efficient means, and also the most common)you have to cut off a further one inch of material…with a saw of some sort. You are not allowed to use any sort of lubricant on the blade, as this will affect the NDT process. There are restrictions on other tools, including the welding processes, the brushes you can use, the methods of contouring and beveling the weld joints. A NAVSEA check point for fit up also has to take place, and the weld joint must be “floated”, with no tack welds in the weld joint. That means a LOT of temporary attachment welds, which by the way also have to have NDT. The weld site has to have weather and wind tight containment. The weld gas must be tested twice a day to insure proper dew point. Once all of this is done, welding can now take place.

    Now the hard part starts. Every inch of every pass must stay completely free of any sort of debris, so there’s a lot of cleaning that goes on during the weld operation. Once the weld process is complete, the weld must then be further contoured so that at no point in the weld joint can any dye penetrant be trapped. If you can imagine the places on the underside where all manner of structural elements are in place, you also have to apply the same weld restrictions. Think LOTS of grinding…lots. And all with tools that are anything but high production. To further add to the welders misery, he has to contend with the existing conditions in the parent metal.

    Now that the weld is ready to present to QA and NAVSEA, the really ugly part starts. Every inch of weld gets dye penetrant tested…every inch. Butt welds (where two plates come together) are also tested with ultrasound to detect interior porosity. No matter how good the welder is, this process has never in my experience passed the first time. There’s always repairs.

    Now steel? The same insert will get a visual inspection and one or two UT shots. Now you know why aluminum is so damn expensive to work with.

  • Bill

    Byron said: “To further add to the welders misery, he has to contend with the existing conditions in the parent metal.”

    And very few ..very, very few..realize what the colloquial term ‘rotten aluminum’ means. The ‘experts’ will tell you there is no such thing. Ive got a fiver on Byron knowing exactly what I mean.

  • Byron

    When you talk about aluminum, keep in your mind that it’s a damn sponge. Most metals are porous, but aluminum is a sponge. Oil, salt, hydraulic fluid, any of the different things you find on a ship will get impregnated into the parent metal.

    Bottom line is that the damn stuff is way more expensive that working with steel…especially when all you can buy is ASTM-B-928 (take a guess how many mills make this material AND will supply a certificate of compliance to the buyer?).

  • Scott B.

    doc75 said : “Scott B., think fire barriers. Bill, yes you have to consider fire barriers. The ones today are pretty light.”

    Approved fire resistant for aluminum deck & bulkhead (N-30 rating) per MIL-STD-X129 (aka Fire Resistance of U.S. Naval Ships) is the FireMaster X607 Marine Blanket.

    Two layers of 1.5 inch each on fire side are required for deck (i.e. total = 3.0 inch), and two layers of 1.5 inch each on both sides are required for bulkhead (i.e. total = 6.0 inch).

    Firemaster X607 blanket, an amorphous alkaline earth
    silicate fibre which is incombustible, does not create smoke nor contribute fuel during a fire has a Melting Point of 1200+° C and density 128kg/m³.

    IOW, to protect 1 m², you need :

    deck : 1 m² x 0.0762 m (i.e. 3 inch) x 128 kg/m³ = 9.75 kg

    bulkhead : 1 m² x 0.1524 m (i.e. 3 inch) x 128 kg/m³ = 19.50 kg

    OTOH, a 1 m² aluminum plate with a thickness of 7.9 mm (5/16″) has a weight of 21 kg.

    The added weight is not as insignificant as you seem to believe.

  • Scott B.

    Now, just to further complicate the issue :

    1) The high thermal conductivity of aluminium means that fire boundary needs to be contained by boundary cooling, otherwise fire will propagate throughout the ship.

    2) Boundary cooling traditionally requires fairly large fire fighting teams, which makes it vulnerable to temporary / permanent loss of personnel.

    3) How is this supposed to work with the skeletic manning currently envisioned on both LCS designs ? Automatic fire suppression ? Mmmhhhh….

  • Byron

    And lets not forget all those pesky wireway MCTs….

  • Scott B.

    Next problem with aluminium is one that, strangely, doesn’t receive as much attention as fire-resistance : aluminum tends to produce splinters when hit.

    Again, the problem is not just hypothetical, as Norman Friedman explained in his description of the USS Worden incident (hit by a Shrike missile off Vietnam in 1972) :

    “Her aluminium superstructure acted to multiply the fragments produced by the missile; every pellet from the missile produced two or more in the superstructure, so that instead of a shield it became a deadly instrument in its own right”

    (Norman Friedman, Modern Warship Design and Development, page 168).

    You could off course somewhat mitigate the problem with anti-fragment materials, but then again, the impact in terms of weight and cost is not insignificant.

  • Scott B.

    Finally, here is another passage from Friedman’s Modern Warship (page 169) which remains remarkably valid up to this day :

    “Writing in 1974, K. Purvis, who had been responsible for all of those ships [i.e. the British postwar frigate program], noted that ‘a visit to the wreck of the Graf Spee in 1940 firmly convinced the author that the risk inherent with aluminium was only justified by its weight saving in minor bulkheads in the superstructure.

    The corrosion and modulus of elasticity problems combined with the complication of construction are so costly that they do not justify the weight saving achieved, which is far less than would be anticipated at first sight if the aluminium is extended to more important structural items’.”

    Ken Purvis, together with Lt Kilroy, did board the wreck of Admiral Graf Spee in 1940, to conduct a survey and remove artefacts.

  • UltimaRatioReg

    Scott B.,

    Great observation. Spall created by a projectile impact on aluminum alloy is very deadly indeed. Much worse than steel. So, it would cut into people, hoses, hydraulics, computers, sensors, all sorts of stuff.

    Pointing again to a possibility of a mission kill with a hit from even light ordnance.

  • Grandpa Bluewater

    Summary:
    Aluminum might be dandy for yachts and maybe even a small ferry.

    A warship? Unsuitable, see above.

  • Grandpa Bluewater

    “aluminum alloys have a low resitance to temperature, with a softening point @ 200°C and a melting point @ 600°C, meaning aluminum structure will suffer structural collapse much faster than steel structures, ceteris paribus.”

    Let’s put that in sailor terms. It means that the all aluminum bulkheads transmit the heat to the ladders, WTD hinges, hatch covers and decks very efficiently, so they “soften” well before the compartment ambient temp reaches 200- 250 degrees. This happens very quickly and relatively far from the site of the fire.
    Decks sag under the weight of equipment resting on it,bulkheads sag and rupture, spilling flammable liquids, ladders lengthen, sag, burn flesh touching them and give way at loads well below the weight of a man. Water tight door hinges sag and give way under the weight of the door and are no longer gas or water tight.
    Flammables touching bulkead or decks flash into fires distant from the original one.

    Deathtrap.

  • Old Guard

    I love Gene Taylor’s “take it or leave” sataement. His concern is getting work into Pascgoula. Then we can small fast ships with the same bad quality work Northrop Grumman is pushing out of all it’s shipyards.

    LCS is the mangled step-child of traditional Navy types trying to design to Adm Cebrowski’s “gun-slinger” concept. The idea was to have a small, fast vessel with modular weapon payload capability. Crewing was to be 5 or less and the key element would be a very high speed escape capsule. Cebrowski even used the “E” word for gun-slinger (expendible), which should have cost about $20M a copy before the warfare modules.

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