Looks like it will be the LCS-1 design, it’s got to be the cheapest to build, although looks to me the LCS-2 is the best design, with truly revolutionary characteristics, more economical cruise and larger flight deck.

Hope they are looking at life cycle costs.

More cowbell!!!

What Byron said.

I think you know where my sympathies lie, but they are going ahead anyway and if anything good comes out of this it will be through the LCS-2 design, LCS-1 is old tech.

Re Aluminum: see the article in Navy times on the random cracking in the cruisers for which there is no design fix.

Agree totally on SLEPing the Figs Byron, but would rather see a modified Berthhoff put into production while developing FFGX

I for one believe the LCS program is a waste of money and has nothing to do with enhancing our maritime doctrine. The best LCS so far is a Coast Guard Cutter on the surface and a submarine below. The first combat mission will require a reconfiguration of the LCS because they weren’t configured properly and the first casualties will disable the LCS’s operational capability. Manning a ship is also based on potential casualties in combat. I would rather see mobile weapons loaded on an LCAC, now that’s a littoral combat ship.

At this stage, I believe it’s worth quoting a couple of paragraph from an entry Galrahn [Raymond Pritchett] posted on his blog on June 15, 2009 :

(bold emphasis added)

——————————————————————
Defense Daily is reporting on the LCS cost cap.

In case you don’t know, those costs will remove about 14% of the LCS cost from the SCN budget, or around $62 million. Basically the Navy pays for those costs out of a different budget. That will likely be enough to get the LCS below the $460 million cap in multiyear.“
——————————————————————

Scott B. said : “For all intents and purposes, what this means is that the “LO” component of the “HI-LO” mix envisioned in the failed SC-21 vision effectively kills the “HI” component.”

The Navy leadership has probably been aware of this situation for some time now.

Since the “LO” component was going to kill the “HI” component because of its prohibitive cost, the solution envisioned by the Navy was to turn the “LO” component into the “HI” component of the “HILO” mix, as explained by RADM Goddard in June 2007 article published in AFJ : (bold emphasis added)

“For example, to maximize re-use of existing designs to reduce nonrecurring engineering and take advantage of the learning curve, a potential strategy for surface combatants is to derive the planned CG(X) cruiser from DDG 1000 and the DDG 51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyer replacement from LCS. Upgrading the radar on DDG 1000, and replacing the Advanced Gun System with additional vertical launch cells to create CG(X) would be similar to how the CG-47 Ticonderoga-class Aegis cruiser was derived from the DD 963 Spruance-class destroyer. Similarly, installing the multifunction radar on one of the LCS variants and retaining the modular mission packages would provide a replacement for DDG 51s.“

That’s indeed what the future might look like if nobody stops that train wreck called LCS as quickly as possible.

What I said on Feb 4 2004…

If a commander doesn’t have the requisite number of
hulls available, then he will have to pick and choose which “focii” he needs carefully. Once on station he is stuck with what he’s got. No reconfiguring unless he sends his LCS’s off to some distant place to reconfigure. Thats if a distant place within range is available. LCS is an operationally inflexible concept-unless there are plenty of LCS hulls. Its doubtful that will happen in the best of circumstances, and really doubtful if the selection is a 400 ft ship that will be regarded as a major combatant.
Also, no one seems to want to broach the significant chances of LCS hull losses. Maybe because that dirty little fact helped kill
Streetfighter. You morph this into a frigate, then it will turn multimission just to protect the investment and things will be back at square one.
The core missions are of the type that are conducted in either a
completely benign environment or which require covering protection
from other forces. In short, the LCS isn’t worth the money without its mission packages.

Still stickin’ to it.

So…Where are those mission modules anywho?

LCS-1 is grossly overweight and requires significant redesign to ‘fix’ everything affected by that factor alone. LCS-2 is little more than an enigma at this point. So how on earth does one leap from there to the assertion that “both ships meet our operational requirements”??

In fact, it took a complete change in operational doctrine and tactics, combined with maneuverability that could only be achieved at less than half the mach 2 design speed of that aircraft and others.

The dramatic decrease in aircraft losses since then (’83 really),
took has been the result of the creation of an entirely new design discipline.

Note to Blackshoes. It applies to you too.

I believe that U.S. Coast Guard “National Security Cutter Class” would be a much more cost effective LCS design with a greater range (albeit less speed) and with configurable modules could meet the same operational requirements!
>>>>http://www.uscg.mil/acquisition/NSC/features.asp
Mark Toomey CWO2,USCG Retired

Anyone remember the statement made by Gene Taylor during the subcommittee mark-up of the FY2010 NDAA : (emphasis added) :

“I am very concerned with the progress of cost reduction in the Littoral Combat Ship program. I will not go into detail here and the list of mistakes made in this program because we would be here for most of the day if I did. But this year is a ’take it or leave it ‘year for the LCS. I asked the Assistant Secretary of the Navy if $460 million was a fair price for the vessel with the current efficiencies of the two shipyards. He believed it was a fair price for the procurement costs of the ship, but that he had government costs for oversight and life-cycle management that would be hard to fit under the current cost cap.

If the contractors do not take it, the proposal would direct the Secretary to use the funds authorized to compile a technical data design package that could be bid to other contractors who might take it. No more games on this program, no more promises. Build ships for a fair price or not, that is the deal on the table.“

What’s the next decision after this one?

Develop a coherent, comprehensive fleet plan…Not some staff work from FFC. Operational staffs are too consumed with the crisis dujour to really focus on such big picture items. The latest maritime strategy reflects this.

Also, wrest control of strategic, operational, and tactical planning from the contractors. That the services subcontracted this role in the 90′s is why we are here.

Instead, convene a no joke summit like those of a century ago, and fix the philosophy first.

Then decide what and how to build according to that framework.

Alas, I put all my hope in the wrong bucket. This new generation of responsbile persons seem to be beyond redemption. One is forced to give up on today’s Lords of the Admiralty and trust in the smartz of the Congress. How could this be worse ?

Chap said : “And wouldn’t it be interesting to talk to the foreign navies who have been offered a variant of LCS to see what they think?”

A couple of months ago, the Israeli Navy decided to drop the LCS-1 derivative and go for a MEKO A-100 derivative instead :

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4160683

http://www.janes.com/news/defence/jni/jni090706_1_n.shtml

“Aluminum superstructure USN ships have been suffering cracking problems since the 1950’s. During storms, I’ve watched those cracks open and close like they were breathing as the ship worked.”

sid, the funny thing is that I have flown many hours on aluminum aircraft and have never watched cracks open and close while in flight. Paper thin aluminum, too. Through a few storms and other events. Not quite wave slap but plenty of fatigue cycles more than a ship. And some of those platforms like the KC-135 or T-37 were designed in the 1950s.

What this tells me is that the Navy has historical problem with design of aluminum structures. Probably cause the designers treated it like steel. One would hope the current designers did a better job than the earlier ones.

sid, the funny thing is that I have flown many hours on aluminum aircraft and have never watched cracks open and close while in flight.

Gee doc…You’ve never had that kind of fun?

As an A&P (pilot too, but only highwing/slowspeed/fixed gear), I will have to quibble with your analogy.

The many tons and thousands of square feet of an aluminum superstructure sitting atop a differently behaving steel hull in a seaway is a way different animal than the relatively densely reinforced semi-monocoque fuselages you cite.

But Byron is the one to wax eloquent on that score….

As for the DDG-51 for everything argument. The one thing I agree with in the whole LCS morass is the need for relatively small ships to “get in close.”

Sure is a travesty the USN decided to turn the LCS into ersatz Frigates.

Cap’n Bill:

Popcorn optional. Have a seat in the bleachers next to me.

Contemplate the stresses on an aluminum hull trimaran, with long swells abeam, doing snap rolls when the horizontal separation from peak to trough is the same as the hull centerline to hull centerline transverse distance. Flex, compress, flex, compress with the force vector the same as the outboard hull wt., not to mention the vertical V squared in 20 foot swells running peak to peak in 30 seconds or less. Rock and roll. Port hull in the air, center in the peak, stbd in the trough, reverse. Wheee! Crack!

Byron, I’m quite familiar with the F-15 and fatigue on that airframe. A key difference is the aircraft goes through cycles more rapidly than a ship. In the course of a flight hour, the number of cycles is far more rapid — higher frequency spectrum — than a ship. Having said that, Bill points out one of the true problems: no one knows what the loads are for ships. Considering how many centuries we have been sailing ships, aircraft designers have a better idea of load spectra on an F-15 wing spar than ship designers have on a stiffened panel — as a result, we have better design efficiencies and damage tolerance on that F-15 wing spar. I like the fact that the USCG is instrumenting their NSCs although because of the low number of sensors the data is extremely sparse. Going to composites aren’t going to help much if you don’t understand the loads! In case you didn’t know, they fatigue, too, (just ask Boeing on that topic for the 787). When using aluminum, marine designers should consider some of the selective reinforcement and damage tolerant approaches in aerospace.

Byron:

Don’t forget shock loading (slamming), torque loading (seas off bow or quarter), bending moment and elastic release from same (bury bow on the down pitch – wave goes aft and stern drops, then bow breaks free…).

Every thing gets much more complicated in catamaran and trimaran designs.

Then there are small dimensional differences in plate cutting and location of weld seams which are inherent in the fabrication process, combined with quality of fit up of plates and weld quality and consistency between different units of a class. Example: USNS Able had crack problems, USNS Indomitable didn’t.
Identical steel ships, catamarans. Why? Dunno.

Then there are day to day minute to minute changes in weight distribution in tanks due to adjustments for stability’s sake when fuel is burned, water consumed or distilled, etc, etc.

It’s a bit of a black art. Oh, and then there is WEATHER…

Byron, this could go on for a while. What about wing loading harmonics from non-symmetric weapons load-out under the wings –even in level flight?

Waves or turbulence, it doesn’t change the fact that ship designers could adopt aerospace fatigue and damage tolerance practices to eliminate some of the problems discussed. They haven’t.

Byron;

You meant 3K..right?