Archive for September, 2009
Guest blogger Chuck Hill checks in with the first of two parts of the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal (12-13 November). We are less than a month out from the attack at Pearl Harbor and Allied forces are on the move – in Europe, Africa, Asia and the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. But so too are the Italian, German and Japanese forces and while the trend may be more in the defensive direction, the Allies’ footholds are precariously narrow. In the Atlantic the U-boat campaign is sending tonnage to the bottom in numbers unimaginable in pre-war planning. The skies over Europe are still held by the Luftwaffe – a least during the day as the RAF was finding out in trying to carry out “Bomber” Harris’ strategic bombing campaign. Soon the losses were too great, forcing the RAF to a night campaign and forfeiture of any semblance of “precision” bombing. Progress is being made in Africa – but it isn’t Europe, and Russian and English demands for a second front in Europe are unceasing. Meanwhile, in the Pacific – US Marines are occupying a scrap of land on a rugged island in the Solomons… – SJS
November 1942 was a busy month.
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE: U-boat campaign sinks 119 ships totaling 729,100 tons, against the loss of 13 German and 4 Italian submarines. Total Allied losses to all causes are 807,700 tons, of which 131,000 are sunk in the Pacific and Indian Ocean, where German and Italian Submarines are also active. 4 Nov. The first meeting of the Anti-U-boat Warfare Committee takes place in London, including service chiefs, government ministers, and several scientists in the field of radar and operations research. Churchill chairs the meeting himself.
INDIAN OCEAN: 11 Nov., Indian minesweeper Bengal (1-3” gun) and the Dutch merchantile tanker Ondina (1-4”) are attacked by Japanese armed merchant cruisers Hokoku Maru and Aikoku Maru (both armed with 6-6”). Hokoku Maru was sunk and Aikoku Maru was driven off.
NEW GUINEA: November 2, Kokoda airstrip is recaptured by the Australian 25th brigade. 11-13 Nov., The Japanese are driven back to their beachheads at Gona and Buna.
ATOMIC RESEARCH: Work begins on the first atomic pile at the University of Chicago under direction of Enrico Fermi.
EASTERN FRONT: At the beginning of the month, Axis forces are advancing, but on November 19 the Soviets launch their winter offensive which will result in the German defeat at Stalingrad.
GUADALCANAL: The Tokyo Express has been very active. On 12 Nov, for the first time, Japanese troops on the island outnumber Americans. Both sides will rush to build up their forces for the expected showdown.
The Battle of Guadalcanal, 12-15 November
In November the Japanese would, again, attempt a major reinforcement of their forces on Guadalcanal. They hoped to land the 38th Division, with the bulk of the division embarked on eleven high speed merchant transports.
Between November 2 and 10, the Japanese had used 65 destroyer and 2 cruiser sorties to bring in about 8,000 men, but to clear the way for the transports, Henderson Field would have to be neutralized.
Yamamoto intended to repeat the success of the October 14 bombardment, when battleships Kongo and Haruna fired 918 rounds from their 14 inchers into Henderson Field, effectively emasculating it by the destruction of more than half of its aircraft and reduction of gasoline supplies to a single sortie for the remaining aircraft. That bombardment was followed up the next two nights by heavy cruisers that added an additional 752 of 8” on the night of 14/15 October and 912 more the following night.
But there had been a change of leadership on the American side. Shortly after the bombardment Halsey had replace Ghormley, and he was not about ready to let it happen again.
Still the odds of American success were long when available forces are compared:
|Aircraft Carriers||1(light)*||1 (damaged)|
Total (standard displacement)
|324,966 tons||203,305 tons|
*(Morison contends the Japanese had Junyo and Hiyo, but Dull specifically confirms that the Hiyo was not available)
Additionally Japanese operations were to be supported by 14 submarines, one of which, I-172 had been sunk on 10 November. Allied forces included 24 submarines, but these were handicapped by poor torpedoes.
Numbers of aircraft was close, but Henderson Field’s position on Guadalcanal gave the allies a huge advantage, as long as they could keep it operational.
64 years ago today, World War II ended in the Pacific. For a list of ships present in Tokyo Bay for the surrender as well as photographs of this historic day, click here.
Thank you to all the members of the Greatest Generation that made victory happen!
We are forever in your debt.
Navy established Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) in January 2006 to lead and centrally manage our Expeditionary Forces. Just four years later, we have a large and diverse group of Sailors at the leading edge of the fight with the demand signal for these forces steadily increasing.
When we discuss Navy’s contributions to today’s conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, NECC’s forces are – and will continue to be – at the center of that discussion. Our Sailors (Active and Reserve) have developed an extraordinary amount of experience and capability that we must continue to bring to bear to execute the missions our nation requires, today and in the future.
It is easy to create and manage a “single-purpose” warfare career field – like sub, surface, and air. My question to you: how do we best ensure that we institutionalize and take advantage of the extraordinary experience that we have gained in NECC over the past four years and will continue to need well into the future?
Cross posted from US Fleet Forces Command Blog
In the pre-dawn hours of 1 September, 1939, German forces began crossing into Poland, marking what most consider to be the start of the six nightmare years of the Second World War. The conflagration would consume more than 30 million souls by the time Japan officially signed the instruments of surrender in Tokyo Bay, six years and one day later. How the eventual defeat of the Axis came about is the subject of countless volumes, with countless more to yet be written.
As instructive to our generation and those which follow is just how the world came to the threshold of catastrophe that was unleashed seventy years ago this day.
The world had spent the majority of the previous decade negotiating with a cruel and despotic dictator whose virulent anti-semitism and design for world domination had been lain open in Mein Kampf for all to see and read.
Among the first acts of this dictator is to withdraw his country from the League of Nations (1933). The hope of controlling his ambitions through collective security was shattered forever. Shortly afterward, agents of his country had a direct hand in the assassination of a neighboring head of state, with the murder of Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss in 1934.
The democracies of Europe, England and France, recoiling from the horrors of the last war, looked the other way as this dictator acquired and developed weapons in direct violation of existing treaties, creating an air force and tank force. To challenge such violations was to risk war. And a European war was an unthinkable, to be avoided at all costs.
Emboldened, this dictator marched into the Rhineland in 1936, an area that had been forbidden military forces and fortifications. Again, rationalizing that such an act could be reasonably justified, and was not worth risking a wider European war, the European Democracies did nothing.
In 1937, as civil war raged in Spain, this dictator sent his legions with their new weapons to use this civil war as a testing ground. Those weapons had been developed and tested with the complicity of Russia, ruled by another dictator whose enemy was the West. The Democracies of Europe were once again silent. To challenge this dictator risked provoking him, leading to a wider European war.
There were those, like Churchill, who warned of this dictator and his ambitions, but were shouted down and dismissed as war-mongers for preaching preparedness and strength. War must be avoided. The dictator’s ambitions, satiated.
The next year, 1938, singing the now-familiar tune of “protection of German minorities from persecution” amidst the supposed chaos of unrest, this dictator subsumed Austria. Expressly forbidden by the Versailles and St Germain treaties, the Anschluss (joining) was allowed to stand, for fear of risking a wider European war.
In the autumn of that year, once again tales of abuse of Germans at the hands of an ethnic majority led to demands for annexation of the Czech Sudetenland. This time, Europe’s Democracies actively participated in the dismantling, meeting at Munich and handing over the territory of a sovereign nation. They did so clinging to the promise that this act of betrayal represented the dictator’s “last territorial demand in Europe”.
Chamberlain returned from Munich to a hero’s welcome, waving the document that represented “peace in our time”. A sigh of relief, war had once again been averted. “Peace in our time” would last exactly 334 days.
In March of 1939, this dictator’s army occupied the rest of unfortunate Czechoslovakia. Without the modern fortifications of the Sudetenland so graciously handed the Germans, the Czechs were defenseless.
By the summer of 1939, rumblings in the East centered around the city of Danzig, whose German population “suffered” at the hands of the Poles. By August, agitation among the Germans in Danzig made it clear to even the wildest optimist in the European Democracies that the dictator had found his casus belli.
Yet, in the previous six years, the Western Democracies had stood idly by while the dictator had:
- Violated the peace treaty by building and testing banned weapons and expanding his armed forces
- Brought about the assassination of the head of a neighboring state
- Reoccupied the Rhineland
- Sent forces to be battle tested in Spain
- Annexed Austria
- Grabbed the Sudetenland
- Occupied Czechoslovakia
This had not satiated the dictator’s thirst for conquest. Instead, such vacillation, weakness, and inaction had only emboldened. “My enemies are worms,” the dictator had said. “I saw them at Munich”.
So, when the Poles refused to accede to the threats of the dictator, there would be war. All that had been surrendered, all that had been conceded, the honor that had been betrayed in order to prevent war had been for naught.
On 1 September 1939, war came after all. The dictator had wanted it all along. He had told us so. We simply hadn’t the courage to believe him.
We live in an age marked by dwindling numbers of real pioneers and visionaries.
Today we just lost another and we are all a bit poorer for it. – SJS
From DoD News:
Retired Navy Rear Adm. Wayne E. Meyer, regarded as the father of the Navy’s AEGIS Weapons System, passed away today.
“I am deeply saddened by a great loss to our Navy family,” said Admiral Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations. “Rear Admiral Meyer’s passion, technical acumen, and warfighting expertise served as the foundation of our Navy combatant fleet today. On behalf of the men and women of the United States Navy, I extend my deepest and most heartfelt sympathy to the Meyer family. He was a close friend and mentor to so many of us. His legacy will remain in the Navy forever.”
Meyer was born in Brunswick, Mo., on April 21, 1926. In 1946, he graduated from the University of Kansas with a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering. He also held an master’s degree in astronautics and aeronautics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School.
Meyer’s Navy career began in 1943 as an apprentice seaman. In 1946, he was commissioned an ensign in the U.S. Naval Reserve and was transferred to regular Navy in 1948. After several years at sea, he returned to school in 1951 and attended the Joint Guided Missile School, Fort Bliss, Texas, and the Naval Line School, Monterey, Calif., and eventually served as an instructor at Special Weapons School, Norfolk, Va.
In 1963, Meyer was chosen to head the TERRIER desk in the Special Navy Task Force for Surface Missile Systems. He turned down a destroyer command to continue his work with missile, radar, and fire control systems, and became the founding Chief Engineer at the Naval Ship Missile System Engineering Station, Port Hueneme, Calif. In 1970, the Navy chose then Capt. Meyer to lead the development of the new AEGIS Weapon System in the Naval Ordnance Systems Command.
In this position, Meyer was promoted to rear admiral in Jan. 1975. In Jan. 1977, he assumed duties as the founding project manager of the AEGIS Shipbuilding Project. This project was ultimately responsible for the construction of all of the Navy’s current cruisers and destroyers – with 89 ships built or in construction, and more in planning. This is one of the longest and largest naval shipbuilding programs in history. He retired from active duty in 1985.
In Nov. 2006, the Secretary of the Navy announced that an Arleigh Burke class destroyer, DDG 108, would be named in honor of Rear Adm. Meyer. Christened on Oct. 18, 2008, the ship utilizes the same combat system that Meyer helped to develop, the Aegis Combat System, including the SPY-lD, multifunction phased array radar. This advanced system makes the AEGIS ship the foundation of the U.S. Navy’s surface combatant fleet. Additionally, when the ship is commissioned in Philadelphia, Pa. on Oct. 10, 2009, it will be manned with a complement of highly trained sailors, providing the Navy with a dynamic multi-mission warship that can operate independently or as part of carrier strike groups, surface action groups, or amphibious ready groups, ensuring USS Wayne E. Meyer will lead the Navy into the future.
Rear Adm. Meyer’s personal decorations and service medals include: Distinguished Service Medal; Legion of Merit; Meritorious Service Medal; Navy Meritorious Unit Commendation Ribbon with Bronze Star; China Service Medal; American Campaign Medal; World War II Victory Medal; Navy Occupation Service Medal; National Defense Medal with Bronze Star; Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal; Vietnam Service Medal; Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross with Palm Unit Citation; and Republic of Vietnam Civil Actions Unit Citation.
His other awards include: American Society of Naval Engineers Gold Medal, 1976; Old Crow Electronics Countermeasure Association Silver Medal; Distinguished Engineer Alumni Award, University of Kansas, 1981; Naval Ordnance Engineer Certificate #99; Fellow in the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics; Missile Systems Award for distinguished service, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1983; Navy League’s Rear Admiral William Sterling Parsons Award, for scientific and technical progress in construction of the nation’s AEGIS fleet, 1985; Harold E. Sanders Award for a lifetime of contributions to Naval Engineering, American Society of Naval Engineers, 1985; Admiral J. H. Sides Award for major contributions to Anti-Air Warfare, National Security Industrial Association, 1988.
In 1977, Meyer was designated a Pioneer in the Navy’s Acquisition Hall of Fame in the Pentagon. In 2008, he was presented with the sixth annual Ronald W. Reagan Missile Defense Award.
Cross posted at steeljawscribe.com
Fascinating article from Stratfor. (c2009 stratfor.com)
THE WESTERN VIEW OF RUSSIA
By George Friedman
A months-long White House review of a pair of U.S. ballistic missile defense
(BMD) installations slated for Poland and the Czech Republic is nearing
completion. The review is expected to present a number of options ranging
from pushing forward with the installations as planned to canceling them
outright. The Obama administration has yet to decide what course to follow.
Rumors are running wild in Poland and the Czech Republic that the United
States has reconsidered its plan to place ballistic defense systems in their
countries. The rumors stem from a top U.S. BMD lobbying group that said this
past week that the U.S. plan was all but dead.
The ultimate U.S. decision on BMD depends upon both the upcoming summit of
the five permanent U.N. Security Council members plus Germany on the Iranian
nuclear program and Russia’s response to those talks. If Russia does not
cooperate in sanctions, but instead continues to maintain close relations
with Iran, we suspect that the BMD plan will remain intact. Either way, the
BMD issue offers a good opportunity to re-examine U.S. and Western relations
with Russia and how they have evolved.
Cold War vs. Post-Cold War
There has been a recurring theme in the discussions between Russia and the
West over the past year: the return of the Cold War. U.S. President Barack
Obama, for example, accused Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin of having
one foot in the Cold War. The Russians have in turn accused the Americans of
thinking in terms of the Cold War. Eastern Europeans have expressed fears
that the Russians continue to view their relationship with Europe in terms
of the Cold War. Other Europeans have expressed concern that both Americans
and Russians might drag Europe into another Cold War.
For many in the West, the more mature and stable Western-Russian
relationship is what they call the “Post-Cold War world.” In this world, the
Russians no longer regard the West as an enemy, and view the other republics
of the former Soviet Union (FSU) as independent states free to forge
whatever relations they wish with the West. Russia should welcome or at
least be indifferent to such matters. Russia instead should be concentrating
on economic development while integrating lessons learned from the West into
its political and social thinking. The Russians should stop thinking in
politico-military terms, the terms of the Cold War. Instead, they should
think in the new paradigm in which Russia is part of the Western economic
system, albeit a backward one needing time and institution-building to
become a full partner with the West. All other thinking is a throwback to
the Cold War.
This was the thinking behind the idea of resetting U.S.-Russian relations.
Hillary Clinton’s “reset” button was meant to move U.S.-Russian relations
away from what Washington thought of as a return to the Cold War from its
preferred period, which existed between 1991 and the deterioration of
U.S.-Russian relations after Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution. The United
States was in a bimodal condition when it came to Russian relations: Either
it was the Cold War or it was post-Cold War.
The Russians took a more jaundiced view of the post-Cold War world. For
Moscow, rather than a period of reform, the post-Cold War period was one of
decay and chaos. Old institutions had collapsed, but new institutions had
not emerged. Instead, there was the chaos of privatization, essentially a
wild free-for-all during which social order collapsed. Western institutions,
including everything from banks to universities, were complicit in this
collapse. Western banks were eager to take advantage of the new pools of
privately expropriated money, while Western advisers were eager to advise
the Russians on how to become Westerners. In the meantime, workers went
unpaid, life expectancy and birth rates declined, and the basic institutions
that had provided order under communism decayed — or worse, became
complicit in the looting. The post-Cold War world was not a happy time in
Russia: It was a catastrophic period for Russian power.
Herein lies the gulf between the West and the Russians. The West divides the
world between the Cold War and the post-Cold War world. It clearly prefers
the post-Cold War world, not so much because of the social condition of
Russia, but because the post-Cold War world lacked the geopolitical
challenge posed by the Soviet Union — everything from wars of national
liberation to the threat of nuclear war was gone. From the Russian point of
view, the social chaos of the post-Cold War world was unbearable. Meanwhile,
the end of a Russian challenge to the West meant from the Russian point of
view that Moscow was helpless in the face of Western plans for reordering
the institutions and power arrangements of the region without regard to
As mentioned, Westerners think in term of two eras, the Cold War and the
Post-Cold War era. This distinction is institutionalized in Western
expertise on Russia. And it divides into two classes of Russia experts.
There are those who came to maturity during the Cold War in the 1970s and
1980s, whose basic framework is to think of Russia as a global threat. Then,
there are those who came to maturity in the later 1980s and 1990s. Their
view of Russia is of a failed state that can stabilize its situation for a
time by subordinating itself to Western institutions and values, or continue
its inexorable decline.
These two generations clash constantly. Interestingly, the distinction is
not so much ideological as generational. The older group looks at Russian
behavior with a more skeptical eye, assuming that Putin, a KGB man, has in
mind the resurrection of Soviet power. The post-Cold War generation that
controlled U.S.-Russian policy during both the Clinton and Bush
administrations is more interesting. During both administrations, this
generation believed in the idea that economic liberalization and political
liberalization were inextricably bound together. It believed that Russia was
headed in the right direction if only Moscow did not try to reassert itself
geopolitically and militarily, and if Moscow did not try to control the
economy or society with excessive state power. It saw the Russian evolution
during the mid-to-late 2000s as an unfortunate and unnecessary development
moving Russia away from the path that was best for it, and it sees the Cold
War generation’s response to Russia’s behavior as counterproductive.
The Post-Post Cold War World
The U.S. and other Westerners’ understanding of Russia is trapped in a
nonproductive paradigm. For Russia, the choice isn’t between the Cold War or
the Post-Cold War world. This dichotomy denies the possibility of, if you
will, a post-post-Cold War world — or to get away from excessive posts, a
world in which Russia is a major regional power, with a stable if troubled
economy, functional society and regional interests it must protect.
Russia cannot go back to the Cold War, which consisted of three parts.
First, there was the nuclear relationship. Second, there was the Soviet
military threat to both Europe and the Far East; the ability to deploy large
military formations throughout the Eurasian landmass. And third, there were
the wars of national liberation funded and guided by the Soviets, and
designed to create powers allied with the Soviets on a global scale and to
sap U.S. power in endless counterinsurgencies.
While the nuclear balance remains, by itself it is hollow. Without other
dimensions of Russian power, the threat to engage in mutual assured
destruction has little meaning. Russia’s military could re-evolve to pose a
Eurasian threat; as we have pointed out before, in Russia, the status of the
economy does not historically correlate to Russian military power. At the
same time, it would take a generation of development to threaten the
domination of the European peninsula — and Russia today has far fewer
people and resources than the whole of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact
that it rallied to that effort. Finally, while Russia could certainly fund
insurgencies, the ideological power of Marxism is gone, and in any case
Russia is not a Marxist state. Building wars of national liberation around
pure finance is not as easy as it looks. There is no road back to the Cold
War. But neither is there a road back to the post-Cold War period.
There was a period in the mid-to-late 1990s when the West could have
destroyed the Russian Federation. Instead, the West chose a combined
strategy of ignoring Russia while irritating it with economic policies that
were unhelpful to say the least, and military policies like Kosovo designed
to drive home Russia’s impotence. There is the old saw of not teasing a
bear, but if you must, being sure to kill it. Operating on the myth of
nation-building, the West thought it could rebuild Russia in its own image.
To this day, most of the post-Cold War experts do not grasp the degree to
which Russians saw their efforts as a deliberate attempt to destroy Russia
and the degree to which Russians are committed never to return to that time.
It is hard to imagine anything as infuriating for the Russians as the reset
button the Clinton administration’s Russia experts — who now dominate
Obama’s Russia policy — presented the Russian leadership in all
seriousness. The Russians simply do not intend to return to the Post-Cold
War era Western experts recall so fondly.
The resurrection of talks on the reduction of nuclear stockpiles provides an
example of the post-Cold generation’s misjudgment in its response to Russia.
These START talks once were urgent matters. They are not urgent any longer.
The threat of nuclear war is not part of the current equation. Maintaining
that semblance of parity with the United States and placing limits on the
American arsenal are certainly valuable from the Russian perspective, but it
is no longer a fundamental issue to them. Some have suggested using these
talks as a confidence-building measure. But from the Russian point of view,
START is a peripheral issue, and Washington’s focus on it is an indication
that the United States is not prepared to take Russia’s current pressing
Continued lectures on human rights and economic liberalization, which fall
on similarly deaf Russian ears, provide another example of the post-Cold War
generation’s misjudgment in its response to Russia. The period in which
human rights and economic liberalization were centerpieces of Russian state
policy is remembered — and not only by the Russian political elite — as
among the worst periods of recent Russian history. No one wants to go back
there, but the Russians hear constant Western calls to return to that chaos.
The Russians’ conviction is that post-Cold War Western officials want to
finish the job they began. The critical point that post-Cold War officials
frequently don’t grasp is that the Russians see them as at least as
dangerous to Russian interests as the Cold War generation.
The Russian view is that neither the Cold War nor the post-Cold War is the
proper paradigm. Russia is not challenging the United States for global
hegemony. But neither is Russia prepared simply to allow the West to create
an alliance of nations around Russia’s border. Russia is the dominant power
in the FSU. Its economic strategy is to focus on the development and export
of primary commodities, from natural gas to grain. In order to do this, it
wants to align primary commodity policies in the republics of the former
Soviet Union, particularly those concerning energy resources. Economic and
strategic interests combine to make the status of the former Soviet
republics a primary strategic interest. This is neither a perspective from
the Cold War or from the post-Cold War, but a logical Russian perspective on
a new age.
While Russia’s concerns with Georgia are the noisiest, it is not the key
Russian concern in its near abroad — Ukraine is. So long as the United
States is serious about including Ukraine in NATO, the United States
represents a direct threat to Russian national security. A glance at a map
shows why the Russians think this.
Russia remains interested in Central Europe as well. It is not seeking
hegemony, but a neutral buffer zone between Germany in particular and the
former Soviet Union, with former satellite states like Poland of crucial
importance to Moscow. It sees the potential Polish BMD installation and
membership of the Baltic states in NATO as direct and unnecessary challenges
to Russian national interest.
Responding to the United States
As the United States causes discomfort for the Russians, Russia will in turn
cause discomfort for the United States. The U.S. sore spot is the Middle
East, and Iran in particular. Therefore, the Russians will respond to
American pressure on them where it hurts Washington the most.
The Cold Warriors don’t understand the limits of Russian power. The
post-Cold Warriors don’t understand the degree to which they are distrusted
by Russia, and the logic behind that distrust. The post-Cold Warriors
confuse this distrust with a hangover from the Cold War rather than a direct
Russian response to the post-Cold War policies they nurtured.
This is not an argument for the West to accommodate the Russians; there are
grave risks for the West there. Russian intentions right now do not forecast
what Russian intentions might be were Moscow secure in the FSU and had it
neutralized Poland. The logic of such things is that as problems are solved,
opportunities are created. One therefore must think forward to what might
happen through Western accommodation.
At the same time, it is vital to understand that neither the Cold War model
nor the post-Cold War model is sufficient to understand Russian intentions
and responses right now. We recall the feeling when the Cold War ended that
a known and understandable world was gone. The same thing is now happening
to the post-Cold War experts: The world in which they operated has
dissolved. A very different and complex world has taken its place. Reset
buttons are symbols of a return to a past the Russians reject. START talks
are from a world long passed. The issues now revolve around Russia’s desire
for a sphere of influence, and the willingness and ability of the West to
block that ambition.
Somewhere between BMD in Poland and the threat posed by Iran, the West must
make a strategic decision about Russia, and live with the consequences.
Don’t get nervous SWMBO! “This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with attribution
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