Comments on: From Our Archive: The Role Doctrine in Naval Warfare by LCDR Dudley W Knox, USN, Proceedings Prize Essay 1915 http://blog.usni.org/2009/10/23/from-our-archive-the-role-doctrine-in-naval-warfare-by-lcdr-dudley-w-knox-usn-proceedings-prize-essay-1915/ The Naval Institute’s taken its independent forum to a new level - with you in the middle of it. Sat, 11 Feb 2012 23:43:34 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1 By: Galrahn http://blog.usni.org/2009/10/23/from-our-archive-the-role-doctrine-in-naval-warfare-by-lcdr-dudley-w-knox-usn-proceedings-prize-essay-1915/comment-page-1/#comment-165770 Galrahn Tue, 27 Oct 2009 03:50:39 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=4799#comment-165770 There is a great article I had never read before. Nice job!! There is a great article I had never read before. Nice job!!

]]> By: Phil Ridderhof http://blog.usni.org/2009/10/23/from-our-archive-the-role-doctrine-in-naval-warfare-by-lcdr-dudley-w-knox-usn-proceedings-prize-essay-1915/comment-page-1/#comment-164454 Phil Ridderhof Fri, 23 Oct 2009 23:43:06 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=4799#comment-164454 I haven’t read the 1920 article Prof Gene refers to (but would like to), but I found this essay in light of what Knox had written in the two preceding years: “Trained Initiative and Unity of Action: The True Basis of Military Efficiency” (1913 Second Honorable Mention), and “The Great Lesson From Nelson for Today” (1914 Prize Essay). They demonstrate that Knox’s thoughts were consistent about the critical role of doctrine, education and leadership in successful naval warfare. In terms of how he would look at today’s situation, I agree with Prof Gene. I think that the Navy has a viable Strategy that articulates the types of missions the Navy will need to be able to do (and thus what should drive doctrine, manning, equipment, etc.). From here, though, you have to drop to strike group level tactical manuals (CWC) that provide the common understanding that Knox sought. I think he would appreciate “command by negation.” However, in looking at where this is all really put together, at the numbered Fleet level, I don’t think we have what Knox was seeking. The new JFMCC/Fleet/NAVFOR doctrine (NWP 3-32) is good for telling a fleet commander how to organize his staff, how to fit into the construct of the joint force commander and adjacent components, and how to provide direction to his subordinates. However, it is almost totally silent on “fighting the Fleet.” There are no general principles of how or why to organize subordinate task forces (by function, by domain, by geography, by all of the above?). Other than general reference to supporting and supported relationships, I’m not sure the subordinate commanders have a good guide of how to relate to one another (other than the CWC and defensive focused “SUPSIT” guidance, which does not necessarily apply to the variety of task force organizations a fleet can employ). In the absence of a common Navy doctrine, what you have is six separate doctrines, one for each Fleet, that are defined by their own peculiar directives, operating guidance, standing organizations, etc. This would be okay if ships and units were permanently assigned to only one fleet. However, they are not. The result is that common understanding, desired by Knox, between the Fleet commander and the Strike Groups and ships reporting in and out of his command is never allowed to fully develop. I know there is an effort to fill this void in Navy doctrine, but I’m not sure where it is going or if it is “languishing” as Prof Gene stated. Phil Ridderhof USMC I haven’t read the 1920 article Prof Gene refers to (but would like to), but I found this essay in light of what Knox had written in the two preceding years: “Trained Initiative and Unity of Action: The True Basis of Military Efficiency” (1913 Second Honorable Mention), and “The Great Lesson From Nelson for Today” (1914 Prize Essay). They demonstrate that Knox’s thoughts were consistent about the critical role of doctrine, education and leadership in successful naval warfare.

In terms of how he would look at today’s situation, I agree with Prof Gene. I think that the Navy has a viable Strategy that articulates the types of missions the Navy will need to be able to do (and thus what should drive doctrine, manning, equipment, etc.). From here, though, you have to drop to strike group level tactical manuals (CWC) that provide the common understanding that Knox sought. I think he would appreciate “command by negation.”

However, in looking at where this is all really put together, at the numbered Fleet level, I don’t think we have what Knox was seeking. The new JFMCC/Fleet/NAVFOR doctrine (NWP 3-32) is good for telling a fleet commander how to organize his staff, how to fit into the construct of the joint force commander and adjacent components, and how to provide direction to his subordinates. However, it is almost totally silent on “fighting the Fleet.” There are no general principles of how or why to organize subordinate task forces (by function, by domain, by geography, by all of the above?). Other than general reference to supporting and supported relationships, I’m not sure the subordinate commanders have a good guide of how to relate to one another (other than the CWC and defensive focused “SUPSIT” guidance, which does not necessarily apply to the variety of task force organizations a fleet can employ).

In the absence of a common Navy doctrine, what you have is six separate doctrines, one for each Fleet, that are defined by their own peculiar directives, operating guidance, standing organizations, etc. This would be okay if ships and units were permanently assigned to only one fleet. However, they are not. The result is that common understanding, desired by Knox, between the Fleet commander and the Strike Groups and ships reporting in and out of his command is never allowed to fully develop.

I know there is an effort to fill this void in Navy doctrine, but I’m not sure where it is going or if it is “languishing” as Prof Gene stated.

Phil Ridderhof USMC

]]> By: SteelJaw http://blog.usni.org/2009/10/23/from-our-archive-the-role-doctrine-in-naval-warfare-by-lcdr-dudley-w-knox-usn-proceedings-prize-essay-1915/comment-page-1/#comment-164291 SteelJaw Fri, 23 Oct 2009 17:34:13 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=4799#comment-164291 How about in light of this past week's topic of discussion, the 1986 Maritime Strategy article? - SJS How about in light of this past week’s topic of discussion, the 1986 Maritime Strategy article?
- SJS

]]> By: admin http://blog.usni.org/2009/10/23/from-our-archive-the-role-doctrine-in-naval-warfare-by-lcdr-dudley-w-knox-usn-proceedings-prize-essay-1915/comment-page-1/#comment-164222 admin Fri, 23 Oct 2009 14:55:13 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=4799#comment-164222 <i>I’d suggest that your next blast from the past should be from then-CAPT Dudley Knox along with Ernie King and William Pye in the August 1920 issue (No 210).</i> Great! I'll go dig it up right now! In addition to comments on this article, I invite everyone to make suggestions on past articles worth republishing! I’d suggest that your next blast from the past should be from then-CAPT Dudley Knox along with Ernie King and William Pye in the August 1920 issue (No 210).

Great! I’ll go dig it up right now! In addition to comments on this article, I invite everyone to make suggestions on past articles worth republishing!

]]> By: Prof Gene http://blog.usni.org/2009/10/23/from-our-archive-the-role-doctrine-in-naval-warfare-by-lcdr-dudley-w-knox-usn-proceedings-prize-essay-1915/comment-page-1/#comment-164212 Prof Gene Fri, 23 Oct 2009 14:22:06 +0000 http://blog.usni.org/?p=4799#comment-164212 Kudos for re-publishing LCDR Knox. His words are just as worthy today. The Navy remains doctrine-deficient, or perhaps more accurately doctrine-resistant. The much-delayed NOC is an obvious example of this, as are the nearly forgotten NDP series pubs. And the new Maritime Operations Centers at the numbered Fleets are a major step into the 21st century, but the associated doctrine for their operation and employment is languishing in the development process. There is a worthy discussion to be had about why the Navy is so institutionally resistant to any warfighting doctrine above the level of tactical employment of individual platforms; perhaps this is the place to begin that. I'd suggest that your next blast from the past should be from then-CAPT Dudley Knox along with Ernie King and William Pye in the August 1920 issue (No 210). Their report on the educational requirements for line officers is 90 years old, but it could have been written last week. Their recommendations, which were never implemented, are just as relevant today as they were in 1920 - and maybe more so. Kudos for re-publishing LCDR Knox. His words are just as worthy today. The Navy remains doctrine-deficient, or perhaps more accurately doctrine-resistant. The much-delayed NOC is an obvious example of this, as are the nearly forgotten NDP series pubs. And the new Maritime Operations Centers at the numbered Fleets are a major step into the 21st century, but the associated doctrine for their operation and employment is languishing in the development process. There is a worthy discussion to be had about why the Navy is so institutionally resistant to any warfighting doctrine above the level of tactical employment of individual platforms; perhaps this is the place to begin that.

I’d suggest that your next blast from the past should be from then-CAPT Dudley Knox along with Ernie King and William Pye in the August 1920 issue (No 210). Their report on the educational requirements for line officers is 90 years old, but it could have been written last week. Their recommendations, which were never implemented, are just as relevant today as they were in 1920 – and maybe more so.

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