A couple of assumptions here,

The Chinese are progressing towards ASBM capability. Eventually, they’ll have something working, which they’ll probably test. I say test it so we can get some good collections.

Targeting, C4IR, lacking, but working on it; space based, OTHR, SIGINT, UAV, ELINT, etc. all in development. Eventually they’ll get something, and we will know what it is, or what combination gives them the best location elipse. And we’ll work on ways to detract from these capabilities.

When would China use it? Last month I attended a conference on China, basically looking ahead at 2025. Lots of experts, lots of good information, also lots of questions. Question I had there, which I still do, is what would prompt China to attack a US Carrier group, specifically a carrier with an ASBM. Got the same answer I received before, which is kind of vague. Basically they would attack the carrier IF they think Attack on Chinese Mainland is IMMINENT, or if they’ve attacked Taiwan and we’re coming to Taiwan’s aid.

I’m still internally debating those answers and have not come up with an accurate decision point when China would attack a US Carrier, and maybe sink it and kill over 5000 American souls. I hope this has been answered at some levels. What would be our response and what would be the escalation point from here? Would China take that kind of risk to keep from saving face vis a vis a Taiwanese bold move towards independence? The economic impact considerations, on both sides? Again, a lot more questions than answers.

Looking at these considerations, ASBM almost becomes more of a deterrent weapon than an actual available arrow in the quiver. A means to maybe prevent us from coming within 1500 km of the coastline when they want to take some actions that maybe would not escalate to invasion. If China had these capabilities last decade, would we have sent the carriers there in 96?

Considering all that, once we have a good idea on the decision point for ASBM employment by the Chinese, I’m assuming that then we would take whatever actions necessary to negate them that possibility. And our range of options is pretty varied, once the decision to engage and negate capability is made.

Our range of options would range from limiting their targeting abilities by either taking out OTHR, strikes, Jamming, spoofing, meaconing, cyberwarfare, etc, ranging up to ASATs. All depends on what we need to impact and whether it is overtly or covertly.

On the other hand, also must have considerations on defeating the weapon. If we are confident on capabilities to defeat the weapon, then kinetic, overt action to limit targeting is not required. Like SJS mentioned, there is a number of limited ATBM capabilities, especially looking at shipbased systems. We have to look at all available options.

Like my hero Forest Gump stated, “I’m not a smart man”, but just of the top of my head something like a Nulka SRBOC on steroids.

Stop laughing now. What follows is like the fry guy at McD telling a brain surgeon which artery to cauterize.

Assuming a 50km radius for terminal guidance area (between 20km and 100km radius in PRC literature), the circle is not going to be a perfect circle due to ASBM speed, angle of attack and slow down maneuver. So basically we’re looking at an elongated elipse with the extended lobe behind the carrier. Assuming prompt notification via national sensors and other cues, CV kicks it in the butt at 35kts, towards axis of attack, the shorter lobe. The missile can and will go long due to slow down maneuvers. It cannot go much shorter due to inertia and flight profile. In 15 mins (launch to impact) the carrier should move about 16km, thus the area the ASBM can target is about 34km or less. Launch a series of chaff missiles at 19km altitude and progressively lower in order to blind the seeker. Higher if needed to blind midcourse targeting. At that altitude, the cloud radius need not be that large to blind the area needed to obscure the CV. Combine this with jamming, some false targets etc on the long (non blinded) side of the elipse and it may have some effect. Again, like I stated, sure there are better, more efficient ideas but they don’t need to be exotic. Now, if they use an EMP warhead, then will see how good our EMP protected equipment holds out. Oh, and the COTS stuff too.

So, too make a long story short, they are developing the ASBM system. It’s a lot more complicated than it seems as a system vs just the weapon. Look at the big picture and come up with solutions, both simple and exotic. We’ve done it for over 200 years. Will do it again.

1. AF is working on a fighter launched airborne-hit-to-kill missile based on modifying existing technology. Not too far a stretch to think it couldn’t be moved to a CVN environment if it meets shipboard requirements. Understand though, the target set is, perforce, a limited one.
2. Risk in attacking the Chinese mainland is not relative, it is escalatory. Patriot is not a player once you start moving beyond the shorter range Scud-type missiles. Target is out of the Patriot envelope – which is why you build a layered system that includes THAAD and the various iterations of the SM-3 family extant and to come.
3. More advanced systems (e.g., directed energy) are being researched but are a long ways away from being operational. From now for almost the next decade, your ability to intercept BMs will rely pretty much on the THAAD, SM-3 and a lesser extent, Patriot and SM-2 Blk4a missiles in the Theater environment, and Alaskan and California-based GBIs for ICBMs if it is a kinetic kill you seek.
4. Ref China’s strategic nuclear inventory – because of numbers and growing complexity of PRC’s inventory, most of the above will be non-players.
- SJS

Also, risk associated with attacking in-land Chinese military targets is relative. I thought the US had miiltary bases in Japan, Taiwan, the Phillipines and South Korea, so could those bases be equipped with TMBD systems like the Patriot? Patriot missiles seemed effective during the 1991 Persian Gulf War…The US currently should be able to position enough TMBD systems near China’s borders to minimize the risk of its strategic nuclear weaponry.

As a backup, it wouldn’t hurt to start researching more advanced TMBD systems, like ship-based rail guns or directed energy weapons. There was a poster on this site a while back who said that ship-based missile defense systems had great potential because they could store better power sources (ie nuclear), to allow the weapons to fire in salvo mode, which would be of great help in “hitting a bullet with a bullet”.

1. Has the PRC developed the OTH targeting capabilities to make a system lik this work?
I ask this question because that use to be the game between the AV-MF and the NATO regarding carrier BatGrus. Everyone knew where the RORSAT’s operated on and could detect a circle of X. Via the application of some basic math regarding processing and interpertation of the data. They would then flush TU-16′s or TU-95′s out to localize the datum. On the flip side NATO would turn thier CVBG’s into black holes trying to hide from the Soviet Naval Aviation and Soviet Fleets. With all this talk about the ASBM, I have not seen nor heard any increasing talk of the PRC’s Maritime Recon capabilities. They have a copy of the Tu-16C that still forms the backbone of thier bomber fleet and MPA fleet. They haven’t seemed to create the equivalent to the tattle-tale trawler that the Soviets had as well. I also haven’t heard that much about the PRC’s satellite capabilities in open-media sources either. So could they find a CVBG and engage it with this weapon where it could change the initative?

2. Would TMBD equipped ships be capable of engaging these weapons while the CVBG is on the move? Most of the articles that I have read required the TMBD equipped ships be required to be operating in a know GPS box at slow speed. Could a high speed radically manuvering CVBG still be able to use TMBD to engage these weapons?

3. Are these fix or mobile launched systems and how much warning time between launch and impact could be given to the fleet? The question of how much counter-targeting could be provided against a system like this needs to be looked at as well. How would we counter target? Would Western forces have to resort to conventionally armed SLBM’s to strike against fixed sites or would they still be able to take a cruise missile to destroy the site. Remember that it wasn’t until the end of every war that stopped ballistic missile attacks. Even during World War 2 when ballistic missiles were introduced the SHAPE forces were being attacked by V-2 weapons until the German’s ran out of material to manufacture and final weapons.

We need to take a deep breath about this weapon system. Just don’t concentrate on a single part of it, rather take a larger look on the whole about the complete intergration of combined arms to employ a weapon system. We should look at how to defend and how to respond if attacked by this weapon system.