I wasn’t suggesting that you gave the Choiseul diversion short shrift, because your articles were focused on Bougainville itself. I mentioned it because I greatly enjoyed Christ’s book, and thought some of your readers might like it as well. I had known nothing about the diversion beyond the fact that it happened, so I was happy to learn more about it. It was quite a feat.

Now as for the Australians and Germans — I’m not faulting your scholarship. There are several sources in which this claim is made, and it’s clear that you read them. I only mean to suggest that the sources used in these references are suspect insofar as they do not include the viewpoint of the native inhabitants themselves.

Planters (and, after them, the miners) understandably prefer docile workers. Bougainvilleans, to the extent that anybody can make a statement about the whole population, are not docile. “Bukas” were valued as bosses/foremen, but less so as workers.

I wouldn’t put much credence in anything that the planters said about their workers, especially how good their relations with them were. What could they possibly have known about them?

In any case, I’m not about to complain that you wrote an article about military history and failed to consider social/cultural history in detail. That would be totally rude and inappropriate.

The intent of my comment was to alert your readers to other ways of looking at the “loyalty” question.

I don’t have my copy of the standard missionization reference handy (it’s Hugh Laracy’s “Marists and Melanesians: A History of Catholic Missions in the Solomon Islands”) or else I’d be able to say something quantitative about the German missionaries. My sense is that by the time the war clouds were gathering, the proportion of missionaries who were German was small. Of course this wouldn’t address the question of how effective they were.

If you haven’t explored some of Douglas Oliver’s works about Bougainville, you might want to — here I’m referring to his general works, such as “Black Islanders: A Personal Perspective of Bougainville, 1937-1991,” which is very readable. Oliver was my PhD advisor.

And finally, you might find “Bougainville Before the Conflict” to be interesting, as well. It’s an edited volume (Helga Griffin and Anthony Regan, editors) with contributions by scholars from a variety of disciplines (including some contributions by Bougainvilleans, such as the current President, James Tanis).

I’ll close by repeating that I do understand this sort of material is not your focus, nor does it have to be.

I’m only trying to suggest to your readers that there are other issues, outside of strictly military history, that they might find interesting, and broadening.

Thank you for writing these blogs. I believe that the more that’s known about Bougainville and its history, the better.

The so-called “influence of German missionaries” appears in several sources, and to me it seemed a plausible explanation for the difference between native attitudes on Bougainville and on other Solomon islands where the Allies operated. Put another way, the long-term pre-war presence of Australian planters almost always led to good relations with the natives on the islands in question (including New Guinea and New Britain), whereas Bougainville had only been under Australian administration since 1919. As you seem to have had extensive personal experience with Bougainville, perhaps you’d like to offer further insight into this situation.

As for Choiseul getting short shrift in the Bougainville articles,it was only in the interest of brevity that I did so. My problem was not in getting information–there’s lots of it out there, it was in distilling it all down into relatively “bite-sized” pieces more in keeping with the other articles in the Solomons Campaign series.

Still, there are many Bougainvilleans who actively use the internet and even use Google Alerts to find articles about Bougainville (as I do) — they will read what you wrote, and be disappointed.

I note with pleasure that your description of the “Australian-led contingent of native guerrillas” squares with what I learned about those days from my friend Mesiamo, the leader of those guerrillas.

May I suggest these works relating to the Australian operations after the Americans left:

Peter Charlton, “The Unnecessary War” (1983, straight military history)

Don Astill, “Commando White Diamond” (1996, memoir)

Peter Pinney,”The Glass Cannon” (1990, fiction, but probably more “creative non-fiction” than straight fiction)

Also, returning to your Part I, your readers might want to know more about the diversionary landings on Choiseul. They can find that information in:

James F. Christ, “Mission Raise Hell” (2006). Interestingly enough, this book was published by the Naval Institute Press.

Finally, I’ll mention that Bougainville endured a decade-long secessionist war (approximately 1989-1999) and during this war, Bougainvilleans located and used weapons and ammunition that had been left behind by the Americans, the Australians, and the Japanese. One Bougainville Revolutionary Army fighter I know had used a US .50 caliber heavy machine gun, obtained from Torokina.

In 2009, the President of the Autonomous Bougainville Government, James Tanis, appealed to the US military for aid in cleaning up dumps at Torokina. President Tanis told me that some remaining undisciplined fighters had located enough weapons there to potentially destabilize the political situation.

I’m happy to report that the cleanup appears to be taking place.

Excellent summary.

Side story: In the Arawe landing, the 112th Cavalry put one of its troops in rubber boats to go in before sunrise, but they were late, and attempted the landing in broad daylight. The rubber boats were shot up and the rest had to be fished out of the water by the landing craft. Among those rescuing the swimming troopers was my Dad’s boat, LCT-172, during which it was shot full of holes by Japanese MGs and 20mm cannon. The story and a picture of my Dad’s landing craft was featured in the 10 January 1944 edition of Life Magazine.