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	<title>Comments on: Obama&#8217;s Public Diplomacy From Haiti Wears Combat Boots</title>
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	<link>http://blog.usni.org/2010/01/19/haiti-update-tuesday-jan-19th/</link>
	<description>The Naval Institute’s taken its independent forum to a new level - with you in the middle of it.</description>
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		<title>By: Obama’s Public Diplomacy From Haiti Wears Combat Boots &#124; Military boots</title>
		<link>http://blog.usni.org/2010/01/19/haiti-update-tuesday-jan-19th/comment-page-1/#comment-197074</link>
		<dc:creator>Obama’s Public Diplomacy From Haiti Wears Combat Boots &#124; Military boots</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 09 Feb 2010 01:57:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.usni.org/?p=5878#comment-197074</guid>
		<description>[...] from:blog.usni.org  0 Comments &#124; PermalinkComments for this entry:Comment this entryYour name: [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] from:blog.usni.org  0 Comments | PermalinkComments for this entry:Comment this entryYour name: [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Offiziere.ch &#187; Ein Rückblick auf die militärische Katastrophenhilfe in Haiti</title>
		<link>http://blog.usni.org/2010/01/19/haiti-update-tuesday-jan-19th/comment-page-1/#comment-196312</link>
		<dc:creator>Offiziere.ch &#187; Ein Rückblick auf die militärische Katastrophenhilfe in Haiti</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 07 Feb 2010 09:48:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.usni.org/?p=5878#comment-196312</guid>
		<description>[...] in large public and private tech project strategy development and implementation in &#8220;Obama’s Public Diplomacy From Haiti Wears Combat Boots&#8220;, Blog des US Naval Institute, [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] in large public and private tech project strategy development and implementation in &#8220;Obama’s Public Diplomacy From Haiti Wears Combat Boots&#8220;, Blog des US Naval Institute, [...]</p>
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		<title>By: In Today&#8217;s News &#171; Budget Insight</title>
		<link>http://blog.usni.org/2010/01/19/haiti-update-tuesday-jan-19th/comment-page-1/#comment-189756</link>
		<dc:creator>In Today&#8217;s News &#171; Budget Insight</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 21 Jan 2010 19:47:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.usni.org/?p=5878#comment-189756</guid>
		<description>[...] Obama’s Public Diplomacy From Haiti Wears Combat Boots With that said the leaders of the operation need to do a better job organizing, cooperating, and coordinating the response to Haiti, because every problem that pops up can be specifically defined as a leadership issue where Command, Coordination, and Cooperation of operations can be improved – and need to be improved. [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Obama’s Public Diplomacy From Haiti Wears Combat Boots With that said the leaders of the operation need to do a better job organizing, cooperating, and coordinating the response to Haiti, because every problem that pops up can be specifically defined as a leadership issue where Command, Coordination, and Cooperation of operations can be improved – and need to be improved. [...]</p>
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		<title>By: eastriver</title>
		<link>http://blog.usni.org/2010/01/19/haiti-update-tuesday-jan-19th/comment-page-1/#comment-189747</link>
		<dc:creator>eastriver</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 21 Jan 2010 18:39:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.usni.org/?p=5878#comment-189747</guid>
		<description>Galrahn, thanks for a great post.
 
State is in charge per a Presidential directive of 2005. 

When some of the dust has settled, both State and DOD should send some bright people over to DHS to have a close look at the Incident Command System. This had its genesis in the &#039;70s in California wildfires, where multiple agencies and NGOs at different levels had difficulty cooperating. Sound familiar?

Today it is a US domestic standard, been embraced by other nations, and recommended by the UN as an international standard. USCG has had it translated into, I think, eight languages, and distributes it widely. It&#039;s their major-incident bible; maybe why they seemed to be the only ones during Katrina who seemed to know what they were doing.

Establishment of this system, or a variant, for US international disaster response would be a laudable goal for both the striped-pants brigade and the uniforms.

A second laudable goal might be some preplanning. Doesn&#039;t take a rocket scientist to establish that, say, Caribbean basin nations are at risk for hurricanes, earthquakes and volcanic events. Figuring out in advance what we can and will do, and setting up a few action menus would save time and circumvent some indecision.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Galrahn, thanks for a great post.</p>
<p>State is in charge per a Presidential directive of 2005. </p>
<p>When some of the dust has settled, both State and DOD should send some bright people over to DHS to have a close look at the Incident Command System. This had its genesis in the &#8217;70s in California wildfires, where multiple agencies and NGOs at different levels had difficulty cooperating. Sound familiar?</p>
<p>Today it is a US domestic standard, been embraced by other nations, and recommended by the UN as an international standard. USCG has had it translated into, I think, eight languages, and distributes it widely. It&#8217;s their major-incident bible; maybe why they seemed to be the only ones during Katrina who seemed to know what they were doing.</p>
<p>Establishment of this system, or a variant, for US international disaster response would be a laudable goal for both the striped-pants brigade and the uniforms.</p>
<p>A second laudable goal might be some preplanning. Doesn&#8217;t take a rocket scientist to establish that, say, Caribbean basin nations are at risk for hurricanes, earthquakes and volcanic events. Figuring out in advance what we can and will do, and setting up a few action menus would save time and circumvent some indecision.</p>
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		<title>By: Bronwen Morrison</title>
		<link>http://blog.usni.org/2010/01/19/haiti-update-tuesday-jan-19th/comment-page-1/#comment-189663</link>
		<dc:creator>Bronwen Morrison</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 21 Jan 2010 14:37:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.usni.org/?p=5878#comment-189663</guid>
		<description>While I am not on the ground (but have colleagues who are as an implementing partner of USAID), I have no insight regarding the report that US Army was asked to stop handing out food at a tent city by an aid agency (with inference that it was USAID).  I would like to comment however that NGOs and US military forces have worked together on humanitarian response for years.  The comment by the Instapundit reader that declared NGOs hate the military and would not work with them on the ground in 2002 Afghanistan is a) comparing apples to oranges b) a sweeping generalization that is largely out of date 8 years on. In 2002 Afghan, there was no humanitarian disaster and as such NGOs and Military did not have mandate to work together.  In July 0f 2008, USAID finally distributed a new mandate for civil military coordination in ALL aspects of its work - not just disaster assistance.  Prior to 2008, there have been many NGOs that have worked quite closely with the military in stability operations - from Bosnia to East Timor to Afghan to Iraq.  I work with (and have worked with) many who have done so and personally have done so.

No doubt the press relations by USAID is woefully poor.  There is a top USAID official on the ground - with former Haiti experience as USAID director and also former Ambo and fluent French speaker.  There are 800 Office of Foreign Disaster Response officials on the ground.  Here is a bit of background on the top USAID official on the ground - On January 15, the Administrator appointed Ambassador Lewis Lucke as Coordinator for Disaster Response and Reconstruction in Haiti , with overall responsibility for managing USG support for the disaster relief and reconstruction effort on the ground and coordination with our partners in Haiti .  He is based at the Humanitarian Assistance Combined Coordination Center established to coordinate relief and reconstruction efforts with the U.S. military, UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti , Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State (DOS), NGOs, Government of Haiti, and foreign governments.
 
From 2004 to July 2006, Lewis Lucke served as U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom of Swaziland .  Prior to joining the DOS, Ambassador Lucke was a career Senior Foreign Service Officer who served for 26 years with USAID. 
 
Ambassador Lucke was the first USAID Mission Director to Iraq , where he managed a $4 billion reconstruction and economic development program in 2003-2004.  The program was USAID’s largest ever and the largest reconstruction effort funded by the United States since the Marshall Plan.
 
From 1978 to 2006, Ambassador Lucke served in the U.S. Foreign Service in 10 countries:   Mali , Senegal , Costa Rica , Tunisia , Bolivia , Jordan , Haiti , Brazil , Iraq , and Swaziland .  He served as USAID Mission Director in his last five posts in Bolivia , Jordan , Brazil , Haiti , and Iraq .  Ambassador Lucke is fluent in French</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>While I am not on the ground (but have colleagues who are as an implementing partner of USAID), I have no insight regarding the report that US Army was asked to stop handing out food at a tent city by an aid agency (with inference that it was USAID).  I would like to comment however that NGOs and US military forces have worked together on humanitarian response for years.  The comment by the Instapundit reader that declared NGOs hate the military and would not work with them on the ground in 2002 Afghanistan is a) comparing apples to oranges b) a sweeping generalization that is largely out of date 8 years on. In 2002 Afghan, there was no humanitarian disaster and as such NGOs and Military did not have mandate to work together.  In July 0f 2008, USAID finally distributed a new mandate for civil military coordination in ALL aspects of its work &#8211; not just disaster assistance.  Prior to 2008, there have been many NGOs that have worked quite closely with the military in stability operations &#8211; from Bosnia to East Timor to Afghan to Iraq.  I work with (and have worked with) many who have done so and personally have done so.</p>
<p>No doubt the press relations by USAID is woefully poor.  There is a top USAID official on the ground &#8211; with former Haiti experience as USAID director and also former Ambo and fluent French speaker.  There are 800 Office of Foreign Disaster Response officials on the ground.  Here is a bit of background on the top USAID official on the ground &#8211; On January 15, the Administrator appointed Ambassador Lewis Lucke as Coordinator for Disaster Response and Reconstruction in Haiti , with overall responsibility for managing USG support for the disaster relief and reconstruction effort on the ground and coordination with our partners in Haiti .  He is based at the Humanitarian Assistance Combined Coordination Center established to coordinate relief and reconstruction efforts with the U.S. military, UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti , Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State (DOS), NGOs, Government of Haiti, and foreign governments.</p>
<p>From 2004 to July 2006, Lewis Lucke served as U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom of Swaziland .  Prior to joining the DOS, Ambassador Lucke was a career Senior Foreign Service Officer who served for 26 years with USAID. </p>
<p>Ambassador Lucke was the first USAID Mission Director to Iraq , where he managed a $4 billion reconstruction and economic development program in 2003-2004.  The program was USAID’s largest ever and the largest reconstruction effort funded by the United States since the Marshall Plan.</p>
<p>From 1978 to 2006, Ambassador Lucke served in the U.S. Foreign Service in 10 countries:   Mali , Senegal , Costa Rica , Tunisia , Bolivia , Jordan , Haiti , Brazil , Iraq , and Swaziland .  He served as USAID Mission Director in his last five posts in Bolivia , Jordan , Brazil , Haiti , and Iraq .  Ambassador Lucke is fluent in French</p>
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		<title>By: UltimaRatioReg</title>
		<link>http://blog.usni.org/2010/01/19/haiti-update-tuesday-jan-19th/comment-page-1/#comment-189589</link>
		<dc:creator>UltimaRatioReg</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 21 Jan 2010 12:20:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.usni.org/?p=5878#comment-189589</guid>
		<description>USNVO,

You win the concert tickets.  Some of that &#039;top cover&#039; includes bi-lateral legal status in case US military personnel have to fire upon/detain a Haitian national.  Among other things, which you have outlined.  Some of the &quot;advantages&quot; I alluded to above.  

Besides, NGOs hate US military, no matter how many times we save their lives.  (And, it seems, even moreso after we do...?)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>USNVO,</p>
<p>You win the concert tickets.  Some of that &#8216;top cover&#8217; includes bi-lateral legal status in case US military personnel have to fire upon/detain a Haitian national.  Among other things, which you have outlined.  Some of the &#8220;advantages&#8221; I alluded to above.  </p>
<p>Besides, NGOs hate US military, no matter how many times we save their lives.  (And, it seems, even moreso after we do&#8230;?)</p>
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		<title>By: USNVO</title>
		<link>http://blog.usni.org/2010/01/19/haiti-update-tuesday-jan-19th/comment-page-1/#comment-189567</link>
		<dc:creator>USNVO</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 21 Jan 2010 09:26:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.usni.org/?p=5878#comment-189567</guid>
		<description>Biggest reason that I can see why State needs to be in charge, besides all of those pesky things like US Code, inter-agency agreements and such, is that in the specific situation of Haiti, we have to deal with the Haitian Government, UN, other agencies of the US government, and a myriad of NGOs. The worse possible thing you can do is plop down a few type A personalities wearing uniforms who start telling everyone what to do.  Much as we may dislike it, we need the active cooperation of these groups, and culturally, they do not always see the world the way the military does. We need a diplomatic face on the crisis, someone not in uniform but with good staff, someone who will listed to the NGOs, UN, Haitian Government, and other groups.  Feel their pain, smooze with them, pat them on the head, and then tell the type A, make it happen people what they want done.  And then get out of the way and run top cover.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Biggest reason that I can see why State needs to be in charge, besides all of those pesky things like US Code, inter-agency agreements and such, is that in the specific situation of Haiti, we have to deal with the Haitian Government, UN, other agencies of the US government, and a myriad of NGOs. The worse possible thing you can do is plop down a few type A personalities wearing uniforms who start telling everyone what to do.  Much as we may dislike it, we need the active cooperation of these groups, and culturally, they do not always see the world the way the military does. We need a diplomatic face on the crisis, someone not in uniform but with good staff, someone who will listed to the NGOs, UN, Haitian Government, and other groups.  Feel their pain, smooze with them, pat them on the head, and then tell the type A, make it happen people what they want done.  And then get out of the way and run top cover.</p>
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		<title>By: XBradTC</title>
		<link>http://blog.usni.org/2010/01/19/haiti-update-tuesday-jan-19th/comment-page-1/#comment-189430</link>
		<dc:creator>XBradTC</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 21 Jan 2010 00:48:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.usni.org/?p=5878#comment-189430</guid>
		<description>&lt;i&gt;State has been a dismal flop of late, certainly in Iraq during my time there, and AFG, by tales told, as well.&lt;/i&gt;

If State wants to run the show, let &#039;em earn it.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i>State has been a dismal flop of late, certainly in Iraq during my time there, and AFG, by tales told, as well.</i></p>
<p>If State wants to run the show, let &#8216;em earn it.</p>
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		<title>By: UltimaRatioReg</title>
		<link>http://blog.usni.org/2010/01/19/haiti-update-tuesday-jan-19th/comment-page-1/#comment-189427</link>
		<dc:creator>UltimaRatioReg</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 21 Jan 2010 00:28:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.usni.org/?p=5878#comment-189427</guid>
		<description>I didn&#039;t say they were looking out the windshield, but they are at the wheel.

Myriad reasons why State should be in charge.  

How well they do?  Another story.  

State has been a dismal flop of late, certainly in Iraq during my time there, and AFG, by tales told, as well.

Matt Armstrong&#039;s comments above, and Galrahn&#039;s, are pertinent.  The State Department hasn&#039;t exactly been positioned for success institutionally.  Some good folks, but miracles are hard to do.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I didn&#8217;t say they were looking out the windshield, but they are at the wheel.</p>
<p>Myriad reasons why State should be in charge.  </p>
<p>How well they do?  Another story.  </p>
<p>State has been a dismal flop of late, certainly in Iraq during my time there, and AFG, by tales told, as well.</p>
<p>Matt Armstrong&#8217;s comments above, and Galrahn&#8217;s, are pertinent.  The State Department hasn&#8217;t exactly been positioned for success institutionally.  Some good folks, but miracles are hard to do.</p>
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		<title>By: XBradTC</title>
		<link>http://blog.usni.org/2010/01/19/haiti-update-tuesday-jan-19th/comment-page-1/#comment-189424</link>
		<dc:creator>XBradTC</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 20 Jan 2010 23:49:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.usni.org/?p=5878#comment-189424</guid>
		<description>URR, if State or USAID were actually behind the wheel, I wouldn&#039;t criticize. But look at what&#039;s going on:

http://xbradtc.wordpress.com/2010/01/20/this-is-frustrating/</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>URR, if State or USAID were actually behind the wheel, I wouldn&#8217;t criticize. But look at what&#8217;s going on:</p>
<p><a href="http://xbradtc.wordpress.com/2010/01/20/this-is-frustrating/" rel="nofollow">http://xbradtc.wordpress.com/2010/01/20/this-is-frustrating/</a></p>
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