Here is something that has come at me from multiple sources – you can blame George Talbot for this post.

All of a sudden – everyone wants to talk about fuel and LCS – so let’s talk about fuel. I was going to do this on my home blog – but decided this was a better venue.

Join me in the LCS pain, because all of this discussion is based on a ship and CONOPS that still is in its changing infancy as emerging realities about the program manifest themselves. All we have to work with are vignettes, computer models, and the low-impact test drive going on in the Caribbean right now – none show a clear picture.

Estimates on line missions – MIW, ASUW, ASW – are even fuzzier as the Mission Modules are not ready for prime-time, and even after they “are,” there won’t be enough to swap-out to any meaningful extent during a deployment, much less the infrastructure and equipment to do so forward deployed to any meaningful extent. It will be years until you get a data sample worth anything – if then.

In that light – I request that everyone keep an open mind with this post – especially you engineers. Don’t fall in love with details – have a wide standard deviation when it comes to the numbers. Any numbers others, or I use are in very large pixels. That shouldn’t stop the conversation. Be flexible, and let’s dive in.

Note the bolded section below,

“But there are troubling indications that Austal’s bid could get scuttled by politics, potentially dealing Mobile a second devastating blow while the city is still recovering from the tanker tragedy.

One of the key advantages of Austal’s LCS is that it is far more fuel-efficient than Lockheed’s heavier ship, particularly at high speeds. The cost savings over a 30-year life cycle could exceed $2 billion per vessel, according to internal Navy documents.

That’s significant at a time when Navy Secretary Ray Mabus, a former Mississippi governor, is trying to cut back on the Navy’s skyrocketing fuel costs.

It’s Austal’s contention, however, that the Navy’s Request for Proposals does not include life-cycle costs as a factor in the LCS contest.

While Mabus and other top Navy officials have disagreed, a top Pentagon acquisitions executive confirmed Austal’s assessment. “

SECNAV is not bluff’n about being Green. The RFP may not have included life-cycle costs, but that was then and this is now.

Take the SECNAV’s push towards Green – and then fold in the CNO’s Guidance for 2010;

We increased our focus on Total Ownership Costs (TOC) and are integrating that into every step of the Two-Pass Six-Gate acquisition review process.
…
We will inject discussion of TOC into all stages of program review stages ….
…
Total ownership and manpower costs will be key components of all programatic discussions and decisions.

Therefore – everyone needs to pivot, ponder, and discuss. LCS is going to happen – we can mitigate the pain (especially during the Terrible ’20s) by ensuring that we have the best value Tiffany; I would bet a P-3 JO’s per diem that this concern was a major driver in the CNO’s statement.

Go back to the bolded paragraph above. $2 bil per ship savings of one design over another if that ship is rode hard and left up wet through crew swapping and max time deployed. That would be with a 25kts+ avg – but let’s run with it to make a point. A lower estimate I have seen has a delta of $400 mil based on 3-months per year deployed on average.

Let’s cut the high estimate in half and call it $1 bil (no one knows what the price of fuel will be over the next 20 years, much less the effect of an overweight LCS and/or partial MMs installed) and let’s round down the platform costs (I am feeling nice today and won’t include the higher estimates over the run and the costs of MMs) and say that at the end of the production run, each ship costs $500mil. You could replace or build the ship twice with the dollars saved.

Harumph? OK, move the decimal place over one. $40 million. Enough to think about? Well, $40milx55= $2.2 billion.

We also have this from Defense Daily,

GD’S LCS BURNS LESS FUEL AT HIGHER SPEEDS, NAVY DOCUMENT SHOWS: The General Dynamics variant of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) uses less fuel per hour during higher rates of speed than the Lockheed Martin vessel, according to a Navy document. The one-page LCS Consumption Curves shows that both ships use about the same amount of fuel, or barrels, per hour between zero and 16 knots. At five knots, the General Dynamics aluminum trimaran uses 3.2 barrels per hour versus 3.9 for Lockheed Martin’s semi-planing monohull. At 14 knots, the General Dynamics ship uses 11.3 barrels per hour while the Lockheed Martin ship uses 12.7. At 16 knots, the Lockheed Martin ship uses 18.4 barrels per hour while the General Dynamics ship uses 15.5, according to the document. At 30 knots, the General Dynamics trimaran burns through 62.7 barrels per hour, while the Lockheed Martin monohull uses 102.9 barrels per hour, according to the document. At 40 knots, the Lockheed Martin ship burns through 138 barrels per hour while the General Dynamics ship uses 105.7 barrels per hour. But how often will the Navy operate either ship beyond 16 knots? According to Lockheed Martin, LCS won’t be spending a lot of time cruising at top speed. “Fuel economy is dependent on the operational profile of the ship. The Navy’s LCS mission profile, a significant criteria used to design LCS, results in the ship operating at speeds below 16 knots more than 90 percent of the time,” Kimberly Martinez, a company spokeswoman, told Defense Daily yesterday. “At this speed, Lockheed Martin’s analysis indicates its design displays better fuel efficiency due to its economical 16-cylinder diesel engines.”

And Lockheed Martin maintains that its semi-planing monohull design meets all of the Navy’s requirements. “Fuel efficiency is just one component of total ownership cost. Acquisition cost, manpower, maintenance, training and support costs are other key elements and Lockheed Martin believes its design provides the most cost-effective balance across all elements,” Martinez added. The Navy declined yesterday to comment for this article. Fuel consumption has become the focal point of efforts by Mobile, Ala.-based Austal USA and Sen. Jeff Sessions to point out that the General Dynamics-Austal USA-built LCS is more fuel efficient. At last week’s Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, Sessions raised the issue of fuel consumption during questioning of Navy leadership. Sessions asked (Defense Daily, 3/2)

Let’s chew some more.

On Baggett’s thesis linked to early on in the post, on page 38 you have this little graph – you can find the background data there.

So. Will the SECNAV want a more fuel efficient warship? Will the COCOMs want ships to be able to show up as needed throughout their AOR? Will the Maritime Component Commander want a ship that isn’t an unnecessary burden on what few replenishment assets he has available? Will the Commanding Officers of LCS want to carry the most fuel possible?

If the future is the Pacific, then with the practical nature of PACFLT ops, especially when we have so few “unsexy” replenishment platforms, is range even more critical?

From what I have seen, 5 knots gets you max range, with LCS-2 going significantly farther than LCS-1 at any speed (due to capacity). Don’t get wrapped up in the “why the h311 do it at 5 kts …”, but work with me here to make a point.

Using the Defense Daily numbers, at 5 knots LCS-2 can probably make San Diego – Pearl (refuel) – Tokyo without going below 50%; LCS-1 would be on fumes as she pulled in for the same transit, but would probably make it to Tokyo. The leg from Pearl to Tokyo is about 3,350 nm.

So, you’re SECNAV. Assume all other planning assumptions are a wash between LCS-1 and LCS-2 models – what call do you make?

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Tags: LCS
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• Mike M.

  All this makes one wonder what a DDG-51 would cost if you didn’t buy the Aegis system. I suspect that it might be very competitive with LCS costwise…with a lot more upgrade potential.

• INDY fan

  The Hamilton bit from 2004 was before the spec change to invoke NVR. The ship has been designed to MIL-S-901D using NAVSEA 3010 and DDAM analysis. Lots of individual components have been shock tested. I have no idea when they might shock an entire ship, will not likely be for awhile.
  The beams were fixed. It was a construction tolerance issue that was blown way out of proportion imho. I know for a fact it happens in shipyards all over the world, just not under the microscope of LCS.
  The flight deck was designed to CH-53E loads, just a matter of time til the Navy needs to land one nearby and chooses LCS-2.
  And the wave piercing trimaran hullform with active ride control has full capability to SS5 and is survivable to SS8.
  This has been fun fellas, and you’re probably glad to see me go, but I think we’ve covered quite a bit on this blog that originally focused on the RFP that does not take into account lifecycle costs. I hope you invite me back sometime.
  VR,
  Indy

• Byron

  Indy, when you pull a three hulled boat outside it’s building shop and you don’t notice the center hull keel blocks didn’t come with it for several hours…until everyone in the yard heard the groan…that’s a BAAAADDDDD thing. And good fitters and welders can compensate and prevent excessive distortion. Just ask me one day, I might pass on a trade secret or two.

• Byron

  Aw, come on, Indy, Sid and I were just getting warmed up!!

• Al L.

  By the way, has anybody noticed that should the Defense Daily numbers prove out, LCS-1 won’t meet the threshold sprint endurance requirement at 30 knots, never mind the required 40 knots?

• sid

  The Hamilton bit from 2004 was before the spec change to invoke NVR. The ship has been designed to MIL-S-901D using NAVSEA 3010 and DDAM analysis.

  Even AFTER the inclusion of NVR, CRS says in their Nov 2008 report…

  25The LCS was earlier conceived as a ship that would be built to a survivability standard that would be sufficient, in the event of significant battle damage, to save the ship’s crew,but not necessarily the ship. The survivability standard for the LCS was increased as part of the issuing of NVR to one that would be sufficient to save not only the ship’s crew, but the ship as well. (Other U.S. Navy combat ships are built to a still-higher survivability standard that is sufficient not only to save the crew and the ship, but to permit the ship to keep fighting even though it has sustained damage.)

  Now the CNO has (finally) publicly stated the LCS is in effect the Frigate replacement. According to OPNAVINST 9070.1 FF type ships should be built to Level II survivability standards.

  Yet both LCS designs EVEN AFTER THE INCLUSION OF NVR don’t even meet Level I!

  That was more dissembling Indy.

  Lots of individual components have been shock tested. I have no idea when they might shock an entire ship, will not likely be for awhile.

  Yeah. Fair statement; that last part anyway… Given that the DOT&E said this:

  The report said the Navy intended LCS to be a Level I survivability combatant ship, but neither design was expected to achieve the degree of shock hardening required to meet those specifications.

  Shock hardening, the ability to keep operating following an underwater explosive attack, is required for all mission-critical systems under the Navy’s Level I requirements, but only a few selected subsystems will meet those, it said.

  “Accordingly, the full traditional rigor of Navy-mandated ship shock trials is not achievable, due to the damage that would be sustained by the ship and its many non-shock hardened systems,” said the report, which was submitted to Congress this week.

  The flight deck was designed to CH-53E loads, just a matter of time til the Navy needs to land one nearby and chooses LCS-2.

  Seems the PEO isn’t so certain…

  Q. What about a CH-53?

  A. That’s a different story; that’s not what the requirement was. There is no concern that I have seen in my programs nor in talking with the technical codes of that ship’s flight deck to handle the types of aircraft it was designed to handle.

• Byron

  It’s one thing to be a fan; it’s another to examine a vessels characteristics under the cold light of reality.

• Grandpa Bluewater

  The press of urgent duty called me away (many Grandkids, parents with many urgent deadlines, many places to haul kids, Gramps has the duty minivan). Thanks to Sid and Byron for defending the right so well

• ENS Willing

  “I would bet a P-3 JO’s per diem that this concern was a major driver in the CNO’s statement.”

  Jealousy does not become you sir

  Besides, most of our per diem goes to buying bottles for our skippers and instructors.

• sid

  We’re putting the cart in front of the horse. As an experiment, LCS makes sense. Build a little, learn a lot. To buy anymore without seeing how they work out is just plain stupid.

  USNVO makes the most imminent sense…that is the least likely to be followed.

  To CDR Sal’s point: Which one should we buy?

  A? or B?

  At this juncture…E: None of the above.

  In his design studies, Friedman often makes the point that steel is the least expensive component in a ship. Why spend the precious few dollars to be had on either hull, as both as so badly compromised to go very fast?

  If its a matter of keeping the yards alive…Heck Congress can print up another billion to stave them from oblivion until a new, more rational omnibus hull can be designed.

  Oh, and what good is either hull if the much vaunted offboard systems that it is expected to carry are nowhere to be seen.

  Nobody would think that building a badly flawed carrier would make sense if there were no airplanes for its deck.

  How come that logic does not hold for the LCS?

• Grandpa Bluewater

  computer glitched and sent the email in mid sentence.

  Anyway….

  Indy: I’m glad you have over 20 years working with aluminum and steel. As it happens I had about 40 practicing and teaching shipboard fire fighting with merchant vessels and warships when I decided to walk inland with an oar over my shoulder. My recent Master any gross tons upon oceans license renewal is still valid to sail on and I’m (well)less than five years from my last time through the Advanced Fire Fighting fun in the fire and an SCBA course. So yes I know about about fixed marine fire fighting systems from magazine flooding, sprinklers and CO2 to HYFOG, Halon replacements and the rest. You ducked the point.

  They all assume a degree of structural integrity to work at all. They work fine in a sealed isolated space with delivery piping in place. ONCE, for the most part. In a running fight with multiple hits that is a rosy scenario indeed. Fire fighting in a battle on a battle damaged ship is done with hoses, hose teams, bunker gear (fire fighting clothing ensemble),
  AFFF cans, in line foam proportioners and pick up tubes, HV and LV fog and OBAs/SCBA’s. And Guts.

  You crawl down ladders that will scorch the skin off you without the gloves and fire suit, sqeeze through scuttles you can’t see for the smoke in spaces where ambient temperature approaches the inside of a toaster oven, lugging the very breath of life on your back. You wade through ponds of shifting scalding water you applied to the fire moments before and clouds of scalding steam from the same source. You use every firefighting tool you have as fast as you can get it to the scene, because the fire doubles every minute. The key is isolation, which assumes structural integrity, to stop the fire, force it back, force down, and force it out. You exhaust the sailors you don’t loose to burns, scalding, incoming ammunition, internal flareups, or
  heat stroke establishing and maintaining the fire boundaries and backup boundaries. Most of the gee whiz stuff you cite is used up, shot up, or screwed up and didn’t work. THAT is how you fight fires.

  On.a.ship.with.no.structural.aluminum.

  And I was writing deficiencies on DE’s with aluminum deckhouses and steel main decks before anybody heard of the classes you mention. Not that it did much good.

  I could go on, but I think the peanut gallery gets my drift.

• Warrant Diver

  As Admiral Tirpitz said:

  “The first duty of a warship is to stay afloat”

  Aluminum warship, close to shore, under fire from artillery, small arms, ATGMs, suitcase Saggers, etc…hope they are fitting her with salvage fittings and plenty of attachment points for salvage pontoons and lift bags. I think me and my boys might be raising some of these if they ever get into a shooting war.

• Byron

  Granpa, it was a privilege and a pleasure to hold up the side. Everything you’ve said about fighting fires on board ships just sails right over the pointy little heads of the people that sing the joys of LCS.

  Indy, I started swinging a hammer for a living in 1971. I first worked aluminum superstructure on an FF in 1979. I rather doubt you have the scars you get from working with hot metal and sharp edges and heavy plate and beams to be able to convince me that aluminum is good for something else better than beer cans.

• PK

  obviously indy has never seen a chainsaw catch fire.
  C

• sid

  Littoral Combat

  Many here are likely much better spooled up on this already…but sure looks like the littorals are proving to be the most lethal place to be at sea yet again…

  shamelessly stealing from Baron Brassey again…

  An admiral with Freedoms and Independences in his fleet will be sure to put them in the line of battle, where their comparatively light protection would be at a disadvantage…

• SCOTTtheBADGER

  Well Said, Grampa, Sir! Well Said indeed! The anniversary of the FRANKLIN was just 2 weeks ago, and we should always remember what fire can do to a ship.

• http://aw1tim.wordpress.com AW1 Tim

  I would offer that, damage-control wise one might want to take a look at what happened to HMS Sheffield during the Falklands war.

  Sheffield was struck by an Exocet whose warhead failed to detonate. However, residual fuel from her motor continued to burn and started fires aboard.

  Sheffield was another ship whose class was designed to save money by doing more with less. Her fire mains were single, not redundant. Maintenance and upkeep costs were kept down by installing vinyl floor and wall covering. Her crew was a bit understrength, had completed a long transit, and maintained continuous combat footing in a war zone under threat of surface, subsurface, and air attack.

  When the missile struck, it severed the main water line for the fire fighting system. Residual fuel then continued burning and set fire to the vinyl floor and wall coverings. As a result, DC teams had to fight through large clouds of black, toxic smoke to get to the fire, and then re-route hoses from other section to connect to the fire main. Additional pumps had to be run from a long distance to counter flooding, due to the volume of smoke and resulting zero visibility.

  Further problems were encountered due to the loss of ship’s hotel power generation, again by impact when the missile struck. It was the perseverance of the crew which, after many hours, finally brought the fire under control and then extinguished it.

  The majority of the 20 KIA casualties were caused by toxic smoke inhalation due to the combustible vinyl materials widely used in the ship. It also caused such thick black smoke that many who became casualties were unable to find their way out of the compartments to safety. The lack of redundant fire mains caused delays in getting to the fire and commencing fighting it. Additional delays and, likely, casualties, were caused by the disruption of communication circuits by the spreading fire so that after compartments didn’t get timely information on the situation.

  In the end, Sheffield’s crew was able to put out the fires and begin to shore up the damage. She was taken under tow, and, on the 10th of May, 1982, sank in heavy seas due to flooding.

  Sheffield was a relatively fast destroyer, with all-steel construction. She suffered damage and casualties as a result of a missile impact, with no warhead detonation, and eventually sank as a result. She was built to do more with less, and save MoD money.

  Due readers honestly feel that LCS, with large parts of aluminum, a smaller crew, and larger amount of open space and fuel onboard would fare better?

  If nothing else, consider that the smaller crew would be unable to cope with any serious fire or flooding if they suffered any casualties. No automated system can pick up a hose, or a stretcher, or plug a hole or run a line from a pump.

  I completely agree that the best solution is to HALT the LCS program in it’s tracks, continue with the Burke class, and cast about for another vessel that could be built here under license to perform the littoral missions we seem so enamored of.

• Nick

  Gentlemen, Ladies:

  Please enough with the National Security Cutter discussions. First off, the ship is NOT built to Grade A shock standards. Let me say that again…the ship is NOT built to Grade A shock. If you redesign it to meet Grade A, you will incur significant cost. Second, the ship’s combat system, CGC2, is basically a more robust CDS with LINK 16. That’s it. As for weapons? A 57mm BOFORS pea shooter, a CIWS B1B, NULKA, and that’s it. No room for anything else.

  Lockheed Martin was trying to push a derivative of LCS 1 on us and we were foolish enough to ignore them. This derivative had no mission modules, had 8 HARPOON launchers, forward VLS, SPY Radar, and AEGIS. Israel was considering purchasing it but didn’t want to be the only country to do so (they would have gone along for the ride if we led the way to help defray costs). What we needed was a replacement for the FFGs. What we got was a half hearted attempt at a new platform that we are yet to find a mission for.

  And the most troubling aspect about all of this is that CNO is now marketing the ship as a replacement for FFG 7 class after the standard navy line has denied this FOR THE PAST TEN YEARS!

• SCOTTtheBADGER

  Poorly designed fire mains was one of the reasons the GANBIER BAY was lost. The CASABLANCA class CVEs had cast iron fire mains, that cracked under shock, rendering the ship dependant on stretching hose lines to intact parts of the main, and on Handy Billies.

• eastriver

  Sorry I’m late to this one, but surprised there is not more reference to Belknap. I got the story from my brother, who was aboard her for the show. It wasn’t pretty, and would have been much worse were they being shot at at the time.

  For those who are unfamiliar, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Belknap_%28CG-26%29

  Aluminum? Next to shore-based offensive capabilities? Not a good idea.

  Grandpa, thanks. Spot on, as usual.

• Pingback: The USA’s New Littoral Combat Ships (LCS)

• http://www.hisuperferry.blogspot.com Mauibrad

  Well, that’s a wrap, it’s over.

  See: http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4603087&c=AME&s=SEA

  And: http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/114xx/doc11431/04-28-SessionsLetter.pdf

  LCS-1 wins.

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