To me this is similar, or analagous to what Gates said a couple of days ago – do we need 11 carrier battle groups if other countries have a max of 1?

Uh – yes, yes we do. We need overwhelming, crushing power to always guarentee our security. Wishful thinking about disarmanment only makes our enemy bolder, thinking we are weak.

Same goes here. Our nuclear arsenal should give other countries pause, because there’s no way to keep up with us. That’s how Reagan won the cold war. That’s the only way to win – YOU DON’T WIN BY UNZIPPING YOUR FLY. This won’t dramitically affect our security, but again, are we going to cut carrier battle groups hoping the Chinese won’t build them? Same thought process. It’s bull, bull, bull. Are we stopping F-35′s, F-18′s, so others won’t build something comparable?

>Deterence is all about keeping them guessing – which means security. You don’t unzip your fly.

I’m not sure this is really the case. Deterrence is about creating as much of one particular certainty as possible: certainty that an action or behavior will result in unacceptable consequences. For the sake of argument, let’s assume that the major powers we hope to strategically deter were unaware of the size of our stockpile within any reasonable measure of certainty. How does the revelation of the exact size of our stockpile reduce deterrence? If anything, admitting that we still have enough nukes to obliterate the offensive capabilities of any conceivable enemy or coalition of enemies creates greater certainty of raw destructive capacity.

>To me this is similar, or analagous to what Gates said a couple of days ago – do we need 11 carrier battle groups if other countries have a max of 1?…
>Same goes here. Our nuclear arsenal should give other countries pause, because there’s no way to keep up with us. That’s how Reagan won the cold war. That’s the only way to win – YOU DON’T WIN BY UNZIPPING YOUR FLY. This won’t dramitically affect our security, but again, are we going to cut carrier battle groups hoping the Chinese won’t build them? Same thought process. It’s bull, bull, bull. Are we stopping F-35’s, F-18’s, so others won’t build something comparable?

It is, in fact, not analogous. Gates’ speech called for different thinking in the Navy that contributes to a coherent national security strategy that takes into account enemy capabilities, allied capabilities, likely threats, and the constraints of domestic policy.

The revelation of nuclear stockpiles, on the other hand, represented essentially a PR move to gain the trust of our allies, prove our commitment to nonproliferation, demonstrate our honest broker-hood and isolate countries who refuse to make good-faith efforts at nuclear stockpile reductions. You could argue with the premises of this strategy and say that none of these factors ultimately matters. You would be disagreeing with your friend Reagan’s pursuit of arms reduction treaties, though.

Really, though, what you are trying to do is somehow paint all of these policies into a picture of characteristically “liberal” weakness by chalking up any decrease in defense spending or reshaping of the naval force as a misguided attempt to cause everyone to get along, and any efforts toward nonproliferation as naivete. This is far from the reality, and Robert Gates is far from a liberal. If you want to say that we should just continue to build carriers forever regardless of cost or the nature of the threat, I’d love to hear it.

For extra credit, if you want to explain why the Chinese or any potential military foe would not be perfectly happy to see us continue to build $20 billion dollar floating islands while they create weapons to sink them, feel free. There are ways to build a Navy that don’t involve simply building more and more of our most expensive ships in hopes of scaring the PLAN back into Beijing.

We both agree that we need overwhelming power to guarantee our security. Luckily for the American people, we have that level and then some. Unfortunately, what we do not have is a balanced budget or any sense of fiscal responsibility. In the long term, this is something that will need to be corrected if we hope to guarantee a broadly-defined national security.

Cody:

I agree w/you on the deterence definition. The Soviet Union knew for sure what was going to happen if they did the unthinkable. I also believe what I said is still true – you still keep them guessing on a number of issues that were, ie., top secret, capabilities of weapons systems, etc. I believe there is truth in both definitions of deterence.

That said – the motive of the Obama administration in releasing our numbers of nuclear weapons is what I oppose, and has me worried. Transperancy is just weakness. How exactly does this help the Iranian situation? It doesn’t – because it says look at us – we’re nice and transparent. But the Iranians don’t think that way. They eventually want to see the demise of the United States. You can’t play nice with them, transperancy will be seen as a sign of weakness. That – politicially – is liberalism.

The only way to ‘negotiate’ with Iran, and North Korea for that matter is to give them one option – and that option is they will not have nuclear weapons. And you have to be ready to back it up with military power. You don’t do that – you lose credibility.

I admit I took Gate’s recent speach at the Navy League’s convention in an incomplete direction, but the fact remains is that the carrier has been written off before, and it will never outlive its usefulness. Is the Chinese building weapons to sink them? Sure, so did the Soviet Union. Again, if the Soviets made a move against one of them, they knew what was coming. Do we need to outlast the Chinese like the Soviets? Maybe. We need a balanced fleet, and we need to counter those weapons. But balance will always include carriers, and I’d buy more, not less. But I’d buy more Virginia class boats as well, LCS’s, Burke’s, Super Hornets, etc. That’s the proper role of government.

As for your comment on Reagan – I would argue, and you know this, (you were baiting me here), that you trying to draw comparisons with what Obama is doing here, and what Reagan was doing as similar, is quite simply a crock.

They’ll be no carrier named after President Obama – with a motto of ‘Peace Through Strength’. I looked at USS Ronald Reagan CVN 76 from the deck of USS Makin Island LHD 8 in October. You want to know how Reagan negotiated – look at CVN 76. That’s the exact manifestation how Ronald Wilson Reagan negotiated.

The Obama administration is negotiating peace through weakness. They feel bad we are a super power, and we all have to play nice w/the world. Remember is ‘apology tour’? This is just another example of it. That is his motivation. Now go play on a liberal blog where you belong dude.

‘For extra credit, if you want to explain why the Chinese or any potential military foe would not be perfectly happy to see us continue to build $20 billion dollar floating islands while they create weapons to sink them, feel free.’

Cody – another great quote drippng in liberalism.

You disguise the argument in a smokescreen. The Chinese government doesn’t want us to continue to build them. Why – because they are effective. When the most powerful weapons system (non-nuclear) on earth shows up – it affects the military balance in that part of the world. And if anything happens to one of them – again – you have to know the hammer comes down. So yeah, even with weapons designed to sink them, I’m going out on a limb here and say the Chinese are going to think long and hard about using those weapons. Because it wouldn’t go well for them.

But let’s agree on this – let’s build more cruise missle subs, and Virginia class subs. But lets not be ‘transparent’ about there movements. Let’s keep them guessing.

URR writes,(caps mine)

“The goal of “transparency”, the latest step being Hillary Clinton’s revelations, the previous being CINC clearing up “ambiguity”, is what those who agree with my premise have the problem with. This was in no way, shape, or form Reagan’s APPROACE TO ARMS REDUCTION TALKS.” 

This is the root of our foreign policy problems, Democrat and Republican.

Why should we negotiate arms reduction with our enemies?

(Off we go into that land where angels fear to tred…)

So…deterrence.

Volumes can (and have been) written on what consitutes deterrence – be it nuclear or conventional, and for the most part, they were written in and for a bi-polar world.

We aren’t there anymore.

One of, if not *the* signatory lines in the 2007 maritime Stratgy, right up front there on the first page of the Introduction is “We believe preventing wars is as important as winning wars.” How do we prevent wars? In this context, what is deterrence? How does deterrence work in a world characterized by regional nuclear powers with their own interests and agendas (which may be at cross purposes with our own), non-state actors that are able to lay hands on increasingly sophisticated weapons that once were the sole province of nation-states (viz., Hanit) in an environment marked by increased proliferation of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them? In the pursuit of said deterrence, how does the US exercise “leadership” in fora that no longer split roughly along the fault line between US-led and Soviet-led blocks with the non-aligned nations chattering from the back of the station wagon? What is transparency in a world awash in the minutae of information which includes what was once considered classified from a strategic intelligence standpoint–Google Earth anyone?

We can’t apply 1980′s logic or planning here anymore. If, for example, we are serious about nuclear non-proliferation, we absolutely need the cooperation and buy-in of nations like India, Pakistan, Brazil, South Africa, France, Germany, Ukraine as well as Russia and China to clamp down on the state- and non-state networks utlized by proliferators like A.Q.Kahn. To lock down and exercise air-tight control of fissionable material and other building blocks for WMD. Want to have some real nightmares? Go read Frank Hoffman’s “The Dead Hand.”

Part and parcel of this process is understanding what the other party is up to. Continually cloaked means, methods and actions foster a climate of mistrust and begets correspondingly cloaked reactions, leading to local and regional tensions and crises which can readily spill into the global domain these days. Advocating and supporting a climate characterized by degrees of transparency can aid in mitigating burgeoning mistrust — but how can we demand transparency of China or even Iran (both, incidently parties to the NNPT), for example, if we don’t lead by showing the example. Isn’t that a quality of leadership, be it an LPO or nation-state — lead by example? How is it considered leadership if we demand of the rest of the world what we won’t do ourselves? Rather, if we demonstrate over time the benefits of certain actions, like transparency in strategic nuclear arms, we can get others onboard. We and the Russians have one such example that is entering it’s eighth year — Open Skies. An idea that began with a Republican president, Eisenhower, and supported by succeeding Republican and Democrat administrations and finally negotiated and entered into force in 2002. Thirty-four other nations have signed onboard (notables missing: China, DPRK and Iran). For eight years US aircaft have overflown Russian installations and Russians over American – unmolested. Additionally, the intrusive inspection and verification regime instituted beginning with the INF treaty and extended to the strategic nuclear arms process has had beneficial results for both parties as well.
Trust but verify – a good Russian proverb quoted by an American president on more than one occasion.
Transparency, in and of itself, isn’t a goal — it is a means to a goal. Just as ambiguity is a tool and has a place and time for employment. Both may be (and are) employed in a various scenarios. Having a stockpile number aired publically is not the same as having unfettered access to the SIOP anymore than knowing there are 11 carriers in the Navy necessarily guarnatees one knows exactly where they are and what they are up to – unless we choose to reveal the same.
TR’s cautionary aphorism of “speak softly but carry a big stick” often has too much emphasis placed on the stick and not enough on the speaking. Yes, we still carry a big stick – for now, but that’s not always going to be the case.
Deterrence comes in many forms — from big sticks to quiet diplomacy. Each is dependant on the other and none can stand alone. Maybe, however, the time is right for a bit more emphasis on the diplomatic side of the house.

Доверяй, но проверить…

w/r, SJS

URR,

Thank you for proving my point. You would much rather discuss which Administration’s policies are more practical than consider whether or not negotiating arms reduction with our enemies is a proper course of action.

As I wrap things up on this post I want to address the following.

URR writes, (Caps mine)

” NATIONS WILL ACT, IN THE END, IN THEIR OWN SELF INTEREST, EVEN IF WE THINK THEY DON’T. Realpolitik. To countenance anything else, or worse, to set policy based on that naive and fallacious assumption, is the height of folly.”

You will have a hard time finding where I hold the view that nations should not act in their self-interest. The question is whether or not their actions are moral.

The best summation that I know of, concerning this issue can be found in Peter Schwartz’ book, “The Foreign Policy of Self-Interest: A Moral Ideal for America (p. 54 – 56).

” It is appalling that we allow Iran, the primary promoter of Islamic totalitarianism, to go untouched by us; it is unconscionable that we may be allowing Iraq-the country we invaded in order to make us more secure-to become another Iran.

This inability to defend our self-interest, in word and deed, is reinforced by Washington’s pragmatist mentality, which scorns
principles and morality. It is a mentality which insists that foreign policy concern itself not with abstract theory but with hardheaded”practicalities.”. There are no firm truths, the pragmatists maintain, only the expediencies of the moment; issues cannot be framed in black and white, only in shades of gray; our self-interest has no fixed definition-it ebbs and flows with the unpredictable tide of offers and counteroffers that sway our foreign policy.

Our leaders are thus constantly searching for some acceptable “middle ground” between America’s value of liberty and Iran’s( or Syria’s or Saudi Arabia’s or North Korea’s) desire to destroy liberty. To the pragmatist, political conflicts are essentially the same as the differences between the buyer and seller of a car; the parties start out far apart, they entertain a variety of proposals, they haggle over the terms, but eventually each makes painful concessions and the sale is consummated to everyone’s benefit. In disputes among nations, too, everything should be “on the table,” because making a deal is the overriding goal. “Flexibility” is the pragmatist’s supreme virtue, integrity the supreme vice. He rejects all absolutes-except the need to compromise.

This is why our government’s actions are so exasperatingly inconsistent. This is why, for example, George W. Bush can resolutely declare to the world, “If you harbor a terrorist, if you support a terrorist, if you feed a terrorist, you are just as guilty as the terrorist”- yet be able, just a few days later, to waive the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 and to assert that allowing Yasser Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organization to operate in this country “is important to the national security interests of the United States.”. Only pragmatism’s view that principles are useless burdens-that consistency is “the hobgoblin of little minds” and that there is no difference between compromising on the price of a car and compromising on the commitment to fight terrorism-makes such incomprehensible contradictions comprehensible.

It is true that under the Bush administration, for the first time in more than half a century, America actually overthrew a foreign government because it participated in the use of force against us. President Bush’s foreign policy is certainly preferable to what is advocated by many of today’s politicians, particularly the typical hand-wringing, America-blaming, U.N.-worshiping liberal. However, if the current policies are seen by the public as the best that the pro-capitalist right can fashion-if President Bush has in effect set the outer limits on what is acceptable in foreign policy, and the political debate is then between the left’s position of subordinating our interests to the international community and President Bush’s position of semi-subordinating-what does that imply about the possibility of ever instituting a foreign policy that will genuinely defend us?

A pragmatic, shifting, seat-of-the pants attempt to uphold America’s self-interest is impractical. It cannot work. It cannot keep us safe and free. Only fidelity to the principle of self-interest can. For America to prevail against its enemies, we must adopt a conviction quite incompatible with the bromides of pragmatism: THE CONVICTION THAT WE ARE RIGHT AND THEY ARE WRONG. Not that we are partially right, not that we have to see things from their perspective, not that we need to be “tolerant” of other cultures, not that we should be willing to give away something to our enemies in order to get something we want from them-but simply that we are right and they are wrong on the non-negotiable issue of whether we are entitled to live in freedom. America’s self-interest can be protected only by those who understand what it consists of, why it is morally proper and what means of protection need to be employed-i.e., the means on non-appeasement, non-compromise, non-sacrifice.”

Cody it is real simple.

We are negotiating arms reduction deals with countries that do not recoginize individuals rights and are anti-capitalist. That is a sign of weakness. Now, I don’t agree with URR on revealing how many nuclear weapons we have since that information was probably already known but I do agree that the current administration’s approach is wrong.

Transparency need not be necessarily strength or weakness . My concern about a policy like this isn’t so much the present (where we are strong), but rather the future – which holds no guarantees.

As we reduce our stockpiles to the point where we no longer hold overwhelming advantage, information about our exact capabilities vis-a-vis potential adversaries becomes important to understanding relative power between states. For adversaries to have a firm understanding of that balance, while we must make do with approximations and guesses, cedes an important advantage to those who hold the power of knowledge.

It may be that the process of nuclear arms reduction could not proceed without transparency by all sides. Even so, I’m far from convinced that unilateral concessions are the most effective way to arrive at multilateral obligations.

I have to admit this is going to be my all time favorite sentence while reading blogs and making comments.

“I’m still waiting for you to educate me.”

Hmmm??? let’s see, educated liberal is to liberal education as intelligent military is to military intelligence.

I just couldn’t resist.