"Hey, I'm just a mere figurehead, really..."

The big reason to attend WEST 2011 is quite simple… Undersecretary Robert Work is already confirmed to speak!

Enjoying lunch while listening to America’s own reincarnation of Jackie Fisher, Winston Churchill and a wild strain of Roosevelt is a treat too rarely served to us far-from-Beltway residents of the West Coast. It is not something to miss.

Register for WEST 2011 here.

It’s the least you can do for the guy who, with the unveiling of last weeks’ LCS “Unselect”, is relentlessly forging the Navy after Next (and hey, he even finds the time to craft the occasional essay for Proceedings, too!)

I mean, to give you some idea of how influential Undersecretary Robert Work is, I’d wager that Admiral Rickover would be horribly jealous given just how effective Robert Work has been–in the space of just two years, too…

In short, the guy is unstoppable, well worth hearing, and, hey, even if you don’t like Undersecretary Work, USNI has invited a whole lot of other interesting folk to drop by WEST 2011, too.  Take a look.  Anybody can register, and, well, what better way to justify a trip to visit San Diego in January?

Posted by Defense Springboard in Navy | read comments (2)

At the 11th hour, on the 11th day of the 11th month…the guns fell silent along what was known then as the Western Front as the Allies and Germany observed the agreement to end this “War to End All Wars.” While fighting continued sporadically elsewhere, in what were fast becoming the former empires of Russia and the Ottoman-Turks, the rest of the world surveyed the cost of four years of war.

- 60 million Europeans put under arms

- 8 million dead, over 20 million wounded; a generation forever thinned and crippled across three continents;

- the world map forever altered

The industrial might and genius of a world gone mad and revealed in the mechanized mayhem of hitherto unknown locales – Marne (500,000 dead), Somme (where Britain lost over 57,000 killed in one day alone) — Ypres, site of the appearance of the cruelest form of warfare – poisonous gas; the cauldron at Verdun which claimed a quarter of a million French and German dead alone; Gallipoli (almost 43,000 Allied dead) and Chateau-Thierry/Belleau Wood which saw the single bloodiest day in Marine Corps history — until Tarawa in 1943.

Machine guns, heavy artillery, submarine warfare, aerial attack and poisonous gas against flesh and blood — 19th Century tactics couched in medieval concepts of battlefield glory against the grim reality of war in the Industrial Age.

It was a slaughterhouse whose effluent would poison the world for ages afterwards. My grandfather (that’s his picture at the top left), a first generation American of German extraction was sent “Over There” to fight cousins and kinsmen. I have a cherished set of sketches from his time in France – they are a study of French soldiers over time from 1914 through 1917, from exuberant youth to prematurely aged and bitterly tired maturity. He purchased them on his way back to his Illinois home from the war after November 11th. My wife’s maternal grandfather was not so lucky. He fell victim to a phosgene attack, leaving him permanently crippled and requiring daily assistance for the rest of his life. He lived to be 90 and was haunted every day by the horror of that attack.

These are those whom I remember every November 11th. The first wave in what became a series of world wars – the second wave one generation removed from the first, enfolding in its embrace my maternal grandfather who led Rangers in the assault on the cliffs at Normandy and my future father in the Pacific theater. And my wife’s father who answered the call in a frozen peninsula in northeast Asia. And don’t forget my godfather – who flew Skyhawks from Oriskany and Hancock during the toughest of times off another Asian country barely a decade later and who would serve as an inspiration for a young Midwestern lad. Yes, these and so many more who have and continue to serve – these I remember,

We remember…

On November 12, 1919, President Wilson signed a declaration proclaiming that day as Armistice Day to recognize the veterans of this war – Congress amended it seven years later to change the day to the 11th of November and after WW II, and following advocacy that began with a shoe store owner in Emporia, Kansas, President Eisenhower signed the bill proclaiming hence forth that Veteran’s Day would honor veterans of all our nation’s conflicts on the 11th day of the 11th month henceforth.

Ypres, Belgium

In Flanders fields the poppies blow
Between the crosses, row on row,
That mark our place; and in the sky
The larks, still bravely singing, fly
Scarce heard amid the guns below.

We are the dead. Short days ago
We lived, felt dawn, saw sunset glow,
Loved, and were loved, and now we lie
In Flanders fields.

Take up our quarrel with the foe:
To you from failing hands we throw
The torch; be yours to hold it high.
If ye break faith with us who die
We shall not sleep, though poppies grow
In Flanders fields. – Lt.-Col. John McCrae

Flanders Field Today

So at 1100 today – and subsequent November 11ths, let us pause to remember that all gave some and some gave all – and others are still giving, and let us give thanks, in solemn prayer for those and in gratitude to those still with us…

(cross-posted at steeljawscribe.com)

Posted by SteelJaw in History | read comments (2)

We will still need men and women in uniform to call things as they see them and tell their subordinates and their superiors alike what they need to hear, not what they want to hear . . . More broadly, if as an officer you don’t tell blunt truths or create an environment where candor is encouraged, then you’ve done yourself and the institution a disservice.

The time will come when you must stand alone in making a difficult, unpopular decision, or when you must challenge the opinion of superiors or tell them that you can’t get the job done with the time and the resources available . . . There will be moments when your entire career is at risk.

Sprinting Through the Tape, by Major General Thomas L. Wilkerson, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), Proceedings Magazine – July 2008 Vol. 134/7/1,265

There are several important activities and topics to discuss regarding the US Navy today, but the most important issue in the US Navy right now is represented in the outcome of last week’s court-martial of Lt. Cmdr. Sean Kearns, former executive officer of the troubled USS San Antonio (LPD 17). Kate Wiltrout has a series of articles regarding the court-martial in the Virginia Pilot – and both are required reading.

The first article came out Sunday with the verdict of not guilty by military jury for his case which involved the death of Petty Officer 1st Class Theophilus Ansong during small-boat operations on Feb. 4, 2009 in the Gulf of Aden. The accident involved 3 crew members in an inflatable boat that flipped while being lowered into the sea. Lt. Cmdr. Sean Kearns, the executive officer of USS San Antonio at the time, was charged with negligence for failing to properly train and supervise small-boat operations. According to the article Lt. Cmdr. Kearns “chose to take the case to court-martial rather than accept a potentially career-ending reprimand like the one given to Cmdr. Eric Cash, the ship’s captain.”

“The true victors here are the sailors who served on, and continue to serve on, LPD-17-class ships,” he said, adding that they face struggles with the new design and are not getting the resources they need from the Navy.

When asked why he refused administrative punishment, Kearns said: “Things needed to be made known…. Someone needed to stand up.”

He stressed that the problems with the ship don’t stem from those who are serving aboard it. “That crew has never failed to come through,” he said.

The prosecution and defense had two very different views regarding the cause of the accident. For the prosecution, the argument ultimately became that regardless of all circumstances, officers are responsible for the crew under their command. The defense argument was that circumstances do matter, and that at some point a team Navy effort must extend beyond the confines of a single ship. The article lays out all of the details of the case, but what is important here is that we find a naval officer with the moral courage to speak out regarding problems in a court-martial and be held accountable by military jury. Ultimately, Lt. Cmdr. Kearns was not found responsible for the sailors death.

During the trial, prosecutors did not address the major material problems that have plagued the USS San Antonio. As I observed the trial through the media, that point stuck out to me as a very important omission by the prosecution, and as I thought about it I remembered something I read earlier this year.

Expecting a ship to meet every mission requirement while providing only 70% of the resources necessary is not setting the conditions for success. The CO is placed in an untenable situation; we set the ship and her crew up for future failure. Ultimately, it is my responsibility, working through the chain-of-command, to balance the resources I provide to our ships, squadrons and submarines with the missions I expect those units to be able to perform.

But…our COs also have an obligation to seek the truth and act on it – to honestly assess their ship, take appropriate action, and forward their findings and recommendations up the chain-of-command for the betterment of the force. This feedback is absolutely critical. Decision-making and directing action (command) only achieves the desired outcome if there is a properly functioning feedback loop (control). We have occasionally disassociated command from control with often devastating effects that are difficult to recover from, even over a long period of time.

So we have to ensure we establish an honest flow of communication through the chain-of-command; indeed, it is critical we do this. It is not about whining up or down the chain-of-command – that is, simply complaining about problems without offering any solutions; it is about effective leadership in a culture where we work together to continually improve our ships, our squadrons, and our submarines.

ADM J.C. Harvey, Jr USN posted March 31, 2010 on the US Fleet Forces Command Blog

Kate Wiltrout explains with her second article this morning that Adm. John C. Harvey was left little choice in regards to his decision to court-martial Lt. Cmdr. Kearns.

Adm. John C. Harvey said he did not take lightly the decision to court-martial Kearns.

Harvey inherited the situation after taking charge of Fleet Forces Command, which is responsible for training, equipping and maintaining naval forces and supplying them to military commanders. Two investigations into what happened Feb. 4, 2009, the day Petty Officer 1st Class Theophilus Ansong died, had been completed, but no actions had been taken.

Harvey said he felt he owed it to Ansong’s family, and the crew of the San Antonio, to deal with the lingering issue.

I think ADM Harvey’s action was absolutely right. ADM Harvey had to court-martial Lt. Cmdr. Kearns in response to the death of Petty Officer 1st Class Theophilus Ansong, as the story goes on to explain.

In May, he issued a letter of reprimand to Cmdr. Eric Cash, the ship’s commanding officer. He had fewer options with Kearns, who had transferred to a shore job. Once Kearns left the ship, he had the right to refuse administrative punishment, which he did. That left Harvey with two options: let Kearns off the hook entirely, or send him to trial.

What follows is important.

Although he is not allowed by the Navy’s legal code to comment on the case or the jury’s verdict, the four-star admiral acknowledged concern about the message the acquittal may send.

He offered a warning to the officers who command or serve as second-in-command aboard Navy warships. They need not fear becoming scapegoats when things go awry, he said. But neither can they claim that less-than-ideal circumstances absolve them of responsibility.

“The absolute responsibility that you have is the Navy’s greatest strength because it gives you the ability to command. And with that responsibility comes the accountability that ensures command is worth something, and worthy of those we lead.”

One of the best articles written in Proceedings over the last few decades was written by then Lieutenant David A. Adams in the June 1998 issue titled Chance Second Chances. The entire article applies to this issue, but this section in particular resonates in regards to the court-martial of Lt. Cmdr. Kearns.

At the core of the problem is a belief that to be successful, individuals, commands, and institutions must appear error-free. This flawed mindset is not entirely new to the Navy, but in recent years it has escalated in scope and magnitude. Downsizing and the inflated fitness and efficiency reporting fuel a widespread perception that maintaining a flawless record is a prerequisite for promotion and selection to command. Since few naval officers have deluded themselves into believing that they are perfect, a perceived necessity to maintain an unblemished record stifles initiative, breeds caution, and encourages people to commit small—yet debilitating —ethical violations on a regular basis. In the October 1985 Proceedings, Admiral Arleigh Burke warned that overlooking small infractions of integrity could erode the stature of a leader. He never could have expected that the Navy—as an institution—could come to behave in exactly the manner he described. This blurring of institutional integrity in peacetime can only have disastrous consequences in war.

Some have argued that “yes, we have problems,” but we are still “the best damn Navy in the world.” True, but the best-trained and best-equipped naval forces on the planet can be beaten if they fail to maintain the trust and confidence of American people. And as we have learned all too often in recent years, a zero-defects organization that cultivates the image of perfection at the expense of honesty is headed squarely for public-disaster. In future wars, a failure to keep dishonest peacetime promises—such as zero casualties—will rapidly be translated into a public perception of military incompetence. History also has shown that a loss of public confidence can erode the public’s will to fight rather quickly. Thus, the Navy’s unwillingness to admit imperfection and error ultimately could bring devastating consequences in battle.

Which brings us to the very heart of the issue, as outlined later in Kate Wiltrout’s article this morning.

Harvey said he’s concerned that junior sailors could come to feel that high-ranking people are immune from being held accountable.

“The issue here is trust, and that’s the only issue,” Harvey said. “If you don’t have the trust of those you lead, you don’t have anything.”

It’s important for sailors to understand that the Navy sets a standard of accountability to ensure their leaders are worthy of trust, he said.

“And I will do everything in my power – legally, morally, ethically – to enforce and sustain that standard of accountability.

“Our leaders must be worthy of the trust of those they lead.”

As I think about the court-martial of Lt. Cmdr. Kearns, I think Kate Wiltrout has appropriately found the real story here. This is a story about leadership and accountability. Both leaders in this case, Adm. John C. Harvey and Lt. Cmdr. Sean Kearns have made a series of leadership choices to stand up and be held accountable. In the case of Adm. Harvey, he is executing his responsibilities as Commander Fleet Forces Command. In the case of Lt. Cmdr. Sean Kearns, he chose to be held accountable to the decision of a military jury, which found him not guilty of the charges filed.

What is being said here is that accountability matters, but what is not being said is who should also be investigated for accountability. When Adm. Harvey says “Ultimately, it is my responsibility, working through the chain-of-command, to balance the resources I provide to our ships, squadrons and submarines with the missions I expect those units to be able to perform” he is speaking specifically of himself in his current job, but he was not in Command of Fleet Forces Command at the time of the USS San Antonio (LPD 17) accident.

The court-martial trial does not specifically state that fault lies with the leadership of those who were tasked to support the USS San Antonio (LPD 17) prior to the ship being deployed in a state that is completely unacceptable to the current standard applied by Adm. Harvey at Fleet Forces Command, but as that was the prevailing argument of the defense it can be implied as part of the ruling.

This is where we run into the real problem no one wants to touch, and none of those involved can address – and why Adm. Harvey is absolutely right to be concerned “that junior sailors could come to feel that high-ranking people are immune from being held accountable.”  Since I have every intention of calling it exactly how I see it – I will state up front that I have a genuine sense that the problem already exists in the Navy, and it goes beyond junior sailors and the attitude exists among many – MANY – officers in Command at the CDR and Captain level. The belief that the US Navy does not hold officers accountable is exactly why Ronald O’ Rourke can testify in front of Congress and mention as a perception the lack of confidence in the US Navy regarding shipbuilding.

Officers and Sailors in the US Navy today understand their responsibilities as leaders and know they will be held accountable for their actions – and in the case of Lt. Cmdr. Sean Kearns, they only ask that they are fairly held accountable by military jury. The big problem is the blatant, obvious, and ignored perception on parade within the flag officer community that Admirals are not held responsible for the most spectacular failures of the last decade – and the only time a flag officer is held accountable is for conduct issues or political miscalculations – not job performance.

I am reminded of a speech given by James Webb on April 25, 1996 at the Naval Institute’s 122nd Annual Meeting and Sixth Annapolis Seminar.

There are still exceptional leaders in our Navy, some of whom are my classmates, others whom I can see in this audience today. But too often the best leaders are not being heard. Something almost unexplainable happened in the decades since we sat in those seats in Mahan Hall. Some of it happened to the country as a whole, but some of it did not. A great deal of it happened to the Navy as an institution. It happened gradually, issue by issue, argument by argument, compromise by compromise.

Over time, getting worse as the years went by, an increasing percentage of the naval leaders who were promoted into the highest sanctums of government somehow lost their way, until finally, in recent years, many whose very duty it was to defend the hallowed traditions and the unique culture of their profession declined to do so when their voices were most urgently needed. Some are guilty of the ultimate disloyalty: to save or advance their careers, they abandoned the very ideals of their profession in order to curry favor with politicians.

I frequently find myself wondering how this possibly could have happened. To be fair, these have been uniquely difficult times for military leaders. Our generation’s complex and volatile political debates resulted in unprecedented intrusions into command relationships because of new concepts of limited warfare, increased judicial oversight, and a variety of programs mandated under the rubric of equal opportunity. The all-volunteer system, with its emphasis on targeted bonuses and specialty pay, fostered greater rewards for individual skills than for group values. But the other services faced these same issues with far less chaos. The inescapable difference has been the approach of the Navy’s top leadership, particularly during this decade.

And so I go back to those dank, sweltering teenage evenings in Mahan Hall, and I ask myself, what would Nimitz have said and done in these situations? Or King? Or Admiral McCain’? Or, dare I be presumptuous, Tom Moorer, one of the great living admirals of our time? Indeed, what should any true leader who believes in the system that advanced him and in the people who serve that system feel compelled to do’? And why has it not been done’?

Perhaps over time moral courage became less important as a promotional criterion than political correctness, so that many of the most capable simply did not get promoted in the first place, couldn’t make the cut in an environment where politicians more and more frequently played favorites.

Perhaps some kept their courage but became confused regarding their jurisdiction in this ever-widening grey area where military and political control overlap. Perhaps, some chose to hide behind the notion of civilian control as a way to duck the hardest issues facing them, issues they feared might be dangerous to their personal advancement, issues that might even affect their ability to get a good corporate job when they retired.

Perhaps for some, loyalty became personal rather than institutional, directed at saving the boss rather than the service itself, and along the way getting one’s self a fine fitness report. Or, just maybe, all of the above, in varying amounts, depending on the individual and the crisis of the moment.

In my opinion, Adm. Gary Roughead has been the best Chief of Naval Operations in the 21st century, and I can say this with confidence despite disagreeing with him on an unmentionable number of issues and decisions he has made. No CNO this century has had to make more tough decisions on highly public and controversial issues than Adm. Roughead has over the last 3+ years. With that said, in my opinion his record has an enormous stain that will severely stain his legacy – he failed to hold several of the highest ranking leaders under his immediate command accountable for their job performance. Their failures are paraded today as promotions even though they are representative of the Navy’s struggles and outright failures over the last decade.

Before Adm. John C. Harvey took control at Fleet Forces Command, there was no accountability for the poor job performance at Fleet Forces Command. We absolutely know there was poor job performance at Fleet Forces Command before Adm. Harvey arrived, because that is exactly what The Balisle Report revealed. Adm. Jonathan Greenert’s resume at Fleet Forces Command is the catastrophe described in the The Balisle Report. The effective defense that acquitted Lt. Cmdr. Sean Kearns by military jury in the court-martial was based on, but not identified as, the terrible performance of Adm. Jonathan Greenert at Fleet Forces Command at the time. Virtually the entire San Antonio class of vessels is in dry dock undergoing incredibly expensive repairs because by coincidence – if you believe it to be coincidence – the San Antonio class problems were not revealed by Fleet Forces Command while under the command of Adm. Jonathan Greenert, rather were only revealed once Adm. Harvey took command.

And for three strikes of consistent failure that have only been revealed since the departure of Adm. Greenert from Fleet Forces Command – failures that have resulted in the death of sailors like Petty Officer 1st Class Theophilus Ansong – Adm. Jonathan Greenert’s record went unblemished to the point he was promoted to Vice Chief of Naval Operations in the Navy. He is not the only Navy Admiral promoted under Adm. Roughead’s tenure whose record in hindsight is one of failure, but Adm. Greenert is the most prominent Admiral promoted and represents the posterchild for the perception that accountability doesn’t apply to flag officers.

Adm. Harvey, Lt. Cmdr. Sean Kearns, and Petty Officer 1st Class Theophilus Ansong’s family can’t do anything about the lack of accountability at the top of the Navy chain of command. Nobody in the Navy or who does business with the Navy would dare call out a Navy leader by name publicly. Only Adm. Gary Roughead, Secretary Mabus, or Secretary Gates could do something about it from inside the Pentagon, unless the new Congress decided to take up their own investigation. It is a truly sad state of affairs in the Navy when a blogger, blessed only by the freedom implied in the independent forum mission of the US Naval Institute, can highlight the failures of Admirals in public in 2010 without worrying about ones career – but then again the culture problems in leadership discussed in 1996 by James Webb, just like the culture problems in maintenance discussed in the The Balisle Report that date back to at least 1996 – still exist, don’t they.

These problems are institutionalized, I fear, but I remain encouraged for the future of the US Navy. In my opinion, one cannot observe the actions of Adm. John C. Harvey, regardless of whether you agree with them, and not see the lights at the end of the tunnel. God bless the US Navy – I do hope it is a train.

Posted by galrahn in Uncategorized | read comments (17)

On Saturday, 13 November, the United States Navy will commission the Guided Missile Destroyer USS Jason L. Dunham, DDG-109.  Every Marine knows, and every American should know, Corporal Dunham’s story.

Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. James Amos will deliver the ceremony’s principal address.  Debra Dunham will serve as sponsor of the ship named for her late son.  The ceremony will be highlighted by a time-honored Navy tradition when she gives the first order to “man our ship and bring her to life!”

Dunham was born in Scio, N.Y., Nov. 10, 1981, sharing the same birthday as the U.S. Marine Corps.  On April 14, 2004, Dunham’s squad was conducting a reconnaissance mission in Karabilah, Iraq, when his battalion commander’s convoy was ambushed.  When Dunham’s squad approached to provide fire support, an Iraqi insurgent leapt out of a vehicle and attacked Dunham.  As Dunham wrestled the insurgent to the ground, he noticed that the enemy fighter had a grenade in his hand and immediately alerted his fellow Marines.  When the enemy dropped the live grenade, Dunham took off his Kevlar helmet, covered the grenade, and threw himself on top to smother the blast.  In an ultimate selfless act of courage, in which he was mortally wounded, he saved the lives of two fellow Marines.

We often hear about the “Old Corps” and how this generation doesn’t measure up to the past, and we worry if our Legacy of Valor is in good hands.  Then, we see the Jason Dunhams, and the Jeffrey Holmes, and the Dakota Meyers, and the Doug Zembiecs.  And we know that their chapter in the long and glorious history of our Corps will stand with any that has come before.

When I recall the faces of those young Marines as we headed down Route Michigan (“IED Alley”) into Ramadi day after day, how they faced the danger and closed with the enemy wherever they found him, there is an emotion that is equal parts pride and awe that cannot quite be explained by words.  At least not any I know.  So it is appropriate on this 235th Birthday of our Marine Corps that we think of Corporal Jason Dunham and those like him, whose courage shone in even the darkest days in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Corporal Jason L. Dunham would have been twenty-nine years old today.  He gave his future so that we may have ours.  Yet, he will live forever in the hearts of his Marines and his loved ones.

Semper Fidelis, and Happy Birthday.

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in History, Marine Corps, Navy | read comments (3)

The United States had not yet entered the Great War on this 135th Birthday of the United States Marine Corps.  Commandant John A. Lejeune would not publish his call for the celebration of the birthday of our Corps for another eleven years.  Nobody outside of the intimate brotherhood of Marines knew who John Lejeune was in 1910.  Nor did they know Smedley Butler, or Wendell Neville, nor Thomas Holcomb.  John W. Thomason, Marine Officer and author of the seminal “Fix Bayonets”, was still in high school in Texas.  Most of the Marine heroes of the Second World War were small children or not yet born on 10 November 1910.

So, why am I posting about that day, the 135th anniversary of the founding of the Marine Corps?

Because 10 November 1910 was the day on which convened the Ordnance Officers’ Board to begin testing of two designs for a new pistol.  The entries were the Savage Arms .45 caliber Model H, and the Colt .45 Special Army Model of 1910, a design of the legendary firearms genius John M. Browning.  The tests were grueling 6,000 round affairs, fired in strings of 100 rounds.  In the end, the Colt weapon proved more easily field stripped, more accurate, and more reliable, with 12 malfunctions requiring replacement of 4 components, while the Savage had 43 malfunctions requiring replacement of 13 components.

The tests would be repeated in March of 1911, with each firm able to make repairs and improvements to the respective designs.

In the subsequent tests, the Colt weapon functioned flawlessly, with no malfunctions in 6,000 rounds fired, and no parts requiring replacement.  The Savage entry suffered 37 malfunctions, and needed eleven components replaced.

The Colt entry was accepted after the decisive second trial, adopted officially on 28 March 1911, as the Colt Caliber .45 Automatic Pistol, Model of 1911.  The designation “Model of 1911″ was changed to “M1911″ in 1940.

The iconic 1911  in .45 ACP was the sidearm of the United States Armed Forces until 1985 officially, with many units only parting (and grudgingly) with their .45 autos in the 1990s.  In fact, the 1911 is still in service worldwide, and with modifications, remains in the USMC MEU(SOC), FBI, and SWAT arsenals.  They were in Iraq, and are in Afghanistan, going strong and putting the model’s replacement, the Beretta P92, to shame.

But for all of our military hardware to outlast its designers, prove its rugged durability, and serve well for ten decades.

So, it was one hundred years ago, 10 November 1910, when the Colt .45 Automatic first proved itself legendary.   It is, quite simply, the greatest handgun ever made.  Its simplicity, reliability, and hitting power have come to make the 1911 synonymous with the word “pistol”.

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Air Force, Army, Coast Guard, History, Marine Corps, Navy | read comments (20)

It was seventy-two years ago this night.  On the night of 9-10 November, 1938, things became so abundantly clear to the entire world, especially those who had insisted time and again with negotiation and compromise with the Nazi state, as to what the true nature of the regime of the Third Reich was.  There were other warnings, of course.  The secret,  and then the open and massive rearmament in violation of the Versailles Treaty.  The virulent anti-Semitism shrieked from the mouths of their spokesmen.  Persecution of the Catholic Church, the severe and brutal imprisonment, punishment, and execution of those who spoke up against the National Socialist regime. The withdrawal from the League of Nations, and the increasingly bellicose tones of their speeches in expressing their plans and objectives.  All this was set aside, as the Allies in Europe clung to frantic hope that Hitler and Germany wished to avoid war as much as they themselves did.

Fewer than six weeks before, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and France’s Edouard Daladier had agreed to the destruction of an ally and sovereign nation, selling out Czechoslovakia and its people to Nazi occupation for “Peace in our Time”.   The Western Powers had negotiated with Adolf Hitler as if he had been an honorable and sincere man, and had taken him at his word that the Sudetenland had been his “last territorial demand in Europe”.

But on this night, the true horror of the nature of Hitler’s regime was laid bare for the world to see.  Jews were brutalized, beaten, murdered, imprisoned.  The glass storefronts of Jewish-owned businesses were smashed in the streets of cities all over Germany and Austria, giving the awful nightmare of the darkness of 9-10 November 1938 its name, Kristallnacht.  The Night of Broken Glass.  More than one hundred Jews were murdered in the streets and in their homes.  The numbers of assaults and rapes against Jewish women and girls is unknown, but German police records show such occurrences to be widespread.  Thirty thousand Jewish men were arrested and sent to concentration camps, where hundreds died.

True to form, the Nazis provided justification for this orgy of anti-Semitic violence and murder.  The death of a minor German diplomat in Paris two days after being shot by a young Jewish man of questionable stability, was the cause of the “spontaneous” displays of outrage against “World Jewry” who had planned the diplomat’s assassination.  The Nazi elite, assembled for their annual Munich commemorations, saw the opportunity for brutal excesses against Germany’s Jews, and took full advantage.

Berlin No. 234 404 9.11.2355
To all Gestapo Stations and Gestapo District Stations
To Officer or Deputy

This teleprinter message is to be delivered without delay
1. At very shot notice Aktionen against the Jews, especially against their synagogues, will take place throughout the whole of Germany. They are not to be hindered. In conjunction with the police, however, it is to be ensured that looting and other such excesses can be prevented.

2. If important archive material is in synagogues, this is to be taken into safekeeping by an immediate measure.

3. Preparations are to be made for the arrest of between 20,000 and 30,000 Jews in the Reich (Germany state). Wealthy Jews in particular are to be selected. More detailed instructions will be issued in the course of the night.

4. Should, in the forthcoming Aktionen, Jews be found in possession of weapons, the most severe measures are to be taken. SS Reserves as well as the General SS can be mobilized in the total Aktionen. The direction of the Aktionen by the Gestapo is in any case to be ensured by appropriate measures.

Gestapo II Mueller
This teleprinter message is secret.

Kristallnacht represents a transition.  From anti-Semitic rhetoric and legal persecution to that of open and state-sponsored terrorism that included violence, imprisonment, and murder.  The events of that terrible night are a watershed, as well.  From that time forward, any German or Austrian who claims not to have known what the Nazis were is either untruthful or willfully ignorant.  The difference being too slight to explore here.  Also from that night, any Western leader who held out hope of further negotiation and compromise with Hitler and his Reich did not deserve to be in any position of leadership or responsibility, for their naive and unrealistic view of the threat they faced put their respective nation in grave danger.

One of the greatest dialogues in the history of cinema comes from the masterpiece Judgment at Nuremburg.

To paraphrase, one cannot claim as a moral defense, that “I did not know about the deaths of the millions, I merely knew of the deaths of the hundreds”.

To a nation in a war with radical Islamic extremists seeking our destruction or subjugation, extremists who demonstrate daily their brutality and show us precisely their view of justice and freedom, these are words to be very mindful of.   We have already had our Kristallnacht.

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Air Force, Army, Coast Guard, Foreign Policy, History, Homeland Security, Marine Corps, Maritime Security, Navy, Uncategorized | read comments (6)

Tougher than it has been in a while.  Malibu at New York Naval Recruiting has the details.

A month into the new fiscal year and:

As you can see a vast majority of the designators already have their number for the year or are at least very close. In addition if you view the column entitled “Goal” it is easy to see how competitive these programs currently are at this time. 

Head over to his place to see more, and the actual numbers…but bottom line – unless you want to be a SWO Information Warfare option, Special Warfare, Pilot, PAO, Oceanographer, Supply, Civil Engineer, or Cyber-warrior…it’s not likely to be this year.

So, what’s the relevance?  Well, in 2007 Navy was looking for 1,571 new active duty officers.  In 2008 -1,962.  2009 – 2, 202.  2010 – 2, 403.

Of last year’s 2,403 accessions, 1,536 were line officers – the ones on Malibu’s spreadsheet. 

Total active duty line officer goal for 2011?  990.

Which means a roughly 1/3 reduction in active duty line officer accessions through Recruiting Command this year.

So, with today’s percentage based promotion system, 20 years from now we should be hearing about a shortage of Commanders and Captains.

Posted by M. Ittleschmerz in Uncategorized | read comments (6)

Once again, fellow USNIBlogg’rs EagleOne and I are turning our sights towards the economic basis of the need for maritime power.

As a maritime, mercantile republic, 90% of our trade relies on commercial ships’ access to the world’s oceans. Without the ability to transport goods at market prices worldwide – our economic engine grinds to a halt.

Our guest for the entire hour will be no stranger to those who attended 2010 USNI History Conference.

From piracy, shipbuilding, the merchant marine, and the economic factors involved in the maritime shipping industry, join us today, Sunday 07NOV10 at 5pm EST for a broad-ranging discussion with Stephen M. Carmel, Senior Vice President, Maersk Line, Limited.

Join us live if you can, and pile in with the usual suspects in the chat room during the show where you can offer your own questions and observations to our guest. If you miss the show or want to catch up on the shows you missed – you can always reach the archives at blogtalkradio – or set yourself to get the podcast on iTunes.

Posted by CDRSalamander in Maritime Security, Piracy, Uncategorized | read comments (0)