In Defense News, US Marine Colonel Mark Desens, CO of 26th MEU currently operating off the coast of Libya, had some very interesting and incisive comments regarding the need for the F-35B STOVL variant of the JSF.

Desens and others noted that the F-35B would be a vast improvement over the Harrier. Not only does it carry more weapons and fuel, its sensors allow it to target enemy air defenses and vacuum up intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance data and feed it back to the fleet.

“When you look at the capabilities of the F-35B and how much it expands the tool box, that aircraft is going to push us way out in front of any future potential threats out there,” the colonel said.

Read the full article here.

But what really jumps out from Col Desens’ comments is the possibility that a smaller aircraft carrier with such a weapon as the F-35B could have efficacy as an alternative to the traditional supercarrier that has been the sole contestant in the US Navy’s aircraft carrier building arena since the commissioning of the Forrestals in the late 1950s.

More from Colonel Desens:

“It would be lovely to have an aircraft carrier here, but there are not enough to go round,” said Col. Mark Desens, the commander of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, which operates the AV-8Bs aboard the Kearsarge. “What we do have is the opportunity to do a lot of things with this vessel, and we are accomplishing a tremendous return on investment with these six STOVL jets.”

He continues:

“With an AV-8B or an F-35B, you get an immediate ability to start impacting a wide range of things,” Desens said. “As you look down the road, the need for a STOVL jet sells itself, because you are not going to get more aircraft carriers. An F-35B costs a lot less than a carrier.”Desens noted that a STOVL jet can also move ashore with troops as they push farther away from the beachhead, landing and flying from far smaller patches of ground than regular fixed-wing planes.

“You have tremendous operational flexibility if you are going to do a projected land war, like Iraq and Afghanistan, where those jets were sea-based…”

The nuclear-powered Nimitz-class super-carrier has been the symbol of US Naval power and influence for nearly four decades.   However, the price tag for such vessels will continue to rise.  The first of its class USS Gerald R. Ford is projected to cost upwards of $10 billion. While the Nimitz-class is expected to soldier on for several more decades, operating costs of the 102,000-ton, 5,000-sailor behemoths will continue to be a serious concern in this era of fiscal austerity.

With each crisis anywhere on the globe that involves US interests, the question that is invariably posed is “where are the carriers?”; the latest instance being a mere two weeks ago off Libya.   But, does every situation in which the question is asked have to be answered with a Carrier Battle Group built around a CVN?   Is it necessary to bring the extremely high-end solution to low- and medium- threat problems?  Is that now what we see with billion dollar warships chasing pirate skiffs off Somalia?

During the Second World War, smaller flattops provided air assets to amphibious assaults and other operations in what we now describe as the Littoral, such as is being conducted in Libya at present.  There were myriad reasons for this, but the predominant was the desire not to risk the trump cards, the Fleet Carriers, in confined waters and within range of enemy land-based weapons systems, any more than necessary.  One would think a 21st century corollary of that rule is still a good idea in today’s A2/AD environment, particularly as we look to the western Pacific.

With the building of the America (LHA-6) class of amphibs, it is possible that the Navy has itself a hull form that could be adapted for the role of smaller aircraft carrier.  At 45,000 tons, 844 feet long, with a beam of 106 feet, the Americas will be very similar in dimension, though with a higher displacement, to the famous Essex-class carriers of World War II, one might hesitate to label such a “light carrier”.   Perhaps, in a redux of previous nomenclature, the former term “attack carrier” (CVA) seems most descriptive.  As General Amos, Marine Commandant, noted in January of this year in a speech to the Surface Navy Association, the America class LHA is already “maximized for aviation” already.  So let’s take the next step of logic.

An adaptation of that warship class, one dedicated to Naval and USMC STOVL aviation assets, one that does NOT have an amphibious mission, doesn’t require billeting for 1,700 Marines and their equipment, that doesn’t have a requirement for V-22 or attack helicopters as a part of its organic air component (but still capable of handling them if desired), a warship like that could prove exceedingly handy and valuable to a fleet which may be looking at a shortage of its heavyweights.

Of course, the obvious argument about efficiency of sorties is a consideration, but would a warship with a complement of STOVL fighters of the capabilities expected of the F-35B create a new baseline for measuring such efficiency of sortie generation?  Would 60-65 aircraft still remain the minimum aircraft complement for efficient operation?  I would love to see some projections using the F-35B to that end.   The speed of the Americas might have to be enhanced, as the 22-knot capability may or may not be sufficient, but options may be available for more powerful propulsion systems to achieve desired speeds.

In addition, operating costs of such a ship would very likely be significantly less.  A crew of 1,000-1,200 Officers and Sailors, with a suitably-sized air component is less than half that of the 4,500-5,000 complement of the Nimitz/Ford CVNs.

If the number of CVNs in commission shrinks to 9 or even 8 in the coming decade, which is a distinct possibility, we are left with a shortage of assets to cover a world-wide commitment.  When the question is asked again, as it will be, “Where are the carriers?”, there are two answers that we should take great pains to avoid.

The first is “Rusting away in Philadelphia.”

The second is “Busy elsewhere, and not coming.”

A STOVL-dedicated CVA based on the America-class LHA may provide a cost-effective and combat capable alternative to the CVBG that may or may not be available when we need it.   If we are to maintain a global power projection presence, as the Maritime Strategy asserts, the approach offered here deserves more scholarship than it has been given.




Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Air Force, Aviation, Foreign Policy, Hard Power, Marine Corps, Maritime Security, Navy, Piracy, Uncategorized

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  • B.Smitty

    USNVO,

    1. I haven’t seen anything to indicate the Ford reactors can go 50 years without refueling. Can you point me to something showing this? If so, then it definitely changes the equation.

    2. Six MT30s can generate 216MW (289,000 shp). The Nimitz class reactors generate 194MW (260,000 shp). So a conventional Ford using this propulsion scheme would have an additional 22MW. I can’t find figures on the Ford’s A1B plant, so I don’t know how this compares.

    My guess is we wouldn’t use six gas turbines. Instead we’d use a mix of turbines and more efficient diesels.

    3. I would rather have more, somewhat less capable carriers, than fewer “exquisite” ones. The point of this blog post was to propose a solution to the carrier coverage gap we have today. URR chose a CVL as his solution. I would prefer to use full-sized, but cheaper, CVs. (Sorry URR for hijacking this thread)

    Of course my plan is predicated on a major up front and life-cycle cost savings from switching to conventional power. If this is not possible, then the plan has no merit.

    We used the 3 day on and 1 day off cycle because carriers needed to replenish JP-5 and stores. Conventional carriers took on DFM as well, but that was not the driving factor.

    The primary reasons we couldn’t generate the maximum sortie rates were the distance to targets and the number of aircraft carried. I don’t see us buying a lot more aircraft and going to the old days of 100+ aircraft air wings. And I don’t see many situations involving a short range to target. Certainly the Ford class advances are nice to have even in these cases, but not necessarily operationally relevant, IMHO.

  • Byron

    So the Navy will have to go back to using fossil fuels? Have you figured out the cost of all that fuel over 50 years? Have you factored in rising fuel costs?

    If I’m going to push 100,000 tons of steel through the water I want nuclear power to do it.

  • UltimaRatioReg

    Byron,

    What about 45,000 tons? Is a reactor still economical?

  • Byron

    Why not? It’s already been done…USS Long Beach, USS California…

  • UltimaRatioReg

    Roger that, but what would the added cost be for modifying an existing warship design like LHA-6? If we are looking to leverage design and development costs for existing platforms, how much does that add?

  • Byron

    I just build ‘em, I don’t get into procurement :) And if I did, there’d be a lot of hurt feelings and shipwrecked careers.

  • B.Smitty

    Crunched a few numbers.

    I took the GAO costs for a CV vs a CVN (page 74, minus fuel) and adjusted for inflation from FY97 to FY10.

    Then I used the fully loaded price to deliver a barrel of fuel (including cost of oiler, and so on) from here,

    http://209.48.244.135/DODCAS%20Archives/42nd%20DODCAS%20(2009)/Lifecycle%20Cost%20Estimation/4a_Kearns_Presentation.pdf

    Instead of the $70.02/barrel of crude assumed there, I used an average of $112/barrel.

    The GAO assumed 25 million barrels of fuel delivered to a CV over its lifetime.

    The total life-cycle costs for each came to the following,

    CV – $23.327 billion
    CVN – $30.05 billion

    My spreadsheet is here here,

    https://spreadsheets.google.com/ccc?key=0AiVQu4lA4SjvdHpaY1FoME9vUnJmR2pHdjUwM0paS1E&hl=en&authkey=CLrey8YP#gid=0

    There’s a HUGE YMMV with all of this, of course.

  • Derrick

    What does the US taxpayer perceive to be the primary purpose of the carrier? If it is deterring peer competitors, than wouldn’t more CVNs and a few CVLs be the mix to meet that requirement? If the requirement is more on participating in minor skirmishes like Libya, then would a mix of more CVLs and fewer CVNs suffice?

    I think if the US taxpayer is willing to live with less involvement in other countries’ internal affairs and just stick to deterrence of peer competitors, then every carrier should be a CVN. If not, then perhaps money should be set aside for a few CVLs?

    For example, from what I can understand from some posts, there are some who believe the carrier is to be used for major naval combat, like World War 2 style. In that case, I think you need a CVN.

    However, other posters would like to use the carrier for things like Libya and the like. For them, a CVL would suffice.

    Also…I am concerned about the statement that the theoretical sortie rates for carriers could only be acheived in finely tuned exercises, as opposed to real life. Why is this the case? Isn’t the purpose of an exercise to mimic real life? I think the US taxpayer would like to be reassured that their several billion USD CVNs can do 120 sorties per day…

  • Derrick

    Thanks for providing the cost comparison spreadsheet, B.Smitty. Your efforts to quantify this discussion are greatly appreciated, especially by ignorant civilians such as me. :)

    I must ask one more favour though…would someone please list out the sortie generation rates for both the CVN and the proposed CV/CVL? I mean, how many aircraft and what type can each carry, and how many targets can be attacked by each with only the supplies on the carrier?

    I appreciate the cost comparison, but I would like to see the differences in terms of “combat capability”, if one could call it that. :)

  • UltimaRatioReg

    Derrick,

    The premise is that someone needs to compute sortie generation with a modern STOVL airframe (F-35B) off a dedicated CVA (I am not calling it a CVL at 45,000 tons) to see where the numbers compare with sortie generation off a CVN. Without a need to house attack helicopters and 1,700 Marines, the stowage capacity for such a ship might be made to greatly exceed that of the current LHA-6 design.

  • Derrick

    How long will it take for someone to compute those sortie generation numbers based on the modern STOVL airframe?

  • B.Smitty

    Derrick,

    Sortie rates are highly dependent on the distance to target and number of aircraft on the ship. A carrier flying 12 hours on and 12 hours off won’t get much more than 1 sortie per day per aircraft, regardless of deck efficiencies, if each sortie lasts 5+ hours.

  • Byron

    URR, it’s not stowage or room that dictates sortie rate (at least not at the front end, when all aircraft are “up”): it’s distance to target and mission requirements.

  • UltimaRatioReg

    Byron,

    Understand, but there was some significant discussion about how often a smaller CV would have to be resupplied with ordnance/aviation fuel, which means time off station.

  • Derrick

    How many aircraft will the CVA carry?

    I guess the CVA, being lighter than the CVN, will be able to get closer in to shore to let its aircraft strike deeper?

    Will the CVA be capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons?

  • USNVO

    Sortie rate, although useful as one of many metrics to access the overall effectiveness of a carrier, is merely a part of the picture. Endurance, range, seakeeping, etc, are also important. For instance, bigger magazines means not just more of everything but also more diversity of ordnance is possible. However, a larger carrier will also generate more sorties by being able to rearm faster, refuel faster, more efficiently moving aircraft, etc. Additionally, with a bigger airwing, they have more flexibility as to the type of sortie they generate. Having said that it is not a linear increase, so a LHA with 50% the number of aircraft will generate, potentially, more than 50% sorties.

    Historically, the CVL was an extremely useful warship, but especially because we already had Fleet Carriers. It was found that the 30-40 or so planes that the CVL carried was too small to have an effective mixed airwing and it created severe problems with aircraft spotting, launch and recovery, etc. But, since they operated as part of a fleet of aircraft carriers, they were extremely useful. They became the primary CAP providers (high cyclic operations of only one type of aircraft (fighters) and minimal aircraft arming). This freed the larger fleet carriers to be able to concentrate on being the primary strike assets (bigger decks, more room for arming and spotting, more pulsing of power, less cyclic ops). By having both types of carriers, the limitations of the CVL could be hidden and its strength (it had a flight deck and could operate aircraft almost as fast as a fleet carrier) was optimized.

    The FORD is clearly optimized for generating strike sorties and handling a large diverse airwing. It will be able to re-fuel and re-arm aircaft faster, move them about easier, spot them faster, and generally support them longer than the NIMITZ class. Its the modern day Fleet Carrier. However, normally it would launch and recover aircraft at about the same rate as a smaller carrier, at least until the smaller aircaft carrier ran out of planes.

    An unmodified LHA-6 supporting only F-35Bs would probably carry around 30-35 F-35B. My rational is that
    1. A LHD can easily carry 24 AV-8Bs and six SH-60s since they have done it before.
    2. A LHA-6 is better optimized for avaiation and is planned to routinely carry 12 F-35Bs in addition to the MEU helicopters (4 CH-53E/K, 10 MV-22Bs, 4 AH-1Z, and 3 UH-1Y). So I am figuring 30-35 F-35Bs if you remove the the helos.

    How many F-18/F-35s are there in a normal CVW? Somewhere around 44-46 total. So a LHA-6 could carry almost as many fighters as a CVN but of course nothing else. So it should be able to generate almost as many fighter sorties as the larger carrier in the same timeframe. In other words, a modern CVL (which is why I like CVL as a designation even if it is ESSEX sized like a LHA).

    So, if (a big if) you can build and operate two optimized light carriers (I think it would make sense to go all the way and have a angled flight deck and catapults) for the cost of one Fleet carrier, you can have a force of 6 CVLs and 7 CVNs for the same cost as 10 CVNs. A conventional CVL that carried say 36 F-35Cs and 2 E-3Ds, (Strike airwing) about the same as the French Charles de Gaulle, or alternatively, 24 F-35Cs, 2-3 EF-18Gs, 2 E-2Ds, and 4-7 MH-60s (multi-purpose airwing) could be very useful as a battle group assets but would also be able to operate independently in lower threat regions. Now, the smaller CVL would have less endurance, probably only one quarter of the magazine space, lower seakeeping limits, etc. but they would add significantly to the number of flight decks (a 30% improvement) and would provide, when configured for the maximum fighter configuration, a greater than 50% increase in the numbers of fighter sorties, at half the cost. As a pure fighter carrier, it can easily support the required sorties. As a attack plane carrier, it is not nearly as good but, operating with a CVN or in a low threat environment, how good does it really need to be?

  • USNVO

    Smitty,

    On the 50 year life reactors, I saw it from a story on the FORD class aquisition from the Defense Industry Daily website that discussed the changes from the NIMITZ class (which is why a fleet of 10 FORDs have about the same operational time as a fleet of 12 NIMITZ class across their service lives). I checked, and the website currently has that story is now only available to members.

    The navy (navy.mil) estimates that a NIMITZ class has around a $32.1 billion total ownership cost (FY04) while the FORD class (after the first one of course) is around $26.8 billion. Approximately $5 billion cheaper over the life of the ship.

  • B.Smitty

    USNVO,

    I’ll have to keep looking for that. You’d think that it would be such a huge selling point, they would trumpet it all over the place.

    So far, I’ve seen no reference to it, so I will remain a bit skeptical.

    On the total ownership costs, a conventional Ford would benefit from many of the same enhancements as its nuclear cousin. Many of those enhancements, if not most, are in areas other than propulsion.

  • B.Smitty

    For the LHA-6, assuming it can normally carry the following air wing,

    12 x F-35B
    4 x CH-53E/K
    10 x MV-22Bs
    4 x AH-1Z
    3 x UH-1Y

    Using the hangar spot factors from here,

    https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=explorer&chrome=true&srcid=1jOkDJr8nm3Q73xbrfgJGV3K8RGE4SHDemFvvjt4tURb7tM_43Mp5uVrS0fE1&hl=en

    The air wing above uses 68.42 “spots”.

    Assuming the same spot factors and packing density, LHA-6 could carry 25 F-35Bs.

  • B.Smitty

    While I’m not crazy about an LHA-sized STOVL carrier, I do still find the old Sea Control Ship concept interesting.

    To gain high sortie rates for a given number of aircraft, you have to be close to the target. There are many cases where we won’t want to risk a CVN, CV or even LHA/CVL very close to shore (e.g. in the Persian Gulf in a conflict with Iran). However, we have shown willingness to operate destroyer or cruiser-sized ships in the same circumstances.

    An SCS the size of the Principe de Asturias or Giuseppe Garibaldi could carry an multipurpose air wing of 12 F-35Bs and 9 H-60s; a long-ranged CSAR wing of 9 F-35Bs, 4 H-60s and 6 V-22s; an ASW/MIW-heavy wing of 6 F-35Bs, 18 H-60s and 12 Fire Scouts; or a Marine/SPECOPs deep insertion wing of 6 F-35Bs and 12 V-22s.

    In other words, an air group much bigger and more flexible than a surface combatant can carry, but not one so big that it requires an expensive LHA/CVL/CV/CVN to carry it.

    Clearly 9-12 F-35Bs won’t generate a large number of traditional, long distance sorties. However they could fly 2-3 sorties per day, per aircraft, out to 200nm or so. The SCS would rapidly exhaust its munitions and fuel stores in this situation, but, if bought in numbers, it could rotate with other Sea Control Ships to provide continuous (albeit limited) coverage.

    If given the ability to defend itself with a robust AAW/ASW suite, an SCS could even operate independently. The large flight deck and hangar make it much more flexible than a Burke, even if it doesn’t cost any less.

  • B.Smitty

    BTW, RAND thinks the Ford class will still require a RCOH.

    http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1073.pdf

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