In Defense News, US Marine Colonel Mark Desens, CO of 26th MEU currently operating off the coast of Libya, had some very interesting and incisive comments regarding the need for the F-35B STOVL variant of the JSF.

Desens and others noted that the F-35B would be a vast improvement over the Harrier. Not only does it carry more weapons and fuel, its sensors allow it to target enemy air defenses and vacuum up intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance data and feed it back to the fleet.

“When you look at the capabilities of the F-35B and how much it expands the tool box, that aircraft is going to push us way out in front of any future potential threats out there,” the colonel said.

Read the full article here.

But what really jumps out from Col Desens’ comments is the possibility that a smaller aircraft carrier with such a weapon as the F-35B could have efficacy as an alternative to the traditional supercarrier that has been the sole contestant in the US Navy’s aircraft carrier building arena since the commissioning of the Forrestals in the late 1950s.

More from Colonel Desens:

“It would be lovely to have an aircraft carrier here, but there are not enough to go round,” said Col. Mark Desens, the commander of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, which operates the AV-8Bs aboard the Kearsarge. “What we do have is the opportunity to do a lot of things with this vessel, and we are accomplishing a tremendous return on investment with these six STOVL jets.”

He continues:

“With an AV-8B or an F-35B, you get an immediate ability to start impacting a wide range of things,” Desens said. “As you look down the road, the need for a STOVL jet sells itself, because you are not going to get more aircraft carriers. An F-35B costs a lot less than a carrier.”Desens noted that a STOVL jet can also move ashore with troops as they push farther away from the beachhead, landing and flying from far smaller patches of ground than regular fixed-wing planes.

“You have tremendous operational flexibility if you are going to do a projected land war, like Iraq and Afghanistan, where those jets were sea-based…”

The nuclear-powered Nimitz-class super-carrier has been the symbol of US Naval power and influence for nearly four decades.   However, the price tag for such vessels will continue to rise.  The first of its class USS Gerald R. Ford is projected to cost upwards of $10 billion. While the Nimitz-class is expected to soldier on for several more decades, operating costs of the 102,000-ton, 5,000-sailor behemoths will continue to be a serious concern in this era of fiscal austerity.

With each crisis anywhere on the globe that involves US interests, the question that is invariably posed is “where are the carriers?”; the latest instance being a mere two weeks ago off Libya.   But, does every situation in which the question is asked have to be answered with a Carrier Battle Group built around a CVN?   Is it necessary to bring the extremely high-end solution to low- and medium- threat problems?  Is that now what we see with billion dollar warships chasing pirate skiffs off Somalia?

During the Second World War, smaller flattops provided air assets to amphibious assaults and other operations in what we now describe as the Littoral, such as is being conducted in Libya at present.  There were myriad reasons for this, but the predominant was the desire not to risk the trump cards, the Fleet Carriers, in confined waters and within range of enemy land-based weapons systems, any more than necessary.  One would think a 21st century corollary of that rule is still a good idea in today’s A2/AD environment, particularly as we look to the western Pacific.

With the building of the America (LHA-6) class of amphibs, it is possible that the Navy has itself a hull form that could be adapted for the role of smaller aircraft carrier.  At 45,000 tons, 844 feet long, with a beam of 106 feet, the Americas will be very similar in dimension, though with a higher displacement, to the famous Essex-class carriers of World War II, one might hesitate to label such a “light carrier”.   Perhaps, in a redux of previous nomenclature, the former term “attack carrier” (CVA) seems most descriptive.  As General Amos, Marine Commandant, noted in January of this year in a speech to the Surface Navy Association, the America class LHA is already “maximized for aviation” already.  So let’s take the next step of logic.

An adaptation of that warship class, one dedicated to Naval and USMC STOVL aviation assets, one that does NOT have an amphibious mission, doesn’t require billeting for 1,700 Marines and their equipment, that doesn’t have a requirement for V-22 or attack helicopters as a part of its organic air component (but still capable of handling them if desired), a warship like that could prove exceedingly handy and valuable to a fleet which may be looking at a shortage of its heavyweights.

Of course, the obvious argument about efficiency of sorties is a consideration, but would a warship with a complement of STOVL fighters of the capabilities expected of the F-35B create a new baseline for measuring such efficiency of sortie generation?  Would 60-65 aircraft still remain the minimum aircraft complement for efficient operation?  I would love to see some projections using the F-35B to that end.   The speed of the Americas might have to be enhanced, as the 22-knot capability may or may not be sufficient, but options may be available for more powerful propulsion systems to achieve desired speeds.

In addition, operating costs of such a ship would very likely be significantly less.  A crew of 1,000-1,200 Officers and Sailors, with a suitably-sized air component is less than half that of the 4,500-5,000 complement of the Nimitz/Ford CVNs.

If the number of CVNs in commission shrinks to 9 or even 8 in the coming decade, which is a distinct possibility, we are left with a shortage of assets to cover a world-wide commitment.  When the question is asked again, as it will be, “Where are the carriers?”, there are two answers that we should take great pains to avoid.

The first is “Rusting away in Philadelphia.”

The second is “Busy elsewhere, and not coming.”

A STOVL-dedicated CVA based on the America-class LHA may provide a cost-effective and combat capable alternative to the CVBG that may or may not be available when we need it.   If we are to maintain a global power projection presence, as the Maritime Strategy asserts, the approach offered here deserves more scholarship than it has been given.




Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Air Force, Aviation, Foreign Policy, Hard Power, Marine Corps, Maritime Security, Navy, Piracy, Uncategorized

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  • JAV

    I can’t remember where I read it, but there have been comments from congress before that we can only afford so many carriers-and for every light carrier authorized there would be a CVN cut. I believe it was part of the last study that looked into carrier size.

  • Old Soldier

    Let’s not forget another WWII concept: the escort carrier. Put a deck on a tanker, load it with aircraft designed explicitly for the counter-insurgency mission, and you have a cheap substitute for the carrier(s) parked off Pakistan.

  • B.Smitty

    ARAPAHO and the more recent Afloat Forward Staging Base both build on the escort carrier concept.

    IMHO, Libya is not the best situation to highlight carrier-based STOVL aviation. It is well within range of land-based tactical air power from Europe. There are 60 to 70 land-based fighters participating, compared to six Marine Harriers.

    If you decide to build a CVA, why not go slightly larger and add catapults? Then you can fly E-2D, Super Hornets, Growlers, and F-35s (B and C). In the future you might add a UCLASS and UCAV to the mix. You can’t do that with a STOVL carrier.

    The two biggest problems here are cost and politics. Adding additional carriers means something else has to be cut. Changing from the status quo will step on entrenched toes, and will be resisted.

  • UltimaRatioReg

    “Changing from the status quo will step on entrenched toes, and will be resisted.”

    Probably true, Smitty, but the lamest of excuses for not doing what is in the best interests of the Navy and the nation.

    Catapults? Dunno, maybe. But a straight deck will not accommodate arrested landings, so non-VL airframes are not likely to work.

  • Chuck Hill
  • UltimaRatioReg

    Chuck,

    Interesting. But could America’s hull form be adapted to a STOVL dedicated mission, and have a complement of 35-50 aircraft? That would be a different set of computations, it would seem.

  • B.Smitty

    URR,

    An angled deck CTOL version would definitely require a major redesign, if not clean-sheet.

    Maybe that’s a good thing. You could cast off all of the amphibious vestiges and have a more cost effective carrier in the long run.

    And you aren’t tied to the most risky F-35 variant. You can still fly relatively “cheap” and proven F/A-18s.

    However if we go this route, perhaps we should just consider a conventional version of the Ford class. Estimates years ago put a conventional carrier at around half the purchase price of a nuclear one, all else being roughly equal. Life cycle costs were closer, of course.

  • Mike M.

    If you limit yourself to STOVL platforms, you give up AEW and COD capability. This didn’t work out too well for the British in the Falklands. You COULD work around the deficit by adopting a non-carrier-based AEW platform (the YEZ-2A airship was designed for that role), but the development costs for such a system need to be considered.

    As to going with a smaller (40-50Kton) CV, you get back COD and AEW capabilities, but start running into cost-effectiveness issues. Ship steel is cheap. It’s the electronics that drive the cost up.

    A better question might be to discuss the virtues of building a CVN, but adding a squadron of V-22s and a Marine assault force.

  • http://blog.usni.org M. Ittleschmerz

    SNAFU talked about the “Brits use AMERICA” idea this weekend: http://snafu-solomon.blogspot.com/2011/03/uk-has-carrier-problemthe-uss-america.html

    Mike M perfectly highlights the standard criticism (which I will paraphrase and boil down to it’s core): A CVL will never be able to do what a CVN can, so why buy a CVL?

    Which is, frankly, a bad argument.

    Navy already killed the ESG concept by trying to treat them like CVBGs instead of the different kind of animal they really were. The culture is all about “we need the biggest that can do the most” and with the exception of CVNs, Hornets and Aegis we will screw it up over, and over, and over again.

    URR – if you choose to present this argument further you will want to read up on deck cycle…that metric comes up when aviators think that someone has a chance of getting a small carrier approved because the analysis always shows that a bigger carrier can get more firepower out than a smaller one (duh).

    ‘Course, they tend to ignore the argument that it’s better to have your assets spread out rather than all on one ship…but then we do tend to be a binary lot.

  • UltimaRatioReg

    MI,

    At the risk of pulling a muscle in my head, I took a look at the sortie generation computations in a few places, but they are all (that I found anyway) based on CATOBAR platforms.

    One has to wonder if a STOVL strike aircraft would change the equation significantly, and even if not, would be far preferable to an empty hole in the ocean where a CV/CVN might once have bobbed up and down. While the sortie cycle may be less efficient, if the difference in building and operating costs is several billion dollars, how much does that really mean?

    “Biggest that can do the most”. Roger. Holding out for more CVNs may mean they get nothing.

  • http://blog.usni.org M. Ittleschmerz

    “Sortie generation” – that’s the phrase my brain wouldn’t give me!

    Yes, CATOBAR…because the analysis needs to be gamed. And when analysis needs to be gamed, then you know something is wrong with the argument.

    If only we had raised a cadre of Naval officers who could look at things in something other than a binary way.

  • AT1 Charles Berlemann Jr

    URR,

    If you want to look at the sortie completion rate for a Surface Combatant Ship testing that was done with a Iwo Jima class LPH back in the late 1970′s. To test a concept of using VSTOL fighters and ASW helos. I have a write up of this in an old edition of USNI’s Ships and Aircraft of the US Navy by Norman Polmar. The idea was that Navy could save money on carriers by building smaller ships with just VSTOLs (first AV-8A’s and later was supposed to be XFV-12) along with SH(X) assets. They could provide protection to convoys during a war while the big decks of NATO were seeking the enemy and trying to regain the initative.

    If I remember right the Navy and the GAO said that the sortie rates at the time were smaller, less effect, and in general eating up more of the dollar for defense than just a regular sized CVN. Although it is pretty old, here is one of the referred to GAO reports: http://archive.gao.gov/f1102a/105055.pdf. I hope this might help you out in trying to strain your brain.

    If I might add history had shown even during WW2, that the only places the CVE’s could succeed in supplying air support to the ground was when the major fleet units or land based USAAF units had sweeped the Axis air fields enough that the only units left were overwhelmed by the older VCF and VOF units on the CVE’s. So unless there is overwhelming air superiority in the region, then risking a CVE/Large L-class gator might be too risky in certain situations. Remember for fleet defense you need eyes that can see out further then the horizion. If you can’t see out further then that, it is going to be a serious sticky wicket when the bad guys decided to fly or fight against you.

  • Derrick

    I guess this really depends on what the requirement the taxpayer has for the US navy. If they expect the US navy to do these “minor policing” type of operations where the target is either a non-state actor or tiny 3rd world state actor with limited naval capabilities, then I think it’s not unreasonable to ask the taxpayer to set aside a few billion USD to fund 1-2 smaller carriers. But I think if the US taxpayer has the expectation that the US navy is to be focused on deterrence of peer competitors and keeping the sea lanes clear for cheap global projection of US military power, then I don’t think it’s a worthwhile expenditure.

    I understand there are lots of military missions the US navy could be involved in, but my personal preference is to focus on deterrence of peer competitors and protecting the ability to resupply US forces overseas. I don’t need to see US naval jets deploying from a CVN to take out some overseas military targets to know the US navy is a worthwhile expenditure.

    Just my 2 cents worth. Feel free to reject. I’m no expert. :)

  • Chuck Hill

    The question seems to boil down to, is there a continuing mission requirement that can be satisfied by a single smaller CV while the CVNs are busy elsewhere?

    We know, on a per aircraft basis, the large carriers are cheaper, so the number of aircraft required would have to be significantly less than supplied by a large carrier air wing.

  • Byron

    Smitty: Have you ever been in the hell known as the “fire room” and have you ever had to work on one of those nasty SOB? I can tell you that the ONLY thing that was good about a boiler re-tube was the overtime because there was going to be a LOT of it.

    Besides, where the hell would the Navy find BTs at?

  • B.Smitty

    IIRC, the deck cycle for a STOVL carrier is actually simpler and faster than an equivalent CTOL carrier. So more sorties for a given number of aircraft. Of course YMMV. Much depends on the deck layout, number and type of aircraft, munitions and fuel handling, range to target, and so on.

    How often are these smaller packets of naval air power really needed?

  • B.Smitty

    Byron, I wasn’t suggesting going back to boilers. With EMALS, the Ford class won’t need steam. So a conventional version could use modern gas turbines, just like the British CVF.

  • UltimaRatioReg

    Three points, one AT1 Berlemann, one to Derrick and one to Smitty:

    AT1, I might question the validity of the study using AV-8As and the Iwo Jima class amphibs. We are talking here about a dedicated STOVL platform to maximize sorties, with an airframe of much greater capability and lethality. And this isn’t a CVE, much more comparable to a CVL or even a pre-Essex Fleet Carrier by comparison. While venturing into enemy waters with just one of these proposed CVAs may not give you the same warm-fuzzy that a CVN might, it beats the hell out of nothing at all if you must venture.

    Derrick, the US Navy will be tasked with missions both large and small, both regional and global presence. Going back to a comment M Ittleschmertz made on another post about re-reading Zumwalt’s hi-lo mix discussion. If you have to do both, but cannot afford the number of CVNs to do it, then there had better be a viable alternative. Is something like this it?

    Smitty, your question “how often are these smaller packets of naval air power really needed?” might be turned around. How often are the larger packets of naval air power going to be available with 8 or 9 CVNs? This “smaller packet” may have 35-50 highly capable Joint Strike Aircraft. There are plenty who would find that highly useful, especially when the alternative may be little else.

  • AT1 Charles Berlemann Jr

    I don’t doubt that even having a LH(X) or your proposed CVL concept would be better. I do believe it might be worthwhile to look again at sortie completion rates with more modern equipment vs the older LPH/AV-8A combo. I just cited that since this idea had been brought up once before in the 1970′s.

  • Derrick

    But what is the requirement for those missions that are against a non-peer competitor or non-state actor? Just provide no-fly zone air support? What about supporting ground forces? What type of aircraft would be required on this CVL/CVA? How many of each?

  • UltimaRatioReg

    AT1,

    Agreed in full. Would love to see the numbers with a purpose-built vessel and a modern STOVL airframe….

  • Spade

    From wikipedia, since I don’t feel like doing real research but:

    LHA-6 is supposed to be 844 feet long and about 45k tons.
    Charles de Gaulle is 858 feet long and comes in at 42k tons. (pretty sure those are both the metric kind of tons).

    Charles de Gaulle has twice the beam and an angle deck, and with that gets real fighters and E-2s.

    So it’s not like a LHA sized real modern carrier is inventing the wheel or anything.

  • http://steeljawscribe.com/ SteelJaw

    URR:
    Your argument for a CVL is predicated on a viable STOVL strike-fighter, something I find problematic in light of the historical record and current continued difficulties the F-35B has shown in development with weight, heat-load, much shorter lifespan than predicted for critical subcomponents (like the lift fan doors) — and all before we even begin to get to the weapons system integration and software tales of woe. All while the cost per unit climbs – something not helped when the Brits stepped away from the F-35B in favor of the F-35C.
    I would not be surprised if the F-35B is offered on the altar of major program restructuring and due to unremitting budgetary pressures. If that happens – the CVL becomes just another heavy helicopter hauler.
    w/r, SJS

  • UltimaRatioReg

    SJS,

    True enough that the F-35B may not work out quite as planned, but the problems of a viable STOVL airframe will be solved eventually. Therefore, looking at a STOVL CVA (rather than CVL) option that is smaller and much lower procurement and operating cost (thus more available and readily risked) than a Nimitz/Ford CVN seems a very prudent thing to do. That we have an existing hull form that could provide much of the answers should not be overlooked.

    I am reminded of Salamander’s admonition for experimentation. Maybe the F-35B doesn’t work out, but what if it does? And what if the next generation does? Will we have explored its potential operational concepts fully or have stymied ourselves by betting against it?

  • leesea

    I suggest that you all go read the “New Navy Fighting Machine” by Capt Wayne Hughes of the Naval Postgraduate School?

  • AT1 Charles H. Berlemann Jr

    Could that also be the same paper that advocates a small, highly expendable ship to fight from the littorals?

  • Redeye80

    URR,

    I agree the concept has merit. However, if you think the Harrier mafia is bad wait until you meet the Big Deck Carrier Mafia. Watch your back and your wallet.

    I am not as fond of moving STOVL into the dirt with a small EAF. Most don’t realize the logistical requirements to make that happen. We were successful in OIF with opening, moving and closing FOBs becuase we had the extra logistical capabilities that normally don’t exist in a MEU sized unit. KC-130s were used to support these moves and without thier support the rapid movement would not have been so rapid.

    I’ll question the source article a little bit. I’ve never seen a Harrier go 600KTS carrying bombs. “150 miles in 15 minutes” If they could, they would screaming for gas.

  • AT1 Charles H. Berlemann Jr

    URR,

    It sounds then that the carrier your advocating is this, http://tinyurl.com/3l7bzxx. If not that the we should re examine the Typhoon Strike Cruiser concept. At its most advance design before it was canceled, it had the AEGIS system and a flight deck and the capability to handle anywhere between 8 to 12 VSTOL aircraft and 4 to 5 helos. The biggest stickler was propulsion (nuke or gas turbine) and costs of all the electronics (specificlaly the AEGIS).

  • Spade

    Why are a bunch of the arguments based on “CVL = STOVL” because I’m not sure why that would have to be true? CVL could also equal “less normal carrier jets” like the escort carriers of old.

  • UltimaRatioReg

    Spade,

    The argument centers around Col Desens’ comments about the AV-8B and the potential (if successful) of the F-35B. I am positing a carrier for them to operate from that would not have to be BAR-capable. The question would be how much that changes the sortie generation computation, and what would such a carrier’s complement of F-35Bs look like if the ship did not have an amphibious mission or was required to carry attack and cargo helos.

    This mythical ship is much larger proportionally than was the CVE concept in WWII.

  • B.Smitty

    URR,

    The 65,000 tonne CVF is supposed to have an air group of around 40 aircraft. A carrier based on the LHA-6 would have a smaller one.

    Here is some background reading on the CVF program,

    http://navy-matters.beedall.com/cvf1-01.htm

    Page 12, in particular, talks about STOVL vs CTOL,

    http://navy-matters.beedall.com/cvf1-12.htm

  • http://wharfratshome.blogspot.com/ Wharf Rat

    http://wharfratshome.blogspot.com/2011/04/must-every-carrier-be-supercarrier.html

    I’ve added a couple of pictures to the discussion over at my ‘place’, but my basic point is this: we’ve already done this in 1991 and in 2003 using the LHA/LHD platforms, and I suspect the resistance to keep using these platforms in this manner is concern that it would take funding from super carriers. I like 25 Harriers on an LHD.

    On an aside, the LHD that doesn’t seem to get a lot of press is USS Wasp. I’ve seen her deploy once just to bring Osprey’s to AFG. Is she just used as a test bed? All the other LHD’s seem to rotate reg. in the deployment schedule.

  • Grandpa Bluewater

    Here’s the deal. The government is broke and in unsustainable debt. The Congress is functionally deadlocked, having overpromised everybody to the point of inability to cut anything in the line of a social program for fear of loss of (the horror!) seats long considered safe.

    The nation’s will to fight has been sapped by forces obvious to anyone who watches the news and has read 2 history books about wars fought before 1955.

    Folks were told there was to be a “peace dividend” from transfer of funds from military readiness to income redistribution at the end of the cold war, and cut the armed services in half, and then in half again. The current “plan” in some quarters is to back away from any conflict in progress, ASAP… and do it again.

    At the same time deindustrialization proceeds apace, justified by the rush to “free” trade. The green’s environmental agenda has placed in-country natural resources increasingly out of reach, sopping up capital beyond that available to import resources, most notably energy.

    It’s all economics kids, and we’re in a death spiral. Thus the pressure for cheaper, less capable combatants and the snuffing out of auxiliaries. Not to mention jettisoning personnel with irreplacable expertise like a drunk lighting cigars with the cash in his wallet.

    Admirals, we’ve got lots of, and all problems are defined as failures of leadership and trust on the part of the jo’s (which includes anybody not an Admiral.) Summary relief is the universal remedy. That’ll fix it. Decisive career termination with prejudice, that’s the ticket! No straw for the bricks, it’s a failure of trust/leadership, pack your bags.

    We’re just imitating the decline of the Royal Navy, but 40 years behind. Only worse.

    Should present trends continue, what will the US Navy look like in 2111?

    Ozmandias.

    Look upon the destiny set for you by the powers that be today, ye seamen, firemen, airmen, constructionmen, and commissioning aspirants….and despair.

    Don’t mind me, though. Feel free to return to rearranging deck chairs.

  • http://wharfratshome.blogspot.com/ Wharf Rat

    Grandpa Bluewater: If I could hit the like button 10 times, I would, or 50 times. You couldn’t be more spot on.

    It is incredible, outrageous that ‘smart’ political people can’t understand the simple concept, you can’t spend more than you take in, or you can’t spend more than you can pay back. My mortgage is well within my means to pay it back. You can’t say that of the United State government.

  • http://wharfratshome.blogspot.com/ Wharf Rat

    Grandpa – I prominently featured your comment at my ‘place’.

    It should be up on a billboard on every freeway in the country.

  • http://wharfratshome.blogspot.com/ Wharf Rat

    Question: what is Great Britain doing with their Harriers? with the concern about the F-35B, are they similar enough for us to grab a few? Will the current roster of about 170 Harriers (correct me if I’m wrong – too lazy to look at Marines web page) last until full implementation of F-35B?

  • Mongo

    As General Amos, Marine Commandant, noted in January of this year in a speech to the Surface Navy Association, the America class LHA is already “maximized for aviation” already. So let’s take the next step of logic.

    And build them as nukes. LHDN & LPDN as centerpieces of the gator Navy. Up front cost is higher, but operational costs going down the road will be much reduced.

    Utilizing CVN-78 technology for LHDN/LPDN, we maximize machine efficiency towards fighting. One bugaboo with smaller decks – remember the 27C in snotty seas. Nobody had fun coming aboard, and, to paraphrase a former VFA-41 CO’s comment, a multi-million dollar jet, CATOBAR or non, is pretty useless at the bottom of the ocean.

    CVF in the MEU places an additional hull requirement for hauling the GCE, whereas LHD carries GCE & ACE. Size up the hull to adequately meet the needs of both GCE & ACE.

    F-35B – If they ever get the darn thing operational, then start talking about building it a sea-borne platform. As it stands, even SecDef doesn’t know where the Bravo will be in two years. In an effort to maximize my tax dollars:
    1. If USAF absolutely has to have it, then let them build the F-35A. Keep the rest of the Services out of that flailex.
    2. Cancel F-35B and burn the blueprints, unless Britain wants to join in on development costs and help redesign the platform into something workable. Currently, all we’re doing is throwing precious tax dollars into a sinkhole.
    3. Cancel F-35C and tell the Navy to design and build a twin engine Carrier based jet that can incorporate F-35 technology. Make it large enough to carry more than a pair of bombs and missiles each. Think beyond the first day of war, and keep at the forefront that the frame has to haul all kinds of trash in all kinds of weather in the worst operating environment known to man. In short, go back and relearn the lessons learned from the history of building Naval aircraft.

    That’s all for now.
    Happy April 1st! Had something in mind to say about ‘we happy band of fools’, but civility and all that…

  • virgil xenophon

    Grandpa Bluewater speak heap big medicine. The sad, horrible, ugly truth is that all the retained expertise in both the active and retired force is all for naught unless our politics get fixed. And to do THAT means doing something which most of us absolutely LOATH–which is to become VERY active 24/7 (in the same manner the communists burrow in–live, eat and sleep it) in both local AND national politics. At the local level the school board is vital. Checked out whats actually being taught in K-12 these days? Its naught but a propaganda/brain-washing exercise to install socialism/eco-fascism in all too many jurisdictions. Not overtly, mind you, most of the teachers are too–how shall I say this politely?–”politically unaware” to realize the source behind much of what is taught in Univ Education Depts and curriculum development associations like the ones William Ayers rides herd on. Latest surveys say 67% of those under 30 have a favorable view of socialism. Where do you think that’s coming from? Unless we get a grip on the culture wars long-term and electoral politics in the short-term, it’s all, as GB says, about re-arranging the deck chairs..

  • virgil xenophon

    PS: Look at the PC rot within our own house. When the CNO of the Navy and the Super at Annapolis say “diversity” is their number one priority, and when the Chief of Staff of the Army states that, if the shooting at Ft. Hood harmed the concept of “diversity” in the armed forces, it would be an even GREATER tragedy than the death of his OWN TROOPS, one has ABSOLUTE living proof of the extent to which the leftist tide of cultural marxism–PC–has overwhelmed even people who should know better. The budget is out of whack because of the attempt of the left to “spread the wealth around” in the best leftist fashion. How do you think the mind-set of those that voted for Obama came to be developed? Did you know that Obama’s approval ratings among the college-age crowd has just hit a new HIGH!?–even as I type this?
    Yes, we have big short-term DOD budget problems, but they can ONLY get worse unless we fix/reverse the long-term cultural trends.

  • Derrick

    Not sure how PC and diversity are related to this topic regarding whether every carrier should be a CVN or if the US navy should purchase a few CVL’s…

    I’m on the fence here…a CVL that can move quickly to trouble spots outside of US air force reach would be very handy, but I personally would not like to overcommit US military forces or distract them from their primary mission.

    I guess as a compromise the US navy should purchase a CVL or 2 for flexibility in terms of what missions it can engage in. As for whether the money should be taken from CVN budget…well…why not take the money from the B-2 budget? I’m still not convinced a plane as big as the B-2 can be stealthy…isn’t it big enough to be seen by a lookout standing on a hill with binoculars? I don’t know…never fought in a war before so I’m just speculating…

  • Retired Now

    While being 100 % in agreement with the LHA-6 design (which is also the LHA-7 design), does everyone know what the Navy is buying ?

    LHA-6 shares the same propulsion as LHD-8. However, LHA-6 has significantly increased her displacement when fully loaded out. Imagine putting an FFG onto the deck of LHA-6 and 7, and then see what her max speed is. Recall that FFG-7 class weighs roughly 4,500 tons fully loaded with helo’s, fuel, and a full loadout of SM-1 and Harpoon missiles in her old MK-13 GMLS one-armed bandit, which has been neutered on this fine old workhorse frigate.

    Results: While LHD-8 could achieve a sustained speed of over 25 knots loaded for deployment, LHA-6 class is estimated to do max sustained speed of 22 knots.

    So, is 22 knots of max speed OK to help launch and recover those new Lockheed F-35B ? You don’t always have alot of wind in the Persian Gulf, so the max speed of a carrier is critical.

    One of the fantastic new features of LHA-6/7 is that they carry significantly more cargo JP-5 fuel than LHD-8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1. Expect LHA-6 class to spend alot less time hunting for an oiler and remaining alongside at a tempting 12 knots while taking on more JP-5 jet fuel.

  • AT1 Charles H. Berlemann Jr

    The only other question I have is if we want to look at this CVL/CVH concept any further will be what sort of mission sets that we expect to be done by a full sized air wing will be sacrificed for this smaller sized air wing. Currently a full sized CVW has the missions of fleet air defense, close air support, anti-surface warfare, fleet airborne early warning, ASW, Electronic Warfare, SAR/CSAR, SpecOps insertation, organic tanking, and elements of the air wing also provide replacement parts/personnel/morale via the COD/VOD,. Right now VSTOL and heliborne machines are not fully capable yet to preform some of these assests and get over the horizion to do the mission effectively. The Briish have the AEW.7/ASaC.7 but that helicopter can only get so high and the radar only has a certain range. Where even the E-2A with its variant of the APS-120 series of the radar that it even out preforms the Searchwater2000 that is installd in the AEW.7. However, for the UK they had to make that sacrifice since they couldn’t successfully get the money to develop a better system. To make AEW work successfully, you need to extend those eyes in your asset over the horizion so that you can see the bad guys before they show up. Look at all of the 5 major carrier battles and the naval battle off the Philippines and Okinawa. The inability of the Allied forces to see the Japanese forces taking off and coming to the fleet. There is a strong evidence that a number of units were sunk or heavily damaged because the fleet couldn’t intercept the raid in time.

    On the EW side of the house meanwhile you need to take just as much equipment in the air as the AEW side. You also need to have the capability to get heavy electronics airborne. Some of the EW pods can weigh up to a ton configured a certain way. Low Observable technology can help you so far, but there are plenty of other systems out there that LO tech can not defeat. So there is still a need for EW roles in operations. Plus the folks on the ground love the EWCAS [Electronic Warfare Close Air Support] mission set that is being preformed by some assests. So if you have to carry at least a ton of electronics to provide EW missions to either the fleet or the ground pounder, then you need to sacrifice fuel to carry that ton. Which means you either need to steam closer to the shore (and closer to shore battery systems) or provide tanking to stand off.

    Organic tanking is going to be a big question if we create a CVLW. I don’t know if the F-35 aircraft have been tested with buddy store systems or even the V-22 has been tested with a tanking system of some sort. So if we give up organic tanking and try to depend on land based air assets. If we are going to depend on land based air to provide that tanking, then what why not depend on land base air to provide some of the other mission sets. Of course we could be totally out of the range of land based air in some places. Which again leads to the CVL to get closer to the beach.

    The final thing to ponder is how many aircraft can you sacrifice to preform some of the missions that the fleet will require. Just because we are off the coast of a supposed “friendly” nation, the fleet will still need provide defense of the fleet just in case that “friendly” nation’s military attempts to strike out against us with air/surface/or subsurface units.

    I only bring up these missions because even in a premissive enviroment like we are supposedly seeing off the coast of Libya, these are still mission sets that need to be considered. I am not disregarding this idea, rather I don’t have a good feeling that the technology for this thought process is there completely to remove the large deck carriers from funding priorities.

  • UltimaRatioReg

    AT1,

    The concept I am positing is whether or not a CVA of the size and capability of a modified America-class LHA, with a generational leap forward in STOVL capability, would be an alternative to counting on a shrinking CVN inventory which may number as few as 8 by this time next decade, if not sooner.

    It would seem that construction costs leveraging an existing design (LHA-6) would be far lower than a Ford-class CVN, with comparable savings in operating costs.

    Questions of AEW and EW platforms needn’t be the determining factor for proceeding with some conceptual computations. What will EW or AEW apparatus look like in 2020? Small enough to go into a smaller airframe, perhaps even the F-35 airframe? Will AEW or EW be a space asset? Tough to say.

    The experimentation of the 1920s and 30s with the NWC games and Fleet Problems looked beyond existing technology toward future platform capabilities, so that when those capabilities became a reality, there was a semi-mature doctrinal concept in which to employ them. The same needs to be true here.

    Two things that would be devastatingly shortsighted:

    The first is to declare that the “Big-deck Navy” would never go for it, so the idea is pigeonholed.

    The second is to dismiss the concept with the “tried that, didn’t work” meme, when the “tried that” was two generations of technology ago and capabilities were in their infancy.

    If one rejects what may be a workable CVN-scarce Plan B because we think it is an all or nothing game, somewhere in the future a COCOM will get precisely the latter, when Plan B would have been infinitely preferable. The CVA concept, if workable, is far preferable to the CVN that isn’t there.

  • Grandpa Bluewater

    Derrick:

    CV’s exist to provide concentration of all the elements of air power necessary to the task force to maintain sea supremacy and project power (break things and hurt people so the enemy can’t do it to the task force). The idea is economy of scale. It works.

    CVL’s mean fewer aircraft of too little variety, fewer sorties, too small magazines, bunkers, endurance, survivability.

    Useful once you have enough CVs, waste of resources until you do.

    The drive to replace capital ships with more limited vessels of too little capability to provide decisive optempo, endurance, organic defense/DC capability (a weak punch with a glass jaw) is a sign of an underfunded navy, concentrating on process, with no strategic plan or meaningful ability to resource the operational units and formations necessary to achieve or maintain a strategy.

    It’s a sign of building down to oblivion. Not the only one manifest at the moment, either.

    Unless there is a specific requirement missing which can be only be filled by a (very) small number of specialist designed small carriers, which will be a force multiplier in an essential supporting campaign of economy of force, they just aren’t cost effective.

    The Falklands were a close run thing, admirable for the skilful use of substandard assets against an unskilled (mostly) enemy.
    Lousy example of strategic planning or resourcing.

    Not the right answer.

    Hope you can tie the two posts together.

  • UltimaRatioReg

    Grandpa,

    Define “cost-effective”. This slow-witted Marine would think it would take an awful lot of the cheaper sortie generation of a CVN to make up $8 billion in additional construction cost vis a vis the CV based on the LHA-6 platform, and the massive differential in operating costs.

    The premise was to begin to explore the concept with this generation of STOVL strike fighters, not to immediately begin building, or replace CVNs one for one. See what the numbers tell you. They may point to something not nearly as limited as you seem to believe them to be.

  • virgil xenophon

    If anyone would care to dig into the government documents section of any library and read the Congressional DOD budget hearings of 1970 in the House Armed services committee one would read the testimony of one Hyman Rickover, USN, advocating the building of the MAX number of CVNs possible during peace-time due to a) the long lead times needed to do so and b) the increased capability for sortie generation because of space otherwise used for fuel bunkers in conventional carriers being used for ordnance and Jp4/5, etc., and c) the speed and rapidity with which the CVBG can cover ocean-space unencumbered by max speed of oilers, etc.,
    not to mention monies saved by lessened need for oilers, and even ammunition ships (due to greater hull storage capacity of CVN)

    Rickover the submariner was NOT an advocate of the small carrier.

    And to those like Derrick who, unlike Grandpa Bluewater, cant see the connection between the culture wars and a shrinking DOD (and, hence,Navy) budget I would suggest you are doomed to disappointing times as you watch the Navy circle down the drain before your very eyes with the plug being pulled by those very leftist legislators that are the products of a neo-marxist leftist-controlled school system. You fools are, like Grandpa says, simply re-arranging the deck chairs while the neo-marxist controlled educational system is pumping out the sort of people only too willing to scuttle the fleet by opening the scuppers. The TRUE existential threat is our educational system and the 24/7/365 drum-beat of the cultural left in the Media and films and TV. The PRC is merely a potential opponent to be reckoned with in the future. The William Ayers controlled curriculum of K-12 and the very active pacifist political left IN ALL ITS MANIFESTATIONS in the 24/7 here and now is THE ENEMY. Failure to confront this fact will eventually mean–and sooner rather than later–that you won’t have a Navy worth mentioning to make your “innovative” plans around. There are presently more operating submarines in the artificial lake in the Canadian super-mall in Alberta then there are in the entire Canadian Navy. Look north USN! That’s your future Navy if you don’t heavily weigh in on the culture wars.

    And don’t delude yourselves. In a day when the OFFICIAL Army after-action report on the Ft. Hood massacre COULD NOT BRING ITS PC SELF to mention EITHER the word “Muslim” OR “Islam” the days of an “apolitical” officer corps content to busy itself with the daily nuts & bolts of maintaining a Navy are LOOOONG GONE..Your budgets and the kind of ships future budgets will support will be shaped by the very people who wish to whistle past the graveyard whistling the Fox’s “we didn’t want those grapes” tune all the way. Appeasement via “unofficial” unilateral budgetary disarmament is the future unless DRASTIC changes in the political sea-state. Embrace the suck or get in the political trenches and fight for your beliefs! Discussion of anything else is esoteric B.S. The day of the “apolitical” officer is OVER! Except most here don’t want to accept the reality of what is before your very noses. And it’s not as if you have a choice–it’s being forced upon you. Rip your blinders off and talk about MEANINGFUL things–NOT about ships that will never be built because they never make it out of the budget and appropriations committees. “None are so blind as who will not see.”

  • AT1 Charles H. Berlemann Jr

    URR,

    I am only getting a reaquainted with the 1920′s and 1930′s Fleet Problems and the NWC wargames of the interwar period. I know they were looking at the beyond the technology to start asking the questions of where can we go from here, plus what do we need to start building or developing to get there.

    I only ask the questions because I want to see this potentially succed, but also to prevent an issue of “We build this as step 1, Step 2 is kind if fuzzy, Step 3 we win!”. Some of those questions we need to start asking of ourselves about some of our plans. I would also suggest that some of us who are advocates for a system like this, be the devil’s advocate. Draw up some of the complaints and the hold backs. Generate the solutions before the questions are asked and the idea is shot down.

  • Grandpa Bluewater

    URR: Cost effective: Spend a little less, get a lot less…Not cost effective. Spend some more, get a lot more, that lasts longer and wears less. Carpenter’s tools for a carpenter, not DIY light duty stuff.

    Or, if you prefer, if you are hauling frozen gourmet quality pies from the bakery on the east coast to San Francisco, you want a really reliable refer on the front of a really good 53′ trailer on an air suspension, with a computer controlled engine, top grade transmission/transaxle, jake brake, air ride, first class tractor: not…a 6 wheel straight truck you bought at a Chevy dealer at an end of model sale with leaf springs, cheap shocks and a stock automobile engine and transmission, which would be OK as a cross town appliance delivery truck in Milwaukee.

    Quality, durability, utility, ease of operation, economies of scale.

  • Derrick

    What would be the air wing complement of the theoretical CVL? What would be the sortie rate of the theoretical CVL? What would be the cost of a theoretical CVL? That way we could quantify the cost savings vs combat efficiency…For example, if a CVL had half the cost of a CVN but only a 25% smaller sortie rate, wouldn’t a CVL be more cost effective?

    virgil xenophon:
    Just because I cannot see how you concluded that the US government’s diversity policy is affecting the US navy’s budget doesn’t make me a fool. We just agree to disagree. Calling me names won’t convince me to your point; it tends to have the opposite effect.

  • UltimaRatioReg

    Grandpa,

    I understand economies of scale. But I am not at all convinced they are quite as great as you make them to be. Not without a realistic look at sortie generation for a dedicated CV platform such as I discuss here, with a modern STOVL airframe. Maybe it is indeed a very large imbalance, but it certainly bears another look.

    As for “spend a little less”, the difference between $2.5 billion for such a design and $12-14 billion for a Ford-class CVN may be the difference between having something and having nothing. Not to mention a sustained cost in the CVN of around $400 million per year for operation against some significantly smaller number for a CVA as I posit here.

    How much are we using the 53′ reefer truck to deliver appliances across town in Milwaukee?

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