But…the CoComms don’t have any real budget authority. And, frankly, I couldn’t think of any sort of intelligence policy that would need to be done that wasn’t already handled at the National level. I am prepared to be educated.

As for the budgeting, someone has to buy the systems and make sure there is money to fund the collections even if there is no policy to be made.

Your “21st century thinking” largely mirrors 20th century US Army organizational doctrine for staffs, circa the deployment of the AEF (including Col George Marshal)to France for the great war.

The Head of Service as Chief of Staff was imposed by Goldwater-Nichols which codified the agenda of the non-sea services at the the earlier Key West Conference in the Truman Administration.

New, trendy, up to date? Bad reasons for change, absent other considerations. In this case, not really the case, actually.

Why have an N5 at all? Why not ensure adequate Navy expertise is embedded within sanctioned (and increased) JDAL billets at the COCOMs. Let the Geographic commanders assigned responsibility for the application of military power determine the strategy and policy germane to their regions nested under the strategic hierarchy of the national guidance.
The Navy needs an acquisition strategy, yes. A Strategically informed budget, yes. But a whole N-code devoted to Navy centric strategy and policy is a self-serving entity. Joint up, Sailors.

If it cuts the flag numbers by 2/3 and a concurrent reduction in bloated staffs, I’m all for it. Too many fingers in the pie, too many damn kingdoms that need protecting.

Actually…OPNAV is mid 20th century…

Like when John D Long started the dismantlement of the old bureau system, which then led to the establishment of the General Board.

By the way, Title Ten says that OPNAV N85 must be commanded by a USMC 2 star General to see to the requirements of expeditionary warfare. So unless you are looking to pass legislation, that one portion of your reorganization will never be realized.

Mittelschmerz:

The Navy is not “suddenly different”. It is, rather, inescapably and functionally different. Over the years since the Truman administration, the army and its offspring, the AF, have been been getting changes in organization, and customs to match their way of doing things….usually by procrustian edict, and usually to the sea services detriment.

The Navy is best run when functionally organized to match the interaction between the unchanging ocean and the ever changing state of art, and the accidents of geography and its own history. Joint considerations have their place, when absolutely required and non mission detrimental.

Being “up to date” or “modern” is not reason to change anything, per se. Evolutionary change based on the adoption of best practices as validated from the bottom up usually succeed. Top down change to yield to pressures from other organizations with great confidence in their own doctrine and no understanding of ships, sailors, or the sea usually fail, even if defined as successful in the face of repetitive failure in practice by edict of the “top” forcing the change “down”. Look about you, oh ye mighty, and despair.

Is it faster, more reliable, lower cost, more efficient, more effective (not always the same, those last two), has it been tested on small scale and shown promise, did it come from the practictioners, does it make sense? When yes, make a change.

For my money OPNAV is labyrinthine, byzantine, internally conflicted and trapped in the coils of Gresham’s Law (The bad drives out the good.) and Pournelle’s Iron Law (Bureaucracies always fall victim to those who seek to shape the bureaucracy to their personal advantage, suppressing those who try to carry out the tasks for which they exist for the reasons the tasks are important, e.g. the mission).

Think I’m wrong? Treat it as a black box and examine the goezins and the comezouts. Ever more money, higher ranking officers, and processing time go in. Better fiscal control, ship design, aircraft design, personnel able to excel at the next step up when chosen for promotion, streamlined paperwork,
and competitive performance vis a vis keeping what the navy holds and adapting to new opportunities and threats, and the simple ability to admit a mistake and backtrack until back on on intended track and even with PIM HASN’T rpt HASN”T come out in decades.

Always for reasons of being thoroughly modern Millies, oh, so up to date. Just can’t get the useful and necessary stuff defined and enforced. Not the bee’s knees, that little fact.

Do it because it will work better, and evaluate it honestly and then set it in stone, but only if it really works.

What number code to give it? How about just call things by their right name. If it confused the AF and the Army, serendipity should be embraced.

Step 1? Abolish the uniform board and the last five years output of the same. Uniforms that camouflage sailors when they abandon ship so SAR can’t find them, grump, mutter, grumble, snort.

But I digress. Over to all for practical examples.