Tags: Europe, Libya, Midrats, NATO
As with most conflicts – and especially this one – the reason for engaging in conflict can change as the facts change. The reality is that this conflict was never clearly defined from the get-go. As a result, everyone should be patient as decisive points, goals, objectives, end states fade in and out, appear/disappear, and change with the tides.
Once the decision is made to commit your nation and its allies to war – all that is important is victory. There is no substitute for victory, as anything but victory brings the dangerous attractiveness of weakness, and undesired second and third-order effects that must be avoided.
As this conflict is presently structured today – with non-USA aircraft doing much of the kinetic action – the next 90-days will hopefully be enough for USA to thoroughly consider, under the planning assumption that Gaddafi is not killed, COA-1 (Re-Americanize) and COA-2 (Fade). By the end of SEP, we will reach a decision point.
Why will we reach a decision point?
Norway will scale down its fighter jet contribution in Libya from six to four planes and withdraw completely from the NATO-led operation by Aug. 1, the government said Friday.
Defense Minister Grete Faremo said she expects understanding from NATO allies because Norway has a small air force and cannot “maintain a large fighter jet contribution during a long time.”
Once that momentum starts – others will follow. Two things will drive this; materiel & will.
There are navies that are designed to fight wars, to fight in short bits and/or as part of¬†coalitions, and there are those that are designed to show the flag. The French do not have an issue of national will in this conflict. No, even though their navy is on the strong side of the middle type of navy, they do have a problem – mat√©riel.
… France (is) indicating it will need in the autumn to withdraw the Libyan mission’s only aircraft carrier, the Charles de Gaulle, on virtually continuous operations since last year — with no replacement in the offing.
“The elephant in the room is the imminent departure of the French carrier, given it has been flying 30-40 percent of all NATO strike sorties,” said Tim Ripley, of Jane’s Defense Weekly.
“It’s a looming problem, so sustaining this operation, particularly if it’s going to grind past September or October, is going to be a problem.”
In the absence of other allies coming forward with strike aircraft that could be flown from land bases — which would necessitate a fleet of refueling tankers only the United States could provide…
We’ve reviewed the European CV/CVN challenge before and the inefficiency of land-based air for this operation – the problem is clear. Given President Obama’s statements of late – one should not expect a USN CVN to take its place. Truth in this business can change, and in spite of the President’s position and that of some in Congress today – we need to keep the option open to, as we have had to do in Afghanistan, re-Americanize the Libyan operation. A CVN or two can fix this very fast if the President wants it to.
So, we find ourselves here hoping for a hope that Gadaffi’s luck will run out. No one ever let me put “Luck” in my OPLANs … but perhaps things have changed.
This fall, if the Congress and/or the President won’t allow USA to do more of the kinetics to replace retreating and worn out Europeans as per COA-1, – then COA-2 it will be. COA-2 will lead to nothing but ugly – but we knew this going in. If things didn’t end quickly, the Europeans would get weak in the knees. More and more understood this as the weeks turned in to months. Almost everyone by now must see it. Baring just plain dumb luck or sudden resolve by Europe – COA-2 leads to defeat. Defeat is not an option.
If Gadaffi lives to see the weather turn cooler and NATO continues to limp and stumble as weak horses do, then we should execute COA-1. Support the President and Congress to end this, and end it right. Finish what we started (yes, we – without the USA, Europe could not and would not have started this). Finish it and then hand post-conflict over to the Europeans – all of it as this is in their interest, not ours. They wanted this done – give it to them and then pivot.
When will we know we reach that decision point, and what do we do after that?
Britain’s top naval officer, Adm. Mark Stanhope, warned Monday that his nation ‚ÄĒ its military hobbled by severe budget cuts and the continuing cost of the Afghan war ‚ÄĒ would face hard decisions if the Libya mission is not resolved by September.
“If we do it longer than six months, we will have to reprioritize forces,” he said, indicating the current commitments cannot be maintained indefinitely.
Britain’s chief of defense staff, Gen. David Richards, insisted Tuesday that Britain can continue operations in Libya as long as it needs to. But another senior NATO official echoed Stanhope’s comments, saying that if the alliance’s intervention in Libya continues, the issue of resources will become “critical.”
Gen. Stephane Abrial, the senior NATO commander, told reporters at a NATO conference in Serbia that “at this stage, the forces engaged do have the means necessary to conduct the operation.”
But he noted that “if the operation were to last long, of course, the resource issue will become critical.”
“If additional resources are needed, this, of course, will need a political decision,” he said.
That political decision will be in Washington, DC. The worlds largest debtor nation will have all the empty pockets looking at her – and then we should take a deep breath, borrow the money from the Chinese, finish it, and then walk away.
What will follow? Odds are – not Jeffersonian Democracy or even Kemalism. No, review the foreign fighter figures from Iraq. Odds are we won’t like it – but we fathered it and will have to accept it for what it is.
Given all the above, there are many things to learn. Lets talk about what I mean about pivot.
For even the most die-hard Atlanticist, some things are becoming unavoidably clear. George Will sums it up.
Since Sept. 11, 2001, U.S. military spending has more than doubled, but that of NATO‚Äôs 27 other members has declined 15 percent. U.S. military spending is three times larger than the combined spending of those other members. Hence Gates warned that ‚Äúthere will be dwindling appetite and patience in‚ÄĚ America for expending ‚Äúincreasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense.‚ÄĚ Already, U.S. officers in Afghanistan sometimes refer to the NATO command there ‚ÄĒ officially, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) ‚ÄĒ as ‚ÄúI Saw Americans Fighting.‚ÄĚ
After a recent NATO attack on a tented encampment where Gaddafi has met foreign leaders, the New York Times reported: ‚ÄúThe desert strike appeared to show the alliance‚Äôs readiness to kill Col. Gaddafi. A NATO statement described the target as a ‚Äėcommand and control facility.‚Äô But apart from small groups of soldiers lurking under trees nearby with pickups carrying mounted machine guns, reporters taken to the scene saw nothing to suggest that the camp was a conventional military target.‚ÄĚ
In March, Obama said that U.S. intervention would be confined to implementing a no-fly zone: ‚ÄúBroadening our military mission to include regime change would be a mistake.‚ÄĚ By May, Obama‚Äôs Bushian mission was to make Libyans ‚Äúfinally free of 40 years of tyranny.‚ÄĚ After more than 10,000 sorties, now including those by attack helicopters, NATO‚Äôs increasingly desperate strategy boils down to: Kill Gaddafi.
Then what? More incompetent improvisation, for many more months.
Disgust with this debacle has been darkly described as a recrudescence of ‚Äúisolationism,‚ÄĚ as though people opposing this absurdly disproportionate and patently illegal war are akin to those who, after 1938, opposed resisting Germany and Japan. Such slovenly thinking is a byproduct of shabby behavior.
‚ÄúBecause we had had our troops there, the Europeans had not done their share,‚ÄĚ President Eisenhower said. ‚ÄúThey won‚Äôt make the sacrifices to provide the soldiers for their own defense.‚ÄĚ
As if on cue;
Iveta Radicova, Slovakia‚Äôs prime minister, says bluntly that defence is ‚Äúnot a priority‚ÄĚ. She wants to improve her country‚Äôs competitiveness and reduce unemployment.
The results? Behold Libya. Behold the caveat laden forces of ISAF and the piracy forces of the Horn of Africa. Do all but two or three in NATO lack the key to anything – will?
SECDEF’s speech in Oslo linked to above needs to be listened to more and more. Then we need to execute some tough love for Europe. Enough Americans have died for Europe – enough American treasure spent to subsidize their sloth. Friends always lean in to protect friends from outside threats – but they cannot protect their friends when their friends won’t even make the effort to defend themselves – or for that matter have no inclination to.
This is not isolationism as some think. No, this is a mature strategic concept for the 21st Century. The Cold War and the Soviet Union are far behind us. Sailors joining the Navy today and the MIDN who will show up at Annapolis this fall were almost all born after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. As decades of inertia rattle to a halt, let us shake hands with our friends and go home. They are strong enough to stand on their own feet if they want to. If they don’t want to, then let history take its course. If they see a threat and make an effort to defend themselves – then we should train and equip our armed forces to be able to help. USA based with global reach – but only for those who will first help themselves.
We need to pivot from the past in Europe. You can’t force someone to take their own defense seriously – but you can create the conditions for them to reassess their sloth. I think it is time.
- A Defense of the Millennial Officer from an Old Guy
- Does Generation X Still Fit?
- Live on Midrats 17 August 2014: Episode 241: Personnel Policy and Leadership, with VADM Bill Moran, Chief of Naval Personnel
- The Virtue of Being a Generalist, Part 1: A Day in the Life of Sub Lieutenant Snodgrass
- Sea Control 47 – British and American Surface Warfare Officers