We have, many of us, the image in our heads of Somali pirates as poor, ragged, skinny teenagers with AK-47s and RPGs, crowded into leaky skiffs, somewhat ineffectually attempting the hijacking of merchant ships which pass close enough to the shore to be accessible. The smarter money has known for some time that this is hardly the case. Those “pirates” in the boats represent the very expendable low-cost labor end of an increasingly sophisticated and technologically capable system that has seen its profits soar in recent years, despite international efforts to clamp down on piracy off Africa’s horn. Which brings me to this very interesting article from Neil Ungerleider over at FastCompany.

It seems some of those massive ransoms collected by the pirates off Somalia in recent years is being reinvested in new technology, heavier and more capable weapons, and people with technical and language skill sets that have enhanced the effectiveness of pirate operations substantially. From the article:

In addition to random attacks on cargo and passenger ships, Somali pirates are increasingly relying on the use of GPS systems, satellite phones, and open-source intelligence such as shipping industry blogs in order to figure out the location of ships.

However, the most interesting weapon in the Somalian arsenal to western observers is the use of pirate-operated radar to locate targets at sea. Pirate “mother ships” with radar and advanced weapons capabilities have strayed far beyond the Horn of Africa to locales as far-flung as Madagascar, India, and the Persian Gulf.

Indeed, even with radar from pirate “mother ships”, it is a big ocean, but considerably smaller when you know where to look. Not surprisingly, penetration of shipping company and port operations data bases has been possible with money to pay those who have the capabilities, as well as:

…translators who interpret the bulk of information that filters in through the automatic tracking devices. These men, though not involved in the actual hijacking, decipher and break down information for the team. The ‘foot soldiers’ are given instructions that most often turn out to be successful. The men who call themselves Somali Coast Guards also invest time on the World Wide Web tracking and gathering vital information. For example, the pirate financiers visit the Maritime Bureau Website to check what strategies have been put in place to curtail their activities. They, in turn, feed the gang.

The article’s final paragraph should serve as warning to those whose philosophy is to ignore or pay off the pirates.

According to the European Union, a sharp uprise in Somali pirate attacks is expected in 2011, including the use of machine guns as an everyday weapon. Western governments are, in turn, stepping up their game–Britain is taking steps to provide merchant ships with weapons, which would be the first time since World War II that this has happened.

Such an appraisal, coinciding with US drone strikes in Somalia against Al Shabab targets, is cause for concern. The statement from the New York Times article that “American intelligence and military officials warn of increasing operational ties between the Shabab and the Qaeda franchise in Yemen, known as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or A.Q.A.P.” should stand as a warning that those who are gleaning profits from the pirates are more than just Somali warlords.

At last autumn’s USNI Piracy Conference, a number of speakers showed great hesitation in acknowledging any link whatever between Somali pirates, Al-Shabab, and Al Qaeda. However, to many of us in the audience who had watched our enemies for some time, and had in some cases fought actively against them either in uniform or as a part of our national security apparatus, the linking of these entities was a foregone conclusion. If the enterprise of piracy in Somali waters (and now well beyond) were profitable enough to be a major funding source for AQAP (or AQ in Yemen), they would involve themselves whether they were welcome and supported by the Somali pirates or not.

In his remarks at the USNI Piracy Conference, Keynote Speaker Stephen Carmel of MAERSK made a number of assertions to reinforce his notion that the Somali piracy problem was not significant enough to warrant anything but business as usual, which meant paying for ransomed ships and trying to avoid areas of known pirate activity. Some of those assertions have been proven tragically wrong in recent months, including this one:

The Somali pirates are a pure hostage for ransom crowd. That means… that the hostages always get released and generally are not horribly mistreated… I am not making light of the experience of those held hostage by Somali pirates – I am simply noting that the treatment of hostages at the hands of Barbary pirates was infinitely worse.

Which certainly calls into question Mr. Carmel’s entire argument.

So, Somali pirates are not a direct threat to US national interests, nor a significant threat to the international system of commerce. Somali pirates are also far less well funded, and far less capable of evolving into a large threat…

From a strict standpoint of the balance sheet, Mr. Carmel’s arguments may remain valid for some time, though for how long is unclear, and whether it is wise to wait for the tipping point is also a valid question. However, when improvements in capabilities that can exponentially increase piracy’s reach and impact are brought into play, especially when that reach means a greater potential as a funding source for our enemies, then the problem of Somali piracy has long since ceased to be one of the balance sheet. Advocacy of Dane-Geld as a means of minimizing such threats has little track record of success, and plenty of examples of a disastrous contrary result. With an adaptive and opportunistic enemy whose benefit from Somali piracy is becoming increasingly more direct, it is well past time to make serious our efforts to combat piracy in those waters.

Once again, that master of describing the human condition provides us a warning passed down through the millenia:

We never pay anyone Dane-Geld,

No matter how trifling the cost,

For the end of that game is oppression and shame,

And the nation that pays it is lost.




Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Air Force, Army, Books, Coast Guard, Foreign Policy, Hard Power, History, Homeland Security, Marine Corps, Maritime Security, Navy, Piracy, Uncategorized


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  • Mike M.

    I am reminded of Lenin’s claim that when it came time to hang the last capitalist, that capitalist would sell his executioners the rope.

    There is more to life than a dollar bill.

  • Distiller

    On what course are more incidents? Out of Suez, or into Suez?

    And how have the insurers’ profits developed since the whole piracy thing re-emerged?

  • http://cdrsalamander.blogspot.com CDR Salamander

    History tells us that paying off pirates is at best a temporary measure – one that only encourages and grows piracy – and one that is done only by those who are too weak – militarily or morally – to confront the pirates in their own time.

    Piracy is not a problem industry needs to solve. From their shareholders’ paying may be the best plan. I don’t fault them for that decision.

    No, piracy is a political problem.

    Those politicians, nations, and international security organizations who are content with the status quo are, like most weak men when confronted with evil, willing to let history find better men to take care of the problem.

  • Matt Yankee

    Stop paying the Dane pirates weak men!

  • Diogenes of NJ

    “We prefer war in all cases to tribute under any form and to any people whatever” – T. Jefferson

    http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/jefferson_papers/mtjprece.html

    – Kyon

  • Grandpa Bluewater

    Pirates not dealt with decisively and forcefully as the common enemies of all mankind are pirates enabled and emboldened.

    Some things never change.

  • Marshall Magruder

    With some 30 or so warships on anti-piracy “area” patrols in the Red Sea, Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, then adequate resources should be able to provide a 2-3 warship anti-piracy screens for convoys from rendezvous at Suez, Cape Horn, Singapore, and the Gulf to protect all commercial shipping going between these four areas.

    Convoys were successful during the Iraq-Iran War, and most wars before, however, they are always seem to be implemented late, such as during WWI and WWII. An enemy wants the targets of a convoy and if no other targets exist, then, with adequate protection, convoys will succeed in their mission. Fatal consequences must always be the result to any pirate attacking a convoy.

    If commercial ships don’t want to follow a published anti-pirate convoy schedule, then they so be it but their insurance rates will increase dramatically while those in a convoy will decrease. Pressure on the insurance agencies can ensure the financial costs become unbearable outside of convoy protection. This may change the attitudes towards an “old fashion” way to protect ships at sea. Since the warships will be with convoys, any ships sailing without protection are at their own risk.

    When pirates have not prey, they will go home and go broke, too, as there will be no ransoms paid.

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