Tags: Cross Domain, Integrated Warfighting Capability, LCDR Snodgrass, naval aviation, Tailhook, VADM Dunaway
This month’s Proceedings article titled “Naval Aviation’s Transition Starts With Why” by LCDR Guy Snodgrass is a fantastic article laying out the upcoming “tech refresh,â€ť so to speak, of naval aviation assets that will soon be fielded, specifically noting a unique philosophical change: the shift from fielding purpose built Cold-War era assets to procuring modular payload-based assets that allow for multi-mission capability, and the flexibility to adapt to new missions. One aspect of his article is particularly noteworthy because it hints of something bigger: the Navy will deliver effects within and across domains. This is important. With aviation principally shifting from purpose-built to multi-mission payload-centric assets, the Navy can explore new and unique ways to deliver effects that otherwise would have been very expensive to implement.
LCDR Snodgrassâ€™ article specifically articulates why Navyâ€™s mindset has changed, and it suggests that the old mindset of designing platforms will become irrelevant prior to using up the useful life of an asset. This shift resulted in the procurement of assets that can remain relevant throughout their entire lifecycle without major redesigns via a Payload-Centric architecture. This means that with limited redesign of systems, assets can be repurposed. This has led to multi-mission platforms that can adapt to emerging missions.
What does this mean to naval aviation? Tailoring or refinement of current mission effectiveness is now obvious, but what other unique missions can naval aviation tackle that it currently not doing? The Navy has created the ability to develop an “app based solution” payload, or even CONOPS that can cross multiple domains if it makes sense. I.e., because aviation assets are so adaptable, in theory, the Navy can create new unique solutions to fill mission gaps with enabling payloads in the Surface, Sub-Surface, and Cyber Domains that otherwise would require purpose-built solutions. More bluntly, big Navy may have the foundational assets to conduct fires and deliver effects downrange on hand today…they just haven’t realized it yet.
LCDR Snodgrass succinctly put it “With the advent of multi-mission and networked aircraft, more nuanced employment options become available that can be appropriately tailored to meet the needs of the mission.” This is a profound statement. Noting that, “[s]quadron personnel must reorient themselves to emphasize missions over their platform,” and that they must, “blur the lines between communitiesâ€ť Snodgrass sends a clear message that we have only begun to realize the potential of the unique mission sets we can now do.
In last monthâ€™s Proceedings, VADM David Dunaway published an article titled “Creating Integrated Warfighting Capabilities” which discussed the concept that, “in the face of decreasing budgets, rapidly evolving threats, and a shift in national defense strategy that demands more than ever from our naval forces, itâ€™s imperative that every dollar spent increases warfighting capability.” VADM Dunaway suggests the Navy must realign interaction of people, equipment, and training to deliver the required effects downrange in an Integrated Warfighting Capability (IWC) and this will require a culture shift to developing solutions.
So how do we create a culture shift? Culture shift is hard and fought with resistance. People donâ€™t want to change what they have because it works well. But at the same time, the Navy knows it must have a true integrated warfighting approach that considers the bottom-up effects needed across the kill-chain, unencumbered by domain. Naval aviation is primed to lead this culture shift upon fielding of multi-mission payload-oriented airframes simply by virtue of being able to adaptable and flexible.
By fundamentally being oriented to adapt, where could naval aviation assets help the most? LCDR Snodgrass highlights the ISR. Providing more battlespace awareness will be inherently present; the entire carrier airwing will gain more situational awareness by just receiving the organic intelligence from forward platforms. This will make the CSG able to defend itself earlier in the kill chain and present the commander more options.
Where else can this mindset take us? Teasing this concept out a little – what if naval aviation assets created a network in the air that represented a â€ścloud in the cloudsâ€ť that can be used for fire control? What could the CSG see and do something about when realizing the full potential (range) of assets with the given improvement in targeting range?
A manual already â€świthin the lifelinesâ€ť of TACAIR exists today â€“ cooperative targeting. The Navy is advancing this theme via an activity called Naval Integrated Fire Control â€“ Counter Air (NIFC-CA) and it was demonstrated last year at White Sands Missile Range. The Army and Navy executed a joint live-fire test to demonstrate extend over-land and over-water engagement ranges. Also, last month the Navy successfully employed an SM-6 shot over the horizon utilizing Cooperative Engagement Capability to interpret data from remote sensors proving a Ticonderoga class ship could engage an air target it was not tracking with its own fire control systems.
Fully implementing this capability will provide the Navy the first steps in shifting culture to be able to conduct integrated fires utilizing assets external the ship. This will have a two-fold effect: runs at the board at integrated fires thereby getting Navy personnel more comfortable with the concept and opening up opportunities for lessons learned. Once the capability is proven and established, the Navy should invest into automation of the passing (or publishing) of fire control data to assets with the ability to reach out and touch the enemy. This capability should be totally transparent to operators providing the data within the CSG and cross domain assets, as well as, to the shooters. These steps further cement the shift in culture of the Navy to accept â€śoutside the lifelineâ€ť data to conduct missions.
If it is almost possible to deliver effects cross domain via naval aviation assets to conduct coordinated fires, what other capabilities and effects could implemented by this emerging architecture? What unique capabilities that are really hard or expensive to conduct today can the Navy now augment with the IWC mindset? Your imagination can really run wild with this and should. The Navy is facing an austere fiscal environment while being challenged to take on the same fight. The clichĂ© in the Pentagon these days is â€śinnovative thinking will be required.â€ť Specifically this innovative thinking will need to leverage emerging assets and enforce necessary cultural shifts in operation. The opportunistic â€śtech refreshâ€ť of naval aviation assets will be the catalyst in a culture shift that will enable the Navy to realize full potential of its already fielded assets, and remain the strongest force on the seas in the fiscally austere environment.
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