ASB

Read the original article to which this post is a response

Colonel Robert Boyles’ article, “Air-Sea Battle Disclaimers And ‘Kill Chains,’” is thoughtfully crafted and facilitates exactly the type of Air-Sea Battle Concept discussion that should be occurring in PROCEEDINGS. The Air-Sea Battle Office welcomes this kind of assessment as it improves our end product.

Colonel Boyles’ article was good food for thought in the Air-Sea Battle forum, and as Director of the Air-Sea Battle Senior Steering Group, I directed our team to take aboard his comments, concerns and recommendations (The chair of the Senior Steering Group rotates among the Services. The next chair is BGen George W. Smith, Jr., USMC starting 1 February 2014). We evaluated Colonel Boyles’ recommendations, and I might add that his article was extremely timely as this week the Air-Sea Battle Office is hosting a working group in Washington of subject matter experts from all Service Echelon II commands to develop our Implementation Master Plan for Fiscal Years 2015-2017.

In our analysis of Colonel Boyles’ commentary, we find several points worthy of deeper analysis. He is absolutely correct that Air-Sea Battle uses the analysis of effects chains to determine the needed characteristics of the desired future joint force. He opines that kill chains are ASB’s “approach to war” and an attempt to “create strategic context” by defining “war on its own technical or tactical-level terms.” We agree to disagree on this. The truth is that most military weapons systems are developed to contribute to or accomplish an effects chain or break a known adversary’s effects chain. Understanding how a potential adversary will use his weapons systems and developing capabilities that can defeat or negate these weapons is a worthy pursuit and capability development often uses effects chain analysis to establish requirements and acquisition needs. It would be incorrect to conclude that because ASB uses effects chain analysis, that ASB is only about effects chains and ignores other aspects of warfighting, force development, and operational art. Effects chains are the “coin of the realm” in building the right force design and buying the right fleet architecture (platforms and payloads) for the future joint force. Effects chains tie programs to operational effects and are understood by senior leaders, acquisition professionals, budgeteers, and appropriators in Congress.

The author goes on to list historical strategic failures which he believes were caused by flawed operational concepts – concepts which failed (in his analysis) because they did not consider all operational variables (emphasis added). He provides many historical examples for examination. Let’s begin with Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon. In each of these cases, freedom of action was not the problem – the U.S. or Israel already had access, or the fight to gain access was over quickly. ASB’s conceptual design would not apply to a great degree in these cases. With air and maritime superiority in hand, the flaws in these operations came in the application and expectations of the power projection or follow-on operations – not in the operations required to gain and maintain freedom of action. This is why the concept is not just “about China.” As weapons systems proliferate it is important to keep the concept in context. ASB is not about any one particular challenger; rather, it addresses any adversary bold enough to field an anti-access/area denial strategy that might restrict our Joint Force access in the Global Commons. ASB is not limited to a particular anti-access/area denial challenge nor does it attempt to describe or conceptualize what follow-on operations will be. As a limited concept, ASB tries to set the conditions for follow-on operations – whatever is needed and appropriate. It should be noted that the problem ASB is trying to resolve is not a small one. The assertion that the “little c” concept of ASB is overshadowing more important ideas simply ignores the problem of access and freedom of action, now and in the future, and assumes the joint force will always be able to achieve freedom of action without purposeful force development activities and the development of specific capabilities. Operational access and freedom of maneuver under an adversary’s A2/AD umbrella is not a trivial problem.

Later in the piece, the author discusses Syria. All the missions laid out as important for an operation in Syria (which looks a lot like the missions required if the U.S. were to invade and occupy) require access and freedom of action. Syria may not be able to sustain a prolonged and robust “A2/AD” resistance to U.S. forces, but that does not mean Syria in 2013 is representative of the security environment in 2025 and beyond. Building a force to fight today’s war amidst a rapidly changing security environment is the quickest path to an obsolete force, optimized for missions no longer the most strategically relevant.

Next, the author critiques the Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Concept in terms of what he calls “unbounded language,” which seems to contradict his assertion that strategic failures occur when concepts do not consider all operations variables. Regardless, his extensive list of references does not include the unclassified version of the Concept published in May 2013. The following quote from the unclassified Concept describes its “bounds” and the work of the ASB Office:

“ASB is a limited objective concept that describes what is necessary for the joint force to sufficiently shape A2/AD environments to enable concurrent or follow-on power projection operations. The ASB Concept seeks to ensure freedom of action in the global commons and is intended to assure allies and deter potential adversaries. ASB is a supporting concept to the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), and provides a detailed view of specific technological and operational aspects of the overall A2/AD challenge in the global commons.”

This language establishes the bounds of ASB in order to establish freedom of action in the global commons that enables follow-on operations. Freedom of action in the global commons is needed for a whole host of possible military operations. In many cases, U.S. forces already have it and it is not likely to be challenged. ASB is focused on those cases where freedom of action is or can be challenged by adversaries with particular capabilities. So, even in this context, ASB is quite bounded by the problem it is trying to address.

Finally, we would also challenge the author’s assertions regarding Title 10 and the Joint Staff. After the closure of Joint Forces Command, DoD defined the Title 10 role of force development as almost exclusively belonging to the Services. DoD invests the Services with the responsibilities to “develop concepts, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and organize, train, equip, and provide…forces.” It also directs the Joint Staff to “provide guidance on joint concept development and experimentation to the Combatant Commands and Services.” In other words, the Joint Staff oversees the Services for force development. The reality is the Joint Staff J7 is an ex-officio member of the Air-Sea Battle Office governing boards and the Air-Sea Battle Implementation Master Plan feeds directly into the Joint Staff’s implementation efforts for Joint Operational Access. In fact, the close alignment between the two concepts on anti-access/area denial and Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) position on the so-called controversial idea of “deep” strike will undoubtedly surprise many readers.

I return to where I started. This week, we assemble the Air-Sea Battle Working Groups at the Washington Navy Yard to work on developing the Implementation Master Plan for Fiscal Years 2015-2017. We laud Colonel Robert Boyles for his analysis and I personally invited him to join us in this important Working Group discussion. Colonel Boyles showed up for the event today and I commended his research, his perspective and his article to everyone in the room. As he did for us, I encouraged all participants in the Working Group to challenge the assumptions. Colonel Boyles concluded the meeting with the quote, “I may be critical of the Concept, but I am a believer in Air Sea Battle!”

That is exactly the kind of approach to doing business that we need. I hope others out there will take advantage of the forum of PROCEEDINGS and the U. S. Naval Institute to influence critical thinking of our warfighters of the future.




Posted by RADM James Foggo in Marine Corps, Navy
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  • Art Corbett

    Impressive. RADM Foggo’s ready acceptance of critical perspective and his leadership by example in beginning and encouraging a dialogue on ASB is as refreshing as it is rare. Great to see a flag officer walk the talk in generating creative and constructive dialogue.

    That said, my sympathies lie with Col Boyles’ concerns, and RADM Foggo’s response still leaves fundamental issues about ASB unanswered. If I may, I’d like to further the dialogue.

    As described in the unclassified version of ASB, the heart of the ASB ‘concept’ is NIA D3– networked, integrated, attack-in-depth to disrupt, destroy and defeat. This acronym represents capabilities and qualities that are routine fundamentals applicable to all joint combined arms operations. Asserting NIA D3 as the core to a supposed ‘operational concept’ is similar to a Soldier who suggests that he has a new concept called ‘Move, Shoot & Communicate’—Better Faster Quicker’ (MSC-BFQ) then he goes to great length to explain that he is not going to just move, now he will maneuver; not just shoot, now he will aim; and now he won’t just talk, he will generate new understanding. If he can say it with a straight face, perhaps he too can get a programing office in the Pentagon. Seriously, when would a JFC not do the fundamentals of NIA D3? An operational concept is shaped to accomplish an operational task or challenge; it isn’t a roster of desirable qualities and capabilities generically applicable to warfighting.

    The first and most fundamental challenge for effectively integrating naval and Air Forces is to figure out the command and control arrangements that will enable operational synergy with current and future force capabilities. Do we really want the JFC to integrate arriving forces forward on the fly in the face of an active enemy? If we don’t want a pick-up team arriving piecemeal, then what is the concept of pre-deployment training between naval and Air Forces that will support deploying an operationally cohesive team capable of coherent joint action in support of the JFC? What are the supported/ supporting relationships? These are tough inter-service issues, but these are the core issues that require real conceptual work. Way before you get around to figuring out what systems to acquire—what is the common C2 to integrate the systems you got? If these sorts of operational challenges were creatively addressed there would be little speculation that ASB is just a lengthy cover page for an extensive acquisition list that gains trump in the JCIDS process because of A2AD induced anxiety promoted by a secret concept with its own PAO office.
    The real reason that ASB is controversial is that it has the clarity of a Delphic oracle. No one can discern the deeply disguised wisdom of NIA-D3, but they know the Emperor wouldn’t wear what isn’t there—so they presume they just can’t see it—or they offer their interpretation of what they think they see. So there are lots of opinions on what it is—but whatever it is, it isn’t an actionable operational concept. Try wargaming NIA D3. Good luck.

    A2AD anxiety is a real malady induced by a brittle joint force. We are brittle because our acquisition process has led us to a dire capability / capacity mismatch with potential adversaries. We have paid too much to get too few platforms and weapons relative to an adversary who has lots of adequate lethal systems and forces. The fundamental challenge to the joint force is to restore resiliency and rebalance and broaden our superior capability with greater capacity. ASB’s failure to comprehend, articulate and address this fundamental operational challenge is its greatest failing. Like the Maginot line, it is all about solving a real problem the wrong way—at great cost in both treasure and opportunity.

    Like ALB, ASB contains the germ of a good operational concept. We need to figure out what it is.

  • Brendan

    RADM Foggo is not N81, he is N3/5B.

  • James Foggo

    Art, Thanks for your comments and long time no see my friend. The development and implementation of the Air-Sea Battle Concept has moved forward quite a ways since you were a member of the Concept Development team. As you know, Air-Sea Battle is an evolution in warfare in response to the increasing sophistication of the A2/AD threat. NIA/D3 may not seem like a visionary operational concept, but the joint force is not as networked and integrated at the tactical level as it should be today. Many concepts sit on shelves. Air-Sea Battle is being implemented in the Fleets, Forces, and brigades – with your help in the Working Groups. As I mentioned in my response to Col Boyles, our Working Groups – comprised of all four Services and manned mainly from Echelon II organizations, are tackling many of the challenges you lay out in your comment. To move the discussion forward, we need to move the discussion to implementation. Air-Sea Battle, like AirLand Battle, will go away when it becomes the way we do business. Thanks for taking the time to comment. Jamie Foggo

  • Phillip Moore

    It’s
    nice to see RADM Foggo driving home the idea that ASB is the future, whether we like it or not. PRC has laid the concept and path for modern A2AD that directly challenges the US operational model and threatens our allies. This path is likely to be copied by other aspiring powers. ASB/JOAC must transition from words to capability, with immediate, intermediate and long term goals. Everything can’t forever remain 5 years off because of lack of money. Mr. Corbett’s assessment is spot on, but THERE ARE REAL IDENTIFIABLE MATERIAL SOLUTIONS REQUIRED. It will take a dedication to the core of ASB/JOAC over all the
    other wants that we have to spend money on, in order to keep our forces relevant and the enemy off balance. The enemy has not been static and will not remain static. Let’s address some of the real hard procurement concerns and agree on priority to assure access to denied
    battlespace. Until we do so, we will continue to suffer with false
    doctrine ideas and failed force integration plans. The problem will
    remain too many cooks in the kitchen, too many congressman with pork
    commitments to satisfy, and too many distracted flag officer’s talent producing questionable product to justify their positions when, as a nation, we must be sharpening our national sword.

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