chostormIn both Part 1 and Part 2 of this series, I compared various naval counterparts – laying the groundwork for discussing what the U.S. Navy’s Surface Warfare Officer community is getting right, and what areas could use improvement. It is easy to complain. Surface Warfare Officers are notorious for it. I am infamous for it, as my peers and superiors alike will attest. Combine our penchant for complaining and our ingrained inferiority complex and it is no wonder that so many SWOs think that everyone else is “doing it better.” This time, though, it is not typical-SWO wanking: they aredoing it better, and we must pull our heads out of the sand and catch up. Royal Navy Warfare Officers, U.S. Naval Aviators and nuclear trained officers are specialists and are unmatched masters of their trade. They must train endlessly and they feverishly adhere to standards written in blood to remain at the top of their respective callings. They are role-models and could teach us a thing or two about being the best. As for Surface Warfare Officers – weare good, and that is the problem.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL launches TLAMs into Iraq

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL launches TLAMs into Iraq

It appears that there is nothing wrong here. As a Surface Warfare Officer myself, I can get onboard with most of the above. There is a seedy underbelly to all of this, though. It thrives on a couple of points: that our greatness has not been tested by an opponent in decades, and that the perspective of greatness is naturally skewed from the top down. If not by desire, doctrine, or intent – then surely through practice – the Surface Warfare Officer community accepts mediocracy.Surface Warfare Officers – and the ships we drive, fight, and lead – guarantee the free flow of commerce across the world. We deliver critical readiness to the Geographic Combatant Commanders and we send a powerful message to both overt and would-be enemies. What we do, works. Our ships deploy and our navy projects unparalleled power around the globe. As an inherently expeditionary force, we ply the world’s oceans, go where we please, and influence international events as a matter of course. We conduct prompt and sustained combat operations like no other nation can. Our ships are leaving port and returning safely, they complete the widest variety of operational tasking of any military community, our personnel are advancing, and finally, as one senior community leader put it to me, “We are pretty damn good… I would take our top 50% Department Heads and put them against the top 10% of PWO (RN, Principle Warfare Officers) or Snipes (engineers) and bet on our people.

Good Enough?

Good Enough?

Tom Skerritt’s Viper stood in front of a room filled with the elite – “the best of the best,” and told them deadpan: “we’ll make you better.” In this fictional portrayal, which is representative of the real-life attitudes found in the previously featured communities, good enough, wasn’t. Surface Warfare Officers are undoubtedly the best in our business. Unfortunately, context matters, as the same can be said when a Major League club steps into a Little League park. We need to be better. We have ill-defined core-competencies, which leads us to becoming Jacks-of-all-Trades. Our habit of recoiling in horror at the thought of specialization causes us to become plug-and-play officers; ultimately figure-heads and placeholders with little value added to a respective sub-unit. Finally, we do not deliver professionals to the Fleet. One Surface Warfare Officer with multiple commands under his belt conceded, “We should be more deliberate. Success and mastery occur by happenstance.” Another community leader said, “We have good tacticians, but that is mostly by personal choice, and a little bit about your ship’s schedule and how interested your Commanding Officer was in tactics.” This series is not about career advancement. It is about a profession. It is about war. It is about winning! Our nation does not deserve victory by happenstance. It deserves an ocean-roiling, awe-inspiring, burned-into-the-history-books slam of Thor’s hammer upon our enemies. I do not think we are there yet.


Defending Freedom and Democracy Around the World

Defending Freedom and Democracy Around the World

Getting there is not simple. It is not as easy as adopting all of the policies and culture of the Royal Navy or Naval Aviators or nukes. Surface Warfare Officers should be the best because we train to be the best, not because we happen to be a part of the American Navy. We should be the best because we retain the best, not simply because our kit is better than everyone else’s. Under some fantastic leaders, the community is getting the right idea. The introduction of the Basic Division Officer Course, the Advanced Division Officer Course, the Surface Navigator’s Course, the Command Qualification Exam, and rigor added to the Department Head Course are all aimed at developing professionals. Weapons Tactics Instructors – previously a rice-bowl of the aviation community – will invigorate tactical awareness and proficiency throughout the Fleet. The SWO Clock concept – another idea poached from Naval Aviators – which gets “beached SWOs” back to the waterfront, shows a tilt towards valuing production in the upwardly-mobile. We are making good efforts to improve our community in an environment that naturally builds anti-bodies to culture change. That said, we are not doing enough; our profession, our competencies, our reputation, and our retention suffer due to this slow trod down the middle-of-the-channel. As is evidenced by both the Naval Aviation and nuclear communities, it really comes down to what a community accepts in, and for, itself. Do we continue to accept mediocracy, or do we stand up and say that “good enough” is not good enough?

One admiral opined, “I think it is good we SWOs have this institutional ‘inferiority complex,’ as it keeps us from getting complacent…like naval aviation did in Vietnam and later years.” I am not nearly the first to question the level of professionalism in our force. In a 2009 Proceedings article, LT Mitch McGuffie discussed his shock at how much more professional Royal Navy Warfare Officers were than SWOs. This topic and topics like it pop up on Sailor Bob – the definitive forum for SWO discussion – all the time. We do have a questioning attitude and that does make us better. While I readily acknowledge that we are the best Surface Warriors on the block, I am not satisfied with a 10:1 or 50:1 advantage. Like Viper and his pals, and real-life naval professionals who recognize that “there are no points for second place,” I am not satisfied with us being the best – I want us to be the best of the best.

To lose the edge, one must have had it in the first place.

To lose the edge, one must have had it in the first place.

To be the best of the best, we must deliver professionals to the Fleet at all levels. To measure one’s professionalism, we must establish community-recognized core competencies. We must define what it means to be a SWO and prove that our pin is worth more than the money we pay for it. For the sake of brevity, I propose that our core competency be ship-driving. Imagine, if you will, a room full of mid-grade Hornet pilots: 20% of them openly admit to each other that they have no clue how to fly Hornets, and another 30% who are less open about their weakness demonstrate their ineptitude in the simulator. The remaining 50% range from barely capable to superstars. While quality spreads are a reality in any group, this scenario is un-imaginable. Naval Aviators with more than 8 years of service that do not know how to fly? Rubbish! This is a reality for Surface Warfare Officers, though. Lieutenants that do not know how to drive ships are commonplace. They exist because they were never trained, nor tested, much less held to a standard, in the first place. They were never trained, tested, or held to a standard because ship-driving – again, if not due to desire, doctrine, or intent, then through practice – is not recognized as a core-competency of the U.S. Navy’s ship drivers. As is demonstrated in the excellent film, Speed and Angels, Naval Aviators consider carrier operations to be a core-competency – if a student pilot cannot land on the boat, then he will not become a Naval Aviator. Why can’t Surface Warfare Officers take the same approach to our profession?



We need a flight school for Surface Warfare Officers. The name is not important at this point – rather, the purpose ought to be the focus: building ship drivers. We must stop accepting mediocracy in this venue! While the Basic Division Officer course is a fantastic concept meant to bolster our young ensigns, it lacks focus and does not zero in on core-competencies. The lessons taught in the Basic Division Officer course are important – being an effective small-unit leader is vital, and I do not propose that we scrap the current construct. Rather, I propose – nay, I implore – that we first recognize ship-driving as a core-competency, and second, require our officers to be competent ship drivers.


BDOC should not give us a warm and fuzzy.

BDOC should not give us a warm and fuzzy.

SEALs do not accept sub-par. Neither do Naval Aviators, nor nuclear-trained officers, or Marines. While I applaud our most recent Commander, Naval Surface Forces for his outstanding efforts to instill meaningful training, we are still accepting sub-par, and are using the re-creation of half-way schooling as a security blanket. Under our current system, young SWO candidates are flooded onto ships in an effort to make future retention goals – an indictment of our culture’s impact on retention. They then fiercely compete for time on the bridge to gain experience – and hopefully competency – as ship drivers. On most ships, this is not a recipe for success. The Professional Qualification Standard books, which drive progression, are signed with unpredictable integrity, imparting sometimes-dubious knowledge on young minds. To cap it off, Officer of the Deck and Surface Warfare Officer qualifications, granted by Commanding Officers, are determined using two-hundred some different standards. Some candidates sit for gut-wrenching, rigorous tests of their skills and knowledge, and others chat with their Commanding Officers at local watering holes after a command event. The evidence of the disparity in knowledge is on display in Newport, Rhode Island – home of Surface Warfare Officers School – where junior officers return for the Advanced Division Officer Course, and later, the Department Head Course. Some officers were obviously put to the test during their professional development, and others were obviously not.

I propose that we start a Deck Watch Officer School – our flight school - in Newport, which all ensigns will attend, and must pass, prior to reporting to BDOC and ultimately, the Fleet. As with aviators, this school would not be a second thought or a 60% solution, but rather would be a proving ground for our nation’s future ship drivers. The length of this notional school can be figured out later; what is important is that SWO candidates shall qualify;ashore. We must have one standard, one organization responsible for enforcing that standard, and must require those desiring entrance into our community to meet it – otherwise, seek life elsewhere. We should not be ashamed of upholding a standard and of telling some people that they are not cut out for this business. At this school, candidates would receive in-depth, hands-on instruction in seamanship and navigation, basic-through-advanced ship handling, meteorology, bridge resource management, and a variety of other skills required for the competent mariner.

YP’s are not giving us a big enough bang for our buck. They should be used to train young SWO’s, not uncommitted midshipmen.

YP’s are not giving us a big enough bang for our buck. They should be used to train young SWO’s, not uncommitted midshipmen.

Integral to this process would be the move of the Yard Patrol Craft fleet – the U.S. Navy’s only training ships – from Annapolis to Newport for the exclusive use of the Surface Warfare Officers School. During the pipeline, ensigns would log hours and prove their skills in simulators and on the water. They would complete classwork, learn from case studies, and would be continually tested, remediated, and attrited, as required. If they successfully made it to the end of this program, they would sit for a SWOS-run and community-sanctioned Officer-of-the-Deck board, ensuring that all ensigns are held to the same standard. Earning one’s OOD letter – like the pilots and their wings – would be a culminating event, and those unable to meet the mark would not be sent to the Basic Division Officer Course or the Fleet. If we could implement this plan, we would then send Captains competent, qualified ship drivers, immediately useful to their commands. Like in the Royal Navy, newly reported officers would then complete their platform endorsement, signifying both their grasp of their new ship and the trust their Commanding Officers have in them.

To be the best of the best, we must be good at our jobs. If Surface Warfare Officers are going to continue to be both professional watch standers, and small unit leaders, we must stop accepting the notion that plug-and-play is an effective way of doing business. Imagine a Naval Aviator spending his junior officer tours flying F/A-18’s, his department head tour in a P-8 squadron, and finally, growing up to command an MH-60 squadron. This progression would never happen in the aviation community because they are not plug-and-play pilots. Yet, a Surface Warfare Officer may indeed spend a tour in Weapons Department, followed by Operations Department, followed by Engineering Department, followed by eventual command. The issue as I see it is that the community views this as a positive – exposing officers to a variety of shipboard functions – but in reality, it ensures that we never become truly good at our jobs. We become personnel and administrative gurus, irrespective of our assigned department, perched to jump into a different role at a moment’s notice.

An Engineer Officer oversees his kingdom.

An Engineer Officer oversees his kingdom.

Instead of our current system, I propose that U.S. Navy Surface Warfare Officers matriculate into the community with a billet specialty: engineering, operations, or combat systems. Anathema! Rather than wandering from department to department as figure-heads, I want us to have a vested interest, and subject matter expertise, in the Sailors we lead and the systems we are responsible for. An Infantry Officer leads infantry units. Armor Officers lead armor units. F/A-18 pilots fly Hornets. Today, a Surface Warfare Officer can become a Weapons Officer, and in theory, an Engineer Officer, without prior experience in those respective departments. Imagine, though, the benefits of the following: a new officer enters the community as a Surface Warfare Officer-Engineering, graduates the OOD School and BDOC, completes basic engineer training, serves two division officer tours in Engineering Department, completes shore duty, graduates Department Head School, and returns to the Fleet as an Engineer Officer. This officer has received specialized training along the way and has walked the walk and talked the talk at sea prior to stepping foot into what is acknowledged as the most challenging tour of a SWO’s career. They are no longer a figure-head, but rather: they are an engineer. Or a Combat Systems Officer. Or an Operations Officer. Their title means something. They are good at their job. To ensure preparation for command and to keep some semblance of well-roundedness, Surface Warfare Officers of all flavors would continue to earn the qualifications and stand the watches that the community currently holds dear: on the bridge, in the Combat-Information-Center, and in the engineering plant. Finally, the XO/CO fleet-up model would ensure that specialists are appropriately rounded-out before taking command.



I want Surface Warfare Officers to push ourselves “right to the edge of the envelope.” I want us to be proud of our community. I want our Surface Warfare Officer pin to mean something – to the military, to the service, and most important of all, to us. I want us to be professional watch standers and experts in our respective jobs. The Surface Warfare Officer community is known for being the dumping ground of Unrestricted Line Officers who could not hack it, and this happens because we do not establish, much less uphold, standards. No more! We should honor our heritage, establish a role in our force that is both respected and admired, and strictly and unabashedly police ourselves as consummate professionals who accept nothing less than the best of the best.

Posted by Jon Paris in Navy, Training & Education

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  • Daniel is Daniel

    I can jive with this. I remember on my first tour back in 2011 we had Aussie crossdecks aboard and we were doing DIVTACS with their ships while they watched on the bridge. I had the deck and our SUPPO (MCM so this was normal) had the Conn. We came up to the turn and started around, everything going perfectly and running smoothly when one of the Aussies walked up to me and the XO and asked, “It looks great, did you use the rule of sixes?” I stared back like she’d hit me with a wet fish, “The rule of huh?” She then spent five minutes explaining to the XO (and passively to me as I was still doing DIVTACS) a detailed account of a concept so foreign to me that I only remember the name. She then turned to me again and asked “If you don’t use the rule of sixes how did the Conn know when to make the turn,” and I just had to reply, rather abashedly, that “We don’t have a set system, we’ve just driven a lot so Suppo and I know when to swing rudders by, well, the seat of our pants.” Now it looked like I slapped her with a wet fish. And it’s true, the only reason we could keep pace with the much more professional Aussies was because being on a small MCM for two years, and being in perpetual three section bridge watch rotations I’d built a watch team that was competent, and I’d learned how to drive, THROUGH TRIAL AND ERROR. I’d been lucky, in other words, in the early days of my bridge watchstanding, and I’d had a good teacher at the start that had put me on the path to success, albeit via the shiphandling equivalent of divining rods and folktales. It was then that it struck me that, the year before at SWOS, my MCM counterparts and I had blown most of our CRUDES and AMPHIB peers away simply because we drove more than they every even had a chance too. Needless to say, after the crossdecks departed in the next port I felt just a little less than knowledgeable about my trade. (Full disclosure, that MCM was the Ex-GUARDIAN, run aground six months after I left by JOs that had proven “mediocre” in the sims.)

  • BudgetGeek

    For years, I have been wondering why the Navy pays SWOs a continuation bonus. The very essence of the Navy is taking ships to sea, so the fact it is necessary to bribe people ($27.3 million this year) to do the most elemental function of the Navy officer corps evinces a very serious problem. I think the SWO community should confront that core problem before aiming at a fictional Hollywood status.

  • grandpabluewater

    Institute a consistent, pertinent, forcewide, minimum standard of demonstrated skills and knowledge; reinforced by training constantly to improve all hands competency ship wide? Then innovate constantly to stay current with the state of the art. While coping with disruptive distractions by ignoramuses with an agenda that doesn’t include survival and victory in battle. Proposed by a Lieutenant (BZ to him by the way). While starved for funds as a force wide norm.

    Well, duhhhh!, to quote the undoubtedly dated by now vernacular. Apt, pertinent and overdue.

    One itty bitty question. What do flag officers do, and why do we have them? The world wonders.

    This comment will destruct (not self destruct) in ten, nine, eight…

  • Donald Mitchell

    Lt, the USN does not have to cross the pond to find the template for training your future Deck Officers. Just head a little north of Seattle to Victoria BC where you will find the RCN’s “Naval Officers Training Centre” AKA “Venture”. Everything you described in your article is the way that the RCN initially trains its MARS (Maritime Surface Sub-surface ) Officers. Ironically, when the RCN was at the point of retiring its dedicated training destroyers, I was one of a group of trainees sent to Newport RI to be part of an evaluation of using simulators to train future Officers of the Watch (Officers of the Deck).
    I think it would be well worth your time to do some TD up in Victoria
    Good luck in your future endeavours.

  • rackops

    So, to sum it all up, LT Paris would like the Navy to bring back SWOSDOC with a touch of pre-DIVO tour shiphandling, a la the RN. Not a bad idea, in my opinion. I, for one, was fairly disappointed when SWOSDOC was removed and replaced by…uhh…some strange course that appeared relatively worthless, far into the initial DIVO tour of a SWO (no, I did not attend it, but as a senior watch officer who sent people to it, my opinion as to it’s overall value was formed…)

    Unfortunately, my hunch is that the train has left the station with regard to the reintroduction of SWOSDOC. Of course, I could be out of the loop (and probably am) but given the huge amount of money it used to cost to PCS every new SWO Ensign to and from Newport prior to their first tour, it probably wouldn’t pass muster with the number crunchers these days.

    What is really too bad is that everything that LT Paris proposes COULD actually be done with what the SWO community has available to it today. As someone who spent 2.5 years as a senior watch officer on a destroyer, I wrote countless watchbills, rotating officers through to get experience on the bridge as well as other watch stations. With seven month deployments, there was far more than enough time to get plenty of hands-on experience driving ships. But…my watchbills were subject to the approval of the XO and CO. And when they didn’t trust someone on the bridge…well, what experience could that person get? The end result was a handful of officers with in depth experience…and the others without much more than a passing familiarization.

    Bridge watchstanding experience can also be obtained inport…DIVOs can be farmed out to other ships getting underway, or full use could be made of the inport simulators and BRM classrooms – both of which were not overtasked when I was in the fleet. Of course, the emergency du jour always took precedence over professional skill and thus those competencies were allowed to atrophy, a sacrifice to the god of micromanagement and administrivia.

    Learning tactics follows the same path. The time and resources are there…but very, very, very few command place much emphasis on them. My “tactical instruction” at department head school was about as useless as drinking from the ocean…I got a bare minimum of familiarization, just enough to know some of the more “tactical-sounding” terms…and that was about it. I remember vividly the day we were “sunk” during a major wargame at sea. My CO was considerably embarrassed by the event…but I was in awe that the other ship had effectively turned our weaknesses against us and gave us a well deserved thumping. We had never even heard of the tactics they used…let alone ever practiced them. Talk about professionally embarrassing…

    Anyway, it would be fantastic if the SWO community took this advice and revamped their training. However, I don’t think it will ever go back to the way it was (with a dash of RN to boot). Making lemonade with today’s lemons though is possible…so long as the time and effort is dedicated to making sure young SWOs are given the tools to succeed rather than fester in multiple tours of shuffling paperwork and earning qualifications that are worth no more than the cheap alloy of the gold colored pin on their chest.

    • grandpabluewater

      If you don’t pay to educate newly commissioned officers properly in the fundamentals of their designator before they start their first operational tour, fewer of them will survive it. As surely as night follows day, you must recruit more to have the minimum necessary skills to survive their next operational tour.

      In nature, huge numbers of newborns breaking out of their shells and crawling across the sands to the sea on a moonless night is a viable strategy, as long as some few by chance survive to drop off the next huge generation some time hence. For primitive and unintelligent species. Apex predators like Orcas care for and educate much smaller numbers, of much smarter and more highly developed and versatile young.

      Just like Submarines and Marines don’t sweat the PCS money to educate and winnow their pack members. But lest someone think I am underestimating the sea turtles rung on the evolutionary ladder, they refrain from eating their own young.

      That behavior is reserved for the really primitive and totally unintelligent species. Chose your survival strategy….

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