German Battleship Tirpitz at sea, 1943

Sixty-five years ago, RAF Lancasters of Number 617 Squadron, the famous Ruhr “Dambusters”, and Number 9 Squadron, took off on a 2,300 mile mission to sink the German Battleship Tirpitz.  For some weeks, Tirpitz sat by herself in the bitterly cold waters of Tromso Fjord along the Norwegian coast, seldom moving.  In the latter months of her life, she would earn the nickname of Die einsame Konigin des Nordes. The Lonely Queen of the North.

When built, Tirpitz was one of the most powerful units afloat.  Slightly larger than her legendary sister ship Bismarck, KMS Tirpitz displaced more than 43,000 tons.  She was 824 feet long, armed with eight 38-cm (15”) guns, and had exceeded 31 knots on trials.  The British had tried desperately to destroy her before she was even completed, and between the RAF and Royal Navy, many air, surface, and subsurface attacks had been only moderately successful, and had often paid a heavy cost for their efforts.

Tirpitz in Kofjord, 1943

The operational history of Tirpitz is stunningly brief.   In fact, there had been but three sorties for the magnificent ship.  She had only fired her main battery once in anger, at targets ashore during a raid on Spitzbergen in September, 1943.  Yet, she presented a threat to the Russian convoys and to British command of the seas from the time of her launching until her sinking.  Tirpitz, with a varied array of Kriegsmarine capital units (battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, “pocket battleships” Scheer and Lutzow, and the superb heavy cruisers Hipper and Prinz Eugen), had been assigned the mission of commerce raiding, a role originally tasked to her more famous sister, Bismarck.   She never filled that role, nor did she ever engage an enemy surface combatant during her short life.  Hitler, unwilling to risk his heavy warships after the loss of Bismarck,  severely restricted the conditions under which German capital units could put to see to seek battle.

The role in which Tirpitz, and most of the capital ships of the Kriegsmarine, would have the most success was that of a “fleet in being”.   Despite a relatively few heavy units being assembled at any one time, and despite a lack of significant aerial umbrella (aside from some Luftwaffe coastal units) to protect them at sea, the German warships were perceived as a major threat to the convoys from the United States to Britain, and later to the Soviet Union via Murmansk and Archangel.

It has been estimated that the “fleet in being”, of which Tirpitz was the centerpiece and eventually the only significant unit, tied down ten times its own combat power in Royal Navy battleships, carriers, cruisers, and destroyers.   Many of these powerful warships were desperately needed in other theaters of war, most notably in November/December of 1941 in the Pacific.

HMS Repulse hit by Japanese bombs

HMS Prince of Wales heeling to port and sinking

How might Britain’s (and America’s) fortunes have been different in December of 1941 had a substantial task force (including additional aircraft carriers) been sent to Hong Kong/Singapore, instead of a single aircraft carrier, one modern battleship, and an elderly battle cruiser?   The largest and most powerful navy in the world was spread too thin to do so.   Instead, when Illustrious was damaged running aground, Prince of Wales and Repulse were helpless against far superior Japanese strength, and were sunk by aircraft from the 11^th Air Fleet.  (Had Illustrious been present, it is unlikely that she would have deterred the attacks, and most probably would have been lost along with Repulse and Prince of Wales.)

The threat the Royal Navy believed Tirpitz and her consorts posed can be illustrated by the fate of Convoy PQ-17.  Putting out of the assembly point in Iceland, PQ-17 was bound for Murmansk with about fifty ships and escorts in early July, 1942. Upon a mere report that Tirpitz (along with cruiser Hipper) had put to sea from Trondheim (Operation Rosselsprung), the order was given for PQ-17 to scatter.  In reality, Grand Admiral Raeder ordered Tirpitz to return to Trondheim over concerns that Home Fleet ships and aircraft would attack and sink her.   The merchant vessels of PQ-17, scattered beyond the protection of the escorting warships, were hunted relentlessly by Luftwaffe  aircraft and Donitz’s Wolf Packs, with U-boats and aerial attacks accounting for twenty-four merchantmen, nearly half of the convoy’s strength.

Tirpitz leads cruisers Admiral Hipper and Admiral Scheer to sea in Operation Rosselsprung

Even as late as November of 1944, Tirpitz, by then truly a lonely queen, continued to draw British attention as a lingering threat to Britain and her lifelines from America.  What the British did not know is that a raid on 11 September, 1944 had badly damaged Tirpitz forward, and the decision had been made not to repair her to seaworthiness.  So the raid of 12 November was launched from bases in Britain.

Tirpitz camouflaged at anchor

British Lancasters from 9 and 617 Squadrons arrived to no Luftwaffe fighter opposition, and despite heavy antiaircraft fire struck Tirpitz with at least two of the 6-ton “tallboy” bombs carried.  The massive battleship suffered a magazine explosion, and rolled to port on her beam ends.  She capsized in shallow water, taking more than one thousand of her crew into the icy waters of Tromso Fjord.   The “Lonely Queen” was gone, and the “fleet in being” was no more.  The effort since 1941 to contain and then destroy Tirpitz had been enormous, and had global implications for British and Allied naval strategy throughout the first five years of war.   Her existence as a “fleet in being” had far wider impact strategically than the heroic but ultimately fatal battles fought by her sister Bismarck in 1941 and her sometimes-consort Scharnhorst in 1943.

Tirpitz, capsized and sunk in Tromso

The concept of the “fleet in being” was not a new one, even in 1939.  In fact, the concept went back three centuries, when in 1690 the British had turned the trick on the French.   In the First World War, the High Seas Fleet had pinned down a much greater number of British warships at Scapa Flow than its own strength ever approached.  During World War II, not only were German capital units in northern waters such a “fleet in being”, but the Italian Navy in the Mediterranean served strikingly similar purposes, and necessitated the daring British raid on Taranto in 1940.  Indeed, the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor was in many ways a “fleet in being” to the Japanese, posing a far more serious threat than what existed the previous year when the Pacific Fleet was based in California.  The Pearl Harbor attack was, like Britain’s against Taranto, to eliminate a “fleet in being” which could challenge and disrupt control of seas vital to the Japanese.

The topic of Tirpitz and the “fleet in being” concept is not merely of academic and historical interest.  In the first decade of the 21^st Century, there has been much discussion by The People’s Republic of China regarding their desires for a blue-water fleet to protect global interests and establish regional hegemony in the waters of the Western Pacific.  We have seen a growing amphibious and power projection capability, and the maturing of a maritime denial strategy with an eye toward the United States Navy.  There is again discussion, this time more serious, of the development of naval aviation by the PLAN.

Could a burgeoning Chinese Navy become a “fleet in being”?  What implications does that hold for the United States?  In each historical example, a “fleet in being” that threatened vital interests was countered by one of two approaches.  The first was the dedication of naval combat power in excess of that which such a “fleet in being” could bring to bear, ensuring a reasonable chance of victory.   The second was an attack (pre-emptive in some notable cases) on that fleet from the air while the critical elements of that fleet were in harbor.

Ships of the PLAN execute underway replenishment at sea

PLAN Attack SS runs on the surface

Is the PLAN wagering we haven’t the national will for the first approach, and that they can effectively defend against the second?  We would be well-served to look at how the various “fleets in being” affected strategic and operational decisions on the part of maritime powers and wrap such considerations into future Maritime Strategies, and shipbuilding plans.  To do otherwise will be to stumble blindly into a future that our adversaries have prepared carefully for.  Such a course would be foolhardy and costly.

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Aviation, Foreign Policy, Maritime Security, Navy, history | read comments (10)

Very interesting report from the Associated Press yesterday.  RADM Donegan’s observations regarding anti-access capability in the article below express some of the same concern that has been heard in Naval and foreign policy circles elsewhere.

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By JEREMIAH MARQUEZ (AP)

HONG KONG — A U.S. Navy admiral expressed new concern Friday over China’s military buildup and urged Beijing to be clearer about its intentions.

With China’s military growing at an “unprecedented rate,” the U.S. wants to ensure that expansion doesn’t destabilize the region, Rear Adm. Kevin Donegan told reporters on a visit to the Chinese territory of Hong Kong.

Donegan referred to China’s expanded weaponry. His remarks echoed the concerns of other U.S. military leaders who have said the growth in China’s military spending — up almost 15 percent in the 2009 budget — raises questions about how Beijing plans on deploying its new power.

“When we see a military growing at that rate, we’re interested in transparency and the understanding of the uses of that military,” said Donegan, commander of the USS George Washington aircraft carrier strike group, a key part of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Donegan’s comments come as a top Chinese general visits the United States on a mission to strengthen trust between the two militaries and dispel U.S. concerns about the growth of the People’s Liberation Army.

Xu Caihou, the PLA’s second-highest ranking officer, told President Barack Obama on Wednesday that ties between the two countries’ militaries play “an important role in enhancing strategic mutual trust and deepening their pragmatic cooperation,” according to Chinese media reports.

China has boosted military spending by more than 10 percent annually for almost two decades, and the official figure of $71 billion this year is thought by many analysts to represent only a portion of total defense spending. It still amounts to only a fraction of U.S. defense spending.

China says much of the increase is used to improve salaries and living conditions for soldiers, but it has also been adding sophisticated new warships, submarines, fighter jets and other weapons systems to its arsenal. PLA leaders have also said they are considering building an aircraft carrier, but such a development is thought to be years, if not decades, away.

Donegan acknowledged the possibility of a Chinese aircraft carrier, but also said he was concerned with anti-access weapons. This class of weapons includes missiles and submarines that can threaten U.S. forces in the region and prevent them responding in the event of a crisis.

“I am absolutely concerned,” Donegan said.

He went on to say, “When a navy is doing that, we just want to make sure it’s transparent enough so those in the region understand what they’re doing.”

At the same time, Donegan described positive exchanges between the two militaries that he said he hoped would continue, including a visit by five Chinese army generals aboard the George Washington during its call in Hong Kong this week.

Ties between the two militaries have been repeatedly roiled by China’s objections to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, claimed by Beijing as its own territory, as well as Chinese efforts to disrupt Navy surveillance missions off its shores.

A series of confrontations involving vessels from the two navies has raised concerns over China’s rising determination to defend what it sees as its territorial interests in the South China Sea, where the U.S. has long operated as the major international power.

Donegan said the Navy would continue to operate in international waters — something that could come in defiance of Beijing’s claims it has the right to bar surveillance work inside its exclusive economic zone.

“We are going to continue to operate in the South China Sea and international waters and not in territorial seas of another country,” he said.

The visit of the George Washington, considered the crown jewel of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, is its first to Hong Kong in its 17-year history.

Associated Press writer Christopher Bodeen contributed to this report from Beijing.

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Is RADM Donegan on the mark with his concerns about China’s increasing capability and long-term intentions?  What are the chances of the Chinese being “transparent enough so those in the region understand what they’re doing”?

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Foreign Policy, Maritime Security, Navy | read comments (26)

From DoD today:

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The Navy announced today the decision to deploy the USS Freedom (LCS 1) in early 2010 to the Southern Command and Pacific Command areas ahead of her originally scheduled 2012 maiden deployment.  According to Navy leaders, Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) are needed now to close urgent warfighting gaps.

“Deploying LCS now is a big step forward in getting this ship where it needs to be – operating in the increasingly important littoral regions,” said Adm. Gary Roughead, chief of naval operations.  ”We must deliver this critical capability to the warfighter now.”

The USS Freedom will have an immediate impact on fleet readiness and global reach as an asset with unique combat capabilities and the ability to meet littoral tasking not previously seen in the modern cruiser or destroyer fleet.

“The Navy plans to build a considerable number of littoral combat ships which will form the backbone of our future fleet,” said Adm J. C. Harvey, Jr., commander, U.S. Fleet Forces, charged with executing the early deployment.  “The sooner we integrate them into our fleet, the sooner we can incorporate them in the order of battle.  This deployment offers a golden opportunity to learn by doing.  Employing the USS Freedom in theater two years ahead of a normal timeline allows us to incorporate lessons that can only be learned in a deployment setting more quickly and effectively in the LCS fleet integration process.”

In evaluating options for deploying the USS Freedom earlier than originally scheduled, the Navy took into consideration several key factors including combat systems testing, shakedown of the ship systems, and overseas sustainment with a new concept of operations and crew training.  To facilitate the early deployment, the Navy adjusted the USS Freedom testing schedule, prioritized testing events needed for deployment and deferred others not required for the missions envisioned during this deployment.  The USS Freedom recently completed Industrial Post Delivery Availability 2, which also supported an early deployment.

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Let’s hope the early deployment into the ORBAT carries with it an honest analysis of LCS shortcomings as a warfighter, the true usefulness of the very high speed requirement, and perhaps a flexibility for a less avant garde design that is more survivable and hard-hitting, with an equally appropriate crew size, before being built in those future “considerable numbers” which will become the “backbone of the fleet”.    Say, 35 knots, steel hull, built to Level II specs, and perhaps a 5″-62 in place of that itty-bitty 57mm?

Might even be able to save a few bucks.

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Maritime Security, Navy, Uncategorized | read comments (25)

There were two interesting stories out in the last week involving Iran and the fight against pirates.

First, we have Iran’s statement that the best way to protect merchant shipping against pirates is to arm the ships:

Iran backs guns on ships – ARMED forces placed aboard merchant ships would be the cheapest and most effective way to deter pirates, an Iranian shipping leader said today.

Mohammad Souri, chairman of National Iranian Tanker, told the International Union of Marine Insurance conference in Bruges: “Having armed forces on board would be the cheapest way to counter piracy in the short term.”

He explained: “If a pirate thinks his life is in danger, he will try and escape the vessel. But insurers are reluctant to support their use on board.”

Multinational forces have included the use of more than 34 warships, helicopters and long-range patrolling aircraft from 16 different nations, he pointed out – all of which runs up huge expenses. But forces on the targeted ships would close down attacks much quicker, he suggested. As an average hijacking episode lasts two months, owners now face long-term fuel, equipment and charter costs – not to mention legal fees and ransoms.

As for his own fleet, Souri reported a dozen piracy attacks on vessels carrying about 2M barrels of crude.

About 30 of the company’s tankers have installed attack-delaying barbed wire, and all entrances are locked. – Fairplay Homepage

I have argued before that it makes the most sense to arm the ships since it is the ships that are the targets. (See link below)

The second article notes just where the Iranians are getting their armed guards:

EX-ROYAL Marines are being routinely deployed as anti-piracy forces onboard fully laden large Iranian oil tankers now under regular attack from heavily armed pirates off the Gulf of Aden. – Lloyd’s List, Former Royal Marines hired to protect Iranian tankers

The Iranians have interestingly stuck to using foreign teams and more interestingly with Brits, who I bet had to think twice before taking the job given Iran’s recent treatment of their fellow countrymen. This probably has more to do with issues related to where the vessels are trading (my guess is Europe) than with a lack of trained personnel in Iran.

Iran has decided to embark professionals onboard. I still think there is a case for training merchant mariners to defend their own vessel. After all, at some point, these armed-guards disembark and surely pirates will migrate to where they are not around.

Just today comes word that Pirates were thwarted by armed guards just long enough for Naval forces to come to the rescue.

“When pirates see the frigate, they usually abort,” said Cyrus Mody from IMB’s Piracy Reporting Centre. HMAS Toowoomba responded to an emergency call from Bockstiegel’s MPP BBC Portugal (3,490dwt, built 2001) on Sunday night.

Nick Davis, speaking for Gulf of Aden Group Transits, told Fairplay today that it had posted an armed Yemeni navy team on the German general cargo ship, which opened fire, causing the pirates to flee while the crew called for help. – Fairplay

Did the armed guards prevent another hijacking? It is impossible to know for sure. However, they were there to defend the ship when the anti-pirate patrols were not.

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Armed Merchant Ship Crews Will Not Escalate The Pirate Problem

Posted by Fred Fry.

Posted by FFry in Maritime Security | read comments (2)

This from DoD this afternoon:

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“Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates announced today that the President has nominated Navy Vice Adm. David J. Dorsett for reappointment to the grade of vice admiral, and assignment as deputy chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance, N2/N6, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations/Director of Naval Intelligence, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. “

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“Information Dominance?”  Who was the Legion-of-Merit wearing 05 or 06 who thought THAT one up?   Do we actually think we dominate the information spectrum?

Nothing against VADM Dorsett, but this type of terminology represents a badly flawed understanding of “information” as it pertains to warfighting.  This seems like the Cult of Cebrowski.  Network-Centric Warfare as a concept is found very much wanting where the rubber meets the road.   It might work if the enemy we are fighting is the United States Navy, who has elevated information technology to a place on Olympus.

But for the rest of the world, our obsession with a flattened information hierarchy is much more of a vulnerability than an advantage.   That obsession treats information like a drug.  The more we have, the more we want.  We are convinced that the key gem of information that will clear away all the fog MUST be coming in the next data dump.  Except the data dump is increasingly difficult to sift through to find the critical information, if we are even aware of what is critical in light of so much unfiltered and unverified gatherings.  The effort required to produce pertinent and actionable intelligence, or even timely and worthwhile information, oftentimes suffers from such an approach to information and intelligence gathering.

Without launching a long dissertation regarding NCW and the problems created by “information inundation” resulting from a sensor/shooter marriage across a massive battlefield, I believe such a term as “Information Dominance” pays short shrift to a less sophisticated enemy whose extensive low-tech networks of informants are capable of negating billions of dollars of maritime “stealth” technology (or finding the right merchant ship in a 400-mile long shipping lane) by using the eyeball, the messenger, the motor scooter, or the sandal.

Such an enemy, I would argue, has a much clearer and simpler set of information requirements, and is far more skilled, more disciplined, and much more successful at meeting those requirements than we are.  So, who is dominant in the information game?  One could argue very effectively that it is not us.

Terms such as “Information Dominance” ring of a grandiose bit of self-delusion that is part plan and part capability, with a large measure of wishful thinking.   In the words of a certain retired Marine Corps General, “words mean things”.   They also reveal a lot about who uses them, and how.  The term “Information Dominance” gives me the willies.   Can we call it something a little less presumtuous?

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Maritime Security, Navy, Uncategorized | read comments (18)