The buildings in the “regimental area” of Camp Lejeune, North Carolina are modest, post-war brick buildings that, to the visitor’s eye, look more or less alike.  Yet, each of the Marine Regiments of the Second Marine Division has its own storied history and battle honors.  As Captain J. W. Thomason wrote in his Great War masterpiece Fix Bayonets, these histories represent

“…traditions of things endured and things accomplished, such as Regiments hand down forever.”

There are symbols of these honors for one to see, if you know where to look.  On a thousand trips past those symbols, one never failed to make me pause and reflect.  On the headquarters building for the Second Marine Regiment hangs their unit crest.  The crest contains only three words.  They are in English and not Latin, and they are not a catch phrase nor a bold proclamation of a warrior philosophy.  They are simple and stark.  Across the top of the unit crest is the word “TARAWA”.  And at the bottom, the grim admonition, “KEEP MOVING”.

It was 66 years ago on this date that the Second Marine Division began the assault on Betio Island, in the Tarawa Atoll.  The island, roughly two thirds of the size of my college’s small campus, was the most heavily fortified beach in the world.  Of the Second MarDiv, the 2nd Marine Regiment landed two battalions abreast on beaches Red 1 and Red 2.  The assault began what was described as “seventy-six stark and bitter hours” of the most brutal combat of the Pacific War.   More than 1,000 Marines and Sailors were killed, nearly 2,300 wounded, along with nearly 5,000 Japanese dead, in the maelstrom of heat, sand, fire, and smoke that was Betio.

Assault on Betio's Northern beaches

Marine Dead on Beach Red 1

I will not detail the fighting for Betio here, as there are many other sources for that information.   Nor will I debate whether the terrible price paid for Betio was too high.   What cannot be debated is the extraordinary heroism of the Marines and Sailors who fought to secure the 1.1 square miles of baking sand and wrest it from the grasp of an entrenched, fortified, and determined enemy.   The fighting was described as “utmost savagery”, and casualties among Marine officers and NCOs were extremely high.   As one Marine stated, initiative and courage were absolute necessities.  Corporals commanded platoons, and Staff Sergeants, companies.

Marines assault over coconut log wall on Beach Red 2

The book by the late Robert Sherrod, “Tarawa, The Story of a Battle”,  is a magnificent read.  Another is Eric Hammel’s “76 Hours”.    Also “Utmost Savagery”, by Joe Alexander, who additionally produced the WWII commemorative “Across the Reef”, an excellent compilation of primary source material.    For video, The History Channel produced a 50th anniversary documentary on the battle, titled “Death Tide at Tarawa”, in November 1993.  I also highly recommend finding and watching this superb production.  It is  narrated by Edward Hermann, and interviews many of the battle’s veterans, including Robert Sherrod, MajGen Mike Ryan, and others, who provide chilling and inspiring commentary of the fighting and of the terrible carnage of those three days.

Master Sgt. James M. Fawcett, left and Capt. Kyle Corcoran salute Fawcett's father's ashes on Red Beach 1. MSgt Fawcett's father landed on Red 1 on 20 Nov 1943.

Tarawa remains a proud and grim chapter in the battle histories of the units of the Second Marine Division.  Each outfit, the 2nd, 6th, 8th, and 10th Marines, 2nd Tank Battalion, 2nd Tracks, and  miscellaneous support units, fought superbly against frightful odds and a fearsome enemy.   It is on the Unit Crest of the 2nd Marines, whose battalions paid the highest price for Betio, that the most poignant of those histories is remembered.    Three simple words:  “TARAWA;  KEEP MOVING”.

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Marine Corps, Navy, history | read comments (0)

h/t to Angie Williams, wife of former Vietnam POW and Founder of National Donut Day, LTC Orson Swindle, USMC-Ret.

Today is also the Marine Corps’ Birthday….. and National Donut Day

As most of you know, my husband, Orson, was a Prisoner of War in Hanoi for 6 years and 4 months. Ironically his shoot down date is Veteran’s Day, November 11, 1966. So this is a big week for him.

As we all know, being a prisoner is a tough experience, but the POW’s also have some funny stories to share, and the following is one of them….

In September 1969, after Orson had been a prisoner three very hard years (the early years were by far the worst) Ho Chi Minh died. Orson was at Son Tay with about 55 other men. One day in October he was called in for an interrogation… which he said was more of an “English lesson” for the interrogator as opposed to one of the beatings they received when Ho Chi Minh was calling the shots. The interrogator began by bragging about his country and its 4,000 year history and belittling the USA… saying, “Your country is very young, it doesn’t even have very many heroes or holidays.” Knowing that the Marine Corps birthday was coming up on November the 10, Orson began to spin a story…….

He pretended to take umbrage, saying… “No, no, no…. you are quite wrong… we have many holidays in our country, as a matter of fact, one is coming up very soon. There will be festivals and children will dress up in costumes and it’s very important to us.” The interrogator became interested so Orson proceeded that it was called, “National Donut Day”….

Before you can really appreciate this you need a bit of background. Before Ho Chi Minh’s death, the prisoners were practically starved to death. They were eating nothing but rice and swamp grass soup (as they call it) and sometimes pumpkin soup. Orson says they estimated that he went down to a little as 120 pounds… At shoot down he was something like 175 and 6′2″. So this is unbelievably thin. The men were hungry all the time. Very hungry. About twice a year they would get what they considered an incredible treat… it was noting more than old French bread.. that had become hard and moldy, but the cooks would deep fry it and roll it in sugar and the prisoners called the result “sticky buns” and to them it was mana from heaven….

So when explaining National Donut Day, Orson told his interrogator that “Donuts are a lot like your sticky buns… they are sweet bread, and on National Donut Day everyone has one…. or more of them.” Not sure what the outcome might be, Orson was sent back to his cell, where he immediately started tapping through the wall to all the other POWs saying…”Hey guys, you gotta back me up. I just invented a new holiday and if they find out I was pulling their leg, there will be hell to pay — tell all the guards that National Donut Day is on November 10 — don’t let me down! Pass it on!” A few weeks went by, and to everyone’s great surprise, on November 10 the prisoners at Son Tay prison — known for being one of the worst —and also for the failed rescue attempt — were served sticky buns and — Orson was the hero of the day!

Orson had forgotten all about this story, and I had never heard it, but in March 03 a fellow POW, Bob Stirm, an Air Force Col was interviewed in a San Francisco paper and in it he described the origin of National Donut Day.

Thanks for sharing Angie!

Posted by Jim Dolbow in Marine Corps, history | read comments (3)

Happy 234th to all the Marines out there, present and past, who have made the legacy of our Corps what it is today.  Especially, best wishes on this 234th Marine Corps Birthday to those Devil Dogs serving in Iraq or Afghanistan, writing new chapters of our glorious history.

A motivating message from our Commandant.

If the Army and the Navy ever looked on Heaven’s scenes,

They would find the streets are guarded by United States Marines!

Semper Fi.

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Marine Corps, history | read comments (5)

At 0619 on a bright October morning in Beirut, Lebanon, a Mercedes pickup truck packed with explosives raced past US Marine sentries with empty weapons, sped through largely dismantled vehicle barriers, through a fence, and into the lower floor of the US Marine Barracks that held HQ Company Battalion Landing Team 1/8.  The explosion, one of the largest non-nuclear detonations since the end of World War II, collapsed the barracks, killing 241 Americans (mostly Marines)  and burying and wounding dozens of others.

The facts from Beirut were grim and maddening.  Sentries without loaded weapons, crew-served guns with no ammo belts, lack of barriers on high-speed avenues of approach.  All tactical sins, all foisted upon BLT 1/8 by those in Congress and in government concerned with “posture” and “appearances”.

Imad Mughniyeh, the alleged mastermind of the Beirut attack (where a simultaneous bombing killed 58 French soldiers) died in a car bombing in Lebanon in 2008.  In the intervening 25 years, he ran rampant throughout the world, killing and terrorizing as far away as Argentina.  He was responsible for the hijacking of TWA 847 in 1985, and the murder of US Navy Diver Robert Stethem, 23, a passenger on that flight.  In addition, Mughniyeh was linked to the bombing of the Khobar Towers.

Some hard lessons came out of that physical, military, and diplomatic rubble.  One would think that they would be with us yet.  Some apparently either forgot, or never learned.

• Muslim extremist are willing to die in order to kill Americans, even when they are send to help other Muslims.
• Proper “posture” is one in which US Servicemen are allowed to defend themselves and kill the enemy.
• Restraint in pursuing and killing those responsible for such acts is seen as weakness by America’s Muslim Extremist enemies, and such encourages more and more terrorism and killing.

We learned, though.  Didn’t we?

Well, the words coming from Afghanistan sound eerily familiar.  Overly restrictive rules of engagement that allow the enemy to engage and disengage at will unless caught in the act of shooting at American servicemen.  An admonition on the parts of General McChrystal and CJCS Admiral Mullen for US Servicemen to take “more risks” and not be so concerned about their own protection.  An outpost sited on poor defensive ground and vulnerable to attack, positioned not by tactical necessity, but by political expedience.  Again we hear the words “appearance” and “posture”.   We see the handcuffs on our servicemen engaged in combat with an elusive and ruthless enemy.

Let’s hope we don’t hear again how US Soldiers or Marines died sleeping, or without a chance to fight back, because appearance, posture, risk, and political expedience put them in that position.    On 23 October, 1983, 241 US lives were lost.  If we do not remember them, and how and why they were lost, we allow those lost lives to be wasted.

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Foreign Policy, Homeland Security, Marine Corps, Navy, Uncategorized, history | read comments (11)

Bryan McGrath, lead author of CS21 (as it is coming to be called in shorthand) stopped by in the comments section on my homepage leave the commentary now shown below.  I opted (head nod to Peter S. per our earlier discussion) to elevate it to a post of its own for wider dissemination and comment.  Bryan makes some good points, especially where the two other missing pieces are concerned and some interesting revelations as to what he expected to follow from the influence of CS21 in the form of actual metal.  On the whole, I think we’re in pretty violent agreement about many items.  One in particular is where we go from here.  The next couple of years are going to be crucial ones for Navy.  If one of the unwritten intents of  CS21 was to build an advocacy for the Navy and naval forces for the long view, mindful of the prolonged land engagement(s) we have been and look to continue conducting, and that constituency is primarily outside Navy (e.g., the public and Congress), then there needs to be some serious effort applied by senior leadership to revitalizing that advocacy, especially on the Hill where the initial offering two years ago was received with, well, lukewarm (to put it charitably) enthusiasm.  In light of an ongoing failure to produce the other legs of the stool, as Bryan points out, and with diminished expectations for budgetary relief, Navy needs to revitalize the advocacy, fleshing it out with supporting force structure andoperationalization documentation and re-engage the Hill. I’m hearing that CNO recently signed out the Naval Strategic Planning Guidance, and if so, that’s a first step. I’d give CS21, in its present form,  about two more years of potential worth in this regard but if the other parts don’t come through, then the strategy’s relevancy and potential to influence, shape and form the operations and force structure of future naval forces will rapidly  fade away. – SJS

Many thanks to Steeljaw Scribe for getting the discussion started here.  Several weeks ago, he reached out to me to see if I wanted to collaborate on some kind of a two-year retrospective in view of the second birthday of CS21; I declined, fearing that I was simply too close to the subject to be objective (which may now be confirmed with this post).  As some may know, my last tour on active duty was to lead the team that put together the document, a tour I found fascinating and rewarding, mostly for the incredible quality of people I came to be associated with both inside the strategy team and in the broader, Newport and DC based strategy communities.

Steeljaw poses three interesting questions, but they are questions I am largely unqualified to answer, as thorough answers (in my estimation) presuppose in-depth knowledge of the Navy’s plans for POM12.  POM12 represents the first concerted effort on the Navy’s part to program in the guidance set in CS21, buttressed by the presence of a CNO no longer in the first months of his job trying to find his way.  I suspect if CS21 is going to have any influence, it will be reflected in POM12.

I make this statement largely due the lack of–as Steeljaw reminds us–the accompanying parts of what VADM John Morgan used to refer to as “the strategy layer-cake”, which consisted of:  the strategy itself,  how it would be implemented (the NOC) and the resources required (a revision to the 30 year shipbuilding plan).  Put another way, our three-legged stool is missing two of the three legs.  This represents an institutional and bureaucratic decision on the Navy’s part, and understandably serves to open up the one extant document to legitimate criticism.  It does not however, obviate either the thinking that went into the strategy or the shifts that it portends.

I ask critics of the strategy a simple question; when you criticize the THINKING and the concepts of the strategy, what are you comparing it to?  Exactly what did it replace?  Prior to October 2007, what was the Navy’s strategy? Come on now–one or two sentences.  I think most folks who’ve read the current strategy can cite some version of the following–that there is a global system of trade, finance, information, etc that works to the benefit of the people of the US and other nations who participate in it, and that USSeapower–increasingly in a cooperative fashion–plays a unique and critical role in the protection and sustainment of that system.  There you have it.  Again–someone suggest in a sentence or two what it replaced.

Moreover, the strategy suggests a shift from the last named strategy of the 80’s–which was clearly postured for the strategic offense–to a posture of the strategic defense–defense of the global system.  It is a strategy of consolidation and defense.  It is the strategy of a statusquo power seeking to protect and extend its position within the global system.  It answers the question “why do we need those ships strung out all over the world?”  Previously, the answer was some version of “well, security and stability”, which always begged the question as to why nations in that region couldn’t do it themselves.  The answer of course, is that they can’t, at least not without our help.  And that inability threatens the health and welfare of the increasingly interconnected world.  Put another way, the global system demands the presence of the US Navy–just as it demanded the presence of the Royal Navy and the Dutch Navy.

While I have little insight into OPNAV’s plans in POM 12, I can quite readily suggest how I thought CS21 would change the Navy.  Firstly, I believe that CS21 represents a growth strategy for the Navy, and that as the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan exact their toll on the national will, it would provide the intellectual basis for an expansion of the Navy.  We didn’t set out to make a strategy to grow the Navy–as a matter of fact, in one of my first days in the job, I asked the question bluntly of VADM Morgan…”what if our deliberations lead us to believe that the proper course is for a smaller Navy”.  ”Write that strategy” was his answer.

With respect to specifics–I suspected that the strategy would 1) lead to the design of a small, lightly armed, mass produced surface vessel with considerable endurance that would serve as the backbone of the “globally distributed mission tailored forces” mentioned in the document and 2) MIGHT lead to a decision to move away from the DDX–as budget realities and operational requirements would eventually pit it against the CGX, a ship more attuned to the expanded concept of deterrence mentioned in the strategy and 3) (most regrettably) would lead to a loss of carrier force structure.  Cutting carrier force structure seems odd in a “growth strategy”, but reading the tea leaves, I believed some portion of that growth would have to come from within, and power projection and strike did not receive the same level of emphasis as in past strategic documents. In general, I thought we’d see additional investment on the low-low end (small combatants andriverine) and the high-high end (CGX and missile defense).

Second, I thought that the process that went into the production of CS 21 would be a repeatable part of the Navy’s strategic planning process; that is, I thought (and advocated) that CS21 ought to be reviewed–that’s right–as part of every POM process to make sure we got the entering presumptions right.

Third, I believed that CS21 would add some weight to the Navy’s push to raise the prominence of its Language Skills, Regional Expertise and Cultural Awareness programs.  I believed these competencies would be critical to a Navy out operating independently (but cooperatively) in places it wasn’t used to operating.

Fourth, I believed that CS21 would resonate with friends, allies and partners alike, letting them know that not only were they important to us but that they were a critical part of our strategy. I believed that this emphasis would be recognized and acted upon by them.

Fifth, I believe the strategy presented the Chinese with an interesting dilemma; do they get with the program, recognize that the global system in place handsomely rewards their people, and pony up to the responsibilities of a first-rate nation in terms of contributing to that system’s protection andsustainment, or do they remain neo-mercantilist free-riders, fattening their coffers due in no small part to the largess of the US Navy (and subject to its continued forbearance).  While we did not name the Chinese in the document, we knew they’d read themselves into it.

I leave it up to others to determine how much of what I believed would be the legacy of CS21 has come to fruition.  I hope this has been helpful to those interested in this matter, and I look forward to reading your thoughts on what I’ve said.

Crossposted at Information Dissemination and steeljawscribe.com.

Posted by SteelJaw in Coast Guard, Marine Corps, Navy | read comments (2)