The investigation into the mass murder on Ft. Hood continues, but there is no doubt who was responsible, and his motivations are clear.  He (his name doesn’t deserve mentioning) acted out of a radical belief in Islam and a hatred of the United States.

One decision by the Army will determine how the service, and the administration, view this attack.  Will it be viewed only as a crime, or will it be viewed as a terrorist attack committed by an enemy of this nation?  The answer lies in whether or not the victims are awarded Purple Hearts.

Army Regulation 600-8-22 (regulation page 20, pdf page 40), article 2-8 b.(6), requires that “the act must be recognized by the Secretary of the Army as an international terrorist attack.”

(6) After 28 March 1973, as the result of an international terrorist attack against the United States or a foreign nation friendly to the United States, recognized as such an attack by the Secretary of Army, or jointly by the Secretaries of the separate armed services concerned if persons from more than one service are wounded in the attack.  (http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/r600_8_22.pdf)

The victims of this cowardly and monstrous attack deserved better than to die or be wounded in what was otherwise a place of safety.  Their sacrifice must be properly recognized.  They earned and deserve the Purple Heart.  What, and when, will the Secretary decide?

Posted by Fouled Anchor in Army, Homeland Security | read comments (34)

At 0619 on a bright October morning in Beirut, Lebanon, a Mercedes pickup truck packed with explosives raced past US Marine sentries with empty weapons, sped through largely dismantled vehicle barriers, through a fence, and into the lower floor of the US Marine Barracks that held HQ Company Battalion Landing Team 1/8.  The explosion, one of the largest non-nuclear detonations since the end of World War II, collapsed the barracks, killing 241 Americans (mostly Marines)  and burying and wounding dozens of others.

The facts from Beirut were grim and maddening.  Sentries without loaded weapons, crew-served guns with no ammo belts, lack of barriers on high-speed avenues of approach.  All tactical sins, all foisted upon BLT 1/8 by those in Congress and in government concerned with “posture” and “appearances”.

Imad Mughniyeh, the alleged mastermind of the Beirut attack (where a simultaneous bombing killed 58 French soldiers) died in a car bombing in Lebanon in 2008.  In the intervening 25 years, he ran rampant throughout the world, killing and terrorizing as far away as Argentina.  He was responsible for the hijacking of TWA 847 in 1985, and the murder of US Navy Diver Robert Stethem, 23, a passenger on that flight.  In addition, Mughniyeh was linked to the bombing of the Khobar Towers.

Some hard lessons came out of that physical, military, and diplomatic rubble.  One would think that they would be with us yet.  Some apparently either forgot, or never learned.

• Muslim extremist are willing to die in order to kill Americans, even when they are send to help other Muslims.
• Proper “posture” is one in which US Servicemen are allowed to defend themselves and kill the enemy.
• Restraint in pursuing and killing those responsible for such acts is seen as weakness by America’s Muslim Extremist enemies, and such encourages more and more terrorism and killing.

We learned, though.  Didn’t we?

Well, the words coming from Afghanistan sound eerily familiar.  Overly restrictive rules of engagement that allow the enemy to engage and disengage at will unless caught in the act of shooting at American servicemen.  An admonition on the parts of General McChrystal and CJCS Admiral Mullen for US Servicemen to take “more risks” and not be so concerned about their own protection.  An outpost sited on poor defensive ground and vulnerable to attack, positioned not by tactical necessity, but by political expedience.  Again we hear the words “appearance” and “posture”.   We see the handcuffs on our servicemen engaged in combat with an elusive and ruthless enemy.

Let’s hope we don’t hear again how US Soldiers or Marines died sleeping, or without a chance to fight back, because appearance, posture, risk, and political expedience put them in that position.    On 23 October, 1983, 241 US lives were lost.  If we do not remember them, and how and why they were lost, we allow those lost lives to be wasted.

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Foreign Policy, Homeland Security, Marine Corps, Navy, Uncategorized, history | read comments (11)

In response to recent reporting of suicide bombers stuffing exposives where the sun doesn’t shine, Dr. Mike Waller of www.politicalwarfare.org has a gem entitled “How to Counter Al Qaeda’s butt-bombs.”   Reprinted below in its entirety due to its non-politically correct nature:

Al Qaeda has flummoxed security experts with its new tactic of evading detection systems by hiding explosives and detonators inside the bodies of suicide bombers.

The method redefines what it is to be an “assassin.”

The new trick came to light last month in a Saudi palace when an Al Qaeda operative, claiming to want to surrender, exploded in a failed attempt to murder the Saudi prince in charge of counterterrorism operations. The terrorist stuffed a pound of explosives and a detonator up his behind (or perhaps one of his buddies did it for him) in order to foil bomb detectors.

What I’m about to propose is gross and disgusting and downright insensitive. But it’s culturally appropriate. And it’s a quick, inexpensive way to see if we can damage terrorist recruitment and neutralize this new and dangerous Al Qaeda murder tactic. So here goes.

Rather than get alarmed about lacking the technical means to detect such bomb smugglers, we should use Arab and Islamic (and generally universal, lowbrow, adolescent) cultural traits to make terrorists too ashamed and embarrassed to turn their bottoms into bombs. And to humiliate their supporters.

This tactic is begging for ridicule. Terrorists hate being ridiculed. Sexually repressed young men hate being ridiculed. Islamist extremists hate being ridiculed. Mockery stains their honor. Most terrorists are sexually repressed Islamist extremist young men.

Therefore, it’s time for the US and its allies, as well as the Saudis, to turn on the laughs by making fun of the butt-bombers. We can all think of ways to ridicule these weirdos in English – oh, the metaphors are just too plentiful and too crude to list here – and the Arabic language is likewise awash in backdoor humor. To say nothing of Pashto.

Let’s start making fun of Osama bin Laden and his butt-stuffing buddies in Al Qaeda, and see how long this terrorist fad lasts. (My money is on the US being too politically correct to give this a try, but I hope I’m wrong.)

Rather than fear these freaks, we should be mocking them. In every country, in every language. It’s perfect for the uber-homophobic, repressed, pseudopious culture in which the terrorists live. Let’s see how many macho young men really want to meet their fate with the world knowing this: That their last act of piety was packing their fanny full of phallic-shaped C-4 and having their buddy detonate them with a cell phone text message.

Let’s see how many virgins that buys them in the next life. And how many other Islamist extremist boys want to emulate him.

Bonus points: Al Qaeda is officially promoting the butt-bomber tactic in a new video it recently posted on the Internet. So we can pin this on Bin Laden personally, and take down his persona a notch or two with some good, old-fashioned locker-room laughs.

What say you gentle reader?

Posted by Jim Dolbow in Homeland Security | read comments (19)

In a previous post, I posed the somewhat rhetorical question, Is Cryptology Dead?  At the time, it appeared that cryptology and Signals Intelligence were not quite dead, but were certainly being under-valued.  It appears that is all about to change.

A 23Jul09 Chief of Naval Operations memo titled Fleet Cyber Command/Commander Tenth Fleet Implementation Plan (pdf) directs the formulation of a plan to stand up these two new commands.  This new organization will “serve as the Naval Component Commander to [U.S. Cyber Command]” and as the Navy Service Cryptologic Commander.  As background, USCYBERCOM is also a new agency, its own formation directed only a month ago by SECDEF memo (pdf).

FLTCYBERCOM is interesting in many ways, but it cannot go unnoticed that this will be a kind of trip back to the future.  The purpose and structure will not be unlike the former Naval Security Group Command, one of the organizations absorbed by NETWARCOM just four years ago.  Ironically, under the construct described in the CNO memo, NETWARCOM will be subordinate to FLTCYBERCOM.  It will also lose an echelon and a star…moving from echelon two to three and its command billet going from three stars to two.

The known plans for FLTCYBERCOM allow limited analysis and lots of conjecture (and I encourage both, especially from folks who really understand naval organization).  The implementation plan will provide a lot more information if it’s made public.  Two important decisions are location and commander.  Because of the relationship with USCYBERCOM (proposed location Ft. Meade) and the National Security Agency (Ft. Meade), FLTCYBERCOM should reestablish the Navy flag officer presence on the Fort.  The future commander will likely be an intel officer…or will the information warfare/cryptologic community get a vice admiral?

The final analysis will not be possible until some time after the command reaches full operational capablility, but this is a step toward reinvigorating SIGINT and achieving true excellence in the other functions FLTCYBERCOM will dominate. What is already clear is the CNO’s imperative for change.  The implementation plan is due by 31 August and the command will be operational on 1 October.  That’s light speed in any bureaucracy.

[For those who might remember, I wasn’t happy about NETWARCOM’s plan to rename to Cyber Command.  Well, I still don’t love the name, but you could call it Frank if you wanted, just as long as cryptology is no longer ignored.]

Posted by Fouled Anchor in Homeland Security, Maritime Security, Navy | read comments (1)

Constable Allen Abbott of the Royal St. Lucia Police Force's Special Service Unit tries to pull himself to shore while practicing swift-water rescue procedures that were taught by USAF pararescueman. (USAF photo/Staff Sgt. Bennie J. Davis, III)

First in a series about the most recent iteration of Operation Southern Partner (OSP).

OSP is a Twelfth Air Force (Air Forces Southern)-led event that was aimed at providing intensive, periodic subject matter exchanges with partner nation Air Forces in the US Southern Command area of focus.   It was held earlier this month with 7 nations.

In a USNI Blog exclusive, I recently had the opportunity to discuss OSP with LT. Col. Al Struthers, 12th AF Theater Security Cooperation Division Chief, Maj. Kenny Sierra, OSP Caribbean deputy mission commander, and Capt. Nathan Broshear, Twelfth Air Force Public Affairs.

According to LTC. Struthers, one of the lessons learned was the type of training the host nation’s forces received during this cooperative exchange mission. AFSOUTH asked the host nations for their training requirements and upon receiving their responses, OSP ”gave them the training they wanted.”

The calendar was another lesson learned according to Major Sierra who commented, “We wished we had more time to do more exchanges.”  Major Sierra’s comments were echoed by Captain Broshear, the Grenada team leader, who noted  that there is “a big appetite for this type of exchanges.”

I can see why there is an appetite for these type of cooperative exchanges.  Over 8500 personnel from the 7-host nations benefitted from the exchange program.  Some the exchange missions performed during OSP included:

Pararescueman and jump master Senior Master Sgt. Michael Fleming (left) checks the parachute harness of Senior Airman Matt Medlock while Capt. Travis Shepard, a combat rescue officer, awaits a buddy check June 9 before they demonstrate a rigged alternate method zodiac, or RAMZ, capability jump into the Caribbean Ocean for members of the Belize National Coast Guard and local media during Operation Southern Partner. (U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt. Bennie J. Davis III)

Urban tactics, small team movements in built-up areas, building entry and clearing and dynamic target acquisition with the Jamaican Defence Force;

fire protection, maintenance, electrical, safety, security forces and para-rescue exchanges with the Belize Defence Force;

search and rescue efforts with the Royal St. Lucia police force’s special service unit; island nation;

international medical education and training with the Guyana Defence Force;

35 community relations projects to include performances by the Air Force Academy Band “Blue Steel” at venues such as the Father Mallaghan’s Home for Boys in the town of Victoria, Grenada.

According to photographer Sagar Pathak of Horizontal Rain “the Airman had a chance to bond with the boys over the international language of music.”   Music diplomacy at its best in my view.

When asked what what theywould remember most about OSP, Major Sierra said, ”I can tell you how much I enjoyed this tdy. I was able to see the difference.  The gratitude on their faces.”

“That’s tough.  20 different things I’ll remember,” was the initial reaction from LTC Struthers when I asked him the same question.  Moreover, according to Struthers, the host nations were “excited about us being down there.  They loved to have us down there longer.  They want us back.  The hardwork paid off.”

For Captain Broshear, the exchange of the first sargeants on Grenada was a memorable moment.  According to Broshear, it was “the first time we did it.”  Moreover, it gave the USAF an opportunity to demonstrate the professionalism of their

NCOs and according to Broshear such exchanges “can help these nations lay out institutionalized training programs.”

To be continued…

Posted by Jim Dolbow in Air Force, Homeland Security, Soft Power | read comments (0)