CDR Aboul-Enein’s finally done it. I’m going to rave about it sight unseen, based solely on his reputation.

Back in the mid-nineties, the Navy tried to build a Foreign Area Officer program. It didn’t work due to structural problems, but I was selected for the subspecialty along with a few other officers. I built a professional relationship with a few, including one guy with an unusual name who seemed to know a lot about the Middle East. As soon as I got back into port after 9/11, he was the first guy I emailed; I was worried about the potential for him to get caught up in harassment or trouble.

Turns out the opposite happened. He wound up being the guy who in the E-ring. He taught his fellow Americans about the insidious nature of islamist ideology and how normal folks in the Middle East think about warfare, a quiet, professional voice between the appeasers and the overly Jacksonian militants. This is very hard to do when so many people who oppose American values speak different things to different audiences, and lie to calm rational concerns about threat to people very willing to accept a reasonable-sounding voice. (Other officers I know have failed at this. Perhaps you remember a particularly ugly catfight between two in ‘07 in the Pentagon from people who may resemble this.)

You know CDR Aboul-Enein if you took JPME II and studied the region, or were in the E-ring after 9/11, or in a variety of jobs we shall not mention here. He has written regularly in a number of publications, and has a particular skill in reviewing a book and giving you the essence of what’s going on–and he does that with books in Arabic that normally we would have no idea about. I’ve learned a lot about the region from his scholarship–and this has served me well when I got yanked from my previous warfare community into a new FAO community, language training, and work in the Middle East, where I’m deployed.

So he’s a friend of mine. I trust his instincts and read what he has to write.

And the guy snuck up on me and finally wrote a book. It’s a summary of years of work he’s done, looking at who these people we’re fighting are. How do these people think? What’s the pump that draws from the pool of normal people and spits out these jerks? What’s the scholarship trail?

Here’s the book, published by USNI. Admiral Stavridis has written the foreword. Can’t get much higher recommendation than that.

Posted by Chap in Books, Foreign Policy, Navy, Soft Power, history | read comments (2)

To beat the drum harder; in this profession a sound knowledge of history is absolutely critical. A love of books is essential. A long and clear perspective, understanding the paths and lessons of those who came before is a professional foundation stone.

Without that foundation, mistakes will be repeated. Debunked theories will be born anew …. with the same results at the terminal end. In our line of work, a terminal end usually results in dead Sailors, sunk ships, and a nation in extreme Strategic risk.

Every now and then a quote comes up from someone that just sets me back. Makes me take a deep breath and read again. Makes me go back to the beginning to look for some contextual clue that I missed. Makes me try to find some mistake in the reporter’s note taking or the editor’s red pen that truncated a quote to mean something the speaker did not intend.

Sadly, often times I find myself looking at another transformationalist – someone who thinks that war is new – a huge paradigm has occurred – “old” things will “never” happen again – a new kind of war that only the select few see will make all other things unneeded.

When you combine a transformatinalist with someone looking at the future Fleet with a more bureaucratic than strategic POV – then you often have this.

From Dan Taylor at InsideDefense;

The fiscal year 2010 defense authorization bill allocates $15 million for the Navy to look into a “mobile maritime sensor” that would essentially be a dedicated radar ship for use in sea-based ballistic missile defense, according to Senate Armed Services Committee staff.

An Oct. 7 committee press release following the passage of the conference report on the bill announces that the funding would be added “for a mobile maritime sensor development program to provide options for the Navy in meeting its sea-based missile defense requirements.”
…
Dave Baker, a naval author and analyst, said a dedicated radar ship “is not a bad idea.” The option would be “infinitely cheaper” than doing it on a CG(X), and the service could use cruiser hulls or even merchant designs instead of developing a whole new platform.

“There’s no sense in going out and building something specialized for that role,” he told ITN Oct. 21. “A bulk cargo ship could do it.”

Baker said such ships might preclude the need for some CG(X) hulls in the future. It would also be important for the surface warfare community to get a new mission, he said.

“They’re not going to be shooting at other ships at sea,” he said. “Getting a new mission for the surface community is important to the surface community.”

Sigh.

We have been here before. Remember when the depth charge, ASDIC, aircraft, and the homing torpedo would make the submarine no longer a threat? Remember when the B-36 and nuclear weapons made the Aircraft Carrier obsolete? Remember when the jet and guided missiles made a gun on a fighter a romantic anachronism? Remember when MIW was a problem for just the European navies to take seriously?

This is the same thought process that told the Royal Navy in the late ’70s early 80s that they would never need a gun on their ships again and that there was no use for Aircraft Carriers in the “new navy.” They got kicked in the teeth by the Argentines to prove otherwise.

I don’t know who this dude is – but I am sure he is a great, fun, and exceptionally smart guy – but someone get him a subscription to USNI’s Classics of Naval Literature series and Naval History magazine – please.

To steal a phrase:

Only the dead have seen the end of “…shooting at other ships at sea.”

If you plan the core of your Fleet with the assumption that you will not have to face another – you will cause Sailors to be killed – you will cause ships to be sunk – and you will cause your nation to be put in extreme Strategic risk.

“Phibian Salamander, a naval author and analyst, said that Dave Baker needs to read some more.”

Do we ever learn?

Posted by CDRSalamander in Books, Soft Power, history | read comments (28)

Up late working on homework, but came across the Navy’s new slogan: “America’s Navy- A Global Force for Good.”  Seems a little too international to me; good is so bland.

What do you think? Also, if you are in the Navy or former Navy post which slogan you joined under if you remember.
Accelerate your life!

Posted by jwithington in Navy, Soft Power | read comments (21)

Last week, Denmark the Netherlands announced that the amphibious transport ship HNLMS Johan de Witt will participate in Africa Partnership Station. The two month deployment is the Dutch Navy’s first major soft-power cruise. The deployment of the Johan de Witt demonstrates the growing Dutch interest in soft-power. But why?

Part of it has to do will the increasing acceptance of soft-power as a useful tool in international relations. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued as such two years ago and I whole-heartedly agree. However, there is likely another reason: soft-power cruises give navies missions for their ships.

The last eight years of war have been, apart from combat air support, sealift, and small maritime security operations, land-based affairs. As such, the US Navy played only a limited, supporting role in both conflicts. In Europe, national security threats are even more remote and European navies have few reasons to justify maintaining expensive blue-water fleets. Enter soft-power.

The possible benefits of soft-power cruises are numerous, but during the USS Nashville’s mission to West Africa, Captain Cindy Thebaud stated “the indicators [of success] will be long-term, not near-term”. In other words, soft-power is important, but impossible to measure. Thus, soft-power provides politicians and naval leaders with both a politically acceptable mission justifying naval budgets and a mission not accountable for effectiveness.

I am a strong supporter of soft-power, particularly using naval assets. There are significant diplomatic and stability benefits to US armed forces providing services and training after disasters and in marginalized regions. But, soft-power mission effectiveness is measurable. If our goal is to develop soft-power into an meaningful tool of foreign relations, then missions must be evaluated on useful metrics.

Posted by Christopher Albon in Navy, Soft Power | read comments (4)

Recently, the US Navy hospital ship USNS Comfort returned from a four month humanitarian deployment to Central and South America. The mission was the idea of Admiral James Stavridis, considered by some to be “the next Petreus”. While we will know more after the release of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), it is a good bet that health diplomacy missions like the Comfort’s are going to play a more central role in Navy operations in the future.

War reporter (full disclosure: and friend) David Axe recently completed a ten part interview series on the USNS Comfort’s deployment. In each part, Axe interviews a member of the ship’s crew (and riders). Be sure to check it out:

• Part One: The Commodore
• Part Two: The Commodore
• Part Three: The Commodore
• Part Four: The Doctor
• Part Five: The Doctor
• Part Six: The Nurse
• Part Seven: The Coastie
• Part Eight: The Master
• Part Nine: The Master
• Part Ten: The Aviator

Posted by Christopher Albon in Navy, Soft Power | read comments (1)