CDR Aboul-Enein’s finally done it. I’m going to rave about it sight unseen, based solely on his reputation.

Back in the mid-nineties, the Navy tried to build a Foreign Area Officer program. It didn’t work due to structural problems, but I was selected for the subspecialty along with a few other officers. I built a professional relationship with a few, including one guy with an unusual name who seemed to know a lot about the Middle East. As soon as I got back into port after 9/11, he was the first guy I emailed; I was worried about the potential for him to get caught up in harassment or trouble.

Turns out the opposite happened. He wound up being the guy who in the E-ring. He taught his fellow Americans about the insidious nature of islamist ideology and how normal folks in the Middle East think about warfare, a quiet, professional voice between the appeasers and the overly Jacksonian militants. This is very hard to do when so many people who oppose American values speak different things to different audiences, and lie to calm rational concerns about threat to people very willing to accept a reasonable-sounding voice. (Other officers I know have failed at this. Perhaps you remember a particularly ugly catfight between two in ‘07 in the Pentagon from people who may resemble this.)

You know CDR Aboul-Enein if you took JPME II and studied the region, or were in the E-ring after 9/11, or in a variety of jobs we shall not mention here. He has written regularly in a number of publications, and has a particular skill in reviewing a book and giving you the essence of what’s going on–and he does that with books in Arabic that normally we would have no idea about. I’ve learned a lot about the region from his scholarship–and this has served me well when I got yanked from my previous warfare community into a new FAO community, language training, and work in the Middle East, where I’m deployed.

So he’s a friend of mine. I trust his instincts and read what he has to write.

And the guy snuck up on me and finally wrote a book. It’s a summary of years of work he’s done, looking at who these people we’re fighting are. How do these people think? What’s the pump that draws from the pool of normal people and spits out these jerks? What’s the scholarship trail?

Here’s the book, published by USNI. Admiral Stavridis has written the foreword. Can’t get much higher recommendation than that.

Posted by Chap in Books, Foreign Policy, Navy, Soft Power, history | read comments (2)

German Battleship Tirpitz at sea, 1943

Sixty-five years ago, RAF Lancasters of Number 617 Squadron, the famous Ruhr “Dambusters”, and Number 9 Squadron, took off on a 2,300 mile mission to sink the German Battleship Tirpitz.  For some weeks, Tirpitz sat by herself in the bitterly cold waters of Tromso Fjord along the Norwegian coast, seldom moving.  In the latter months of her life, she would earn the nickname of Die einsame Konigin des Nordes. The Lonely Queen of the North.

When built, Tirpitz was one of the most powerful units afloat.  Slightly larger than her legendary sister ship Bismarck, KMS Tirpitz displaced more than 43,000 tons.  She was 824 feet long, armed with eight 38-cm (15”) guns, and had exceeded 31 knots on trials.  The British had tried desperately to destroy her before she was even completed, and between the RAF and Royal Navy, many air, surface, and subsurface attacks had been only moderately successful, and had often paid a heavy cost for their efforts.

Tirpitz in Kofjord, 1943

The operational history of Tirpitz is stunningly brief.   In fact, there had been but three sorties for the magnificent ship.  She had only fired her main battery once in anger, at targets ashore during a raid on Spitzbergen in September, 1943.  Yet, she presented a threat to the Russian convoys and to British command of the seas from the time of her launching until her sinking.  Tirpitz, with a varied array of Kriegsmarine capital units (battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, “pocket battleships” Scheer and Lutzow, and the superb heavy cruisers Hipper and Prinz Eugen), had been assigned the mission of commerce raiding, a role originally tasked to her more famous sister, Bismarck.   She never filled that role, nor did she ever engage an enemy surface combatant during her short life.  Hitler, unwilling to risk his heavy warships after the loss of Bismarck,  severely restricted the conditions under which German capital units could put to see to seek battle.

The role in which Tirpitz, and most of the capital ships of the Kriegsmarine, would have the most success was that of a “fleet in being”.   Despite a relatively few heavy units being assembled at any one time, and despite a lack of significant aerial umbrella (aside from some Luftwaffe coastal units) to protect them at sea, the German warships were perceived as a major threat to the convoys from the United States to Britain, and later to the Soviet Union via Murmansk and Archangel.

It has been estimated that the “fleet in being”, of which Tirpitz was the centerpiece and eventually the only significant unit, tied down ten times its own combat power in Royal Navy battleships, carriers, cruisers, and destroyers.   Many of these powerful warships were desperately needed in other theaters of war, most notably in November/December of 1941 in the Pacific.

HMS Repulse hit by Japanese bombs

HMS Prince of Wales heeling to port and sinking

How might Britain’s (and America’s) fortunes have been different in December of 1941 had a substantial task force (including additional aircraft carriers) been sent to Hong Kong/Singapore, instead of a single aircraft carrier, one modern battleship, and an elderly battle cruiser?   The largest and most powerful navy in the world was spread too thin to do so.   Instead, when Illustrious was damaged running aground, Prince of Wales and Repulse were helpless against far superior Japanese strength, and were sunk by aircraft from the 11^th Air Fleet.  (Had Illustrious been present, it is unlikely that she would have deterred the attacks, and most probably would have been lost along with Repulse and Prince of Wales.)

The threat the Royal Navy believed Tirpitz and her consorts posed can be illustrated by the fate of Convoy PQ-17.  Putting out of the assembly point in Iceland, PQ-17 was bound for Murmansk with about fifty ships and escorts in early July, 1942. Upon a mere report that Tirpitz (along with cruiser Hipper) had put to sea from Trondheim (Operation Rosselsprung), the order was given for PQ-17 to scatter.  In reality, Grand Admiral Raeder ordered Tirpitz to return to Trondheim over concerns that Home Fleet ships and aircraft would attack and sink her.   The merchant vessels of PQ-17, scattered beyond the protection of the escorting warships, were hunted relentlessly by Luftwaffe  aircraft and Donitz’s Wolf Packs, with U-boats and aerial attacks accounting for twenty-four merchantmen, nearly half of the convoy’s strength.

Tirpitz leads cruisers Admiral Hipper and Admiral Scheer to sea in Operation Rosselsprung

Even as late as November of 1944, Tirpitz, by then truly a lonely queen, continued to draw British attention as a lingering threat to Britain and her lifelines from America.  What the British did not know is that a raid on 11 September, 1944 had badly damaged Tirpitz forward, and the decision had been made not to repair her to seaworthiness.  So the raid of 12 November was launched from bases in Britain.

Tirpitz camouflaged at anchor

British Lancasters from 9 and 617 Squadrons arrived to no Luftwaffe fighter opposition, and despite heavy antiaircraft fire struck Tirpitz with at least two of the 6-ton “tallboy” bombs carried.  The massive battleship suffered a magazine explosion, and rolled to port on her beam ends.  She capsized in shallow water, taking more than one thousand of her crew into the icy waters of Tromso Fjord.   The “Lonely Queen” was gone, and the “fleet in being” was no more.  The effort since 1941 to contain and then destroy Tirpitz had been enormous, and had global implications for British and Allied naval strategy throughout the first five years of war.   Her existence as a “fleet in being” had far wider impact strategically than the heroic but ultimately fatal battles fought by her sister Bismarck in 1941 and her sometimes-consort Scharnhorst in 1943.

Tirpitz, capsized and sunk in Tromso

The concept of the “fleet in being” was not a new one, even in 1939.  In fact, the concept went back three centuries, when in 1690 the British had turned the trick on the French.   In the First World War, the High Seas Fleet had pinned down a much greater number of British warships at Scapa Flow than its own strength ever approached.  During World War II, not only were German capital units in northern waters such a “fleet in being”, but the Italian Navy in the Mediterranean served strikingly similar purposes, and necessitated the daring British raid on Taranto in 1940.  Indeed, the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor was in many ways a “fleet in being” to the Japanese, posing a far more serious threat than what existed the previous year when the Pacific Fleet was based in California.  The Pearl Harbor attack was, like Britain’s against Taranto, to eliminate a “fleet in being” which could challenge and disrupt control of seas vital to the Japanese.

The topic of Tirpitz and the “fleet in being” concept is not merely of academic and historical interest.  In the first decade of the 21^st Century, there has been much discussion by The People’s Republic of China regarding their desires for a blue-water fleet to protect global interests and establish regional hegemony in the waters of the Western Pacific.  We have seen a growing amphibious and power projection capability, and the maturing of a maritime denial strategy with an eye toward the United States Navy.  There is again discussion, this time more serious, of the development of naval aviation by the PLAN.

Could a burgeoning Chinese Navy become a “fleet in being”?  What implications does that hold for the United States?  In each historical example, a “fleet in being” that threatened vital interests was countered by one of two approaches.  The first was the dedication of naval combat power in excess of that which such a “fleet in being” could bring to bear, ensuring a reasonable chance of victory.   The second was an attack (pre-emptive in some notable cases) on that fleet from the air while the critical elements of that fleet were in harbor.

Ships of the PLAN execute underway replenishment at sea

PLAN Attack SS runs on the surface

Is the PLAN wagering we haven’t the national will for the first approach, and that they can effectively defend against the second?  We would be well-served to look at how the various “fleets in being” affected strategic and operational decisions on the part of maritime powers and wrap such considerations into future Maritime Strategies, and shipbuilding plans.  To do otherwise will be to stumble blindly into a future that our adversaries have prepared carefully for.  Such a course would be foolhardy and costly.

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Aviation, Foreign Policy, Maritime Security, Navy, history | read comments (10)

Very interesting report from the Associated Press yesterday.  RADM Donegan’s observations regarding anti-access capability in the article below express some of the same concern that has been heard in Naval and foreign policy circles elsewhere.

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By JEREMIAH MARQUEZ (AP)

HONG KONG — A U.S. Navy admiral expressed new concern Friday over China’s military buildup and urged Beijing to be clearer about its intentions.

With China’s military growing at an “unprecedented rate,” the U.S. wants to ensure that expansion doesn’t destabilize the region, Rear Adm. Kevin Donegan told reporters on a visit to the Chinese territory of Hong Kong.

Donegan referred to China’s expanded weaponry. His remarks echoed the concerns of other U.S. military leaders who have said the growth in China’s military spending — up almost 15 percent in the 2009 budget — raises questions about how Beijing plans on deploying its new power.

“When we see a military growing at that rate, we’re interested in transparency and the understanding of the uses of that military,” said Donegan, commander of the USS George Washington aircraft carrier strike group, a key part of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Donegan’s comments come as a top Chinese general visits the United States on a mission to strengthen trust between the two militaries and dispel U.S. concerns about the growth of the People’s Liberation Army.

Xu Caihou, the PLA’s second-highest ranking officer, told President Barack Obama on Wednesday that ties between the two countries’ militaries play “an important role in enhancing strategic mutual trust and deepening their pragmatic cooperation,” according to Chinese media reports.

China has boosted military spending by more than 10 percent annually for almost two decades, and the official figure of $71 billion this year is thought by many analysts to represent only a portion of total defense spending. It still amounts to only a fraction of U.S. defense spending.

China says much of the increase is used to improve salaries and living conditions for soldiers, but it has also been adding sophisticated new warships, submarines, fighter jets and other weapons systems to its arsenal. PLA leaders have also said they are considering building an aircraft carrier, but such a development is thought to be years, if not decades, away.

Donegan acknowledged the possibility of a Chinese aircraft carrier, but also said he was concerned with anti-access weapons. This class of weapons includes missiles and submarines that can threaten U.S. forces in the region and prevent them responding in the event of a crisis.

“I am absolutely concerned,” Donegan said.

He went on to say, “When a navy is doing that, we just want to make sure it’s transparent enough so those in the region understand what they’re doing.”

At the same time, Donegan described positive exchanges between the two militaries that he said he hoped would continue, including a visit by five Chinese army generals aboard the George Washington during its call in Hong Kong this week.

Ties between the two militaries have been repeatedly roiled by China’s objections to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, claimed by Beijing as its own territory, as well as Chinese efforts to disrupt Navy surveillance missions off its shores.

A series of confrontations involving vessels from the two navies has raised concerns over China’s rising determination to defend what it sees as its territorial interests in the South China Sea, where the U.S. has long operated as the major international power.

Donegan said the Navy would continue to operate in international waters — something that could come in defiance of Beijing’s claims it has the right to bar surveillance work inside its exclusive economic zone.

“We are going to continue to operate in the South China Sea and international waters and not in territorial seas of another country,” he said.

The visit of the George Washington, considered the crown jewel of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, is its first to Hong Kong in its 17-year history.

Associated Press writer Christopher Bodeen contributed to this report from Beijing.

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Is RADM Donegan on the mark with his concerns about China’s increasing capability and long-term intentions?  What are the chances of the Chinese being “transparent enough so those in the region understand what they’re doing”?

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Foreign Policy, Maritime Security, Navy | read comments (26)

At 0619 on a bright October morning in Beirut, Lebanon, a Mercedes pickup truck packed with explosives raced past US Marine sentries with empty weapons, sped through largely dismantled vehicle barriers, through a fence, and into the lower floor of the US Marine Barracks that held HQ Company Battalion Landing Team 1/8.  The explosion, one of the largest non-nuclear detonations since the end of World War II, collapsed the barracks, killing 241 Americans (mostly Marines)  and burying and wounding dozens of others.

The facts from Beirut were grim and maddening.  Sentries without loaded weapons, crew-served guns with no ammo belts, lack of barriers on high-speed avenues of approach.  All tactical sins, all foisted upon BLT 1/8 by those in Congress and in government concerned with “posture” and “appearances”.

Imad Mughniyeh, the alleged mastermind of the Beirut attack (where a simultaneous bombing killed 58 French soldiers) died in a car bombing in Lebanon in 2008.  In the intervening 25 years, he ran rampant throughout the world, killing and terrorizing as far away as Argentina.  He was responsible for the hijacking of TWA 847 in 1985, and the murder of US Navy Diver Robert Stethem, 23, a passenger on that flight.  In addition, Mughniyeh was linked to the bombing of the Khobar Towers.

Some hard lessons came out of that physical, military, and diplomatic rubble.  One would think that they would be with us yet.  Some apparently either forgot, or never learned.

• Muslim extremist are willing to die in order to kill Americans, even when they are send to help other Muslims.
• Proper “posture” is one in which US Servicemen are allowed to defend themselves and kill the enemy.
• Restraint in pursuing and killing those responsible for such acts is seen as weakness by America’s Muslim Extremist enemies, and such encourages more and more terrorism and killing.

We learned, though.  Didn’t we?

Well, the words coming from Afghanistan sound eerily familiar.  Overly restrictive rules of engagement that allow the enemy to engage and disengage at will unless caught in the act of shooting at American servicemen.  An admonition on the parts of General McChrystal and CJCS Admiral Mullen for US Servicemen to take “more risks” and not be so concerned about their own protection.  An outpost sited on poor defensive ground and vulnerable to attack, positioned not by tactical necessity, but by political expedience.  Again we hear the words “appearance” and “posture”.   We see the handcuffs on our servicemen engaged in combat with an elusive and ruthless enemy.

Let’s hope we don’t hear again how US Soldiers or Marines died sleeping, or without a chance to fight back, because appearance, posture, risk, and political expedience put them in that position.    On 23 October, 1983, 241 US lives were lost.  If we do not remember them, and how and why they were lost, we allow those lost lives to be wasted.

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Foreign Policy, Homeland Security, Marine Corps, Navy, Uncategorized, history | read comments (11)

“Special Missions” commands – oft times one hears the title and catches the slight eyeroll, or smile with a hint of a sneer about it . . . you know, the outfits that are “almost” a combat unit, but, well, you know, only “special” people go there – usually those in a career cul-de sac.    The photo community was one such – usually tolerated (at best) by CAG, his staff and the ship, the photo det received its scraps and pressed on nonetheless performing their necessary, but oft taken for granted, services.  Funny thing is, those special mission outfits often find themselves in the thick of crises when their “special” services are suddenly in demand.  Such was the case in 1962 when a young President found himself looking full at the beast – and needed more information.  VFP-62, fortunately, was there to answer the call. . .
- SJS

15 Oct 1962.  Imagery from U-2 flights begun on the 14th continue to roll in for imagery analysts at NPIC (National Photographic Interpretation Center), located in Washington, DC, from high altitude flights over Cuba.  Of interest is the Soviet build-up of forces on the island which apparently include nuclear-armed medium range ballistic missiles.  While detailed, the imagery isn’t granular enough to accurately determine operational status and equipment details.  To do so would require high-speed, low altitude runs…and the new RF-8A Crusaders of Light Photo Sixty Two were the perfect platforms to execute the mission…

Read the rest of this entry »

Posted by SteelJaw in Aviation, Foreign Policy, Navy, history | read comments (3)