I wrote this piece shortly after my first deployment in 2010, mainly to organize my thoughts and keep a record of my personal reflections. I captured what I considered to be the pertinent points of the experience and put the article away until I recently reopened the file for the first time in three years. There are a few parts that reflect the natural naiveté and pride of a first deployment JO, but I believe there is value in sharing the words as we continue to look back at lessons learned from various phases of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade. Particularly, I hope others use the occasion to capture their own personal CAS/COIN lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan as we all return to more traditional, pre-9/11 mission sets such as counter-maritime, counter-air, etc. I haven’t made any edits to the original piece.
Carrier-based tactical close air support platforms have proven to be valuable resources for ground commanders and war planners conducting counterinsurgency campaigns
In a remote village near Herat, Western Afghanistan, a mounted convoy of Marines travels en route to conduct a Key Leader Engagement with the village elder and local leaders. The opportunity to discuss economic issues, insurgent activity, and security concerns serves as a keystone in the effort to maintain a mutually beneficial relationship with the community. As the convoy navigates the small, winding roads, the lead vehicle strikes an IED and insurgent gunmen open fire from behind the walls of a compound 300 meters north of the friendly position. What might have been the obvious response in prior years, an immediate strike on the enemy position executed by aircraft overhead, now requires much more consideration. Following the tenants of Counterinsurgency (COIN) Strategy, as detailed in the Counterinsurgency Field Manual, the collateral effects of the bombing, to include potential effects on civilians and major damage to infrastructure, would likely negate the hard-earned good will critical to a successful COIN strategy. Additionally, the unintended effects could harm ISAF efforts in the long term by fostering resentment and reducing the credibility of friendly forces, ultimately driving local support to insurgent fighters.
- On Midrats 19 April 2015 – Episode 276: “21st Century Ellis”
- John Quincy Adams — The Grand Strategist: An Interview With Historian Charles N. Edel
- 4 Reasons Not to Resign Your Commission as a Naval Officer
- About Face: A Return to Marine Corps Innovation
- On Midrats 29 March 15 – Episode 273: Partnership, Influence, Presence and the role of the MSC