Unable to attend the 2013 USNI West Conference and Exposition in San Diego last week?

Well, you might have missed some really good information – except that you can still view some of the key presentations and panels by watching them on USNI’s YouTube page and get a summary of each day’s summary here.

Almost like being there except you miss the giveaways at the vendor’s booth.

Also, given that Midrats has Super Bowl “Best of” going this Sunday, it’s a way to get your “talking ’bout National Security” fix.

Posted by Eagle1 in Aviation, China, Cyber, Foreign Policy, Innovation, Marine Corps, Maritime Security, Naval Institute, Navy | read comments (1)

Cold steel isn’t worth a damn unless you have men to command it.

– Representative Fred Britten, House Naval Affairs Committee, 1928

The warrior spirit of its members constitutes the most important characteristic of any fighting force. Superior equipment is wasted unless manned by individuals that are properly trained to use the tools of their trade and are enlivened by a warfighting spirit. An effective force requires resources, yet millennia of human conflict teach us that platforms and weapons are no more than enablers through which warriors exercise their expertise and exert their resolve. Hence any changes in the warrior spirit will have a magnified impact on the force’s overall effectiveness.

Napoleon emphasizes the importance of a warrior spirit in one of his maxims: “The moral is to the physical as three to one.” A fighting spirit exists beyond the realm of warfare as a science. It resides in the realm of warfare as art; where intangible human passions affect outcomes. As CAPT (Ret) Wayne Hughes brings to our attention in a section called “Men Matter Most” of his book Fleet Tactics,our profession of arms must possess a warrior mentality, because “beneath the veneer of reason lie passion and mortal danger.”

In 1944 Fleet Admiral King issued an Instruction that underscored the importance of the human dimension in warfighting:

“As wars are fought by men the human element is a basic factor in naval warfare… It is the human element in warfare which may, if understood by the commander, prove to be the only way of converting an impossibility into a successful reality… A force of inferior material potency may, due to the moral resources of its men, prove superior in naval strength.”

The unforgiving conditions of maritime combat require a unique breed of warrior. This is due to the fact that at sea once a platform is detected there are few places to hide; and because, as opposed to land operations, members of platforms at sea are physically bound together. An important benefit of a common warfighting spirit is that it forges inseparable bonds and unifies members into “Band of Brothers.”

Yet even as arms and tactics change fundamental warrior characteristics are timeless. The collective spirit of Sailors and Marines give us a tremendous advantage over adversaries. The tenets that enable an effective fighting spirit in the Navy are summarized in the core values of Honor, Courage, and Commitment. These values are more than lofty ideas, designed to guide Sailors and Fleets to persevere in tough and confusing times. As our nation strives to organize, man, train and equip a superior naval force to meet the challenges of enhanced threats in a globally connected era, let us not underestimate or neglect the most important ingredient of the capability equation. To project seapower we must cultivate and extol the virtues of a warfighting spirit. History indicates effective sea warriors consistently exhibit the following traits: leadership, discipline, technical competence, creativity, and initiative.

• Leadership. Effective leadership is an essential ingredient of warfighting. Leadership is earned not bestowed. Leaders foster cohesion to achieve a common objective. Leaders provide clear direction and ensure subordinates understand the mission. They mentor juniors and uphold standards. With leadership comes authority, responsibility, and accountability. Authority refers to who is in charge of a task; responsibility refers to the fulfillment of a task; and accountability refers to who bears the burden for the conduct and results of a task.

• Discipline. To thrive in a melee at sea requires stouthearted individuals. The best warfighters possess tenacity and a stubborn determination to persevere against hardships and long odds to achieve objectives. This requires mental toughness and physical strength. Discipline enables the unification of individuals to achieve a common goal. Environs of the sea compel warriors to work together to survive and win.

• Technical Competence. Complex equipment and systems must be safely operated and well maintained. The maritime environment is hostile. Machines are constantly battered with salts, pollution, marine life, pounding waves and winds. Preventive maintenance extends the life of equipment and prevents failures. Every position in the Navy has basic skills and tasks that must be mastered to be effective in combat.

• Creativity. The American spirit of ingenuity is a significant advantage our Navy has over other navies. Tactical creativity does not emerge in combat unless it is nurtured and rewarded in peacetime. Pragmatic innovation from the deckplates has been and must remain a trademark. Viewed as a formidable weapon, the enterprising nature of American Sailors must be exploited to the fullest extent possible.

• Initiative. In war leaders are charged with exploiting initiative to advance the plan. This could be as complex as recognizing that a potential adversary’s actions indicate an attack or it could be as simple as a deck officer notifying his captain that he maneuvered to avoid a collision. Victory at sea depends on initiative, tempered by calculated risks and sound judgment. In the fog of war decisions must be made quickly with incomplete information. With lives at risk this requires a clear understanding of commander’s intent and tremendous self-confidence.

Despite the fact that the Navy Special Warfare community is very different from other maritime forces, the SEAL ethos statement does a superb job of describing at an individual level, the warrior spirit.

“In times of war or uncertainty there is a special breed of warrior ready to answer our Nation’s call. A common man with an uncommon desire to succeed. Forged by adversity, he stands alongside America’s finest special operations forces to serve his country, the American people, and protect their way of life. I am that man… We train for war and fight to win… I will not fail.”

Armed with formidable weapon systems, competent combat forces of the Navy and Marine Corps are the nucleus of American seapower. As our maritime forces prepare for a future shaped by dramatically smaller budgets, we must reinvigorate a warfighting spirit into the professional development of our men and women. Again from Fleet Admiral King’s instruction, “By training, discipline and consideration of the men’s welfare, the commander obtains fighting strength – a strength so great that it will take its toll against an opposing force superior in numbers or equipment.” The Sailors and Marines we entrust to operate today’s Fleet are highly knowledgeable and motivated. To maximize the warfighting effectiveness of our forces into the future we must cultivate within each individual a warrior spirit.

CAPT David Tyler, Navy Warfare Development Command,  Assistant Chief of Staff, Concepts and Innovation

Posted by admin in Books, China, Foreign Policy, Innovation, Maritime Security, Naval Institute, Navy, Tactics | read comments (9)

“…We will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.”-

Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21^st Century Defense

The strategic guidance for the Department of Defense released in January 2012 clearly emphasizes pivoting to focus on the Asia-Pacific realm.  While it notes that the Middle East is still an area of concern, the guidance largely adheres to the Obama administration efforts to shift diplomatic, economic and military strategic focus to the Far East, ending a decade of predominant focus on the Middle East.

But can the United States truly afford to refocus to the Asia-Pacific realm amidst the chaos of the Middle East?  Recent events highlight a deeply unsettling trend.  Iran is adamant that it will pursue nuclear technology; Israel is just as adamant that it will not permit this to happen.  Gulf States are warily following the Iranian progress and ramping up their own weapons acquisitions in the event that Iran acquires nuclear weapons technology.

The United States is leading a coalition of more than thirty nations in an International Mine Countermeasures exercise in the Persian Gulf right now, seeking to sharpen skills as fears of Iranian attempts to mine the Strait of Hormuz reach new highs.  Two carriers have been sent to the region to provide “95,000 tons of diplomacy” and act as a reminder of the potent strike potential the US can bring to bear.

Following the riots that led to the recent death of the US Ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens, the Commander in Chief sent Marine anti-terrorist units and two Arleigh Burke class destroyers to patrol off the coast of Libya.   Rioting spread like wildfire throughout North Africa and the Middle East- stretching to countries as widespread as Tunisia, Sudan and even staunch ally Saudi Arabia.  Intense diplomatic and military efforts took place to quell violence and halt further action against America.

Ironically, the most violent riots were in countries that received the strongest US support during the last year’s Arab Spring revolts.  Countries that were lifted from the yoke of dictatorship- under brutal regimes such as that of Muammar Qaddafi- and given billions of dollars in economic, military and diplomatic assistance have now violently turned on the US.  Far from the peaceful, democratic nations we had hoped would emerge, the region is at the brink of turmoil and chaos.  US interests may be in a worse state now than under the authoritarian regimes we helped to overthrow.

Even Afghanistan is posing serious challenges just as the ISAF prepares to draw down forces.  Taliban focus on disrupting the handover process has been all too successful, generating mistrust as infiltrated Afghan national forces are accused of killing dozens of their international trainers.  It remains questionable whether or not the Afghans will be able to emerge with a stable government or slip into chaos following America’s withdrawal.

Regardless of how one views democracy building, we must accept the governments that have formed in the region.   We must further understand what this means for US interests aboard- and how it changes our strategic outlook.  One of the most basic questions to ask when determining a national security strategy is whether or not the resources exist- or will exist- to enact such a plan.  This poses a challenge to a military facing an era of fiscal austerity, stretched by multiple demands on limited resources.

While the Obama administration announced that US strategy would entail a rebalance to Asia, the reality is far more complicated.  Though the Asia pivot has garnered immense attention, it is not an entirely new strategy.  America never left Asia.  Yet it serves to realign focus and resources towards the region on a broad front- economically, diplomatically and militarily.  Antiquated focus on the Middle East- including unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan would be shifted to a more modern outlook.

This pivot reflects the belief that Asia is the future- and rightly so.  Asia is home to five of our treaty allies and six of the ten most powerful economies in the world.    As globalization dominates international trends, our economic success is tied inexorably to that of our Asian trading partners.  Asia has emerged as the top economic region in the world, with increasing trade and global impact.  The future is in Asia and our national strategy must reflect that.

Yet we may not be able to rebalance just yet.  While Asia is clearly the region of the future, recent events have demonstrated that the US cannot leave the Middle East in its current state of turmoil without serious implications for national security.   America is quietly amassing naval forces in the 5^th Fleet Area of Responsibility (AOR).  The Pentagon announced the rapid redeployment this fall of the John C. Stennis Strike Group after it returned in March from a Middle East deployment.  Instead of the planned Western Pacific deployment, the ship will proceed four months early to Central Command.

Despite strategic focus on Asia, the Middle East is simply too tumultuous to leave.  With our current fiscal constraints and limited resources, this means that forces heading to Asia will potentially keep on transiting west to arrive on station in the Middle East.

Despite our best efforts to aid democratic movements and stabilize the region, the Middle East is rapidly approaching a crisis point.  With the Department of Defense facing tremendous budget cuts, the amount of resources available are limited.  American forces simply are not resourced to handle multiple significant crises simultaneously.   Assets from Asia must be pulled to help stabilize the Middle East in the short term.  This should serve as a poignant reminder that even though the Asia pivot is clearly in our best long term interest, ultimately fiscal limitations and rising regional tensions may prevent truly rebalancing until the Middle East has stabilized.

LCDR Rachael Gosnell is an active duty surface warfare officer.  She recently completed a Masters of Arts degree in international security studies from Georgetown University as part of the Navy’s Political-Military Masters Program.

Posted by admin in China, Foreign Policy, Maritime Security, Navy | read comments (4)

Russian Torpedo Boat circa 1897.

“There is, at all events, no perplexity exceeding that with which men of former times haven’t dealt successfully.”

- CAPT Alfred Thayer Mahan

Back in 2003 Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, Barry Watts and Bob Work (now the Under Secretary of the Navy) coined the term “A2AD,” for the growing Anti-Access, Area Denial threat posed by the proliferation of long range missiles systems, precision munitions, and satellite technology that will make operations in the littorals more challenging for 21^st century naval forces.  They were right when they wrote that ignoring the threat “appears to be a huge gamble and one that neither prudence nor history could recommend with much confidence.”  The challenge of A2AD spreads from the shores of the Arabian Gulf to the South China Sea and beyond with players like Iran, China, and North Korea continuing to develop and spread the capabilities and technologies like the C-802 anti-ship missile and FAC’s like the Chinese Houbei that has come to symbolize part of the threat.

While it is cast as a threat based on rapidly modernizing, high technology weapons the A2AD threat is actually nothing new in the annals of naval history.  Despite the description of certain technologies, like the Chinese DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, as “game changing” and “revolutionary” there are still basic principles of naval strategy and tactics that apply to these weapons.  At the turn of the last century the United States and the naval powers of the world faced a similar challenge.  Modern technology was advancing weapons systems and making it harder for naval forces to get close to the enemy’s shores.  The eminent naval strategist and historian Alfred Thayer Mahan (ATM) wrote on the subject, and offered some thoughts that may be worth considering as the world once again faces A2AD challenges.

In 1911 ATM published the lectures he originally gave at the United States Naval War College in the decade leading up to the start of the 20^th century as the book Naval Strategy: Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land.  In it he discussed the A2AD threat which developed after he gave his original lectures.  “It seems appropriate here to mention, if only incidentally, certain changes in the weapons with which war is waged,” he wrote, continuing “the progress of the submarine, the immensely increased range of the automobile torpedo, and the invention of wireless telegraphy,” were significant changes to the technology of naval warfare.  According to ATM the introduction of these new weapons would have an important impact on the development of naval tactics, however, “these consequences will not change the principles of strategy,” which apply to naval warfare.

In his essay “Considerations Governing the Disposition of Navies,” published in May of 1902, ATM also discussed torpedo boats and “the added range of coast guns, which keeps scouts at a much greater distance than formerly, and the impossibility now of detecting intentions which once might be inferred from the conditions of masts and sails.”  However, ATM’s continued discussion reminds us that the technologies which make A2AD a challenge are not exclusive of one side in the fight.  He says that “on the other hand the sphere of effectiveness has been immensely increased for the scout by the power to move at will, and latterly by the wireless telegraph.”  Today there are differences of distances, stand-off ranges, and communications and ISR, but these are the same issues faced over a century ago.

ATM made some suggestions on the tactical and operational level to approach the A2AD threats of his day.  He suggested that by taking advantage of high speed and large numbers, “it should be possible to sweep the surroundings of any port so thoroughly as to make the chance of undetected escape very small, while the transmission of the essential facts – the enemy’s force and the direction taken – is even more certain than detection.”  Today ATM might call for numerous and inexpensive unmanned systems to work the near shore and scout deep inside the enemy’s coastal WEZ.

Despite the fact many strategy and history students are taught ATM only cared about big guns and battleships, in his concept of the modern fleet which would face the early 20^th century A2AD threat ATM wrote “the vessels nearest in are individually so small that the loss of one by torpedo is militarily immaterial; moreover, the chances will by no means all be with the torpedo boat.”  After calling for small combatants which can take the fight in close in search of the torpedo boats, while assuming some individual risk, ATM suggested that a group of cruisers sail further out from the enemy’s A2AD threat range.  The cruisers are able to sprint to the support of the smaller ships if needed but also able to discover other enemy concentrations, or fall back to support the main battle fleet.  ATM pointed out that the main battle fleet has great freedom to maneuver.  He said the main force of the fleet can be hundreds of miles away, connected to the scouts, small combatants, and cruisers by wireless and “in a different position every night, [it] is as safe from torpedo attack as ingenuity can place it.”  The point is as valid today as it was at the dawn of the last century.  The ocean is a large expanse and in order for the enemy to attack, he has to be able to find you.  Even satellite surveillance and broad area ISR can only cover a portion of the maritime domain.

ATM believed there was nothing about the early 20th century A2AD threat that fundamentally changed the way naval strategy was developed, or how naval wars were led.  There would be changes to tactics, and the requisite adjustments to operational planning that those changes required.  He also made the point that a properly balanced Navy, with small combatants, cruisers, and the main battle fleet was required for success in any naval conflict.  However, at its heart countering A2AD is more about applying the intellectual rigor to overcome the time, distance, speed differences than it is about fundamental changes to naval strategy;  as ATM wrote “war is a business of positions.”  In the end, naval commanders must also remember it takes two to have a fight, and the idea is to ensure the enemy is dealing with as many, or more challenges, than you are.  You threaten him too and as ATM wrote, “These probabilities, known to the enemy, affect his actions just as one’s own risks move one’s self.”

LCDR Armstrong is an active duty naval helicopter pilot.  This post is adapted and expanded from his book 21st Century Mahan: Sound Military Conclusions for a Modern Era forthcoming  from the Naval Institute Press.  The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Posted by admin in China, From our Archive, History, Maritime Security, Navy, Proceedings | read comments (0)