Tomorrow, 11 March 2012, the storied USS Enterprise (CVN-65) will leave home port to ply the world’s oceans for the 22nd, and last time.  As she is about to head toward Middle Eastern waters, the Associated Press published a nice piece about her, and the challenges that her crew of 4,000 face in keeping a ship that is older than most of their parents operating and ready.

Since SWMBO reminded me how expensive picture books were to print, I figured I would take advantage of this newfangled internet thing to post some pictures of the Big E, and relate some things about her 52 years in service.   A good deal of these pictures will come from familiar places, such as NavSource.org,  and DANFS, as well as some others included from various spots.

Enterprise under construction in Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, 1960

Christening, September 24th, 1960

Enterprise in original configuration, perhaps on sea trials, with no embarked air wing. She reportedly exceeded 40 knots.

It is staggering to think of a ship 52 years in commission.   How long is that?   Here are some facts about Enterprise and her history:

The sitting Secretary of the Navy, William B. Franke, whose wife christened CVAN-65, had been born in 1894.   He lived to be 85, and still died 33 years ago.

Enterprise’s first CO, Captain Vincent P. de Poix, Annapolis ’39, had been a World War II aviator, and is still with us at 95!

In February of 1962, Enterprise stood by to assist with the recovery of the first American to orbit the Earth, LtCol John Glenn, USMC, in Mercury 6.

Enterprise was a part of the Second Fleet force that established the “Naval quarantine” of Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis, October, 1962.

Iconic photo of Enterprise (CVAN-65), Long Beach (CGN-9 next to starboard), and Bainbridge (DLGN-25) during 30,000 mile unrefueled global circumnavigation, June, 1964 (Operation SEA ORBIT)

Enterprise was the first nuclear powered warship ever to operate in a combat zone, off Vietnam, December, 1965.

Enterprise remains the longest warship ever to put to sea at 1,102 feet, 2 inches.

On May 24th, 2011, a Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet of VFA-11 made arrested landing number 400,000 on Enterprise.

When Enterprise joined the fleet in October of 1961, she was one of 24 carriers, and the only nuclear-powered carrier, in a Navy of 870 ships.  Today she is one of 11 nuclear-powered carriers in a Navy of 285 ships.

Flames on aft flight deck from fire that killed 28 Sailors and destroyed fifteen aircraft, 14 January 1969

Enterprise after 1979-82 modernization at Puget Sound

Enterprise deployed to Vietnam six times, Operation SOUTHERN WATCH three times, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM four times (about to be five), and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM three times.   Her CO, Captain William Hamilton, was not yet three years old when Enterprise was commissioned, her XO would not be born for another five years.

Enterprise celebrates her 50th, November 2011

Best of luck to all the Officers and Sailors who crew this venerable old warship.   She carries a glorious name proudly.  One day you can tell your grandchildren you sailed on her.    When you return, she will pass from the Navy list and into history.

But perhaps her name can live on with CVN-80.  There always should be an Enterprise in the US Navy.

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Aviation, Books, From our Archive, Hard Power, History, Marine Corps, Maritime Security, Naval Institute, Navy, Proceedings, Uncategorized | read comments (19)

Many of the decision points in our lives can be sorted into four specific guiding questions.  They provide an excellent means of evaluating our decision, our choices, and most effectively melding what we need with what we can afford.   The questions can correspondingly apply to selecting a college, or to  prospective employment.  They work well when designing and building a house, or buying a car.  Purchasing insurance.  Even when deciding on marriage.  What are these four questions?

• What can I live with?
• What can I live without?
• What can’t I live with?
• What can’t I live without?

Simple questions, really.  But their answers require a good deal of thought.

They are also questions that should be asked when developing National Security Strategy, and its subcomponent, National Military Strategy.  Those questions need to be asked as we determine the size, posture, and capability of our military and its supporting industrial base.   Those four straightforward questions must eventually be asked of our Navy at a number of different levels.

The first is to address the size and capabilities/capacity of our Navy.    What can we reasonably expect our Navy to do?  For how long?  In how many places at once?  Hard questions that demand realistic and informed discussion.   Currently, we have a Cooperative Strategy that cannot be executed under any but the most benign conditions on the world’s oceans.   How long are we going to continue to make promises to ourselves and our allies that we cannot keep?   What are we willing to have the courage to say openly that we cannot do with current capabilities?

Related to the above queries, but not identical, is to ask how big will our Navy be.   Numbers tossed around in the previous decade and a half range anywhere from 340 down to the current 285-ish.  (The disparity of 55 ships is equivalent to the strength of two Royal Navies, so it isn’t trivial.)  Yet, the budget realities and the cuts made to shipbuilding projections point to a number closer to 260, if not lower, by the end of the decade.  While it is true that 260 modern warships have tremendous combat power, it is also axiomatic that they cannot have the same global forward presence that 340 warships, some with somewhat less capability perhaps, can have.

The next level at which the four guiding questions need to be asked is the level of ship design and shipbuilding.    This cannot be done in isolation, but must be informed by serious and exhaustive discussion regarding what Admiral Zumwalt called the “high-low mix”.  How many capital ships of extensive capability are required for our missions, and how many of lesser but more appropriate capabilities does the Navy need?   It is this level in particular that the Navy seems unable, in fact abjectly refuses, to answer.   Not every ship needs every capability.   When we believe it does, we end up with multi-BILLION dollar platforms chasing skiffs off the Horn of Africa, and a fleet so expensive that the risking of a single unit for a dangerous but necessary mission becomes all but unacceptable.

There has been much discussion of those issues in the pages of Proceedings, and among Naval Officers and strategic thinkers, Naval enthusiasts, and the legions of the Great Unwashed who blog the intertubes.    One of the more interesting remarks in this regard was an assertion, perhaps rightly, that with its current philosophy and unwillingness to address the high-low question, the Navy is incapable of building a platform in between the under-gunned and unsurvivable LCS and an Aegis-capable Arleigh Burke.

So the question of the mix is not new.  Captain Jerry Hendrix wrote of it with his Buy Fords, not Ferraris in the April 2009 Proceedings.   Discussion at the last three USNI/AFCEA West conferences was rich with commentary.    In this month’s Proceedings, Norman Polmar evokes Plan URR with his A Paradigm Shift, asking whether a much larger number of STOVL carriers would be more effective than a small and likely shrinking number of $15 billion dollar CVNs.   (A hat-tip woulda been nice!)   When I asked the question of high-low mix at this year’s Shipbuilding Panel in San Diego, the panelists all but admitted that there hadn’t been much discussion on the subject, and that the goal was still 313 ships.

The final level at which those four questions above need to be asked is in the experimentation with “Optimal Manning”.   Anyone who even occasionally glances at this site knows my aversion to reducing crews of ANY equipment or weapon platform below what is required to drive, fight, fix, and maintain.  The biggest decision for the Navy has to be defining “optimal”, and to whom the term applies.   Is it “optimal” for the Navy leadership to show reduced manpower costs to our Congresscritters while our warships continue to experience serious maintenance issues and are not mission capable?    Do we want crews so thin that there is only time for eating, sleeping, and operating?   No time for training in the myriad skills and requirements of basic seamanship, damage control, or weapons proficiency?  Do we want crews that have no ability to absorb any casualties without compromise of mission?

Again, difficult questions.  Senior Navy leadership, and senior Defense Department officials, are going to have to make some hard calls.  The answer is not to exhort our Sailors to do “more with less”.   That bit of self-delusional platitude is the path to a head-on collision with the realities of combat, with usually catastrophic results.

The discussions must be informed, serious, and realistic.   And they need to be soon.   In May, USNI/AFCEA will be holding the Joint Warfighting Conference in Virginia Beach.    The theme is “Joint and Coalition Forces; The Inflection Point.  What to Hold and What to Fold?”  Without these discussions, commentary will again be nearly blind speculation, akin to a hand of five-card stud, but deciding which cards to keep and which to discard without looking at them.    If we continue to insist on playing our cards in such a way, we ought not to be surprised if the betting patterns of our potential adversaries change accordingly.

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Aviation, Coast Guard, Foreign Policy, Hard Power, History, Marine Corps, Maritime Security, Naval Institute, Navy, Piracy, Proceedings, Uncategorized | read comments (3)

Episode 113 “To be Blunt on Afghanistan 03/04 by Midrats on Blog Talk Radio
CDR Salamander writes:

Where is the line between truth, optimism, spin, happy-talk, and lies?

Those of us who have served in Afghanistan and those serving now all have our stories. Our guest this Sunday has a few as well.

“Over the course of 12 months, I covered more than 9,000 miles and talked, traveled and patrolled with troops in Kandahar, Kunar, Ghazni, Khost, Paktika, Kunduz, Balkh, Nangarhar and other provinces.

What I saw bore no resemblance to rosy official statements by U.S. military leaders about conditions on the ground.
…
When it comes to deciding what matters are worth plunging our nation into war and which are not, our senior leaders owe it to the nation and to the uniformed members to be candid — graphically, if necessary — in telling them what’s at stake and how expensive potential success is likely to be. U.S. citizens and their elected representatives can decide if the risk to blood and treasure is worth it.

Likewise when having to decide whether to continue a war, alter its aims or to close off a campaign that cannot be won at an acceptable price, our senior leaders have an obligation to tell Congress and American people the unvarnished truth and let the people decide what course of action to choose. That is the very essence of civilian control of the military. The American people deserve better than what they’ve gotten from their senior uniformed leaders over the last number of years. Simply telling the truth would be a good start. “

Using his article in Armed Forces Journal; Truth, Lies, and Afghanistan as a starting point – our guest for the full hour will be Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Davis, US Army.

For those of us who served in earlier wars this might bring back some memories. And the common warrior question: “What is ground truth?”

Join us live at 5pm here or download the show later from the same location or iTunes.

Posted by Eagle1 in Army, Foreign Policy, Hard Power, Soft Power | read comments (3)

The January 2012 issue of Proceedings Magazine contained an excellent article from Dr. Norman Friedman (“A Different Kind of Blast”, pg. 88-89) referencing the May 2011 testing of a cruise missile containing a Counter-Electronics High Microwave power (CHAMP) warhead.   As Dr. Friedman explains, high-power microwave (HPM) is a short-range and non-nuclear alternative to Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP), something which the US Military is becoming reacquainted with after a post-Cold War hiatus.

Dr. Friedman goes on to explain the differences between those two phenomena and that of electronic jamming:

EMP and HPM differ from electronic jamming in that they operate at much higher power and across a broad frequency spectrum; their users do not need intimate knowledge of how their targets function in order to disable them.

The applicability of this weapon in beginning to reduce the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) threat, and thereby helping to enable Operational Access,  is potentially very interesting.  Among the chief concerns to strategic and operational planners is the proliferation of anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles, the latter in supersonic and hypersonic form, which are likely to saturate US Navy missile defenses with lethal warheads, even a small number of which would cause significant damage.  This is not a new paradigm, as any Destroyer sailor on the Okinawa picket line in 1945 could attest.

However, with a weapon such as the CHAMP warhead, which by all reports is a more or less directional weapon, the ability to much more effectively and efficiently eliminate the targeting radars of air defense and anti-ship missile systems we would likely find in an A2/AD environment may be realized.

Previous discussions as to how to counter such numerous systems had centered around destruction with kinetic warheads, or disruption with “cyber” (there’s that word again) disruptions.  The first is likely beyond the reach of current capabilities.  Hardened and concealed positions will require precise, complete targeting and a prolific expenditure of munitions into areas where collateral damage may be considerable.   The second, the “cyber” option, assumes a level of networking that most of our adversaries have not achieved, and with known and assumed US capabilities, something that is often purposely avoided.  Indeed, a good deal of the air defense and anti-ship radars operate on purpose-built and relatively closed-loop networks, making intrusion into those networks a doubtful prospect.

Rather than destruction with kinetic munitions, or through disruption/intrusion, CHAMP/HPM offers the ability to blind those systems by burning out the processors and microprocessors of their operating equipment.

The recently-published Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) has a number of key imperatives that would be greatly enhanced by such capabilities that a directional HPM weapon can provide:

• Prepare the operational area in advance to facilitate access.
• Exploit advantages in one or more domains to disrupt enemy anti-access/area-denial capabilities in others.
• Disrupt enemy reconnaissance and surveillance efforts while protecting friendly efforts.
• Create pockets or corridors of local domain superiority to penetrate the enemy’s defenses and maintain them as required to accomplish the mission.
• Attack enemy Anti-Access/Area-Denial defenses in depth rather than rolling back those defenses from the perimeter.

While I am always hesitant to employ the overused and hackneyed term “game-changer”,  it would appear that countermeasures to something like CHAMP may be difficult to develop and expensive.  The technology required to produce the HPM-protection equivalent of a “Faraday Cage” may be beyond many countries and non-state actors to develop and employ.  The result of such limitations may render the A2/AD systems of smaller adversaries vulnerable to US capabilities.  Such may also significantly reduce the number of effective nodes of near-peer adversaries, who will have to choose which of the critical A2/AD systems they wish to make survivable.

As with every emerging capability, we need to be aware of the effects of such weapons on our own weapons systems and information/operating networks.  We aren’t the only ones developing such systems.   The back-and-forth of measures and counter-measures will be the future of such development.  With the widespread industrial espionage capabilities attributed to some of our adversaries, their development cycle will be foreshortened by the ability to steal information and technical data.

The myriad challenges of Anti-Access and Area Denial environments will require continued development and experimentation with equipment. technology, and doctrine.  However, the capability of a directional HPM weapon such as CHAMP provides a potential key to one of the A2/AD challenges that has increasingly become the focus of those thinking Operational Access.

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Air Force, Army, Aviation, Hard Power, History, Marine Corps, Maritime Security, Naval Institute, Navy, Proceedings, Uncategorized | read comments (5)

Among the Americans serving on Iwo island, uncommon valor was a common virtue.

-Admiral Chester Nimitz

America lost 6,821 of her sons on Iwo Jima.  More than 19,000 were wounded.  Twenty-seven Medals of Honor and more than 200 Navy Crosses were awarded for heroism on that island.

Where is USS Michael Strank?  USS Franklin Sousley?  USS Harlan Bloch?

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Air Force, Alexander Martin, Army, Aviation, Books, Coast Guard, Foreign Policy, From our Archive, Hard Power, History, Marine Corps, Naval Institute, Navy, Proceedings, Uncategorized | read comments (46)

Colonel William H. Dabney, Unites States Marine Corps (Ret.) passed away today.   He was the son-in-law of legendary Marine Lewis “Chesty” Puller, and was a mustang officer who commanded a two-company detachment of 3rd Bn 26th Marines on Hill 881S near Khe Sanh for seventy-seven days in early 1968.  Colonel Dabney’s Marines held onto that key terrain with clenched fingers against anything and everything the NVA could throw at them.  Only two ways off the hill, they said.  “Blown off, or flown off.”   A 2005 Leatherneck Magazine article tells the story.

Colonel Dabney waited 37 years to receive a Navy Cross for his actions.  It was awarded in 2005, at Virginia Military Institute, his alma mater.  Here is his citation:

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to:

William H. Dabney (0-80399), Colonel [then Captain], U.S. Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving as Commanding Officer of two heavily reinforced rifle companies of the Third Battalion, Twenty-Sixth Marines, THIRD Marine Division (Reinforced), Fleet Marine Force, in connection with operations against the enemy in the Republic of Vietnam from 21 January to 14 April 1968. During the entire period, Colonel Dabney’s force stubbornly defended Hill 881S, a regional outpost vital to the defense of the Khe Sanh Combat Base.

Following his bold spoiling attack on 20 January 1968, shattering a much larger North Vietnamese Army (NVA) force deploying to attack Hill 881S, Colonel Dabney’s force was surrounded and cut off from all outside ground supply for the entire 77 day Siege of Khe Sanh. Enemy snipers, machine guns, artillery, and 120-millimeter mortars responded to any daylight movement on his position. In spite of deep entrenchments, his total casualties during the siege were close to 100 percent. Helicopters were his only source of re-supply, and each such mission brought down a cauldron of fire on his landing zones. On numerous occasions Colonel Dabney raced into the landing zone under heavy hostile fire to direct debarkation of personnel and to carry wounded Marines to evacuation helicopters.

The extreme difficulty of re-supply resulted in conditions of hardship and deprivation seldom experienced by American forces. Nevertheless, Colonel Dabney’s indomitable spirit was truly an inspiration to his troops. He organized his defenses with masterful skill and his preplanned fires shattered every enemy probe on his positions. He also devised an early warning system whereby NVA artillery and rocket firings from the west were immediately reported by lookouts to the Khe Sanh Combat Base, giving exposed personnel a few life saving seconds to take cover, saving countless lives, and facilitating the targeting of enemy firing positions.

Colonel Dabney repeatedly set an incredible example of calm courage under fire, gallantly exposing himself at the center of every action without concern for his own safety. Colonel Dabney contributed decisively to ultimate victory in the Battle of Khe Sanh, and ranks among the most heroic stands of any American force in history. By his valiant combat leadership, exceptional bravery, and selfless devotion to duty, Colonel Dabney reflected great credit upon himself and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

Great web site about the “Warriors of Hill 881S”, of which Colonel Dabney was the mightiest.   “India Six Actual”.  Colonel Dabney was 77.

“Another Marine reporting, Sir, I’ve served my time in hell.”

h/t Masta G

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Alexander Martin, Hard Power, History, Marine Corps | read comments (41)

It’s gonna get you!

From NBC News.

It is difficult to think of a death too agonizing for someone whose sole objective is the deliberate killing and injuring of innocents.    So maybe living the remainder of your short life with the same horrible and painful wounds you wished to inflict on others is closer to poetic justice.   A shame he wasn’t sharing a phone booth with Ahmedinejad and Khameini at the time.   But fortuitous neither he nor his accomplice made it onto an airplane full of people.

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Hard Power, Homeland Security, Travel, Uncategorized | read comments (2)

Last Man Standing, The 1^st Marine Regiment on Peleliu

by Dick Camp

Zenith Press, c. 2008

Retired Marine Colonel Dick Camp (Lima-6) whose writing has taken us from the battlefields of the Great War to the August 2004 fight for Najaf, produces with “Last Man Standing” an unvarnished account of one of the most tragic stories of Marine heroism, sacrifice, and bloodshed in the securing of a Pacific island objective in the Second World War.

The author’s duties as Aide de Camp to Marine Corps legend General Raymond Davis allowed Camp to compile a compelling and fascinating inside account of the savage and unrelenting combat on Peleliu.  In addition to General Davis’ perspective (Davis was 1^st Battalion commander in the 1^st Marines under Colonel Lewis Puller), the author interviews Russ Honsowetz, also commander of a battalion (2^nd) in 1^st Marines, and makes extensive use of Eugene Sledge’s account of the fighting (With the Old Breed) to provide a day-by-day narrative of the unfolding of the near-destruction of Pullers’ First Marines in the coral crags of the Umurbrogol.

Operation STALEMATE, the seizure of Peleliu and Angaur in the Palau Islands of the Caroline Island chain, was intended to shield the flank of Douglas MacArthur’s drive to the Philippines.   The airfield on Peleliu was of particular interest to US planners, and was believed to necessitate a major operation to seize it and the rest of the island.   Despite the destruction of Japanese air power on Peleliu, and against the pleading of William Halsey to cancel STALEMATE, Admiral Nimitz ordered the landings on Peleliu and Angaur to proceed.  Camp’s accounting of the fighting on Peleliu, illustrated with helpful maps and combat photographs, is nothing short of chilling.  The airfield seizure was quickly accomplished, but in the rugged, forbidding coral croppings that ran the center of the island, a tragedy of bravery, sacrifice, and failed leadership played out.

The two Marine leaders whose performance, rightly, bear the most scrutiny are 1^st Marine Division Commander BGen William Rupertus, and legendary Marine Colonel Lewis “Chesty” Puller.   The reputation of General Rupertus is at best uneven, many of his peers and immediate juniors being somewhat unimpressed with the man, his tactical acumen, and his leadership.  On top of his already identified shortcomings, Rupertus had badly injured an ankle in a rehearsal and was nearly immobile.  His message to the Division that Peleliu would be a quick three-day affair highlighted Rupertus’ lack of understanding of the tasks at hand.

But it is the performance of “Chesty” Puller, commanding the 1^st Marines, that is laid bare by the events on that hot and forbidding coral ridge.  Camp’s book brings to the fore the human cost of Puller’s failure to understand the terrain and enemy his Marine rifle companies faced, nor the losses they incurred daily, for little or no gain.  Puller was hobbled by a flare-up of the leg wound he had received two years earlier, commanding 1/7 on Guadalcanal, and despite his characteristic penchant for locating his command post within rifle range of the enemy, his lack of mobility prevented Puller from walking the ground with his Battalion and Company commanders.  Had he been able to do so, he would have halted his stubborn admonition for wasteful and fruitless attacks against a disciplined and well-dug-in enemy in impossible terrain.  In addition, as Camp makes clear, his unwillingness to heed the reports of his superb Battalion Commanders doomed his regiment to being bled white in the coral hills.

Camp also describes the foolishness of Rupertus and Puller all but refusing to accede to the presence of an Army Regiment to relieve Puller’s shattered 1^st Marines after six bloody days, until Amphibious Corps Commander General Geiger came ashore and after meeting with both, ordered the relief.

How much Colonel Lewis Puller was affected by the debilitating pain in his leg, or by the death of his brother Sam on Guam some weeks before Peleliu is not known, but the author intimates both were draws on Puller, at a time and under conditions which required his absolute best.

Camp’s matter-of-fact treatment of an otherwise legendary figure in Marine Corps lore is a valuable reminder that perspective is an important component of historical analysis.  While many enlisted Marines would revere “Chesty” even after Peleliu, many Marine Officers who understood the tactical situation and had a larger view of Puller’s performance are less forgiving.  As an example, Camp includes the perspective of Captain Everett Pope, the lone surviving Company Commander who was awarded the Medal of Honor while leading Charlie Company in Davis’ First Battalion.   Captain Pope is quoted in Camp’s book leveling harsh, if justified criticism of Puller’s understanding of the terrain and conditions, and complete disdain for his ordering futile and bloody attacks.  “The adulation paid him these days sickens me”.   In hindsight, while Rupertus should never have been allowed to command the Division with his physical infirmity, Puller should probably have been relieved of command of 1^st Marines.

Thankfully, Peleliu was most decidedly not the end of the Puller legend.  His leadership at the front of those same 1^st Marines in November-December of 1950 in the breakout from the Chosin Reservoir is a study of inspirational leadership and determination.  There, Puller would win a fifth Navy Cross, and earn Brigadier General ‘s stars.    He retired from the Marine Corps in 1955 as a Lieutenant General.

Dick Camp’s book is an important work for understanding the history of the Marine Corps, one of its more tragic episodes, and a rather inglorious performance of one of its revered legends.   This book should be on the shelf of every serious student of the Pacific War, and of the Marine Corps’s role in that war.

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Air Force, Army, Aviation, Books, Foreign Policy, Hard Power, History, Marine Corps, Naval Institute, Navy, Uncategorized | read comments (1)

For an Institute dedicated to naval issues, Bold Alligator 2012 has all sorts of subtext. But the one that might be most difficult to miss is the widely announced intention to re-orient more towards the Pacific. And one hardly needs to advocate on this blog for the importance of the appreciation and understanding of military history.

But something is the matter with looking towards the Pacific. It isn’t necessarily that the strategy is wrong. It is that as a country we don’t always appreciate history. This isn’t a ‘kids these days’ sort of comment. A young Israeli officer knows his father’s and grandfather’s war stories. He’s studied since childhood the terrain and nature of the wars he is likely to face. The young American officer is different. In the service of a global power, he will invariably be called upon to fight an unexpected adversary in an unexpected place — witness our entire military history since the end of World War II. The one consistent thing about his father’s and grandfather’s war stories is that he probably won’t be seeing combat there himself.

But there’s something more specific about the reorientation towards the Pacific. It is a reorientation of ‘air-sea battle.’ The reorientation is not just a rebalancing from a decade of ground combat operations against insurgencies in landlocked countries. It has become about the high-end, high-tech capabilities that have gone unused and unnoticed by comparison since the Sept. 11 attacks. (I continue to come back to one book when it comes to new, legitimately game-changing technologies and the practical realities of their cultivation and implementation: FAST TANKS AND HEAVY BOMBERS: Innovation in the U.S. Army 1917-1945 by David E. Johnson) Even Clausewitz teaches us that each commander must be understood in the appropriate context of his circumstance, history, technological circumstance, etc. But the danger with the technology focus is that it tends towards territory that privileges concepts of fundamental, revolutionary change. And that’s particularly dangerous territory when it comes to appropriate appreciation for the lessons of history.

The U.S. has made the decision to return to the Pacific. Much of the thinking is about game-changing, high-end tech and the complexity of getting to the point of being able to successfully execute an air-sea battle concept. What are the best and most relevant histories we can recommend in terms of the long-term, enduring realities of the Pacific? There are many hard-won and costly lessons. Can we create a reading list of the books that best convey those realities and lessons to the servicemen and women who will be implementing this reorientation? What lists already exist that do this?

I would open with two:

• WAR PLAN ORANGE: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945 by Edward S. Miller
  For nearly fifty years the U.S. grappled with the fundamental realities of the Pacific theater. It was a messy, contentious and often flawed process (the struggle over the importance of the Philippines and the dominant place it served in the strategy over time is particularly memorable) but it provided the understanding of enduring strategic realities that not only made clear the need to move aggressively from coal to oil (and efficient, long-range oil power plants) but proved to have provided excellent foundations and guidance for the opening phases of the Second World War.
• HELL TO PAY: Operation DOWNFALL and the Invasion of Japan, 1945-1947 by D.M. Giangreco
  Particularly insightful immediately following War Plan Orange, Hell to Pay outlines the plans to — and the terrible inadequacies of the intelligence estimates of — invading mainland Japan (something War Plan Orange very explicitly and consistently argued against). Anyone involved in strategic thinking about the Pacific should understand the true cost of ‘rapid termination of the war’ we came all too close to paying.

What else and why?

Posted by nhughes in Hard Power, History, Marine Corps, Navy | read comments (14)

Monday was D-Day for Exercise BOLD ALLIGATOR 2012.  A good article from CBS News about the event, also at AFP.   Some cogent analysis of the significance of the exercise:

After a decade dominated by ground wars against insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, the drill dubbed Bold Alligator is “the largest amphibious exercise conducted by the fleet in the last 10 years,” said Admiral John Harvey, head of US Fleet Forces Command.

The American military, mindful that Marines have spent most of their time in the deserts of Iraq and the mountains of Afghanistan since 2001, said the goal was “to revitalize, refine, and strengthen fundamental amphibious capabilities and reinforce the Navy and Marine Corps role as ‘fighters from the sea.’”

The lack of practice at a craft that is immensely complex (amphibious assault) and requires extensive planning and rehearsal has been a concern of the Marine Corps for most of the past decade.  Many junior Officers and SNCOs have never been afloat, let alone had anything to do with amphibious operations.  Landing plans, serial assignment tables, scheduled, on-call, and unscheduled waves are terms unfamiliar to most.    Fire support planning in amphibious operations, challenging in the best of circumstances, must now be done in an environment of austere Naval surface fires.

The BOLD ALLIGATOR exercises, and the war games that reinforce them (EXPEDITIONARY WARRIOR, etc.) will introduce those younger Marines to the art of projecting power ashore from the sea.   Shortfalls in capabilities and capacity will be identified, new methods developed to leverage modern platforms, and assumptions either validated or proven incorrect.   The bugaboo of every amphibious operation, the command relationship between CATF/CLF, will be examined anew.

The addition of our French allies in this exercise is crucial, as the interoperability of international forces in a coalition operation is always a challenge.  Lessons on doctrine, equipment requirements and capabilities, as well as the personal command relationships between seniors, make for more lethal and efficient combat forces.

The landings in North Carolina and Virginia are not being conducted in a vacuum, either:

The threat of mines, anti-ship missiles and small boats in coastal waters conjure up Iran’s naval forces, but the commanders overseeing the drill, Admiral Harvey and Marine Lieutenant General Dennis Hejlik, say the scenario is not based on any particular country.

When asked by reporters last week, Harvey acknowledged that the exercise scenario was “certainly informed by recent history” and that it was “applicable” to the Strait of Hormuz, as well as other areas.

Harvey also said the exercise incorporated lessons from the 2006 Lebanon conflict, when Iran-backed Hezbollah forces hit an Israeli navy corvette with an anti-ship missile.

This event was important enough to have CNO Admiral Greenert in attendance, and highlights a significant shift in the Navy’s views regarding its role in the amphibious power projection mission.   While always publicly supporting the Navy-Marine Corps team, the unofficial position of the Navy toward this mission  seemed decidedly luke-warm and was at odds with the Marine Corps over requirements and resources.  This is good news for Naval forces whose focus will be the western Pacific.  One can bet a paycheck that the USN and USMC will be scribbling furiously, taking copious notes.   Lessons will be learned, training will be invaluable.

And best of all, an entirely new generation of Marines will be introduced to the smell of paint, exhaust fumes, crude oil, salt water spray, and vomit that are indelibly etched on every Marine who has climbed down the cargo net, ridden the tuna boats off the well deck through the surf, or splashed ashore from the LCUs.  The more things change, the more they remain the same.

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Air Force, Alexander Martin, Army, Aviation, Coast Guard, Hard Power, History, Homeland Security, Marine Corps, Maritime Security, Naval Institute, Navy, Uncategorized | read comments (8)