The following post is by a friend of mine, Nate Hunt.  Nate takes care of the family farm by day, and by night does CG renderings of North Korean missile launch sites.  He often shares his work on facebook, where I’ve watched him hone his skills over the last few years.

_____________________

A number of people have asked me to do short write-up describing a little about the current Tongchang-ri launch pad reconstruction work that I am working and why I am doing such a project along with the methods and tools I use for the reconstruction process.

To answer the first question, the launch pad reconstruction is actually a small part of a much larger project which scope is to accurately reconstruct not just the launch pad but the entirety of the North Korean West-Coast launch site that I am currently working on reconstructing in small stages with the launch pad being just a part.

The reconstruction is to provide a comprehensive reconstruction tool of said site for research and to help gauge changes to the site overtime which is useful if one has an accurate model to compare top down images with to better understand how things may be have been changed or removed over time.

Read the rest of this entry »

Posted by YN2(SW) H. Lucien Gauthier III in Hard Power, Innovation | read comments (2)

USAF photo

Please join CDR Salamander and me on February 10, 2013 at 5pm Eastern U.S. for “Episode 162: Air Diplomacy, Air-Sea Battle, and the PAC Pivot”:

Photo: Lockheed Martin

As we shift from ground combat in Asia and reset to a more natural position of a naval and aerospace power, are we thinking correctly on how to best leverage our resources and strengths?

Photo: MDA

How should we be using sea power and air power to create the right effects during peace, yet be poised to have the best utility at war? Are there concepts, habits, and systems that have had their time and should be moved aside for newer tools and ideas?

Our guest for the full hour will be Dr. Adam Lowther, Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest in Washington, DC.

He is the author of numerous books and articles on national security topics and previously served in the US Navy.

Join us live if you can here or download or listen to the show later here or on our iTunes page here.

Posted by Eagle1 in Air Force, Aviation, Foreign Policy, Hard Power, Homeland Security, Maritime Security, Navy | read comments (0)

In the course of reading Robert Kaplan’s article in the Wall Street Journal, I had to back up and read this twice.

The Japanese navy boasts roughly four times as many major warships as the British Royal Navy.

Wait … what?

OK, that reality has sunk in over the last decade – but we are still a bit of an Anglophile navy,  and even with the Pacific Pivot, we still give the mother country a lot of heft for historical and emotional reasons.

In their constitutional quasi-isolation, Japan’s very real power has

Here is the context;

… in Asia. Nationalism there is young and vibrant—as it was in the West in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Asia is in the midst of a feverish arms race, featuring advanced diesel-electric submarines, the latest fighter jets and ballistic missiles. China, having consolidated its land borders following nearly two centuries of disorder, is projecting air and sea power into what it regards as the blue national soil of the South China and East China seas.

Japan and other countries are reacting in kind. Slipping out of its quasi-pacifistic shell, Japan is rediscovering nationalism as a default option. The Japanese navy boasts roughly four times as many major warships as the British Royal Navy. As for Vietnam and the Philippines, nobody who visits those countries and talks with their officials, as I have, about their territorial claims would imagine for a moment that we live in a post-national age.

The disputes in Asia are not about ideology or any uplifting moral philosophy; they are about who gets to control space on the map.

Silly Transformationalists … dreaming is for kiddies.  Get ye back to your history books!

Back on topic though; yes, the facts are clear.

Though you can find +/- difference depending on source, definitions, and recent com/decom; here are the numbers:
Royal Navy:
Helicopter Carriers: 2
Amphibious Ships: 2
Destroyers: 7
Frigates: 13
Submarines: 6-SSN, 4-SSBN

We’ll call that 24.

Japanese Navy:
Helicopter Carriers: 2 (technically 4, all of which are helicopter carrying destroyers. The SHIRANE Class of 2 are only half decks and are really just destroyers. HYUGA Class of 2 are no-kidding helicopter carriers. Two more much larger 19,500 ton ships on the way this decade as well).
Amphibious Ships: 5
Destroyers: 40
Frigates: 6
Submarines: 16-SS

We’ll call that 67. If you are what Salamander defines as “major combatants” then you have 2.8 times, not 4x, but there are lots of ways to count. Perhaps they are looking at smaller ships as well. By either definition though, it should give one pause not only to reflect about the decline of the Royal Navy – but more importantly – the latent and potential power of the Japanese Navy.

Anyone who has worked with the Japanese will agree with me as well that from a professional point of view, they are an exceptionally quality force.

Here is the tie in.

Did you catch this little memo?

Japan’s Defense Ministry will request a second boost to its military budget, according to reports, just a day after the government announced the first Defense budget increase in 10 years.

The boosts, although relatively modest compared with Japan’s overall defense spending, coincide with increasing tensions in the Asia Pacific region.Japan’s Defense Ministry intends to ask for 180.5 billion yen ($2.1 billion) from a government stimulus package – on top of an increase of more than 100 billion yen ($1.1 billion) to its military budget announced earlier this week – in order to upgrade its air defenses, according to the BBC..

Good. Japan needs to continue to do this, and we should welcome the move as long overdue (though don’t get too excited, their larger budgetary problems are even greater than ours). Europe fades, Royal Navy withers … where can the USA look for its major partner at sea?

We don’t have to look far. With the tweaks they are on the road to make in their Constitution – Japan is right there.

Posted by CDRSalamander in Hard Power, Navy | read comments (42)
Tags: Japan, Royal Navy

Join us at 5pm (Eastern U.S.), 6 Jan 2013, for the first live episode of the new year,  Episode 157: “Force Structure and Tipping Points”:

What happens when a global maritime power finds itself in a position where it can no longer sustain the global presence it once considered an essential requirement?

The US Navy has been in a period of decline in both numbers and capability for awhile, and as budgetary reality sets in and burn out starts to hollow remaining capabilities – the decline is set to continue for at least another decade.

How far the decline goes until stability sets in is unknown, but what is the best reaction to this reality? Are the lessons one can derive from history that can help policy makers shape direction and priority going forward?

Our guest for the full hour to discuss will be Daniel J. Whiteneck, Ph.D.

Dr. Whiteneck is a Senior Research Scientist at the Center for Naval Analyses. He has directed projects ranging from Tipping Point and the future of US maritime dominance, to the use of naval forces in deterrence and influence operations. He also led studies on naval coalition operations and maritime security operations focusing on counter-piracy and counter-proliferation.

Dr. Whiteneck deployed twice with Carrier Strike Groups for OEF and OIF. His CNA field assignments included two tours on numbered fleet staffs, as well as field representative to the Commander of NATO Joint Command Lisbon in 2004-05. He also did three tours in the Pentagon as CNA Scientific Analyst to N51, N31, and OPNAV DEEP BLUE.

He held academic positions at the Seattle University, the University of Colorado, and the Air Force Academy, before joining CNA. In addition to authoring a number of CNA studies over the past 14 years, he has published articles and book chapters on US and British global leadership and naval operations, NATO’s expansion and operations, and the role of conventional and strategic deterrence against terrorist networks and rogue states after 9/11.

Join us live here or download the show later from Midrats on BlogTalkRadio or from our iTunes page.

Posted by Eagle1 in Hard Power, Homeland Security, Maritime Security, Navy | read comments (0)

In his own soft-spoken words, from our Americans at War Series.

http://www.americans-at-war.com/videodetail.php?id=2

In part:

Daniel Inouye / U.S. Army /Served 1943-1947. Inouye’s remarkable act of courage resulted in being awarded the Medal of Honor. This can be partly explained by the words his Japanese immigrant father told him before deploying, “This country has been good to us. Whatever you do, do not dishonor this country and if you must die, die with honor.”

In the outtakes of this video, Inouye related to the Naval Institute that the grenade was in the hand of the arm that was blown off  (THE ONE BLOWN OFF), pulled out the grenade out of that hand and threw it over enemy lines.

Posted by admin in Army, Hard Power, History | read comments (3)

We hear a lot about the Battle Force when talking about US Navy force structure and the documents that guide how we deploy and employ our Fleets.  As a reader of Mahan, the language brings me back to a phrase he repeatedly uses in his writing, “The Battle-fleet.”  See, in Mahan’s day the U.S. Navy started out as a 5th rate power (or worse) and didn’t even have a single fleet that could stand up to a foreign navy when massed together.  Over the years he wrote, culminating about the time he passed away in the prelude to World War I, the USN slowly built its battle-fleet to be a peer of almost any navy on the seven seas.  Over the next century the USN continued to build and develop itself into the superpower it is today, with several fleets positioned globally.

Much of what we hear about the Battle Force today harkens back to Mahan’s writing on how to use the battle-fleet.  The focus is decisive combat against the enemy’s naval forces followed by or concurrent with the projection of power ashore.  The focus is on the high-end and kinetic operations which should be the focus of the battle-fleet and, by analogy in today’s language, the modern Battle Force.

But the comparison to today’s Navy starts to come apart as you read about the types of ship’s Mahan thought were appropriate for a navy.  While most of us are taught about his belief in the battle-fleet, and its role in pursuing and winning decisive battles that would establish American command of the sea, we’re rarely reminded that in his view a Navy didn’t stop there.  Yes, he believed the battle-fleet had to win the decisive battle but there are many other tasks of naval forces.  In his essay “Considerations Governing the Disposition of Navies” he wrote that a properly constructed navy needed to be balanced and have three main parts.  First was, yes, the battle-fleet.  Second was independent cruisers.  Third was small combatants and craft to operate in close to an enemy’s shoreline.  It wasn’t all one battle-fleet, but a balanced naval force designed for more than just blue water battle.

Each of these different groups of naval vessels had a role to play in major combat operations, but also a matching role to play in peacetime operations.  In war the battle-fleet remained offshore, far enough away from the enemy’s coastline that it wouldn’t fall victim to costal defenses (what today we call A2AD threats).  There the battle-fleet awaited the enemy’s fleet, maneuvering for positions of advantage for the coming decisive battle.  The independent cruisers would range between the battle-fleet and the enemy’s coast, looking to pick off scouts and small squadrons or ranging further afield to strike at the enemy’s merchant shipping and impose an economic cost.  Finally, the smaller littoral ships ranged in close, tested and engaged the enemy’s coastal defenses, and scouted for the enemy’s fleet to determine when or where it would sortie to engage in the decisive battle.

Today’s Battle Force has platforms which fill all of those rolls in the vision of the 21st century naval conflict.  In Mahan’s day it was an all surface affair, with ships of varying sizes and armaments filling the roles.  (He wrote that submarines and torpedo craft, which were experimental platforms for turn of the century navies, were likely to gain success and capability and become part of the mix, but it hadn’t happened before his death).  Today, many of the roles are still filled by surface combatants, but submarines and aircraft have taken over significant parts of the equation.  They have assumed many, if not all, of the roles and missions traditionally taken by the independent cruisers and the small combatants in the littorals, and with much success in kinetic operations.  The name Battle Force, rather than battle-fleet, is certainly accurate.

The problem with today’s Battle Force is that by replacing the cruisers, scouts, and small combatants with submarines and aircraft it loses the capabilities those vessels brought to the peacetime missions.   For centuries navies, unlike armies and more recently unlike air forces, have had dual responsibilities not just to fight and win the nation’s wars at sea but to serve in peacetime to protect the nation’s interests, deter challengers, and serve as a diplomatic arm of the military in building partnerships and friendships across the globe.   From our nation’s earliest days the dual uses of naval forces were on our leaders minds.  Former Naval Academy and Naval War College professor Dr. Craig Symonds wrote in his book Navalists and Antinavalists:

All of President James Monroe’s surviving papers on the navy or on naval policy reflect a concern that it efficiently perform two distinct services: first, that it be adequate to cope with the daily problems of a maritime nation – smuggling, piracy, and combating the slave trade; and, second, that it provide the United States with a comfortable degree of readiness in case war should be forced upon the nation.

What today we refer to as maritime security operations and partnership building isn’t a new-fangled 21st century idea.  In fact, it’s a mission which goes back to the very founding of our service, shared with navies throughout history.

Today’s Battle Force is a battle-fleet on steroids, one that has absorbed the rest of the naval force.  It is surely powerful and brings us more than “a comfortable degree of readiness in case war should be forced upon the nation.”  For fighting and winning a major war it has no equal on the seven seas.  However, it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy because major war may become more likely if there are no ships to conduct the first distinct service President Monroe enumerated.

While the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower says all the right things, the Battle Force isn’t built for that strategy.  It is only built for one half of our navy’s job.  It has mobility and the flexibility to engage multiple targets, but more and more often it lacks true adaptability to do more than just put warheads on foreheads, or threaten it.  As the Battle Force shores up its control of the Navy the ability to adapt to smaller contingencies, work in contested waters that are not yet in kinetic conflict, or engage non-state actors and build partnerships becomes harder and harder.  Yet these are all the things needed to help avert war, and so actual war at sea becomes more likely, and the Battle Force continues to become stronger.

Naval thinkers from Mahan to Corbett to Zumwalt to Hughes have discussed the importance of having a balanced fleet.  High/low mix, Streetfighter, or Influence Squadrons are just other ways to talk about a balanced fleet which is capable of the “regular” major combat operations and fleet engagements as well as the “irregular” maritime security operations and partnership/diplomatic development.  Mahan wrote that his own thinking and writing provided a solid foundation to move on to the writing of Sir Julian Corbett, the British navalist who told us that “in no case can we exercise control by battleships alone.”  Today’s networked Battle Force is impressive and powerful.  As Mahan wrote, it is the starting point for a properly constructed naval force.  But the question is…does a powerful battle-fleet alone provide the Navy we need to face the turbulent seas of the 21st century?

LCDR Armstrong is a contributor to Proceedings, Naval History, and USNI Blog.  His book 21st Century Mahan: Sound Military Conclusions for the Modern Era is forthcoming from NIP.  The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Posted by admin in Foreign Policy, Hard Power, History, Innovation, Maritime Security, Navy, Proceedings, Soft Power, Tactics | read comments (12)

In Afghanistan today, it is the general meta-trends that matter.

In his twitter feed, our co-blogger here at USNIBlog and SHAPE, Admiral Stavridis, points to a link for a very nice story that really is worth your time to read, as it does represent the very best of our partnering with the ANSF – and what should have been the general condition of our relationship in 2012, vice just a specific instance;

1st Lt. Michael Molczyk had heard stories about “insider” attacks — and the Afghan soldiers and police officers who grew to see their partners as enemies. As a platoon commander, he couldn’t ignore those assaults on American troops, which during bad weeks were reported day after day.

But to him, he said, the stories sounded like news from a different planet. In Molczyk’s corner of eastern Afghanistan, uniformed Afghans had saved American lives time and again. They had developed a brotherhood with their U.S. partners that felt earned and unassailable. … no relationship mattered more to Molczyk than his partnership with Jalaluddin, the head of the Afghan police in Jaji district …

Sadly, that relationship between two specific individuals is not in line with the general trend in Afghanistan – and with each Green on Blue we need to look that fact square in the face. While there are always individual stories that can tell any side of an issue – it is the general trend that you need to keep an eye on.

The bottom line is this; we are well along the scheduled withdraw on a calendar-based vice conditions-based OPLAN. That is a polite way of describing a retreat under fire. Those we will leave behind, and those who will fill the vacuum after we leave are acting in a rational manner, and the second and third order effects of our decision to leave the field will continue to fill your news feed as the process takes its natural course. We have been here before.

As noted last month;

The last of the 33,000 American surge troops sent to Afghanistan two years ago have left the battlefields of Afghanistan, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said.

Actually, it was four years ago that the uplift of forces started – but let’s not quibble.

That little note from last month was one of the critical junctures following President Obama’s 2009 West Point Speech where he announced the end of conditions based planning for AFG. Gone was the “Shape-Clear-Hold-Build”, and in was the race to slap something together with bailing wire and duct-tape until our then 2011 (and now 2014 thankfully) drive to whatever will be our version of the Friendship Bridge.

Defeat, like decline, is more often than not a choice. In AFG, it is/was unquestionably a choice. We threw away a good chance for an acceptable outcome the minute we told our enemies, and more importantly our friends and those on the fence, that we lacked the strategic patience to follow through on our promises, creating in essence a self-fulfilling prophecy of failure. They have seen this before.

As the cliche states, “Hope is not a plan.” In war, hope is a path to self-delusion and defeat. So it has always been, so it will always be.

In the executive summary from the International Crisis Group’s, Afghanistan: The Long, Hard Road to the 2014 Transition,  they cut right to the chase;

Plagued by factionalism and corruption, Afghanistan is far from ready to assume responsibility for security when U.S. and NATO forces withdraw in 2014. That makes the political challenge of organising a credible presidential election and transfer of power from President Karzai to a successor that year all the more daunting. A repeat of previous elections’ chaos and chicanery would trigger a constitutional crisis, lessening chances the present political dispensation can survive the transition. In the current environment, prospects for clean elections and a smooth transition are slim. The electoral process is mired in bureaucratic confusion, institutional duplication and political machinations. Electoral officials indicate that security and financial concerns will force the 2013 provincial council polls to 2014. There are alarming signs Karzai hopes to stack the deck for a favoured proxy. Demonstrating at least will to ensure clean elections could forge a degree of national consensus and boost popular confidence, but steps toward a stable transition must begin now to prevent a precipitous slide toward state collapse. Time is running out.

Yes, our timing is that bad.

Quiet planning should, nonetheless, begin now for the contingencies of postponed elections and/or imposition of a state of emergency in the run up to or during the presidential campaign season in 2014. The international community must work with the government to develop an action plan for the possibility that elections are significantly delayed or that polling results lead to prolonged disputes or a run-off. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) should likewise be prepared to organise additional support to Afghan forces as needed in the event of an election postponement or state of emergency; its leadership would also do well to assess its own force protection needs in such an event well in advance of the election.

Does anyone see a ISAF, post-USA withdraw, getting involved in AFG domestic police actions? Really?

No, they/we won’t. The Taliban also know we won’t. They know we have left the field for them, and they are patient. We no longer have the ability or will to break their back, and with only one more fighting season left until we are totally focused on withdraw – we can’t.

I am reminded of one of the heartbreaking scenes – for a military professional – from the 1984 movie, The Killing Fields.

In the background as Dith Pran and Sydney Schanberg watch the fighting between Khmer National Armed Forces and the Khmer Rouge, we see Tom Bird’s US military adviser character do what he can to push his Cambodian forces on, to let them know that the USA was with them. Pointing to himself (in bold below);

00:27:00 What did he say?

00:27:01 He said he thought all American people left already.

00:27:05 Made in the USA.

00:27:10 Are we winning?

00:27:12 No, you’re not winning.

We have seen this before, and so have those who were our friends.

Much more will be written about our AFG experience over the next couple of decades. Somewhere there is a young man or woman who will be the next McMaster, who will cut their PhD teeth on how this all came apart. How a conscious decision was made to slide from a position of strength and progress to one of weakness, vacillation, insecurity, and decline. Why thousands of years of sound military experience was thrown away one evening in New York State, pretending that the lessons of history didn’t apply to us. We thought that because it was spoken, so it would be done; that hope and luck would beat the calender and patience. Through it all, the silence of “make it happen” marched forward in to the maw, again.

Rest assured, we won’t be leaving these problems behind in AFG. No, then enemy has a vote – and they too have seen this before.

CBS correspondent Lara Logan put it well recently;

“There is this narrative coming out of Washington for the last two years,” Logan said. It is driven in part by “Taliban apologists,” who claim “they are just the poor moderate, gentler, kinder Taliban,” she added sarcastically. “It’s such nonsense!”
…
She made a passionate case that our government is downplaying the strength of our enemies in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as a rationale of getting us out of the longest war. We have been lulled into believing that the perils are in the past: “You’re not listening to what the people who are fighting you say about this fight. In your arrogance, you think you write the script.”
…
The Taliban and al Qaeda, she made clear, “want to destroy the West and us,” and we must fight fire with fire, She appeared to leave the assembled alternatively riveted and just a bit troubled by a critique with interventionist implications clearly drawn from her reporting.

When you have the person who just tried to kill you on the ground, with your knee on his chest and your knife at his throat, but then you get off and try to walk away without finishing the job – should you be shocked when he gets up and attacks you? Should you be shocked if he does not stop his attack simply because you stopped it? Will he stop if you cry uncle? If you bow, apologize, and plead?

Really?

So there we are; we have emphasized the meme of the weak horse, and the butcher’s bill will be dear because of it.

What is the solution? Frankly, I think it is too late to get back to where we were in late 2009. We are almost three years in to the signal of retreat that we sent. Those allied nations in ISAF who have not already left will soon. Those AFG on the fence have already made plans and associations with our enemies to protect the interests of their families, villages, and tribes in the expectation that we will abandon them. Smart move, if I were them I would do the same thing.

A precursor to the Soviet withdraw were their version of Green on Blue – the AFG remember that and are seeing it again. They have indications and warnings too.

Could the NOV USA election change anything? No. With the lack of top-level support and enthusiasm for the mission, the American people lost whatever will they had to aggressively sustain operations in AFG – and with much of the uplift gone and force levels back to late-’09/early-’10 levels and falling, that momentum is gone and even if the will was there – it would be difficult to get back.

We are at the point now where the die is cast. This version of the war in AFG for USA forces will soon be over regardless, by design. All that remains is to see if we drive across our version of the Friendship Bridge, or leave in a helo under fire; all the while doing our best to avoid Gandamak.

Until then, there are things that can be done on the margins, but one question remains; if we are not in this to win it – do we have the political will, rules of engagement, and operational plan to create the effects on the ground to further our national interests besides just “getting out?”

Is, “Do the best we can until the summer of 2014 and then wish them luck.” now by default our Mission Statement? Has the military leadership been realistic about what can be achieved inside the POLMIL guidance it has received? What Decisive Points have we achieved in our Lines of Operation? Are they in-line with expected time-line dates? What about our Effects Matrix?

District by District, Province by Province – is the Afghan government on, behind, or ahead of schedule to take over security responsibilities? Are the criteria used to determine that status tighter or looser than they were three years ago?

Yes, much of that is classified – but it won’t be forever. This story will be told, and people will be held to account. If history is any guide, that won’t mean much to the thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, or millions who will die because we did not finish what we started.

The last time we abandoned a nation like this, the losses were in the millions.

Posted by CDRSalamander in Foreign Policy, Hard Power | read comments (9)
Tags: Afghanistan, The Long War

Over the past few weeks, senior military leaders and intelligence officials have publicly acknowledged the growing threat from foreign military forces to the US homeland. This may seem unrealistic given the overwhelming military advantage the United States has over any other nation’s military, but there are plausible scenarios where the US homeland could be vulnerable to attack, particularly during periods of US military operations overseas.

Before examining emerging threats that may place the security of the homeland at risk, one must first consider the complex problem of escalation. According to RAND, escalation can occur in several forms: vertical, horizontal and political. Escalation can also be carried out through conventional or asymmetric means. Certainly, attacks can be executed in the future to create a more complex hybrid escalation event. The US Military has already encountered the challenges posed by escalation during Operation Desert Storm.

As Iraqi President Saddam Hussein faced the reality of an overwhelming coalition force, he decided to use his over-matched military assets to attack civilian population centers in Israel. He also ignited oil fields in Southern Iraq in order to inflict environmental damage and to restrict coalition military movement.  These are examples of horizontal and political escalation, respectively.

In discussing the new DOD Strategic Guidance, Dr. Janine Davidson recently noted that adversaries will likely go asymmetric and irregular to counter a US military advantage.  This implies the US homeland will likely be in play should military force be used in the future. US military leaders and policy makers have not had to contend with this reality since World War II.

A host of legal/policy concerns, such as the Posse Comitatus Act and the imposition of wide-spread martial law, would challenge conventional thinking given these scenarios.  An effective response would demand an unprecedented level of coordination and integration of Title 10 and Title 32 military forces with federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel.  Some scenarios would likely have local law enforcement personnel performing ad hoc para-military operations. A significant military response within the homeland would certainly stress civil-military relations and threaten the civil liberties of US citizens, particularly those of certain ethnic groups associated with the adversary.  Could this lead to increased radicalization or even threaten internal stability?

Current military capabilities that could be used to attack the US homeland include:

• Conventional attacks enabled by emerging technology
• Special Forces conducting direct action –Mumbai style attacks
• Weapons of Mass Destruction
• Improvised Explosive Devices
• Cyber Attacks
• Psychological Operations
• Economic Attacks

While these capabilities alone or in aggregate would certainly not defeat the US military, they can inflict damage to the homeland that would cause public support for military operations to either wane or force the military to take more aggressive action than would normally be prudent.  Homeland attacks would also impose a significant cost imposition on the US, which would divert scarce resources away from other military operations.

Considering the prolonged military operations over the last decade, would US popular support for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have lasted as long as they have if US citizens were being killed in the homeland?  In the future, would direct support for a critical ally, say Israel or Taiwan, withstand foreign military operations on the homeland or would US citizens demand military operations cease, as witnessed in Vietnam or Iraq?

Having to fight a two Combatant Command (COCOM) war has not been experienced by the modern US military since the National Security Act of 1947 established our current organizational structure.  This scenario would provide an enormous challenge to coordinate and integrate operations between multiple COCOMs.  An example the US could use as a precedent was having to respond to hurricane Katrina, while fighting limited wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  However during these events, leaders were not faced with command and control challenges or limited military resources. This would certainly not be the case in military operations against a near peer competitor.

The so called American way of war ensured the security of US interests over the past sixty years by taking overwhelming military force to the enemy’s doorstep. Unfortunately, the US will not be afforded that luxury in the future.  Our nation’s military and civilian leaders must incorporate defending the homeland into their decision making calculus should military action be realistically considered in the future.  The US public must also be aware that the decision to use military force will likely affect the livelihood of each American citizen in ways Americans have not witnessed during this generation.

The plausible scenarios associated with future wars will radically challenge our current perception of complex operations and will make the wars fought over the last 10 years seem like child’s play.  The results of past operations speak for themselves and future wars will be even more complex and will demand a far greater level of strategic thinking and adaptation by both military and civilian leaders.

Robert Kozloski is a program analyst with the Department of the Navy and the author of  “Rethinking Threats to The Homeland: Considerations for the Joint Force” currently under review at Joint Forces Quarterly.

Posted by admin in Foreign Policy, Hard Power, History, Homeland Security, Marine Corps, Maritime Security, Navy | read comments (11)
Tags: Robert Kozloski

Reuters has the story.

Russia has been increasing the reach of its navy in recent years, sending warships further afield as part of an effort to restore pride project power in a world dominated by the U.S. military.

That throws a wrench in our Maritime Strategy, it would seem.  Or does it?   What should our reaction be, militarily?  And what, diplomatically?  Should there be any?

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Air Force, Army, Aviation, Coast Guard, Foreign Policy, Hard Power, History, Homeland Security, Marine Corps, Maritime Security, Merchant Marine, Naval Institute, Navy, Proceedings, Soft Power, Tactics, Uncategorized | read comments (26)

James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence in the Obama Administration, thought so.

From the Daily Beast:

Whether or not sensitive weapons technology was moved to Syria is a hotly disputed question in the intelligence community. James Clapper, now the Director of National Intelligence and formerly the director of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, said in 2003 that he believed materials had been moved out of Iraq in the months before the war and cited satellite imagery.

If the Bashar al-Assad regime falls, and should the securing of the chemical and biological stockpiles of Syria be necessary, what would be the effect if some of those materials and munitions bear Iraqi markings?

Former Iraqi General Sada asserted that Saddam’s chemical stockpile was lifted, in his book “Saddam’s Secrets” and summarized by Investor’s Business Daily:

As Sada told the New York Sun, two Iraqi Airways Boeings were converted to cargo planes by removing the seats, and special Republican Guard units loaded the planes with chemical weapons materials.

There were 56 flights disguised as a relief effort after a 2002 Syrian dam collapse.

The IBD article also mentions Israeli General Yaalon’s assertions, and those of John Shaw regarding Russian assistance in the form of former KGB General Primakov:

There were also truck convoys into Syria. Sada’s comments came more than a month after Israel’s top general during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Moshe Yaalon, told the Sun that Saddam “transferred the chemical agents from Iraq to Syria.”

Both Israeli and U.S. intelligence observed large truck convoys leaving Iraq and entering Syria in the weeks and months before Operation Iraqi Freedom, John Shaw, former deputy undersecretary of defense for international technology security, told a private conference of former weapons inspectors and intelligence experts held in Arlington, Va., in 2006.

According to Shaw, ex-Russian intelligence chief Yevgeni Primakov, a KGB general with long-standing ties to Saddam, went to Iraq in December 2002 and stayed until just before the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003.

Anticipating the invasion, his job was to supervise the removal of such weapons and erase as much evidence of Russian involvement as possible.

An interesting statement from Brian Sayers, the director of government relations for the Syria Support Group:

We believe that if the United States does not act urgently, there is a real risk of a political vacuum in Syria, including the possibility of a dispersion of chemical weapons to rogue groups such as Hezbollah.”

What of a regime such as Saddam Hussein’s in Iraq that was suspected of actively attempting to peddle such weapons?

Should these suspicions surrounding Iraq’s possible pre-invasion transfer of its remaining chemical stockpile be confirmed, the silence being heard in the media regarding them will have been deafening.

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Just in case folks still wanted to debate the existence of Syria’s stockpile, I think we might have our answer.   How many carry Iraqi markings?  How many, Russian?

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Air Force, Army, Foreign Policy, Hard Power, History, Homeland Security, Marine Corps, Navy, Proceedings, Uncategorized | read comments (40)