Archive for the 'Hard Power' Category
I had a very interesting experience earlier this year co-chairing, along with Gen Larry Welch, USAF (Ret), the SecDef-directed Independent Review of the Nuclear Enterprise.
I haven’t seen too many posts on USNI Blog regarding our nuclear deterrent force or nuclear weapons in general, for that matter, so I thought this issue might prove interesting for some of our readers.
Several major lessons learned for me from this experience:
- If you have nuclear weapons, you need to consistently devote a great deal of high-level attention to their maintenance and sustainment as well as the maintenance and sustainment of the platforms that would deliver those weapons should the President so direct.
- It was obvious to me that, since the dis-establishment of SAC, we haven’t been able to establish the right organizational construct within DoD that would consistently and effectively accomplish #1 above.
- We can debate the efficacy and utility of nuclear weapons all we want – whether or not we should deploy a monad, a diad or a triad of nuclear delivery systems, or whether conventional deterrence of some kind can ever replace our current posture of having our nuclear deterrent as the foundation of our national security policy, but, and it’s a big but, as long as we have nuclear weapons – like them or not – we’ve got to invest the required resources in their “care and feeding” and the care and feeding of the people who maintain the warheads, the missiles, and the delivery systems.
There is no middle ground here, no ability to allow some sort of an elegant and systematic degradation that can be monitored and managed with intervention before lasting damage or a catastrophic event occurs.
We either execute this mission totally right, every day, or we will get it totally wrong.
The approach General Welch and I took was to review all past reports on this issue, and the responses to those reports, and then meet with Sailors, Airmen, and Marines, and their commanders, at every level at the nuclear forces locations in the U.S. and at three Air Force locations in Europe.
Our methodology was to generate extensive opportunities to listen to those carrying out the deterrent mission and to hear from their commanders as well; they all clearly had a great deal they wanted us to hear.
We then applied the experience and judgment of the review team, a small group of subject matter experts – officer and senior enlisted, active and retired – to synthesize both what we found and what we heard in order to provide specific recommendations to address the issues we found and answer the Secretary’s specific question to us, “What do I need to do?”.
We delivered our report on 1 June. Since that time, we have seen extensive work at multiple levels across the Department of Defense with continuing direct involvement of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense to address the issues we discussed in the report. We are also seeing very welcome and much needed results delivered to the Sailors, Airmen, and Marines in the operating units.
We believe the major issue now is sustaining the engagement that is absolutely required at the most senior levels within DoD to re-establish both the enduring and appropriate level of attention and investment that will ensure the nuclear forces can effectively and safely carry out the deterrent mission, which remains the foundation of our national security policy.
The bottom line in our report is that the forces are meeting the demands of the mission, but with such increasing difficulty that any margin of capability to meet those demands has been consumed and our Sailors, Airmen, and Marines are routinely required to pay an unsustainable price to accomplish the mission.
The troops’ resolute determination to get the job done – doing, in their words, whatever it takes – has masked the true cost of mission accomplishment from their senior leadership, who routinely receive reports showing the required number of boats are on deterrent patrol, the ICBMs are on alert, and the bombers are available and ready if needed.
We found three overarching core issues in the nuclear enterprise that led to a wide range of specific issues and specific recommendations:
- There has developed a leadership “Say-Do” Gap where the declared importance of the nuclear forces to national security is not matched by leadership attention and support from the Department and Service leadership and from multiple levels down to field commanders. This mis-match has resulted in a range of issues from a perception that the mission and those performing the mission are not truly valued to critical manning shortfalls, deteriorating facilities and deficient logistics support.
- Over time, an incessant Demand for Micro-Perfection led to the expectation that there must be zero mistakes in every operational and administrative action. Hence the focus shifted from efficiently and effectively accomplishing the mission to the routine imposition of draconian measures to ensure there could be no mistakes. Said another way, avoiding criticism took precedence over efficient and effective mission accomplishment. This approach led inexorably to a widespread substitution of process and procedure for personal responsibility and accountability.
- This drive for micro-perfection also led to a culture that valued Inspection over Mission – that is, the focus of commanders and supervisors shifted from the mission to avoiding criticism from extensive, frequent, and enormously detailed inspections. The consequences to the unit and the commander of any adverse outcome from a large, multi-agency inspection team has been seen as so severe that preparing for inspections eclipses mission focus, at the expense of the Sailors, Airmen, and Marines performing the mission. This attention to avoiding the risks from small mistakes in inspections that do not have safety or mission impacts has actually increased the much larger risk to the effective and safe accomplishment of the mission itself.
Emanating from these three core issues, the review team addressed issues in a dozen activity areas.
As I stated earlier, we are seeing attention to the full set of issues with guidance from the top and execution at multiple levels throughout the various chains-of-command.
It is very important to note that most of the issues identified in our report and in the report of the Internal Review have been identified in past reports – these issues are not new ones. And with each previous review, leadership at the appropriate level initiated actions to correct the deficiencies, but the attention has not been sustained as needed to bring about lasting change.
This time, the senior leaders of the Department and the Services are directly and deeply involved so there is reason to hope that, unlike in the past, there will be the lasting and positive change needed to not only accomplish the nuclear mission, but to do so effectively and safely.
How do we build the future surface fleet to ensure our forces maintain the ability to access to all regions of the world’s oceans that our vital to our national interests?
Our guest to discuss this and the broader issues related to our surface forces will be Bryan Clark, Senior Fellow at Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA).
A basis for our conversation will be his recent study for CSBA, Commanding the Seas: A Plan to reinvigorate U.S. Navy Surface Warfare, where he articulates the operational concept of “offensive sea control” as the new central idea to guide evolution of the U.S. surface force. This idea would refocus large and small surface combatant configuration, payloads and employment on sustaining the surface force’s ability to take and hold areas of ocean by destroying threats to access such as aircraft, ships and submarines rather than simply defending against their missiles and torpedoes.
Prior to joining CSBA in 2013, Bryan Clark was Special Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations and Director of his Commander’s Action Group.
He served in the Navy headquarters staff from 2004 to 2011, leading studies in the Assessment Division and participating in the 2006 and 2010 Quadrennial Defense Reviews. His areas of emphasis were modeling and simulation, strategic planning and institutional reform and governance. Prior to retiring from the Navy in 2007, he was an enlisted and officer submariner, serving in afloat and ashore including tours as Chief Engineer and Operations Officer at the Navy’s nuclear power training unit.
Mr. Clark holds a Master of Science in National Security Studies from the National War College and a Bachelor of Science in Chemistry and Philosophy from the University of Idaho.
By Mark Tempest
13 years into the long war, what have we learned, relearned, mastered, forgotten, and retained for future use? What have we learned about ourselves, the nature of our latest enemy, and the role of our nation? What have those who have served learned about their nation, their world, and themselves?
Iraq, Afghanistan, the Islamic State, and the ever changing global national security ecosystem, where are we now, and where are we going?
Our guest for the full hour to discuss this and more will be returning guest John Nagl, LTC US Army (Ret.) D.Phl, using his most recent book Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice as the starting point for our discussion.
Dr. Nagl is the Ninth Headmaster of The Haverford School. Prior to assuming responsibility for the School in July 2013, he was the inaugural Minerva Research Professor at the U.S. Naval Academy. He was previously the President of the Center for a New American Security. He graduated from the United States Military Academy Class in 1988 and served as an armor officer for 20 years. Dr. Nagl taught at West Point and Georgetown University, and served as a Military Assistant to two Deputy Secretaries of Defense. He earned his Master of the Military Arts and Sciences Degree from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and his doctorate from Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar.
Dr. Nagl is the author of Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam and was on the team that produced the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual.
Please join us at 5pm EST on 9 Nov 14 for for Midrats Episode 253: “The Fleet we Have, Want, and Need – with Jerry Hendrix”
What is the proper fleet structure for the USN as we design our Navy that will serve its nation in mid-Century?
Join us for a broad ranging discussion on this topic and more with returning guest, Henry J. Hendrix, Jr, CAPT USN (Ret.), PhD.
Fresh off his recent retirement from active duty, Jerry is a Senior Fellow and the Director of the Defense Strategies and Assessments Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS).
A Naval Flight Officer by training, his staff assignments include tours with the Chief of Naval Operation’s Executive Panel (N00K), the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (Force Development) and the OSD Office of Net Assessment.
His final position in uniform was the Director of Naval History.
Hendrix also served as the Navy Fellow to the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. He has a Bachelor Degree in Political Science from Purdue University, Masters Degrees from the Naval Postgraduate School (National Security Affairs) and Harvard University (History) and received his doctorate from King’s College, London (War Studies).
He has twice been named the Samuel Eliot Morison Scholar by the Navy Historical Center in Washington, DC, and was also the Center’s 2005 Rear Admiral John D. Hays Fellow. He also held the Marine Corps’ General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. Fellowship. He authored the book Theodore Roosevelt’s Naval Diplomacy and received a number of awards, including the United States Naval Institute’s Author of the Year and the Navy League’s Alfred T. Mahan Award for Literary Achievement.
The USS Ingraham (FFG-61) just completed her final successful sea and anchor detail as she transited in from the Pacific Ocean, through the Strait of Juan de Fuca, returning to her homeport in Everett, Washington. After being greeted with homecoming fanfare, she will prepare for a much less exciting event, her decommissioning ceremony. On November 12th, the flag will be lowered for the last time and in January she will be struck from the battleforce inventory.
The Ingraham is one of the very last Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates remaining in the fleet. These ships were known for their steadfast performance, executing critical missions around the globe. Much like Ingraham’s last deployment to the waters of Central America, these ships have been stalwarts in the U.S. anti-drug efforts. Many are now lamenting the loss of this versatile class of ship, declaring that missions will go unfulfilled once the class has completely decommissioned next year. Demands are growing louder for a ‘next generation surface combatant’ to replace the frigates, bringing more firepower, survivability and offensive capability than the current littoral combat ships have to offer.
Yet we must be careful not to be too nostalgic when reviewing the capabilities of the frigates and demanding a better armed new surface combatant to fill their void. Certainly, the Navy needs a next generation surface combatant to fill the gaps that the workhorse guided missile destroyers cannot cover alone – there is simply no debating that our destroyer fleet is over-stretched. But, when it comes to covering the missions being carried out by frigates, we have ships that can perform at the same or higher levels – we just need to work on incorporating them.
Though it’s been a while, I distinctly recall hours spent memorizing ‘Ships and Aircraft’ as part of the standard Naval Academy plebe professional knowledge requirements. Frigates were easy…there wasn’t a lot to memorize in terms of armament. Especially since the removal of the Mk13 ‘one-armed bandit’ missile launcher. The nickname we learned was ‘missile sponge,’ due to the lack of significant offensive and defensive weaponry. Even the Mk75 Oto Melara gun onboard could only be fired when the ship presented a stern aspect to the target due to firing cut-outs. The CRU/DES advocates would joke that frigates could only fire the sole remaining offensive weapon, a mere 3-inch gun, while running away. Aviators quipped that the only real weapon onboard was the embarked LAMPS helicopter.
But it didn’t matter. Though I opted for the CRU/DES world, plenty of classmates went to frigates, where they became exceptional ship-handlers and learned how to conduct critical maritime security missions by thwarting drug-runners off our coasts and in the waters to the south, learning from the Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs) that often embarked. They pulled into ports around the globe with shallow draft requirements, to the envy of those of us on cruisers at the time. They operated with the nascent coastal navies of partners around the world and didn’t tower over their counter-parts in terms of size or weaponry, making for more successful engagements.
These roles can all be filled exceptionally well by our newest generation of ships – the littoral combat ships, and even innovative platforms like Austal’s Joint High Speed Vessel. While the LCS is not a perfect ship – far from it, but that’s been covered rather extensively in the press – it can easily fill the niche role recently occupied by frigates. The speed, versatility and shallow draft of LCS make it well suited to coastal patrol missions and working with partnership navies. The Joint High Speed Vessel is an even more innovative platform, and the USNS Spearhead (JHSV-1) has demonstrated its worth on its maiden deployment this year. The MSC-run ship has operated in three different Fleet AORs, conducting missions with numerous partner nations and US Navy assets, proving its exceptional capabilities.
Maritime security missions will continue to be a critical aspect of the Navy’s mission – just as they have for the past 239 years. Worth noting, however, is that most maritime security missions do not require high-end Aegis ships like the destroyers commonly filling the tasks today. It may be reassuring to have destroyers tasked to anti-piracy missions off the Horn of Africa (or, in the case of the Maersk Alabama incident, an entire Amphibious Readiness Group), but it isn’t necessary. Instead, platforms like the LCS and JHSV are well-suited to conduct low end missions like countering piracy, illicit trafficking and weapons proliferation and can do so at a much lower cost than sending a Strike Group or a couple of destroyers. The security situation we will face demands a robust, well-trained maritime security force. Our CRU/DES platforms should be reserved for missions requiring their exceptional weapons and radar systems. With the projected build of thirty-two LCS and ten JHSV, these ships are well-poised to perform vital maritime security roles that the frigates will no longer be around to fulfill. There is no dispute that maritime security is – and will continue to be – a core mission, but we already have the right ships to ensure success while being cost-efficient.
We must be careful not to embellish the past and demand that the frigates’ replacements have significant offensive and defensive capabilities. We need to be realistic when examining the missions needing to be fulfilled and let the void left by the frigates be filled by the newer, more innovative ships that are well-suited to the missions. The next generation surface combatant can be better utilized elsewhere.
The phrase “no boots on the ground” has become a constant refrain when this country contemplates the use of military force. This phrase relies on the myth that air power alone can resolve a crisis. As a policy it sees boots only as people vulnerable to victimization by the enemy. However, the boots are actually grunts, people who dedicate their lives to defeating our enemies and are not afraid to get their hands dirty in the process. Militarily they increase the effectiveness of airstrikes and bring capabilities to the fight that aircraft do not possess.
Grunts possess not only boots but also optic, audio, and olfactory sensors. These sensors gather information which the grunt’s brain housing group develops into an awareness of the situation. While remote electronic sensors such as drones and satellites can be substituted to a degree, the grunt provides a more complete picture. This allows for quicker and more accurate target identification for aircraft.
Recent history shows the problems from a failure to deploy grunts. In Kosovo, NATO attacks were wasted on decoys, the Chinese Embassy was mistakenly bombed, all while civilians continued to suffer below. In Operation Desert Storm, Saddam Hussein continued to launch SCUD missiles from mobile launchers in Western Iraq until Special Forces grunts were deployed. In Pakistan, mistaken attacks by drones on civilians undermine our efforts in the Global War on Terror.
Grunts also possess a unique capability that aircraft do not. While aircraft can influence events on the ground, grunts control them. Aircraft fly over the battlefield. After the initial shock subsides, the enemy adapts their tactics and becomes acclimatized to the bombing. (Despite years of strategic bombing by the U.S. and Britain, German production continued to increase throughout World War II.) In contrast, a grunt occupies the ground they stand on and the enemy must first push our grunts off the ground before they can act as they wish. Massacring civilians is not as easy when you must first defeat the grunts protecting them.
Like in Kosovo, after Desert Storm the U.S. attempted an air only approach to protect Iraqis who revolted against Saddam Hussein by imposing a no-fly zone over portions of Iraq. Those revolts were brutally suppressed. In the 1980’s, French air attacks stalemated Libyan advances into Chad but never defeated them. Finally, after a decade of fighting, the Chadian ground forces assimilated the surface-to-air and anti-tank guided missiles provided to them into their natural fighting style and decisively drove out the Libyans within a year.
By attacking with both air and ground forces you impose a dilemma on the enemy. If they concentrate to engage your ground forces, your air attacks become more effective. If they disperse their forces to minimize the effects of your air attacks, they become vulnerable to your ground forces. With boots on the ground supported by air attacks you inflict a defeat on your enemy, without them you can only hope he gives up.
Above all a no boots on the ground policy is a moral failure. Defeating an enemy requires convincing them that they cannot obtain victory. Accepting the risk of deploying ground troops demonstrates your resolve to seek victory. In contrast, attacking from the air and setting deadlines for withdraw indicates that you are more interested in reducing your risk and leaving as quick as possible. Showing this kind of weakness emboldens your enemy, not only by lifting their morale, but also because you tell them exactly what they have to do to win. The Greatest Generation did not ask for a no boots on the ground policy after seeing the pictures from the Tarawa beaches of the carnage of battle. They won World War II with a policy of “for the duration”. If we are committed to acting militarily, we should state clearly the goal we intend to accomplish, obtain Congress’s authorization for military action, and deploy the forces, including some form of ground component, necessary to accomplish our goal.
By Mark Tempest
Believe it or not, this week is our 250th Episode of Midrats.
In celebration, we’re clearing the intellectual table, going to open the mic and see where it takes us.
From Kobane, to Coastal Defense, to Ebola and everything in between and sideways that’s been in the national security news as of late, plus whatever else breaks above the ambient noise – we’ll be covering it.
As with all Midrats Free For Alls, we are also opening the phone lines for our regular listeners who want to throw a topic our way.
Come join us Sunday as we try to figure out how we got to 250.
For the moment, the U.S. military can still apply overwhelmingly decisive force – whether we’re talking lethal Special Operations teams or waves of bombers. At the same time, no one has our logistical reach for responding globally to natural disasters and other unforeseen catastrophes like Ebola.
We should build on these dual strengths. Indeed, the real shift that is needed in the defense budget and in national security debates isn’t about who or what we have, but about what we deploy our forces to do. Forget trying to re-make the military to fight violent extremists the way violent extremists want us to fight them. Instead, we should re-build foreign policy to fit our military capabilities and re-tilt the playing field to advantage us.
How about “don’t tread on me” married to “to each his own.” Just consider: if the U.S. got out of the business of telling other people how to live their lives – which is what respecting others’ sovereignty should mean – then the U.S. could demand of other governments the other quid pro quo sovereignty promises: namely, no one hailing from any other country should seek to cause us harm.
If foreign leaders were held accountable for the actions of their citizens, if they were made to understand that in exchange for the deference they receive as heads of state their duty is to guarantee security to their citizens and to us, they’d have to deliver better services. Otherwise, they risk an insurgency or worse. Meanwhile, let just one non-state actor harbored in another country attack the U.S. again, and here’s what violating our sovereignty would mean: that government would have to root out our attackers or we would be obliged to consider it complicit, too.
In other words, if people elsewhere prefer to live under a Caliphate or under a leader like Vladimir Putin, so be it. If they don’t want to, however, let them do the lion’s share of the fighting. Let them organize. Let them demonstrate that they are capable of uniting under a more viable alternative – one that can govern effectively, deliver services equitably, and will be a steward of regional peace. Then, ‘we the people’ can decide: is this an entity we want to support, in which case the U.S. Senate can ratify a treaty that makes clear to everyone what our support consists of.
No doubt this will strike some readers as too unrealistic and far-fetched. Clearly, we wouldn’t declare war on Russia over irredentism in its backyard. But, if not, why are we lending desultory support to Ukraine? Ditto for our positively schizophrenic treatment of Bashar al-Assad; we wanted him gone, encouraged the rebels, but refused to help them remove him, and now we need his help.
Imagine if we instead had a far clearer “don’t tread on me, or else” foreign policy. And say we had applied such a policy in the wake of 9/11. Mullah Omar either would have turned over Usama bin Laden or Mullah Omar would no longer be alive. Afghans would have chosen their own next leader in their own way. We wouldn’t still be in Afghanistan, still trying to cajole Afghans into a form of government and democracy that suits us.
One reason the U.S. should get out of the business of propping up regimes is that by doing so we prolong chaos and uncertainty. Cutting off the aid spigot is critical for two additional reasons. First, what too few Americans appreciate is the extent to which foreign aid projects don’t just corrupt, but corrupt absolutely. After all, why should a foreign government have to provide for its own citizens if we are willing to do so for them?
Second, our serial experimentation hasn’t really worked. The ‘developing world’ has been the developing world for decades. Have any of our taxpayer-funded aid projects really made a sufficiently significant dent?
Pilferable projects and cash feed the dysfunction we say we want to stop. Which isn’t to say that we should halt efforts to offer education or training. Those are unstealable. Nor should we stop delivering assistance in the immediate aftermath of unforeseeable natural disasters.
Indeed, there are numerous reasons why the United States should strive to remain the globe’s most robust First Responder. Not only is this what all good neighbors should do and what American citizens always seek to do anyway, but there is no surer way to show people elsewhere how well democracy and a free market economy can work, since without them we wouldn’t be able to deliver the mountains of assistance we do.
Assisting during the triage phase of an earthquake, tsunami, or pandemic is one thing. But prolonged assistance or a lengthy intervention is something altogether different. We Americans are unbelievably generous as a people. And we are great logisticians. But we don’t have what it takes to undo others’ chronic problems. Also, despite what many might think, we are too egalitarian and too impatient to successfully make people over in our image since that takes an imperial ruthlessness we don’t possess.
Our greatest strength? Directness – ideal for getting to the scene quickly to do immediate good, but also ideal for getting to the scene quickly to do immense damage. Reflect on our dual capabilities of relieving people from, or introducing people to, devastation, and we would save untold blood and treasure by re-calibrating our foreign policy to make the most prudent possible use of the Navy, Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps we have.
At the same time, reinvigorating sovereignty would liberate others to make much more of themselves, too. It would force those heads of state in the path of ISIL, Boko Haram, al Shabaab, or you-name-the-armed-group to live up to their obligations to their citizens. They (too) would have to make far better use of the resources they already have – or succumb.
Consider what else Washington would gain if it took the military’s core strengths and made more (rather than less) of them. Members of the military would be able to concentrate on their comparative advantages, which come from being impatient, generous, capable, and direct. These are among the attributes that non-Americans used to admire in us – exactly the attributes that prolonged un-declared, fitful counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency campaigns squander.
Power projection, sea control, access, denial, and the ability to impose your will on the enemy from the sea – or depending on your perspective – prevent them.
If the comparative advantage of American military power includes the use of the world’s oceans as a basing area from projecting power and national will, how can other nations design systems and tactics to trump that advantage? What are in place now, and what can we expect to see in the near future?
Our guest for the full hour will be Sam J. Tangredi, a defense strategist whose studies of future warfare prompted Defense Department officials to label him “the Navy’s futurist.” His thirty-year naval career included command at sea, service in key strategic planning positions in the Pentagon and overseas, earning a PhD in international relations, and research fellowships at two think tanks.
His over one hundred publications—which include four books–have won awards, including the U.S. Naval Institute’s Arleigh Burke Prize and the U.S. Navy League’s Alfred Thayer Mahan Award. He is currently the director of San Diego operations for the planning/consulting firm Strategic Insight.
Please join us on Sunday, 21 September 14 at 5pm (EDT) for Episode 246: When the short snappy war goes long, with Chris Dougherty
As we once again face the promise of a conflict with a limited mission and a strangely ill-defined Strategic and Operational design – what do we need to keep in mind not just from recent history, but the longer term record?
History shows us that military and political leaders either over or under appreciate changing technology, outmoded doctrine, and the imperfect correlation between past experience and present requirements.
From the national psyche to stockpiled war reserves – what happens when the short and splendid turns in to the long slog?
Using his latest article in The National Interest, The Most Terrifying Lesson of World War I: War Is Not Always “Short and Sharp,” as a starting point, but expanding to a much broader discussion, our guest for the full hour will be Chris Dougherty, research fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA).
Mr. Dougherty graduated summa cum laude with a B.A. in Security Studies from the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington and received an M.A. in Strategic Studies with distinction from John Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. He also served as an airborne infantryman with the 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment from 1997 to 2000.