Archive for the 'Hard Power' Category

seacontrol2Sea Control interviews Erik Prince, former CEO of Blackwater. He describes the challenges of African logistics and how his new public venture, Frontier Services Group, will tackle them. We also discuss the future of private military contractors and the lessons learned from Blackwater.

DOWNLOAD: Sea Control 29 – Erik Prince

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Please join us on Sunday at 5pm (EDT) for Midrats Episode 222: USS PONCE (AFSB(I)-15) Lessons with CAPT Jon N. Rodgers, USN

As with most concepts and good ideas, you really don’t know what you need and how you need to do it until you put Sailors to task and head to sea.

The idea of an Afloat Forward Staging Base has, in a variety of forms, been a regular part of naval operations arguably for centuries under different names and with different equipment.

What about the 21st Century? More than just a story about the use and utility of the AFSB concept, the story of the USS PONCE is larger than that – it also has a lot to say about how one can quickly turn an old LPD around for a new mission, and how you can blend together the different but complementary cultures of the US Navy Sailors and the Military Sealift Command civilian mariners.

Our guest for the full hour to discuss this and more will be Captain Jon N. Rodgers, USN, former Commanding Officer of the USS PONCE AFSB(I)-15.

Either join us live or pick the show up later by clicking here.



I’m sure my invitation to this got -um- lost in the mail, but if, like me, you find that you were unable to attend this 24-26 March 2014 U.S. Naval War College Symposium on “Maritime Security, Seapower, and Trade,” then I can recommend that you follow that link to learn about the symposium and then visit the working papers link for some interesting reading.

Some of the usual suspects were there, Claude Berube, B. J. Armstrong and Dr. Martin Murphy – but there are many others who names presently may not be known to you, but whose papers will both inform and raise new questions for you to ponder.

The symposium goal:

To make sense of the relationship among maritime security, seapower, and trade, the EMC Chair will convene a symposium that brings experts from industry, the policy community, and the sea services. Participants will reflect on the importance of classic maritime thought and how changes in the shipping industry, trade patterns, and non-state use of the oceans impact future naval operations. The implications are important for understanding the types of missions combatant commanders will execute and the types of equipment and training the Navy must provide to support these missions. Keynote speakers will address the diplomatic and operational considerations of maritime cooperation.

Sure would like a webcast of these things . . . but without that, go read and enjoy.



seacontrolemblemSea Control discusses the Crimean Crisis, with three CIMSEC writers: Dave Blair, Viribus Unitis, and Robert Rasmussen. We discuss Russia’s aims and tactics, the Maidan movement, Ukrainian governance and passive resistance, and what this crisis means for Russia and the EU/NATO.

DOWNLOAD: Sea Control 25 – Crimean Crisis

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Join us live on 23 Feb at 5pm (Eastern U.S.) for our Episode 216: Maritime Strategy and Control of the Seas with Seth Cropsey:

What direction do we need to go for our next maritime strategy? Using the recent article, Control of the Seas, as our starting point, our guest for the full hour will be Seth Cropsey, Senior Fellow and director of Hudson Institute’s Center for American Seapower.

He served in government at the Defense Department as Assistant to the SECDEF Caspar Weinberger and then as Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy in the Reagan and Bush administrations, where he was responsible for the Navy’s position on efforts to reorganize DoD, development of the maritime strategy, the Navy’s academic institutions, naval special operations, and burden-sharing with NATO allies. In the Bush administration, Cropsey moved to OSD to become acting assistant secretary, and then principal deputy assistant SECDEF for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.

U.S. Navy photo by OSSN Andrew L. Clark


During the period that preceded the collapse of the USSR—from 1982 to 1984—Cropsey directed the editorial policy of the Voice of America on the Solidarity movement in Poland, Soviet treatment of dissidents, and other issues. Returning to public diplomacy in 2002 as director of the US government’s International Broadcasting Bureau, Cropsey supervised the agency as successful efforts were undertaken to increase radio and television broadcasting to the Muslim world.

Cropsey’s work in the private sector includes reporting for Fortune magazine and as a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and as director of the Heritage Foundation’s Asia Studies Center from 1991-94.

His articles have been published in the Wall Street Journal, The Weekly Standard, Foreign Affairs, Commentary magazine, RealClear World, and others.

Join us live or pick up the show later by clicking here.



FoxBlock some time out today to watch the speech by Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Christine Fox that kicked off the AFCEA-USNI West2014 Conference. She was strong, direct, and the substance of her comments should be considered a good source of Indications & Warnings for what our Navy will be faced with going forward.

In some ways, she spoke as a prophet of the Church of the Hard Truth, and that was refreshing. More of that tone from her and others. It is healthy and gets people’s attention.

Some points to ponder from her speech as I heard it – with a little commentary from my part from what I saw, unspoken, between the lines;

Pacific Pivot: She rightfully reminded everyone of the fundamentals. The Pacific is predominately a maritime theater, and that aspect needs to be central to the military side of the refocus. This cannot be just a military effort, it must be a diplomatic, informational, and economic rebalance to the Pacific. Yep, she kicked off with D.I.M.E. It was at that point that I knew I was going to like a lot about what she had to say.

China: In the near term, we should look at the military growth of China in the maritime theater as a drive to thwart the freedom of movement of others in her sphere of influence, as China sees it.

Disengagement: If the influence and presence of the USA decreases, regional rivalries will increase. In the Pacific, American military presence is a stabilizing force, not a provocative force.

Complacency & Assumptions: We cannot assume American dominance going forward or that we can operate in the permissive environment we have enjoyed for the last couple of decades. We need to reassess our ability to bring force from over the horizon and under the surface in order to get around Anti-Access and Area-Denial systems.

LCS: Though she didn’t address LCS directly, it was clearly there in her warnings that we cannot build a Fleet for a specific kind of fight. Our platforms need to be flexible, and more importantly, survivable in combat. “Niche” platforms are not what we need to invest our limited resources in.

Unsexy but Important: She reminded all that in previous drawdowns, enabling forces were ignored in a rush to save “combat” assets. When actual war comes, we are significantly hampered by the lack of those enablers we ignored in the lean years. Sacrificing enablers for combat units in peace is a false economy.

Hollow Force: We know what creates a hollow force, all we have to do is look at the 1970s. We need to make sure we don’t ignore that history. This will be the 5th drawdown in living memory, and when the next conflict comes, forces will be used more than what was sold during the drawdown.

Personnel Compensation: The post-911 benefit plus-ups are not sustainable and the costs are impacting readiness and modernization. That and the fact we need a BRAC are well known, but there is no political will to address it.

Force Levels: The upcoming QDR will show that there will be no “Peace Dividend” from the last decade of conflict. That being said, the military must get smaller in the next 5 years. We just need to ensure a tighter fit between strategy and budget resources in order to get it right. In theory strategy should drive budgets, but the reality is that budgets force one to make strategic decisions and define priorities. Budgets and strategy are hard-linked together.

One final note on style. Yes, style. In both style and substance, Fox was strong. We are lucky to have someone like her at the front of the conversation, and if I may offer – whatever her future holds, the Pentagon needs to make sure a place is found to have her out front of the public and decision makers.

As you watch the video, remember that though superficial, it is true that regardless of how good or important the information you want to present, you have to deliver it in a manner that gets and keeps people’s attention. You have to make sure your style matches your substance, or the substance is lost.

Fox was not dry, stilted, nervous, or excessively wonky. She was humble without being cheesy, but most important – the hard truths she delivered were presented with an upbeat but serious tone. Even a few smiles thrown in. The happy warrior style.

That is how you do it. Again, the national security community needs to encourage and create opportunities for Fox to come more from out of the background. This drawdown will be done right or wrong based on a the results of intellectual battles in the marketplace of ideas. In this conversation, I think we have identified a High Value Unit.

Transcript here.



seacontrolemblemBryan McGrath joins Matt and Chris to discuss his ideas for the future of maritime security. From the focused threat of China to McGrath’s ideas on a unified sea service, this is one of our best podcasts yet. Enjoy Sea Control 20- McGrath on Maritime Strategy (download).

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Please join us Sunday 26 Jan 14 at 5 pm (Eastern U.S.) for Midrats Episode 212: NATO in Afghanistan with Stephen M. Saideman

Lost to many whose news sources in the USA consists of the major newspapers and the standard networks, for most of the last dozen+ years, the conflict in Afghanistan has not been a USA-Centric battle; it has been a NATO run operation.

When the Commander of the International Security Assistance Force has been an American 4-star, the visuals can be misleading.

For most of the last decade, American forces were dominate in only one region of Afghanistan, the east. Other NATO nations from Italy/Spain in the west, Germany in the North, and Commonwealth nations and the Dutch in the south.

More important than the actual numbers involved, it was the Rules of Engagement, caveats, and the fickle nature of national politics that drove what effects those forces had on the ground.

The good, the bad, and the ugly of modern coalition warfare was all in view for all in Afghanistan, but outside small circles, has yet to be fully discussed.

Our guest for the full hour will be Stephen Saideman.

Stephen holds the Paterson Chair in International Affairs at Carleton University’s Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. He has written The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy and International Conflict and For Kin or Country: Xenophobia, Nationalism and War (with R. William Ayres) and NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone (with David Auerswald), and other work on nationalism, ethnic conflict, civil war, and civil-military relations. Prof. Saideman spent 2001-02 on the U.S. Joint Staff working in the Strategic Planning and Policy Directorate as part of a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship. He writes online at OpenCanada.org, Political Violence at a Glance, Duck of Minerva and his own site (saideman.blogspot.com). He also tweets too much at @smsaideman.

Join us live or pick the show up later by clicking here.

If you have had the pleasure of participating in coalition warfare you should find this interesting. If you haven’t, you might find it instructive.



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Chuck Hill joins Matt to talk about design, use, and possibilities of naval corvettes, reflecting on the articles from 2013’s Corvette week. From definitions, to potential employment, to interdiction operations during Vietnam… this podcast runs the gamut. Please enjoy, Sea Control Episode 18: Naval Corvettes (download).

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Michael VitoBecause of Don Vito’s health problems, his son Michael (as a fictional Marine Captain, he was the obvious choice as successor) assumed control of the Corleone family business. His rapid ascent disrupted the distribution of power within the family. After Don Vito’s passing, Michael used an early version of distributed operations against the leadership of near-peer competitors. Michael’s rise within the family and subsequent violent struggle to bolster the Corleone’s position within the organized crime syndicate illustrate the inherent dangers of power shifts.

The reality is – shifts happen. Power shifts happen in clans, in industry and among states. State power shifts occur at various levels – internal, regional and global and many believe power shifts are frequently the cause of international conflicts. The graphic below illustrates various power shifts in modern history.

Source: Conceptualized by Doran (1965; updated 1981, 1989, 1993), based on estimations for the period 1500 to 1815, and data for the years 1815-1993).

Source: Conceptualized by Doran (1965; updated 1981, 1989, 1993), based on estimations for the period 1500 to 1815, and data for the years 1815-1993).

Measuring National Power

As many have observed, the American military has gone to war over the past decade but the United States as a nation has not. When analyzing great power wars it is important to consider the total power of the states involved and not to simply count the number of ships, air wings or divisions. When analyzing military power in this context both actual and latent capabilities (those that a state could produce in the future) must be taken into account. Measuring national power is difficult and extremely subjective. One method, albeit not perfect, is to use the National Material Capabilities data set.

Power is considered by many to be a central concept in explaining conflict and six indicators are widely used to quantify power – military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, urban population, and total population.

The Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) index is based on these six variables. The CINC is useful for historical analysis and often helps explain the outcome and duration of conventional conflicts between states. The figure below displays two conflicts where the opposing forces were at different levels of power; the first, near power parity and the second, an overwhelming power difference. The former lasted nearly eight years and ended in stalemate while the latter lasted only a few days with a decisive victory for coalition forces.

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The CINC can also be used to analyze the future environment. Using the CINC to examine the state powers of China and the US (including Pacific partners) should paint a worrisome picture for US military planners.

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Some consider the CINC model to be obsolete in the information age and only appropriate for historical analysis. Measuring national power accurately in the post-industrial age is still a work in progress. An alternate power assessment method comes from the intelligence community. The NIC historically used a four component model to forecast power that included GDP, population size, military spending, and technology. However in the Global Trends 2030, an updated model included other elements such as health, education, and governance.

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Regardless of the method or data one uses, it is clear that a global power shift is underway. The primary question that remains is will this shift result in peaceful integration or in a great power war?

Revisiting Power Theories

Within the IR field there are two prominent schools of thought regarding power shifts – power transition theory and power cycle theory.

Power Transition: A.F.K. Organski developed this theory in 1958. He asserted that the international system can be categorized into four levels of state power: dominant power, great powers, middle powers and small powers. Unlike the balance of power theorists, Organski felt the system was in a constant state of flux with the dominant power attempting to maintain the status quo. Rising contenders were either satisfied or dissatisfied with their position in the system. The outcome of the contender’s rise could either be peaceful integration or war depending on their level of satisfaction during ascendance. Throughout history, the closer the contender and dominant power were to power parity, the longer and more severe were conflicts.

Power Cycle: Originated by Charles Doran in 1963, the power cycle theory asserts the power of a state is cyclic and it rises and falls based on the state’s relative position within the international system. Along the cycle’s path are several critical inflection points that create shifts in the international system and often result in major wars.

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Both of theories remain relevant today and portend a dangerous threat to the stability of global order.

The Rise of China

Both schools express concern over the rise of China and potential disruption to the international system. Disciples of Organski offer three strategies for the US to consider:

  • Engineering Satisfaction with Realignment: This strategy largely involves economic development in China and places more emphasis on business development and partnerships as a means to keep the contender satisfied during its ascent.
  • Controlling Territorial Flashpoints: Primarily focused on Taiwan, the authors argue that even a successful defense of Taiwan against Chinese military aggression in the near-term will not resolve the power shift dilemma. At some point in time all three parties, China, US and Taiwan will come to the realization that because of the China’s great power status, Taiwan may voluntarily associate itself with China.
  • Reengineering Power Distributions: The United States must prevent China from achieving power parity. To accomplish this it must form a “super-bloc” alliance by expanding NATO and developing alliances with India and even Russia.

The authors caution against over-militarizing America’s policy towards China and recount former SECDEF Perry’s warning, “If we treat China as an enemy, it will surely become one.”

Doran contends that China’s rise could eventually be slowed by India’s ascent to power and tensions may escalate between the neighboring states. For China to enjoy a “peaceful rise,” it must contend with the challenges of future systems transformation just as the other members of the system had to in the past. Other governments must learn to preserve their security and interests while assisting China to traverse this projected and particularly stressful interval in history.

Concerns

Examining China’s rise through the power shift lens brings several concerns to the fore.

If a military confrontation between China and the US is inevitable, would the perfect military plan or operational concept overcome the power parity problem or would a long war of attrition be unavoidable? Would America’s military advantage diminish if a conflict is fought on Chinese territory, thus forcing America to project military power thousands of miles from the US homeland?

Second, would any amount of conventional military force be sufficient to compel the state of China to accept an outcome favorable to the US and its allies? Because of China’s population advantage and massive economy, could it simply absorb a shock-and-awe type campaign until its adversary’s magazines were exhausted?

Third, to what extent do America’s domestic problems (i.e. national debt, percentage of Americans not in the workforce, inefficient governance and immigration reform) limit its ability to reverse the current power declination trend in the international system?

Finally, because of advances in missile technology, cyber capabilities and asymmetric tactics, the reality is the US homeland will no longer be a sanctuary during future wars. The American military did not contend with this problem in the great power wars of WWI, WW II and Korea. How would degraded American industrial capacity affect the ability to project power overseas for a significant period of time?

Conclusion

The examination of power shifts among states should raise concerns among America’s foreign policy makers and military planners. Most of the latter entered active duty after the end of the Cold War when America emerged as an uncontested hegemon. This dominant power status may have resulted in a certain degree of hubris that prompts many into thinking America can simply impose its will on another state at a time and place of its choosing. While this may have worked in Grenada, Panama and against Somali pirates, this paradigm will need to shift to contend with the rise of a great power.

To ensure the relative stability of the international system and American prosperity, planners must challenge some underlying assumptions about America’s relative dominance in the future and develop a national strategy that is not centrally focused on using conventional military force to counter the rise of China’s power.



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