Today’s London’s Sunday Times shed light on even more damning evidence of Iranian involvement with the Taliban forces in Afghanistan.  The article says, in part:

TALIBAN commanders have revealed that hundreds of insurgents have been trained in Iran to kill Nato forces in Afghanistan.

The commanders said they had learnt to mount complex ambushes and lay improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which have been responsible for most of the deaths of British troops in Helmand province.

The accounts of two commanders, in interviews with The Sunday Times, are the first descriptions of training of the Taliban in Iran.

The article goes on to discuss why Shia Iran has come to the aid of the Sunni Taliban.  It should come as no surprise, but to many, it will.

A couple of questions for Mister Putin in Russia:

Is this the same Iran for whom you will be launching  the Bushehr Nuclear Reactor?   Have the Iranians agreed suddenly to IAEA inspections of the Bushehr site?   If so, why have you not announced that to the West?

Here is a suggestion.  Let us not harbor delusions about either regime, Iran or Russia, as we seem desperate to do with China.

Iran is a fiercely anti-Western Islamic theocracy bent on the destruction of Israel and subjugation of the non-Muslim world.  They are seeking nuclear weapons, for sale to Non-State Actors (who would not hesitate to use those weapons in Amsterdam or Los Angeles), and for their own use, atop missiles that can range Tel Aviv and beyond.  Iran’s assistance to the Taliban (as well as Hezbollah and Al Qaeda) is part and parcel of such an anti-Western policy.

Russia, ruled by neo-Stalinist Putin, is actively helping Iran with its nuclear efforts.  Putin is deliberately frustrating US aims at sanctions against Iran, and is well aware of Iran’s activities in Gaza and Afghanistan.   Russia is not an American ally, nor a partner, except in those rare instances when doing so (or appearing to do so) gains Russia an advantage.  Russia is a rival and an adversary, and a dangerous one.  Even without the military might she once had (and is anxious to rebuild at first opportunity), Russia has the economic and technological weapons to be that dangerous adversary, and uses them at every opportunity.

Secretary of State Clinton should know this as well as anyone after this latest trip.  It is high time for the US to prepare and act accordingly.

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Foreign Policy, Homeland Security, Uncategorized, history | read comments (4)

War which has undergone the changes of modern technology and the market system will be launched even more in atypical forms. In other words, while we are seeing a relative reduction in military violence, at the same time we definitely are seeing an increase in political, economic, and technological violence. However, regardless of the form the violence takes, war is war, and a change in the external appearance does not keep any war from abiding by the principles of war.

The above quote is from the book “Unrestricted Warfare“, written by a pair of People’s Liberation Army Colonels, Qaio Liang and Wang Xiangsui, and published in Beijing in early 1999. The book has gotten some attention, but often in the eleven years since it was unveiled to the West, the work has largely been dismissed as unlikely wishful thinking on the part of the two authors, and not representative of PLA viewpoints or policy.  As recently as early 2008, discussion in strategic-level war games was dismissive of Chinese capability and intent in the cyber realm.

Well, today the Times of London published yet another ominous summary of China’s ongoing activities in the cyber realm.   One should be reminded that this represents only what is being acknowledged publicly.   Of particular note are the words of Dr. James Lewis of CSIS:

Dr Lewis said that neither the US nor any of its Western allies had formed an effective response to the Chinese threat, which has its origins in a massive boost to Chinese technology ordered by Deng Xiaoping, the late Chinese leader, in 1986. The West’s own cyber offensives have so far been directed largely at terrorists rather than nation states, giving China virtually free rein to penetrate Western systems with its own world-class hackers and increasingly popular Chinese-made components. “You almost have to admire them,” Dr Lewis said. “They have been very consistent in their goals.”

Will we look back across an economic or military cataclysm years or decades on and acknowledge, regretfully, that the warnings had been in front of us since 1999, or even 1986?

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Air Force, Army, Aviation, Books, Coast Guard, Foreign Policy, Homeland Security, Marine Corps, Maritime Security, Navy, Soft Power, Uncategorized | read comments (11)

Simply put: ease and simplicity.

One of the most common questions asked when someone finds out that the USCG isn’t part of DoD is: “If the Coast Guard isn’t part of the Department of Defense then why are we/they considered a branch of the military?”

It’s actually a great question and one I’ve been waiting to answer in light of some historical references. The month of March, as it pertains to Coast Guard history, is a busy one. However, I’d venture to say that one of the most pertinent pieces of our history, with regard to said question, happened today in 1799; it was today, March 2nd, in the year of ‘99 that

Congress authorized that “Revenue Cutters shall, whenever the President of the United States shall so direct, cooperate with the Navy of the United States during which time they shall be under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, and the expenses thereof shall be defrayed by the agents of the Navy Department.” (CG Historian)

Though this historical reference doesn’t quite answer the question outright it’s enough to help justify the end result. The Coast Guard, with its non-military affiliation as part of the Department of Homeland Security (seven years ago yesterday), must always be made available to transfer over to the Navy. As such considering us and paying us as member of the military will/has made this transition much easier. It’s this duel affiliation that gives us both our rolls as both a military service and a federal agency.

And of course if this theory isn’t good enough for you you’re more than welcome to read these two cited items; the first is 14 U.S.C. § 1 stating that

The Coast Guard as established January 28, 1915, shall be a military service and a branch of the armed forces of the United States at all times. The Coast Guard shall be a service in the Department of Homeland Security, except when operating as a service in the Navy.

or 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(4) which so elegantly states

The term “armed forces” means the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.

I thought I’d through those in there to cover my bases. And though the transfer of the CG to the Navy hasn’t happened since World War II there’s no telling what the future holds as the world furthers itself into multi-theater conflicts and pirate ops.

And on a side note of historical reference and in regard to the pictured flag on March 2, 1799 (busy day in the Congress):

Congress authorized cutters and boats to be “distinguished from other vessels by an ensign and pendant” with the marks thereon prescribed by the President of the United States, to fire on vessels who refused to bring to after the pendant and ensign had been hoisted and a gun fired as a signal, masters to be indemnified from any penalties or actions for damages for so doing, and be admitted to bail if any one is killed or wounded by such firing. On August 1, 1799, Secretary Oliver Wolcott, Jr., prescribed that the ” ensign and pennant’’ should consist of “Sixteen perpendicular stripes, alternate red and white, the union of the ensign to be the arms of the United States in dark blue on a white field.” There were sixteen states in the Union at that time.

Ryan Erickson is a semi-regular contributor to USNI and can be found daily at ryanerickson.com; this post was written as an original piece for ryanerickson.com and cross-posted to USNI.

Posted by Ryan Erickson in Coast Guard, Homeland Security, history | read comments (50)

The Navy is getting underway as Hawaii prepares for an incoming tsunami.

The latest news, with about an hour and a half to go before the tsunami arrives, is that 4 naval vessels are getting underway to ride out the tsunami at sea, and some naval housing complexes are being evacuated.

Though the strategic impact of this tsunami is likely to be low, it might be an interesting exercise to consider what the impact of a larger event might be.  So, this morning, as we wait, we ask the readers to weigh in.  Is the Navy too vulnerable to natural disasters?  Are we putting “too many eggs in too few baskets”?

Posted by Defense Springboard in Homeland Security, Maritime Security, Navy, Soft Power | read comments (3)

A neglected resource and vital to our national security, too.

A look here.

Posted by Eagle1 in Army, Coast Guard, Homeland Security, Maritime Security | read comments (0)

From USNI West 2010:

“…instabilities and threats to key US allies or trading partners, and the specter of international terrorism have combined to force a redressing of our National Military Strategy.”

…”Another element of instability in the world environment has been the emergence of terrorism as a means of achieving political ends…  Whether seeking political anarchy, a homeland to call his own, or the overthrow of a hated regime, the international terrorist has exhibited a devotion to his cause even unto death that respects neither social mores nor rules of law…  The… unpredictability of this threat makes it perhaps the most difficult and frustrating of all to counter and negate.”

The above statements might easily have been taken from the recently released 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).  They do not come from the 2010 QDR, however.  They come instead from the 1986 USNI publication The Maritime Strategy.  The first statement was authored by then-CNO Admiral James Watkins, and the second by Marine Commandant P. X. Kelley.  They are illustrative of the utility of looking at the path already traveled as well as that which still lies ahead.  The lessons learned in the journey thus far often pay great dividends in the journey yet to come.   The above assertions about the conditions in which US forces operate are as germane today as when they were written a quarter century ago.

The release of the Quadrennial Defense Review on Monday has generated plenty of debate based largely on initial impressions.  Contained in its one hundred-plus pages is a great deal of information that discusses current defense posture, current threats, and current fights. (I have read through the QDR once and selected portions a second time.  So my familiarity with the QDR falls somewhere between the Gettysburg Address and the 1,000-page Health Care Reform Bill.)

Having said that, I find the document to be adequate in some areas, providing some interesting portent as to what the vision for parts of US National Security Strategy will likely be.  However, I am struck not just by the fact that the QDR does not look forward twenty years, as is the generally accepted understanding of the document’s purpose, but how disconnected the assertions of the QDR seem to be from our past National Experience.

The 2010 QDR gives only cursory mention as to why the US maintains relationships with its key allies, and even less about why they came about.  The listing of US vital interests across specific regions of the globe includes many, many references to “stability”, yet there is little by way of defining what those interests are for which stability is vital.  Are they strategic?  Military? Economic?  Or do we simply identify war prevention as a pursuit of an altruistic national goal?

Tenets of likely National Military Strategy (the NMS, with its guiding National Security Strategy, is as yet unpublished), contained under the heading of “Defense Strategy”, appear in the body of the document but are matched with no particular vision or guidance as to how those tenets will be accomplished, other than “initiatives” defined in the most general of terms.  Of those initiatives, many represent significant and possibly unreachable challenges in an era of shrinking defense budgets.

References to a naval presence and power projection seem to ignore the historical lessons that possessing such capabilities require the necessary ships, manpower, equipment, and training inherent in maintaining those capabilities.  Yet, our navy and amphibious capabilities continue to wither, a situation incompatible with QDR guidance.

Assumptions made in the QDR, such as “Many of our authorities and structures assume a neat divide between defense, diplomacy, and development that simply does not exist” would come as a bit of a surprise to someone who spent time in foreign or military service throughout the 1950s and 60s.  Such a demonstrated short-term memory at the national level leads to a lack of perspective and context in which to frame present and future challenges and opportunities.  The ability to point to a tradition of inter-agency cooperation provides a far more effective template for how such must be done than the simple assertion that it needs doing.

The assertion that the world is somehow more complex than ever points to a lack of understanding of the events of the last century, many of which continue to shape our 21st Century world.   I doubt very much that the world of 2010 is any more complex an environment than the world of 1913 was, or 1938 or 1949.  Or 2001.  US foreign and military policy was made and executed during those times, however imperfectly, despite the complex and unknown before the respective leaders.

I agree with the commentary here and elsewhere that the 2010 QDR generates far more questions than it answers.  Reading through the document, I admit I am not surprised.  The ability to provide an organization with meaningful vision for the future is inextricably intertwined with the requirement to examine and absorb the lessons from that organization’s history.   The 2010 QDR has precious little of either.  What we have in the 2010 QDR is a document that cannot be used as a foundation for developing a future vision, because there is little concrete enough to provide any underlying assumptions upon which to begin.

Much of what I find in the 2010 QDR is somewhat less than insightful and certainly non-specific.  What I have heard called “blinding flashes of obvious”.   Not that the QDR is a platform for intense detail or greatly in-depth discussion.  However, this document is generic enough that it provides DoD with a slate that is next to blank.

Too often at all levels of policy making and execution, from warfighting doctrine to weapons and warship design and development, any attempt to provide historical context or revisit known axioms that do not lend themselves to “transformation” is dismissed brusquely as “old think”.  Possibly a reflection of what CDR Bryan McGrath so eloquently described as “uniqueness bias”, a belief that the current circumstances and situation are like none other yet experienced, with no lessons of previous efforts of much value or credence.

Perhaps it is a symptom of the age we live in, where nothing is so tantalizing as that which is “revolutionary”, “ground-breaking”, or “transformational”.   Yet, in believing so, we fail to heed the wise warning of a distant past.  The voice of the Roman philosopher Cicero echoes in our ears from across the ages when he cautions us that,

“A culture that knows not its past is doomed to forever reside in that most illusory of tenses, the Present, as if a small child lost, who knows not from whence he came, nor whither he goes.”

The QDR may could have been authored by that lost child.  Let’s hope he finds himself soon.

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Air Force, Army, Coast Guard, Foreign Policy, Homeland Security, Marine Corps, Maritime Security, Navy, Soft Power, history | read comments (0)

This morning’s panel, “What can be done about North Korea?” contained much of the familiar definitions and explanations of the North Korea problem, and many of the well-worn regrets of North Korean intransigence.  The list of North Korean transgressions include the continuation of its nuclear program, its clear intent to solidify its status as a nuclear state, weapons trafficking by North Korea to terror organizations in the Middle East and the threat that the Kim Jong-Il regime represents to the region.

Discussion about what can be done with North Korea centered around the familiar cycle of incentive and sanctions, offers of economic and humanitarian aid, continuation of the Six-Party Talks, enforcement of UNSC Resolutions (1718 and 1874, respectively), and the desire to partner with China to resolve the problems presented by a rogue North Korean regime.  While thoughtfully expressed, the majority of the panel discussion was not new.

What was new, at least to the ears of the panel attendees, was the perspective of Dr. Katy Oh, a long-time policy advisor on the North Korea problem.  Dr. Oh’s assertions were refreshing to hear and drove to the heart of the failure of US policy toward North Korea over the last fifteen years and three administrations.

Dr. Oh laid out some unpopular but largely inescapable conclusions regarding the North Korean regime.  North Korea will never give up its nuclear capability.  It will use that capability to execute what is described as “coercive diplomacy” against its neighbors (Japan and South Korea) in the region.  The “change in behavior” sought by US policy toward North Korea is highly unlikely given the nature of an insular and repressive dictatorship.  The Six-Party Talks have little real value, and are being incorporated into the North Korean paradigm of “negotiate, prevaricate, escalate, then re-negotiate”.

China’s role and motivations towards North Korea, she believes, are misunderstood by the United States.  A territorial hegemon who recognizes the United States as an economic rival and potential military adversary, China does not align her long term interests in the region with the United States, even if she has some common goals (nuclear disarmament) regarding North Korea.  China is looking to reduce or replace US influence in the region, and is willing to use North Korea, within limits, as a foil to US interests and those of her allies.  China remains, to a certain extent, North Korea’s benefactor and protector, especially when doing so frustrates US plans for regional influence.

Also, the pervasive belief that North Korea is susceptible to internal collapse does not reflect the reality of the skill and determination of the regime to survive.  Kim Jong Il’s North Korea, says Dr. Oh, will not easily go away.

The approach offered by Dr. Oh to break the impasse regarding North Korea was a novel and interesting one.  Rather than more high-level government-to-government effort that has limited chance of success, her assertion is that the effort needs to be a direct reaching out to the people of North Korea.  She has written extensively about the state of “the forgotten people” of that grim land.  Dr. Oh has noted the subtle but definite introduction of information technologies that have the potential to bring to the isolated and suppressed people of North Korea the ideas and information that drives the societal change that topples oppressive regimes.

Dr. Oh calls this outcome “constructive destruction”.   She points out that US options regarding North Korea are very limited, and thus far North Korea’s strategy for survival has been far more effective than the last decade and a half of US policy to disarm the North.  Now, however, she sees the opportunity for exploiting the “double life” led by a small but significant number of North Korean citizens who are “socialist by day, and capitalist by night” as they begin to comprehend the advantages of the officially demonized South Korean and American (and ironically, Chinese) free-market economies.

Dr. Oh’s proposition of direct engagement of the North Korean people does indeed have precedent.  Our efforts at the height of the Cold War, with Radio Free Europe, to directly engage the Eastern European peoples subjugated by the Soviet yoke, yielded results that manifested themselves as soon as the prospect of freedom from Communist dictatorship became a realistic possibility.  Similar effects may be possible behind one of the last vestiges of the Iron Curtain, on the peninsula of Korea.

Dr. Oh’s ideas are worth a serious look.   Current policy, and that of the past administrations, has been nearly entirely ineffective and are likely to remain so.  North Korea is a dangerous enemy, a regional threat, and potentially a global one (with proliferation of fissile materials).  The government will not yield.  But the people, when they are exposed to life outside the borders of their depressed and repressive country, may force their hand.

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Foreign Policy, Homeland Security, Uncategorized | read comments (8)

Galrahn’s post below is a good overview of the highlights from Day 1. There are so many good things to discuss that picking what to post on is difficult.

That overview gives me a chance to focus on something specific; something that bothered me all day.

Have you ever sat there listening to someone speak, and you hear they say something that you just have trouble believing was spoken? You kind of tilt your head a bit, look at your notes, look back at the speaker, and then lean to the guy next to you and ask, “Did he just say ….?”

Well, that happened early today at West 2010, right out of the box, I heard something that worried me. It doesn’t worry me in the way the black-helicopter AFDB crowd may be worried – but it has worried me nonetheless.

At an early age I came upon a collection of Ben Franklin’s little known works with a very funny title.  Not just for that reason though, but for many reasons, Ben Franklin is bar none my favorite Founding Father.

There is a quote of his that is a touchstone for me, one that often comes to mind when this nation’s leaders begin to look for shortcuts when faced with difficult security challenges.

As with many of his quotes, this one is a warning; a timeless warning founded on the lessons of thousands of years of human history.

They who can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.

It is closely tied to another of his quotes,

Outside Independence Hall when the Constitutional Convention of 1787 ended, Mrs. Powel of Philadelphia asked Benjamin Franklin, “Well, Doctor, what have we got, a republic or a monarchy?” With no hesitation whatsoever, Franklin responded, “A republic, if you can keep it.”

Franklin knew that like all human institutions, governments are subject to weaknesses and mistakes. These weaknesses and mistakes, often made by good people trying to do the right thing - if not corrected leave doors open for bad men to do evil.

Day 1 was very Cyber Domain focused, and in the kick-off address, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Cartwright, USMC, said something roughly along the lines of this,

(some Americans might be willing to say) I will voluntarily give up my privacy to ensure that I will be protected.

He saw this as a good thing. Something to be hoped for. Something to be encouraged.  And they should give that privacy up to the uniformed services.

Gulp. Yes, a 4-star American General said that in the context of it being good – good for the security of the state.

Here is the context. One of the big transformationalist movements and producers of much PPT is the drive to better protect the critical information infrastructure, AKA the Cyber Domain. All the services are setting up their own cyber security areas (see 10th Fleet), and the experience of Estonia, Georgia, and those “mysterious” probes [thumbdrive] of our systems is driving a lot of smart people – and quite a few civilian companies – to beat the drums of cyber security.  That is a good and smart thing.

The problem is complicated by the following statement by the Commander in Chief.

“From now on our digital infrastructure, the networks and computers we depend on everyday, will be treated as they should be – as a strategic national asset,”
- President Barak Obama, 01 JUL 09

This is where the military mind kicks in. With clear direction and guidance from the CINC – the 4-Stars will wait for a nod from the JAGs and march forward.

Where does that get us today? Well, it seems that the some senior leadership in the military have decided that the military needs to take the lead in cyber security. Why? Well, the CINC has designated it as a strategic asset – to be treated like … well …. a strategic asset.

And so the machinery starts.

What makes the military even twitchier is that they have known since the beginning that the .mil 1’s and 0’s would ride their IT pipes on top of existing civilian infrastructure – from fiber to satellites. We have adopted civilian systems, COTS. Everything relies on that civilian infrastructure as a body relies on water. Backup? Ask your IT’men where their HF TTY system is.

Yes; Admiral Adama is worried – but Skynet is pleased.

The military is twitchy – but what about the civilian industry – are they worried? Of course they are, but they have their own security protocols, back-up systems, and ways of addressing computer network attack. They are also relatively nimble, aggressive, and can quickly hire the best personnel with a focus on shareholder value that demands decisive and secure action.  On a whole, a distributed, redundant and diverse system. Unorganized and with some critical weaknesses, of course – but some would argue that the diversity and lack of organization is also a strength … but that is a different post for a different day.

Is it industry’s desire for the Pentagon to come in and rescue the day? Treat the Cyber Domain like navigable waterways and the interstate highway system – the sea lanes and the airways? Are the American people ready for the Department of Defense to assume security responsibilities from your house to wherever your information flows or is stored? Really?

Now it is time to ask; – can we do it? Does our nation want us to do it? Should we do it?

Can we do it? Sure – the military can do anything it wants, really. It has the power of the state. The military can do, by order of the CINC, anything unless the Supreme Court says no – by precedence or judgment – or the Legislative Branch acts. Our Founding Fathers knew that – that is why we have the system we have; thank goodness.

Does our nation want us to do it? I would offer you this:

Walk into any bank, insurance company, pharmaceutical manufacturer, or software company and tell them, “Hi. I’m from the Department of Defense. We need full administrator rights to your network, software code, PCs, mainframes, communication infrastructure, security protocols, and file storage facilities. Trust us. We’re here to help. Don’t say no or we will shut you down and do it anyway.”

See where that gets you.

Let’s get beyond the Orwellian idea of the U.S. military in our Representative Republic having control of the security of the personnel, professional, and financial data for the civilian population it serves. That is enough to stop anyone cold. Let’s look at the deeper problem.

Ah, what is that line again?

“I …. do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States,

Yep, I am going to go there.

Posse Comitatus (Latin): Power of the county.

18 U.S.C. § 1385. Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.

10 U.S.C. § 375. Restriction on direct participation by military personnel:
The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to ensure that any activity (including the provision of any equipment or facility or the assignment or detail of any personnel) under this chapter does not include or permit direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless participation in such activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law.

One of the challenges of the Cyber Domain is that an attack can come from anywhere – and if done right – nowhere and everywhere.

If the Bank of American in Charlotte, the New York Stock Exchange, and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange all come under cyber attack and the US military has control for security of the nation’s cyber infrastructure – and that attack is coming from Gainesville, FL by American citizens – then in essence the U.S. military is “…willfully (being) use(d) …. to execute the laws...”

Has this angle been looked at? Of course it has. Am I a Constitutional Lawyer? No.

Do we not have federal, civilian law enforcement entities (FBI, DHS, etc call your office) for the purpose of this? Yes we do.  You do not have to be a Constitutional lawyer to say that they are the ones who need to take this, with DOD in a supporting role within well defined and highly restricted confines. Most external work in this area should be done by NSA and CIA with DOD again in the supporting role.

Good news though – even through Gen. Cartwright’s brief was very “DOD in Charge” directed, ADM Stavridis’ presentation later on in a related topic put DOD in its correct area – at the bottom of the chart and in a supporting role. That and other panel discussions tell me that this is an ongoing conversation. Good.  We have time to get this right.

I ask you though –  a lot of very powerful people wearing a uniform who think that it is:  is it the legitimate function of the uniformed services to ask of its citizens to, “Give up your privacy to ensure that I can protected you.”?

I don’t know about you – but the fact that the question needs to be asked is worrisome.

Posted by CDRSalamander in Homeland Security | read comments (4)

From USNI West 2010:

The afternoon session today, “Cyber Issues: What should have priority?”, continued the theme of General Cartwright’s kickoff address this morning, and Admiral Stavridis’ remarks today at lunch, that theme being the expansion of the effort to exploit and protect operations in the cyber domain.

The remarks of the panel were interesting and provided insight into the perceptions and assumptions of DoD for operation as users of the almost exclusively (85-90%) privately owned and operated global computing networks collectively known as the Internet.

During the Q&A period that followed the discussion, I asked the following question:

The private sector recognizes that the preponderance of vulnerabilities to enterprise networks are due to user-level security.  With the extensive discussion of extending and expanding networks into new and “unexplored” areas that will introduce large numbers of unvetted users to our critical C2 and information backbone networks, how are the two (user-level security and expanded user base) reconciled?

The answers, after some initial silence, varied from more training for users to increased awareness from commanders.  But Norman Friedman gave what I consider the best response.  His assertion was that total protection was an impossible goal.  Instead, the networks needed sufficient flexibility to be able to be altered in response to the attack into a different configuration in order to maintain the ability to perform their primary functions.

The most interesting question, however, was asked of the panel by the Moderator, VADM Nancy Brown, USN (Ret.).  Hers was this:

If each of the panel members had one dollar more to invest in their priority of choice in the development of cyber capability, where would it go?   Network architecture mapping was mentioned, as was a true and impartial cost analysis, by Mr Carey and Mr. Friedman, respectively.  VADM Mauney mentioned the training of personnel.   VADM Brown chose to fill manpower requirements.

All justifiable and well-considered answers.

My dollar?  That would go toward the ability to develop tools that can provide I&W, indications and warnings, that an attack on a network has begun.  The flexibility that Mr. Friedman advocated as hand in hand with network protections requires the capability to quickly determine how and where a network is being attacked in order to execute extremely rapid decisions about further protection measures and reconfiguring to maintain critical function.  The ability to effectively build I&W capability represents a tall challenge, likely requiring a level of automated analysis and reporting not yet widely available.  However, the effort to do so will in some ways represent gaining the “brass ring” of network protection.

Decisions regarding individual hardware responses are required to be made at “machine speed”, faster than the ability of humans to make cognitive assessments and take action.  Much has been done in the realm of protective algorithms that will accomplish those “machine speed” tasks.  Where humans can effectively and appropriately intervene is in the higher cognitive decisions regarding altering data paths or network architecture to maintain critical functions.

Much mention has been made regarding attribution.  Important as it is, attribution is a revenge shot.  The damage has occurred, the disruption perpetrated.  Being able to assign attribution to the culprit responsible for a network attack will likely require more than just technical capabilities.   The timeline for that attribution may be weeks or months, especially in the instance of a skilled and patient attacker, if attribution is even a possibility.

For my dollar, the capability that would increase the effectiveness of Network Operations Centers (NOCs) in creating and maintaining secure, flexible networks, is that of a system of indications and warnings of network attacks from hostile entities.

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Air Force, Army, Coast Guard, Homeland Security, Marine Corps, Maritime Security, Navy, Uncategorized | read comments (0)

The impressive array of talent and intelligence that SWMBO has accumulated in San Diego for USNI/AFCEA West 2010 can only be described in one word:

Holy Moley.

Yes, I know that is technically two words, but not if you say them fast.

I am joined out here by the now-world-famous CDR Phibian Salamander, he of the 400+ comments, Galrahn from Information Dissemination, Jim Dolbow from around these parts, Defense Springboard, and the lovely and ubiquitous Maggie from Boston, along with the also lovely FBL from Soldiers’ Angels.

I feel like I should be at the little kid table with crayons, construction paper, and the scissors with the rounded ends (in case I violate Article 92 and run with them).  And I should let the folks above, at the big people table, talk about grown-up stuff.

Lots and lots of talent and experience here.  Please check in often for this group’s analysis of the QDR, cyberspace, deterrence, constitutional issues, shipbuilding, balancing the force, as well as life, love, death, and the imperfect nature of man.  Well, at least the first few.  The reading will be interesting.  Enjoy.

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Air Force, Army, Aviation, Books, Coast Guard, Foreign Policy, Homeland Security, Marine Corps, Maritime Security, Navy, Soft Power, Uncategorized, history | read comments (0)