The President of the United States visited the Pentagon yesterday to attend and speak at the Memorial Service for the victims of 9/11.  Security was tight, but after a solemn service and a rather uneventful day, I departed work for home via the 5th corridor entrance.  As I passed the 9/11 Memorial Chapel, which sits precisely at the point of impact for American Airlines Flight 77, I paused to reflect on what this place must have looked like 11 years ago and was thankful for how it looked now and the fact that nothing untoward had transpired on this 9/11 anniversary in our great country.

When I woke up this morning, I was deeply saddened by the news of the murder of Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other Americans in Benghazi, Libya yesterday.  Although I didn’t know how it happened, I did know that the United States had lost a great American, an accomplished diplomat and a courageous man.  In my last job at U.S. SIXTH Fleet Headquarters, I served as Operations Officer for the Libya Campaign.  I will never forget some of the “movers and shakers” that made things happen during Operation Odyssey Dawn and Operation Unified Protector.  Three names in particular always come to mind: LTC Brian Linville, U.S. Army, Assistant Defense Attaché in Libya; Brigadier General Abdel Salam al-Hasi, a key member of the Libyan Opposition Forces who repeatedly risked his life during the campaign, and Chris Stevens, who as Special Envoy to the Libyan Trans-National Council was one of the first Americans on the ground.

All three of these men are heroes, but I will only pay homage to one of them today–Ambassador Chris Stevens.  Chris and his small team of diplomats and volunteers from the US Agency for International Development (USAID) entered Benghazi not long after U.S. and NATO airpower had pushed Regime Forces out of the city and further south to the cities of Brega and Ajdabiya.  It was then still a very dangerous and uncertain environment.

One of our roles in Joint Task Force Odyssey Dawn was to provide a means to get Chris and his team out if they ran into trouble.  There were several possible courses of action (COA) and means at our disposal. Each one carried with it associated risks. It was our job at JTF HQ to minimize those risks.  For my part, I believed we were overlooking one big factor in our planning: A personal interaction with the guy we were going to have to extract. So, I arranged a phone call with Chris.  There was a lot I wanted to discuss, but I knew he had his hands full.  I just wanted to tell him one thing: “Chris, if you need us, the Navy and Marine Corps have got your back!”

It was a great conversation, much longer than I had anticipated.  Chris was a wellspring of knowledge about what was going on.  He was direct, candid and incredibly informed.  When I hung up, I told VADM Harry Harris, then the Sixth Fleet Commander–”Boss, Chris Stevens is one phenomenal guy.  Now I know why State sent him!”

Since no American military boots were allowed on the ground in Libya during the operation and since we were just massing Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance assets, we were starved for real time eyes-on-the-ground information about what was happening in the Transnational Council, in Benghazi and in the rest of the country.  Chris was a virtual encyclopedia.  I was struck by his upbeat tone and tenor and his calm and cool demeanor.  He was under a lot of pressure and challenging deadlines to show American support for the Libyan people, provide an avenue and method for delivery of humanitarian supplies and establish a sound relationship with the Trans National Council.  The odds were against his mission, but Chris was full of enthusiasm and hope for the Libyan people’s right to self-determination.

As number two man at our Embassy in Tripoli before the campaign, he was plugged in. He knew the turf and the terrain.  He understood the people, the demographics and the tribal politics.  He knew the importance of humanitarian aid and that speed mattered — being the first responder to the needs of the Libyan people was going to pay big dividends during the campaign.  He helped clear up a number of important questions for us about conditions on the ground and how we might better do our job and carry out our charter inherent in the United Nations Security Council Resolution.  Chris gave me better situational awareness than any of the intelligence reports I received and in the final analysis, I was buoyed by his spirit, hope and enthusiasm.

He made me want to work just a little bit harder.  He made me want to be better at my job.

Finally, I was struck by how he went out of his way to thank the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps for doing so much to plan for his safety and that of his team. Thankfully, we never had to execute those plans.  Chris completed his mission and his mandate.  The Libyan Campaign came to a close and the Libyan people earned the right to govern themselves. Free and fair elections took place a few months ago and moderates won the majority in government.  Earlier this year, Chris was confirmed as U.S. Ambassador and returned to Libya.  His selection was a “no brainer” to me, and I thought to myself, that guy is going to make a difference.

Now, he is dead… killed in the very city he helped set free. I regret that I never had the chance to meet him in person or shake his hand.

Ambassador Chris Stevens is the epitome of what Admiral Mike Mullen used to call “expeditionary government.”  After 9/11, everything changed and although sending our military forces overseas was necessary, it was by no means sufficient.  Along with those forces, on the front line and in the trenches, are members of so many other federal agencies–the ultimate force multiplier.  Like Sailors, Soldiers, Airmen and Marines, our State Department and other agencies are operating by our side on the tip of the spear and assuming similar risks.  My hat is off to these men and women who sacrifice much for their country.

In the case of Ambassador Stevens, he made the ultimate sacrifice.  I salute him.  The next time I see someone from the Department of State, I will say, “Thank you for YOUR service!”  I hope you will do the same.

James G. Foggo

RDML, USN

Posted by admin in Foreign Policy, Marine Corps, Maritime Security, Naval Institute, Navy, Tactics | read comments (18)
Tags: James Foggo

Last Friday, I had the pleasure of attending a change of office ceremony for the Navy Chief of Information (CHINFO) in the “Sail Loft” of the Washington Navy Yard in Southeast Washington, D.C. It was a gala event, that paid tribute to the incredible work ethic, energy and achievements of RDML Denny Moynihan during his four and a half-years on the job. RDML Moynihan was relieved by RDML John Kirby, another super-charged officer who is highly regarded in the Navy and the Navy Public Affairs community for his support of Admiral Mike Mullen as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and most recently, as the military spokesman for Secretary Leon Panetta in OSD Public Affairs.

By nature of his position as CHINFO, which supports the Office of the Secretary of the Navy and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, RDML Kirby will have a direct impact on the Navy and Navy programs and people every day. He has myriad responsibilities that he will want to prioritize, but in many cases, the 24 hour news cycle will modulate and modify his priorities as current events involving U.S. Naval Forces unfold around the globe. As CHINFO, he will be one of the most important architects of the Navy’s Strategic Communications strategy.

Accordingly, he may want to examine our current “brand.” In enterprise terms, Strategic Communicators employ the marketing strategy of “branding” to focus on the objectives achievable with the goods and services that the company can offer its clientele. For example, the American Marketing Association (AMA) definition of a “brand” is a “name, term, sign, symbol or design, or a combination of them intended to identify the goods and services of one seller or group of sellers and to differentiate them from those of other sellers.”

Sounds very business-like doesn’t it? But, let’s agree that the Navy has achieved some incredible efficiencies by adapting industry best practices to streamline support to the warfighter-Lean Six Sigma for example. So it follows that we might embrace “branding” as a method of unifying our strategic message to a target audience.

Since I joined the Service, we’ve adopted many different brands, even before the term and the enterprise approach became popular. Do you recall:

“It’s Not Just a Job… It’s an Adventure!”

“Let the Journey Begin!”

“Navy, Accelerate Your Life!”

And our current brand. “Navy. A Global Force for Good!”

Defining the target audience is part of the discovery process in adopting a brand. Those in the Human Resources aspect of what we do tell me that the target audience is the quality young men and women that we recruit annually to join our Service. We want the best and brightest from the pool of eligible young Americans. With an all-volunteer force, opportunities to learn new skills and be assured of job security, although necessary, are not enough – you need an appealing tagline! Human Resource specialists tell me that our current brand sells well with the Millennial Generation. Those joining our ranks today want job skills and a career, but they also want to make a difference-to be a part of a global team that has a raison d’etre- i.e. to make the world a better place. Recruiting, however, is normally tied to the economy and right now, our recruiting and retention statistics are pretty good. That could all change in a heartbeat with a major change in our economy, so it makes sense to keep a regular drumbeat on the theme of recruiting. Our brand is intended to attract and retain the very best, our challenge is to identify the Navy as a choice worth considering in the minds of those choosing and the minds of those providing advice and counsel.

I wonder however, if new recruits are the only audience? Shouldn’t our brand also appeal to the American taxpayers and their direct representatives on Capitol Hill? To the teachers, counselors, parents and coaches—those figures America’s youth look to when trying to figure out their personal way ahead? The point is that the “brand” has to appeal to a broad audience, with different levels of experience and different perspectives. The challenge is to reach and appeal to this wide audience with a clear and concise message of who we are.

In the marketplace, brands appeal to consumers and stifle the competition. Consumers of our brand are the American people, who want a safe and secure environment with conflicts resolved far from our shores. Our competition in the market of national security could be a peer competitor, a downright enemy of the state, or worst case – apathy and the belief that national security is someone else’s job. So, how will our brand keep us moving forward and deter our adversaries? This is an important question, if in fact you subscribe to the theory that our brand has multiple target audiences. Could we or should we change our brand to send a different message or a message to a different audience. I don’t have a good answer to these questions, so I thought we might benefit from the wisdom of the crowd–hence the reason for this blogging effort?

The CNO has given us three simple tenets and only six words on which to base our day-to-day fulfillment of our duties: Warfighting First! Operate Forward! Be Ready! Does our brand convey these three tenets? Do we need more than one brand for more than one audience? Do we need a brand at all?

I always liked the poster of the Aircraft Carrier that you see in many Navy Facilities-”90,000 tons of diplomacy.” A picture is often worth a thousand words, but that picture combined with that caption conveys many things about our Navy and our great country. It champions our industrial base and the United States’ ability to construct and operate not one but eleven nuclear powered aircraft carriers. It illustrates our ability to operate from our sovereign territory—the flight deck of the carrier—anytime and anyplace where our national interests may be threatened or where a helping hand may be needed. It epitomizes our ability to take the fight to the enemy far away from our shores. Finally, it sends the message that when diplomacy or deterrence fails, standby! American resolve and wherewithal will be there, ready to act if called upon. Perhaps we should adopt a brand that does all that?

 RDML Foggo is the Director, OPNAV N81 (Assessments)

Posted by admin in Aviation, From our Archive, History, Maritime Security, Naval Institute, Navy, Proceedings | read comments (53)
Tags: James Foggo

Reuters has the story.

Russia has been increasing the reach of its navy in recent years, sending warships further afield as part of an effort to restore pride project power in a world dominated by the U.S. military.

That throws a wrench in our Maritime Strategy, it would seem.  Or does it?   What should our reaction be, militarily?  And what, diplomatically?  Should there be any?

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Air Force, Army, Aviation, Coast Guard, Foreign Policy, Hard Power, History, Homeland Security, Marine Corps, Maritime Security, Merchant Marine, Naval Institute, Navy, Proceedings, Soft Power, Tactics, Uncategorized | read comments (26)

It seems that USNS Rappahannock has fired on a small craft that ignored warnings and closed with her in the Persian Gulf.  From the NBC News article:

The crew aboard the Navy ship sent out repeated warnings, including radio calls, flashing lights, lasers and ultimately warning shots from a 50-caliber machine gun.  When the boat failed to heed the warnings, the crew was ordered to open fire with the 50-caliber gun.

It will be critically important that US civilian and military leadership emphasizes the above, and plasters images and accounts of USS Cole all over the news immediately and persistently for the next several weeks.  We should be very proactive in letting the world know that there is a terror threat to US warships and auxiliaries posed by small craft, and any such vessel that ignores the warnings as were summarized above will be fired upon and destroyed.

We mustn’t begin the oh-so familiar course of meekly apologizing for having to kill those who threaten us.   If we do, we will see many more actions such as this, likely designed to cause us to fit ourselves for ever-tighter handcuffs and more restrictive rules of engagement in combat on land and sea, which the enemy will use to increasing advantage to exploit his strengths and our weaknesses.  On the contrary, we must be firm and aggressive with our reaction to the incident.  Actions without strong narrative are subject to interpretation.

If the United States, and in particular the United States Navy, has any sense of true ‘strategic messaging”, we will let the rest of the world know that, should another small craft ignore similar warnings, it, too, will be fired upon.  And any death or injury that results from such incidents is the responsibility of those who willfully ignore the warnings, and on those who likely have sent them.

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Foreign Policy, Hard Power, History, Homeland Security, Marine Corps, Maritime Security, Naval Institute, Navy, Piracy, Tactics, Uncategorized | read comments (10)
Tags: Alexander Martin

This post is part of a group covering a Lockheed Martin media event for the F-35 Lightning II. For an analysis of the fighter’s potential as an unmanned aircraft, visit news.usni.org. For my discussion of the Joint Strike Fighter as an international acquisitions program, visit the NextWar blog at the Center for International Maritime Security.

The F-35 Lightning II, also known as the Joint Strike Fighter, has seemed to be the third rail of defense acquisitions. The aircraft program’s costs and operational role have been thoroughly discussed both here and elsewhere. When USNI kindly offered me the opportunity to represent them at a Lockheed Martin event, I felt daunted by the volumes of ink spilled to date on the subject. But, I think the JSF program as suffered from polemic coverage and needs some measured commentary. I learned a lot and hope this knowledge serves as an antidote to the vitriol surrounding this aircraft:

One interesting note: the event showed USNI’s influence in stark relief. Once the floor was open for questions, the first two focused on the Chief of Naval Operations’ recent Proceedings article “Payloads over Platforms.” These questions weren’t from me, but from bloggers from other venues. It was a moment that underscored how much the Naval Institute frames the discourse on maritime security.

Lockheed was reluctant to discuss the piece, at one point Lockheed’s Bob Rubino joked “CNO’s article? Didn’t see that…” Many have taken the CNO’s piece – especially his discussion on the limitations of stealth – as an indictment of the F-35 program. But if you read the piece closely, I think a better summary would be that stealth is important, but isn’t the sole determinant of a successful aircraft.

The Joint Strike Fighter inspires strong feelings in both supporters and detractors, and so it’s difficult to have a measured discussion of the program. What’s clear is that the Navy, the United States, and many allies and partners are counting on the program’s success. After today, any discussion of the program that isn’t constructive towards that end holds little interest for me.

LT Kurt Albaugh is a proud member of the US Naval Institute. He is also President of the Center for International Maritime Security, a Surface Warfare Officer and Instructor in the U.S. Naval Academy’s English Department. The opinions and views expressed in this post are his alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Navy.

Posted by admin in Army, Aviation, Maritime Security, Naval Institute, Proceedings | read comments (15)

It would seem that the word “solidarity” doesn’t mean what it used to.

Turkey, a long-time member of NATO, invoked Article 4 of the Charter, which calls for emergency consultation of all 28 member states, in response to the Syrian downing of an RF-4E reconnaissance aircraft.   While not as serious as Article 5, which is invoked in the defense of a NATO ally that has been attacked, Article 4 has generally been seen as a preliminary to discuss options short of armed response.   Turkey had threatened to invoke Article 4 back in April, when a cross-border incident in a refugee camp left five people, including two Turkish officials, dead.

From the meeting in Brussels, all Turkey got was the expected condemnation and the assurances of NATO togetherness.  Turkey may have been expecting little else.   Which is a good thing.  In the case of Turkey and Syria, NATO is contemplating no such thing as armed intervention, or intervention of any kind.  Not least of which because of Russia’s stance and Putin’s support for Syria’s embattled Assad, combined with the general and embarrassing lack of credible capability demonstrated by NATO in Libya last year.

Despite a WAPO article with some speculation that NATO would consider sidestepping the UN and a certain Russian veto for real action against Syria, the chances of such a sidestep are virtually nil.   Turkey knows that, Russia and Syria (and Iran) do, too.   Making invocation of Article 4 a symbolic gesture by Turkey toward an increasingly impotent NATO, whose only action was to “condemn in the strongest terms”.   I am reminded of one of my favorite Daffy Duck lines.  “I will do everything in my power to help you.  Which will be nothing!”   The rather unimpressive response to Turkey’s Article 4 declaration bodes ill for any NATO member that might possibly wish to invoke Article 5, particularly if Putin and Russia wait in the wings.

Visegrad Group, anyone?

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Air Force, Army, Foreign Policy, Hard Power, History, Maritime Security, Naval Institute, Navy, Uncategorized | read comments (19)

A couple weeks ago I wrote a blog piece that asserted that the naval conversation has lost a vital piece, tactics. We as a naval service have focused the professional dialog on the strategic level while the tactical level has largely been neglected. I got a good response to the piece but one frequent criticism that I received was that many believe the discussion of tactics belongs in the classroom and wardroom, but not the open forum. I disagree. The navy has many schools that focus on sharpening tactical skills. These schools, in combination with vibrant discussions in wardrooms and ready rooms around the fleet can effectively cover the tactical baseline for each community; however, the connective tissue, that forms the bridge between communities, known as Fleet Tactics, is left completely void.

“Trackin Devil Dog, Good to go, Err, Hoorah.”

The Marine Corps perhaps is the best example of a cohesive fighting force. Because every Marine is a rifleman and all the officers went through TBS, they are able to speak the same language and anticipate the actions of their fellow Marines, whether they are in the air or on the ground.  This is a trait that distinguishes them and makes them a much more deadly force than they would be as individual units. By contrast, we as a naval force speak different languages and have no common experience or training to connect us. Each community studies its own tactics, some more than others, but none fully understand what to expect from our brethren in the other communities.

As a SWO I would love to say that every Naval Officer should be a ship driver but that is impossible for many reasons, least of which that we do not have enough ships to facilitate it. However, there does need to be some common thread, some common tactical language that can be fused together so that the Navy, if required, could move forward as one Fleet and know exactly what to expect from the other units in the force, without having to have them explicitly stated in a 300 page OPORD.

It starts with a Conversation

I believe that void, that deficiency in training, can and should be filled in part by a robust professional tactical discussion that could occur fleet wide.  Not only can we as a naval service step up and have a more robust conversation that brings in junior and senior officers alike, but can come together as one so that aviators understand and predict what the SWOs are going to do in a tactical engagement, and SWOs understand what the Submariners are going to do etc.

This dialog does not have to be in Proceedings or on a blog. I would argue that at one point in naval history this void might have been filled by discussions that happened around a pint in the officer’s club. Whether this dynamic discussion happens in print, in symposiums, around the wardroom, or in a new school, the crossing of those barriers is vitally important and is something to be aspired to. Now that the money is drying up, we have to be more effective with what we have, and the best way for us to be more tactically effective is to be a more cohesive fighting force. That means that we need to double down on Fleet Tactics.

LT Robert McFall is a Surface Warfare Officer that did two tours on USS WINSTON S. CHURCHILL. He is currently the Vice Chairman of the Editorial Board of the United States Naval Institute and on the Board of Directors of the Surface Navy Association. 

Posted by admin in Marine Corps, Maritime Security, Naval Institute, Navy, Tactics | read comments (17)

Navy Lt Kurt Albaugh’s recent piece (“The Return of the Privateers”) at news.usni.org is valuable in the discussion about an old concept made new in response to the challenge of Somali piracy off the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean. The private sector is adapting to new markets. In this case, a private security industry has emerged to address the needs of the private sector’s threat by pirates, especially in that region of the world.

Appropriate terminology is the first step in understanding this issue. Privateers were ships authorized by states to engage in armed conflict against another state’s commerce. Letters of marque were issued by a state to formalize that authorization. They were considered such an integral part of naval warfare that the founding fathers included that specific power for Congress in Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. During the War of 1812, for example, the U.S. government with a small navy of approximately sixteen ships at the war’s outset, issue some 500 letters of marque to privateers which, subsequently, captured more than 1,300 British prizes (see Charles Brodine, “The War’s Pervasive Dimensions,” Naval History, June 2012). Letters of marque were later issued by the independent Republic of Texas in the 1830s and the Confederate States of American during the Civil War. The Treaty of Paris (1856) (see “Contracts of Marque,” Proceedings, November 2007) ending the Crimean War banned the use of privateers by the war’s combatants. The U.S. later signed the Hague Convention of 1907 signaling its own end to the use of privateers.

Consequently, the term “privateer” is not an entirely accurate reflection of today’s emerging maritime security industry since the companies are a) not hired largely by states and b) not engaged to seek out and capture or destroy enemy commerce. The current termed that has gained acceptance is “PCASP” – Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel. This includes both the armed guards hired on board ships and as well as a subset of the maritime security industry.

The proposed Convoy Escort Programme, a private naval force underwritten by Lloyds, despite indications otherwise in the past several years appears poised to finally materialize. This concept is not new. Since 2007, when piracy began to emerge as a threat to shipping at first in the Gulf of Aden, several firms have claimed they had or intended to buy ships. While the former Blackwater was the first to produce a ship – the former NOAA ship McArthur – it arrived in the Red Sea without any clients and the ship never provided protection to commercial clients as intended. Other firms, including U.S. and French companies, made bold assertions that they had many boats at the ready, but upon investigation none existed and the stories rapidly changed. (see “Private Security Companies and Piracy,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, March 2009). Several companies have, however, had platforms in the region including Protection Vessels International (PVI) which has operated three escort boats on a consistent basis. Other firms have also emerged providing logistics platforms such as “floatels” (floating hotels).

The response to piracy has included both state navies and a far more robust response from the shipping industry including improvements to Best Management Practices as well as the reluctant acceptances of on-board armed guards. State navies have existed for thousands of years and control of the seas were determined by battles such as Salamis between the various Greek city-states and the Persian Empire or Actium between the competing Roman and Egyptian forces. But, on occasion, usually out of necessity, states and shipping companies (such as the East India Company) have turned to the private sector, right or wrong, to supplement their numbers or address other shortcomings.

Lt. Albaugh piece echoes the fundamental questions of accountability, rules of engagement (or in PCASP parlance “use of force”), and interests of the state – or more appropriately the shipping companies, are important. These and other questions are being debated but the answers are by no means set. Finally, the market itself may change as radically as it has in the past five or six years.

With some 20,000 ship transits in the Gulf of Aden annually, the opportunities for maritime security companies seemed encouraging, but the actual number of vulnerable ships to pirates is far less depending on the speed and ship structures which are both preventative to most attacks. Six years ago, only six to twelve firms offer armed maritime security guards (according to my co-editor on “Maritime Private Security”). Today the Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI) has over 120 firms as members. Some estimates suggest the number of firms is higher than 200. Arguably not every firm has the same capability, offers the same services, or is as robust as others. Some may simply be an individual through whom other contracts and resumes are processed. The number of Gulf of Aden transits will not markedly increase. With the proliferation of PCASPs and the decreased number of successful attacks (primarily due to armed guards), it is possible that if these conditions hold the market in that region has been saturated, that opportunities with it will diminish and marginal PCASPs with no other choice than the leave the market or to find other markets, should they arise, such as the Gulf of Guinea.

Lieutenant Commander Claude Berube is the co-editor of “Maritime Private Security: Market Responses Piracy, Terrorism, and Waterborne Security Risks in the 21st Century” (Routledge, 2012). His articles about private security as sea have appeared since 2007 in Orbis, Jane’s Intelligence Review, the Washington Times, Forbes.com, and Naval Institute Proceedings. He serves on the Editorial Board of Proceedings.

Posted by admin in Foreign Policy, History, Maritime Security, Naval Institute, Navy | read comments (1)

This is the final installment in my series of posts on William Sims and what his discovery and development of continuous aim fire a century ago can tell us about junior leaders and innovation.  They are part of the remarks that I delivered at NWDC’s Junior Leader Innovation Symposium.

PREVIOUS:

 A Junior Officer and a Discovery.

The Gritty Truth of Junior Leader Innovation 

Years after serving as the Navy’s Inspector of Target Practice, as World War I raged, Rear Admiral William Sims was sent to England to command all U.S. Naval Forces based there.  Promoted to Vice Admiral, he arrived as the U-boat Wolfpacks of the German Navy were decimating the supply lines across the Atlantic.  The British Isles were on the verge of starvation.  The Royal Navy had been completely ineffective against the German submarines as they massed their battleships to take on the German Imperial Navy’s High Seas Fleet.

When Admiral Sims arrived he was approached by a group of young Lieutenants who brought him an idea which the Royal Navy had refused to implement.  These Lieutenants were the Commanding Officers of a new class of warship called a Destroyer, and they believed that working together they could convoy supplies across the Atlantic and take on the Wolfpacks, swarm against swarm.  The Royal Navy’s Admiralty refused to adopt the new tactics.  Sims requested more destroyers from the States, and told the Royal Navy that the US would help out if they tried the young JO’s ideas.

The convoy system showed results almost immediately.  The convoys were so successful and so vital to the war effort that Sims – the very definition of a Battleship Admiral – cabled back to Washington and told the Department of the Navy to stop building Battleships and put all shipbuilding into Destroyers … all because he listened to a group of Junior Leaders with a good idea.

After the war was over, Sims took over as the President of The Naval War College.  He made adjustments to the curriculum and he started running officers through war games.  These war games included early work on a war plan that could be used for a conflict in the Pacific.  The work that Sims started on the Pacific plan, which became War Plan Orange, suggested that the U.S. Navy should look into investing in a new kind of ship … the aircraft carrier.  The Battleship Admiral, who championed Destroyers because of the tactical and operational innovation of junior leaders, turned to the birth of naval aviation because of the ideas of his subordinates at the War College.  The Milwaukee Journal wrote that Sims “continued to be a thorn in the fat flesh of the naval hierarchy during his entire career.”

What can we learn from this story?

First, you have to know where your expertise lies.  You have to study, and do the deep research needed to understand why things are the way they are.  You have to understand that you don’t know everything, and like Sims working with his wardroom mates and his gunner’s mates, you have to work to identify challenges and problems.  It’s important to admit that you don’t know everything.  Once you admit it, start learning as much as you can.  Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote, “The study of history lies at foundation of all sound military conclusions and practices.”  The key element in his principle is that we have to study and develop our expertise.

Find a way to talk about your idea.  Take Sims’ warning to heart though and don’t be insubordinate, don’t write a letter to the President (it’s probably not going to get you anywhere today anyway). However, you need to engage both inside the system and outside the system.  Inside the Navy and the Military you have NWDC concept development.  You have SUBFOR’s TANG that we heard about from VADM Richardson earlier.  And we have some of the resources that Dr. Fall from ONR described.  You also have your chain of command.  You can submit changes to TTP’s and manuals, NATOPS changes, or write white papers to submit up the chain.  Outside of the lifelines there are also options.  Write an article for USNI’s Proceedings or write up your idea for one of the online publications like USNI Blog, Small Wars Journal, Information Dissemination, or the Next War Blog at the Center for International Maritime Security.  We can also engage with the community professional organizations like Naval Helicopter Association, Tailhook, or the Surface Navy Association.

Third, find something you believe in and demonstrate your own grit.  You have to want to do this.  This isn’t a fast or sure way to a fitrep or an eval bullet.  This isn’t necessarily going to get you another ribbon for your chest candy.  This is for the combat effectiveness of the Service.  This is about professionalism.  You have to be willing to spend 2 years writing 13 reports that everyone appears to be ignoring.  You have to be willing to invest the time and energy and hard work needed to see your idea through.  Christopher Hitchens wrote in his book Letters to a Young Contrarian, “Don’t expect to be thanked, by the way, the life of an oppositionist is supposed to be difficult.”

Finally, we all need to learn to listen.  This is especially true as we become more senior.  Today we may be the junior leaders, but that means tomorrow some of us will be the mid-grade leaders, and in the future some of us will be the senior leaders of the Navy.  Sims is proof that when you remember it’s not about you but instead it’s about the idea and about the Service, you can continue to innovate as you are promoted.  However, as a senior officer or senior enlisted it takes more listening and more encouraging of your subordinates, because they’re likely to have the next great idea…like convoys or aircraft carriers.  Having senior leaders that listen, and who become the champions of the great ideas of their subordinates, is just as vital as having junior personnel with innovative ideas.

There’s a reason why the title of my last slide says “Lessons Observed.”  These lessons are just ideas that I’ve pulled from this story.  William Sims offers us all a great example to learn from.  However, whether or not these observations actually become lessons learned … that’s up to you.

The author would like to thank VADM Daly, Bill Miller, and Mary Ripley from USNI for encouraging his involvement with the NWDC conference.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Posted by admin in Hard Power, History, Maritime Security, Naval Institute, Navy, Proceedings | read comments (11)