In the Navy, our concept of an organization is dominated by the “chain of command” and the quintessential “org chart,” both of which are vertically focused.  These concepts do a good job of telling us who we work for, and who works for us.  However, they serve little purpose in outlining with whom we should work.  These relationships are horizontal in nature and help us navigate the seams of an organization, seams which are readily apparent in a traditional, vertically-focused “org chart.”  While vertical relationships are key to authority and responsibility, effective innovation, planning, and execution are typically dependent on horizontal relationships.

The Chief Petty Officers’ Mess is well known for establishing horizontal relationships.  Chiefs utilize relationships established during CPO 365 and within the Chiefs’ Mess to solve problems and accomplish the mission.  In essence, the effectiveness of the Chiefs’ Mess is based in large part on these horizontal relationships.  These horizontal relationships need not be limited to the Chiefs’ Mess, however.  Command members at all ranks, officer and enlisted, can and should seek to establish these relationships in order to make themselves and their command or organization more effective.

A good example is the somewhat recent emphasis on the N3/N2 (Ops/Intel) relationship, linking the operator to the intelligence professional, and vice versa.  The result has been greater synchronization between these supporting entities.  Another example is the establishment of the Information Dominance Corps (IDC), which seeks to establish a close working relationship between information-focused communities.  Regardless of where these information-focused professionals work in an organization, a roadmap for their horizontal relationships has been pre-established by the formation of the IDC.  The possibilities for horizontal relationships are truly endless, while the potential value in establishing and utilizing these relationships is immeasurable.

Establishing a horizontal relationship takes little effort.  Warfare qualification programs, command functions, social events, and command organizations, such as the First Class Petty Officers Association, all encourage the establishment of horizontal relationships.  Getting out of your work space and interacting with your peers is another method.  Share each other’s roles and responsibilities and seek to identify overlap, and common or supporting efforts.  Then establish a relationship and ensure you leverage it whenever necessary or feasible.

Horizontal relationships need not be limited to your own command or organization.  Establishing relationships with other commands or supporting staffs can be beneficial as well.  Horizontal relationships can also be established within a wider community, leveraging the collective thoughts of a large, diverse group.  Tools like the IDC Self-Synchronization website enable establishment and utilization of such relationships.

So the next time you think about the chain of command or look at an org chart, focus on the horizontal vice vertical aspects of the organization.  Identify the seams and look for places to establish horizontal relationships, relationships that will help make you and the command more effective.  Then set out to navigate the seams.

LCDR Chuck Hall is an Information Warfare Officer and member of the Information Dominance Corps. He enlisted in the Navy in 1988 and served 13 years as a Cryptologic Technician (Interpretive) prior to commissioning as a CWO2.  Subsequently selected for LDO, he transitioned to the Restricted Line once he completed his BA in Middle Eastern Studies.  He currently serves on the CCSG-8 staff, embarked in USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.  When at home he enjoys spending time with his wife and three amazing children.  He has also contributed to Connecting the Dots with his blog post Waiting to Lead.

Posted by Fouled Anchor in Cyber, Homeland Security, Maritime Security, Navy, Soft Power | read comments (5)
Tags: chain of command, Horizontal cooperation, horizontal relationships, org chart

With sequestration hovering like a black cloud, PME like everything in the Defense Department is under the hammer and in flux regarding present operations and future planning. Nobody knows quite what to expect and many decisions are beyond internal control.  Nevertheless, there are decisions being made or apparently being considered that are within Navy control that have PME faculty in a tailspin.  In a time of high faculty anxiety already, this is just one more stone.  We don’t need to do this and there are even costs and morale savings to be gained in taking a different approach.

Communication in the PME community too often seems to utilize a very Asian “information is power” model. Official notices or all-hands meetings where messages of “all is well” or “all isn’t well but we don’t know anything” are common. Even in “normal” times, that allows the rumor mill to function on overdrive. In times of extreme fiscal constraint such as currently being experienced, when clearly all isn’t well, speculation and rumor naturally runs especially rampant.  Will faculty be furloughed? How would a furlough be instituted? Will civilians be treated differently from military faculty and support staff? Are faculty basically facing a 20% pay cut? On these questions we will all have to wait and see. Other questions, however, are not dependent on the actions of others and could be addressed if those in charge chose to do so.

For example, faculty travel has been dramatically curtailed as a result of the financial crisis. Again, that is understandable. A choice between funding a faculty member to attend the International Studies Conference (ISA) and buying fuel to keep ships running seems pretty obvious, even to the person whose trip to ISA has been canceled. But travel and association with peers is part of academic life. The best teachers are also active researchers who must interact with peers. Therefore, if the Navy intends to maintain the kind of “world class faculties” it often purports to want, and to have, other avenues of funding ought to be sought, and made user friendly, which they are not.

Consequent to an investigation that found expenses related to some conferences being funded by the Navy were extravagant – a finding confined to a remarkably small number of groups – a new battery of forms, procedures and requirements have been generated within the Navy that make is difficult if not sometimes impossible for faculty to travel and attend conferences, even if not funded by the Navy. The required hoop jumping is difficult and ambiguous.

To cite a personal example: I had a trip turned down in November, fully funded by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to the annual meeting of the prestigious NAS Space Studies Board, on which I serve with permission.  The reason given was that approval for faculty to attend conferences now apparently includes a DC component, and whoever does that in DC simply never got around to it.

Seeking to attend a conference is another tripwire working against faculty seeking to remain professionally active.  If a faculty member is requesting to attend a conference using Navy money, the conference must be deemed “mission essential” to the Department of the Navy. That rationale, while regrettable, is understandable. But whether that qualification applies to trips fully funded externally is unclear. If a request to travel is fully-funded by the inviting group, but is deemed to be a conference, it apparently still can be turned down – thereby requiring faculty to take annual leave if they want to attend. If travel is partially funded externally and the faculty member volunteers to personally pay for the rest they still have to take annual leave to attend – apparently even if the event has not been designated a conference.

And nobody seems able to declare definitively what constitutes a conference. Personally, for example, me speaking as part of a panel to several hundred people was not considered a conference, me speaking to a group of 40 students was considered a conference, and acting as a moot court judge in China was considered a conference as well. What are the guidelines? The legal officers within PME, at least at the Naval War College, are struggling mightily to make determinations on a case-by-case basis – and their efforts are greatly appreciated by faculty members. But would it be so difficult for those setting these requirements to provide clear guidelines that could be known and understood by all? The lead-time for making these decisions is currently 30 days, though rumor has it that will soon be changed to 60 days. These constantly changing, ambiguous rules will soon have a chilling effect on faculty performance, if they aren’t already.

Perhaps most insidious and potentially chilling is the rumor that consequent to a Navy Investigator General (IG) finding of wrongdoings at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) originating from a complaint about a university publication about the university, the Navy is considering instituting a policy of pre-publication review of faculty publications.  While the Navy, like any government agency, clearly has the right to review employee publications for security purposes, the processes, parameters, and unintended consequences for such a review process within an educational framework should be clearly considered before instituting such a system. I strongly suspect that has not yet happened.

Who would conduct these reviews? The Public Affairs Office at the respective commands? I suspect they have neither the time nor the substantive expertise. The Security Office? The Legal Officer? How would they be done in a timely manner? When there is talk of furloughing faculty, would new staff be hired to screen publications? What would be their qualifications? What would be included: books, article, OpEds, media interview material, public presentations…personal blogs?

I attended a space conference this month in Washington, DC.  A very high-ranking government official enthusiastically recommended James Clay Moltz’s book on space to the audience. Dr. Moltz is a faculty member at NPS. I’ve been told my Orbis will now be part of a required reading package for new faculty at a senior PME institution. NWC faculty member Milan Vego’s book on operational art is a standard within PME. Also from the Naval War College, faculty member Nick Gvosdev writes a weekly online column, “The Realist Prism,” and Thomas Mahnken has his online blog “Shadow Government.” Will similar publications be supported in the future? Will ongoing, online publications be subject to review?

What would the censors be looking for, security violations…or something broader, perhaps sensitive topics? Who will determine what is sensitive? Might this article be considered sensitive? And perhaps political correctness would be considered? That could all but negate the Academic Freedom required to make any great educational institution, or a great educator great.

The rumor mill is already in high gear. I have written about this potential pre-publication review process once already, based on communications from NPS faculty who had been present when it was raised in a meeting. I then received mail from another NPS faculty chastising me for raising such a rumor, saying unequivocally it had never happened. I have now heard a similar rumor about publication reviews at the Naval War College. OPNAV clarification would go a long way toward calming waters on this very sensitive issue in a very turbulent time.

Finally, I must also ask a question that I have asked repeatedly before. Are there designated individuals in OPNAV involved in discussion of these issues who actually have experience in what is required to be a professionally active academic?  To prepare materials for a 21^st century professional education? Or, are bureaucrats  or consultants who have no idea of either requirements or consequences making these seemingly arbitrary decisions?  Would a similar approach be taken if creating procedures that would affect the running of a ship?

Critics have sometimes characterized PME faculty (especially civilian academic faculty) as lazy and unproductive. There is unquestionably deadwood at all academic institutions – civilian or PME. Being deadwood, however, has nothing to do with their pedigree, but with what are they doing currently. Are they professionally active in their fields, and consequently, are they teachers who can challenge theirs students with current ideas and depth? Or are they simply bureaucrats with academic titles, phoning-in teaching and collecting paychecks? Politicos hiding out until the next change of administration in DC? Ambiguous and arbitrary rules with a chilling effect on professionalism will actually encourage deadwood, serve no purpose and quickly damage the already questioned credibility of PME.

Sometimes, those who consider or issue new policies and procedures are unaware of the tumultuous unintended consequences that result, because the individuals charged with executing the new policies and procedures are reluctant to point out problems. If those in charge realized what was going on though, they might be very anxious to fix things. Perhaps that is what is happening now, and so raise these issues for awareness, hopeful that those in charge will want to address them.

Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Her publications include: Heavenly Ambitions: America’s Quest to Dominate Space; Space As A Strategic Asset, and over 80 journal articles. She is a member of the Space Studies Board of the National Academy of Sciences, a Fellow of the International Academy of Astronautics, and a member of the Editorial Board of China Security. She has testified before Congress on multiple occasions, and is regularly interviewed by the media, including CNN, CBS, ABC, The New York Times, Reuters and the BBC, on space issues. She also teaches courses on Globalization & US National Security, and Space & Security, at Harvard Summer and Extension Schools. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ alone and do not represent the official position of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.

Posted by admin in Education, Innovation, Navy, Soft Power | read comments (8)

The demands of the warfighter are like cheese processed through the lactose intolerant digestive tract that is military supply; though digestion is a vital process, it can be unspeakably painful and smell of rotten eggs. End-users already plagued by rapidly decreasing manning and time are now interrupted by long backorder lead times, artificial constraints on off-the-shelf solutions, and funding. Personnel are known to skip the supply system altogether, purchasing parts or equipment out of pocket when an inspection is on the line. This both hides the problem and takes from the pockets our sailors. The military has forgotten that supply exists for the utility the operator, not the ease of the audited. For the military supply system to regain the trust and capabilities necessary to serve the end-user, reforms to the way supplies are selected, commercial purchases are managed, and funding requested are necessary.

COSAL:
The first major problem is the Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List (COSAL). COSAL is a process by which the navy’s supply system determines what supplies it should stock on the shelves; items are ordered through the in-house supply system and the hits in the system raise the priority to stock. Unfortunately, COSAL is reactive rather than predictive and cannot meet the needs of either the new aches of an aging fleet or the growing pains of new ships. As ships grow long-in-the-tooth, parts and equipment once reliable require replacement or repair. New ships find casualties in systems meant to last several years. Equipment lists also change, leading to fleet-wide demands for devices only in limited, if any, supply. The non-COSAL items are suddenly in great demand but nowhere to be found. Critical casualties have month+ long wait-times for repairs as parts are back-ordered from little COSAL support. Commands attempt to fill their time-sensitive need by open purchasing these items from the external market, which are not COSAL tracked. This leads to either supply forcing the workcenter to order through supply and end-users waiting potentially months for critical backordered items, or the open purchase being accomplished and COSAL staying unchanged. Although difficult, the supply system should be more flexible to open-purchasing stock item equivalents due to time constraints while integrating open purchase equivalence tracking into the COSAL process. This bypasses the faults of COSAL’s reactionary nature while still updating the supply system with the changing demands.

Split Purchasing:
The limitations on open purchasing (buying commercial off-the-shelf) create artificial shortages of material easily available on the street. Namely, when items are not under General Services Administration (GSA) contract, single vendor purchases or purchases for a single purpose cannot exceed $3,000, no matter how the critical need or short the deadline. This further exacerbates the problems from an unsupportive COSAL; if requirements exceed purchase limitations, requests are sent through a lengthy contracting process which wastes more time than money saved. The contracting requirement ignores the fact that from the work-center supervisor to the supply officer, everyone now has the ability to search the internet for companies and can compare quotes. Purchasers need not be encouraged to spend less money, since they have the natural deisre to stretch their budget as far as possible. Contracting opportunities also become more scarce as the end of the fiscal year approaches, since money “dedicated” to a contracting purchase is lost if the clock turns over and no resolution is found. This means money lost to the command and vital equipment left unpurchased. For deployed/deployable units, this can be unacceptable. The supply system exists to fulfill the operational needs of the training/deployed demand-side, not to streamline the risk-averse audit demands of the supply side. If not raising the price-ceilings of non-GSA purchases for operational commands, the rule against split purchasing by spreading single-type purchases across multiple vendors should be removed. Breaking out a single purchase amongst several vendors alleviates the risk that large purchases are being made to single vendors due to kick-backs. This would call for more diligence on the part of Supply Officers, but that is why they exist.

Funding:
Finally, the recent Presidential Debates have shown the military’s poor ability to communicate the message that funding is becoming an increasingly critical issue force-wide. To many, the defense budget is so large that cuts are academic, savings no doubt hiding throughout the labyrinthine bureaucracy. However, for those of us who had no money to buy everything from tools to toilet paper for a month, it’s a more practical problem. Long before sequestration, Secretary Gates started the DoD on the path of making pre-emptive cuts before outside entities made those choices for the DoD. However, the military has made a poor show of communicating that these cuts have become excessive and are now cutting into the muscle of the force. Obeying the directive to cut funding does not require quietly accepting these cuts; now the Commander and Chief believes the military not even in need of a cut freeze, let alone a funding increase. With Hydra of manning, material, and training issues constantly growing new heads, the strategic communicators must come out in force to correct this misconception. While administrative savings can be found, our capabilities are paying the price for the budgetary experiment. Military leadership should, in part, involve advocacy; obedience requires the resources to execute the mission.

The supply system is a painful process, but with rather humble reforms, that pain can be both lessened and taken off the shoulders of whom the system exists to serve. With a reformed COSAL tracking open purchases, a loosened open-purchase limit that puts the stress on the supplier rather than operator, and better strategic communications about funding, we can apply a bit of lactaid to an otherwise painful process.

LTJG Matthew Hipple serves as the weapons officer for PC Crew India. He graduated from Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service and is the Director of the NEXTWAR blog at the Center for International Maritime Security (WWW.cimsec.org).

Posted by admin in Homeland Security, Navy, Soft Power, Tactics | read comments (4)

Please join us Sun, October 28, 2012 05:00PM for Episode 147: The Recipient’s Son and Navy PAOs

Our show today will have guests that have seemingly unrelated topics – but both are connected to one thing; getting the story of our Navy, its people, and its culture out to the larger population.

For the first half of the hour, we will have returning guest Stephen Phillips. Steve is a 1992 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. He began his naval career as a surface warfare officer in USS Harlan County and USS San Jacinto. He then applied and was accepted into the Navy’s Special Operations community. He subsequently served as an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Technician at EOD Mobile Units Six, Eight, and Ten.

Steve is the author of the awarding-winning debut novel, Proximity, describes life as a Navy EOD Technician in the war on terrorism. His second novel,The Recipient’s Son, is a coming of age story that takes place at the U.S. Naval Academy in the late 80’s early 90’s.

Our guest for the second half of the hour will be LCDR Chris Servello, USN, director, Navy Newsdesk (OI-31) and Public Affairs Assistant to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

Chris will be here on his own behalf to discuss the role of the PAO in today’s media environment. We’ll also discuss how someone becomes a PAO along with some of the misconceptions and surprising aspects of what a PAO does.

Join us live by clicking here or use that link to download the show later which you can also do by going to our iTunes page here.

Posted by Eagle1 in Books, Navy, Soft Power | read comments (0)

We hear a lot about the Battle Force when talking about US Navy force structure and the documents that guide how we deploy and employ our Fleets.  As a reader of Mahan, the language brings me back to a phrase he repeatedly uses in his writing, “The Battle-fleet.”  See, in Mahan’s day the U.S. Navy started out as a 5th rate power (or worse) and didn’t even have a single fleet that could stand up to a foreign navy when massed together.  Over the years he wrote, culminating about the time he passed away in the prelude to World War I, the USN slowly built its battle-fleet to be a peer of almost any navy on the seven seas.  Over the next century the USN continued to build and develop itself into the superpower it is today, with several fleets positioned globally.

Much of what we hear about the Battle Force today harkens back to Mahan’s writing on how to use the battle-fleet.  The focus is decisive combat against the enemy’s naval forces followed by or concurrent with the projection of power ashore.  The focus is on the high-end and kinetic operations which should be the focus of the battle-fleet and, by analogy in today’s language, the modern Battle Force.

But the comparison to today’s Navy starts to come apart as you read about the types of ship’s Mahan thought were appropriate for a navy.  While most of us are taught about his belief in the battle-fleet, and its role in pursuing and winning decisive battles that would establish American command of the sea, we’re rarely reminded that in his view a Navy didn’t stop there.  Yes, he believed the battle-fleet had to win the decisive battle but there are many other tasks of naval forces.  In his essay “Considerations Governing the Disposition of Navies” he wrote that a properly constructed navy needed to be balanced and have three main parts.  First was, yes, the battle-fleet.  Second was independent cruisers.  Third was small combatants and craft to operate in close to an enemy’s shoreline.  It wasn’t all one battle-fleet, but a balanced naval force designed for more than just blue water battle.

Each of these different groups of naval vessels had a role to play in major combat operations, but also a matching role to play in peacetime operations.  In war the battle-fleet remained offshore, far enough away from the enemy’s coastline that it wouldn’t fall victim to costal defenses (what today we call A2AD threats).  There the battle-fleet awaited the enemy’s fleet, maneuvering for positions of advantage for the coming decisive battle.  The independent cruisers would range between the battle-fleet and the enemy’s coast, looking to pick off scouts and small squadrons or ranging further afield to strike at the enemy’s merchant shipping and impose an economic cost.  Finally, the smaller littoral ships ranged in close, tested and engaged the enemy’s coastal defenses, and scouted for the enemy’s fleet to determine when or where it would sortie to engage in the decisive battle.

Today’s Battle Force has platforms which fill all of those rolls in the vision of the 21st century naval conflict.  In Mahan’s day it was an all surface affair, with ships of varying sizes and armaments filling the roles.  (He wrote that submarines and torpedo craft, which were experimental platforms for turn of the century navies, were likely to gain success and capability and become part of the mix, but it hadn’t happened before his death).  Today, many of the roles are still filled by surface combatants, but submarines and aircraft have taken over significant parts of the equation.  They have assumed many, if not all, of the roles and missions traditionally taken by the independent cruisers and the small combatants in the littorals, and with much success in kinetic operations.  The name Battle Force, rather than battle-fleet, is certainly accurate.

The problem with today’s Battle Force is that by replacing the cruisers, scouts, and small combatants with submarines and aircraft it loses the capabilities those vessels brought to the peacetime missions.   For centuries navies, unlike armies and more recently unlike air forces, have had dual responsibilities not just to fight and win the nation’s wars at sea but to serve in peacetime to protect the nation’s interests, deter challengers, and serve as a diplomatic arm of the military in building partnerships and friendships across the globe.   From our nation’s earliest days the dual uses of naval forces were on our leaders minds.  Former Naval Academy and Naval War College professor Dr. Craig Symonds wrote in his book Navalists and Antinavalists:

All of President James Monroe’s surviving papers on the navy or on naval policy reflect a concern that it efficiently perform two distinct services: first, that it be adequate to cope with the daily problems of a maritime nation – smuggling, piracy, and combating the slave trade; and, second, that it provide the United States with a comfortable degree of readiness in case war should be forced upon the nation.

What today we refer to as maritime security operations and partnership building isn’t a new-fangled 21st century idea.  In fact, it’s a mission which goes back to the very founding of our service, shared with navies throughout history.

Today’s Battle Force is a battle-fleet on steroids, one that has absorbed the rest of the naval force.  It is surely powerful and brings us more than “a comfortable degree of readiness in case war should be forced upon the nation.”  For fighting and winning a major war it has no equal on the seven seas.  However, it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy because major war may become more likely if there are no ships to conduct the first distinct service President Monroe enumerated.

While the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower says all the right things, the Battle Force isn’t built for that strategy.  It is only built for one half of our navy’s job.  It has mobility and the flexibility to engage multiple targets, but more and more often it lacks true adaptability to do more than just put warheads on foreheads, or threaten it.  As the Battle Force shores up its control of the Navy the ability to adapt to smaller contingencies, work in contested waters that are not yet in kinetic conflict, or engage non-state actors and build partnerships becomes harder and harder.  Yet these are all the things needed to help avert war, and so actual war at sea becomes more likely, and the Battle Force continues to become stronger.

Naval thinkers from Mahan to Corbett to Zumwalt to Hughes have discussed the importance of having a balanced fleet.  High/low mix, Streetfighter, or Influence Squadrons are just other ways to talk about a balanced fleet which is capable of the “regular” major combat operations and fleet engagements as well as the “irregular” maritime security operations and partnership/diplomatic development.  Mahan wrote that his own thinking and writing provided a solid foundation to move on to the writing of Sir Julian Corbett, the British navalist who told us that “in no case can we exercise control by battleships alone.”  Today’s networked Battle Force is impressive and powerful.  As Mahan wrote, it is the starting point for a properly constructed naval force.  But the question is…does a powerful battle-fleet alone provide the Navy we need to face the turbulent seas of the 21st century?

LCDR Armstrong is a contributor to Proceedings, Naval History, and USNI Blog.  His book 21st Century Mahan: Sound Military Conclusions for the Modern Era is forthcoming from NIP.  The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Posted by admin in Foreign Policy, Hard Power, History, Innovation, Maritime Security, Navy, Proceedings, Soft Power, Tactics | read comments (12)

Much has been written of late about “Creating Cyber Warriors” within the Navy’s Officer Corps.  In fact, three prominent and well-respected members of the Navy’s Information Dominance Corps published a very well articulated article by that very title in the October 2012 edition of Proceedings.  It is evident that the days of feeling compelled to advocate for such expertise within our wardroom are behind us.  We have gotten passed the WHY and are in the throes of debating the WHAT and HOW.  In essence, we know WHY we need cyber expertise and we know WHAT cyber expertise we need.  What we don’t seem to have agreement on is WHO should deliver such expertise and HOW do we get there.

As a proud member of both the Cryptologic Community and the Information Dominance Corps, I feel confident stating the responsibility for cultivating such expertise lies squarely on our own shoulders.  The Information Dominance Corps, and more specifically the Cryptologic and Information Professional Communities, have a shared responsibility to “Deliver Geeks to the Fleet.”  That’s right, I said “Geeks” and not “Cyber Warriors.”  We don’t need, and despite the language many are using, the Navy doesn’t truly want “Cyber Warriors.”  We need and want “Cyber Geeks.”  Rather than lobby for Unrestricted Line status, which seems to be the center of gravity for some, we should focus entirely on delivering operational expertise regardless of our officer community designation.

For far too long, many people in the Restricted Line Communities have looked at the Unrestricted Line Communities as the cool kids in school.  Some consider them the “in-crowd” and want to sit at their lunch table.  Some think wearing another community’s warfare device validates us as naval officers and is the path to acceptance, opportunity, and truly fitting in.  We feel an obligation to speak their language, understand the inner workings of their culture, and act more and more like them.  Some have grown so weary of being different or considered weird that many would say we’ve lost our identity.  Though establishment of the Information Dominance Corps has revitalized our identity, created a unity of effort amongst us in the information mission areas, and further established information as a legitimate warfare area, many continue to advocate that we are lesser because of our Restricted Line status.  We seem to think we want and need to be Unrestricted Line Officers ourselves.  Why?  Sure, we would like to have direct accessions so that we can deliberately grow and select the specialized expertise necessary to deliver cyber effects to the Fleet.  Yes, we would like a seat at the power table monopolized by Unrestricted Line Officers.  And yes, we would appreciate the opportunity to have more of our own enjoy the levels of influence VADM Mike Rogers currently does as Commander, Fleet Cyber Command and Commander, U.S. TENTH Fleet.

But there is another path; a path that celebrates, strengthens, and capitalizes on our uniqueness.

In the private sector, companies are continually racing to the middle so they can appeal to the masses.  It’s a race to the bottom that comes from a focus on cutting costs as a means of gaining market share.  There are, however, some obvious exceptions, my favorite of which is Apple.  Steve Jobs was not overly interested in addressing customers’ perceived desires.  Instead, he anticipated the needs of the marketplace, showed the world what was possible before anyone else even dreamt it, and grew a demand signal that did not previously exist.  He was not interested in appealing to the masses and he surely wasn’t focused on the acceptance of others in his industry.  He was focused on creating unique value (i.e. meaningful entrepreneurship over hollow innovation), putting “a dent in the universe,” and delivering a product about which he was personally proud.  We know how this approach evolved.  The market moved toward Apple; the music, movie, phone, and computing industries were forever changed; and the technological bar was raised with each product delivered under his leadership.  Rather than lobby for a seat at the table where other leaders were sitting, he sat alone and watched others pick up their trays to sit with him.  Even those who chose not to sit with him were looking over at his table with envy, doing their best to incrementally build on the revolutionary advances only he was able to realize.

Rather than seek legitimacy by advocating to be part of Team Unrestricted Line, we ought to focus on delivering so much value that we are considered a vital part of each and every team because of our uniqueness.  I am reminded of a book by Seth Godin titled “We Are All Weird.”  In it he refers to “masses” as the undifferentiated, “normal” as the defining characteristics of the masses, and “weird” as those who have chosen not to blindly conform to the way things have always been done.  For the sake of argument, let’s consider the Unrestricted Line Officers as the masses, those considering themselves “warfighters” as the normal, and the Information Dominance Corps as the weird.  I say the last with a sense of hope.  I hope that we care enough to maintain our weirdness and that we don’t give in to the peer pressure that could drive us to lobby for a seat at what others perceive to be “The Cool Table.”  By choosing to be weird and committing more than ever to embrace our geekiness, the table perceived to be cool will be the one at which the four Information Dominance Communities currently sit.  It won’t happen by accident, but it will happen, provided we want it to happen.  Not because we want to be perceived as “cool,” but because we are so good at what we do, and we deliver so much unique value to the Navy and Nation, that no warfighting team is considered complete without its own personal “Cyber Geek.”

I sincerely respect the opinions voiced in the article to which I referred earlier in this post.  However, I think we are better than we give ourselves credit for.  Let’s not conform, let’s create.  Let’s not generalize, let’s specialize.  Let’s not be normal, let’s be weird.  Let’s choose to be Geeks.

CDR Sean Heritage is an Information Warfare Officer who is currently transitioning from Command of NIOC Pensacola to Staff Officer at U.S. Cyber Command.  He regularly posts to his leadership-focused blog, Connecting the Dots.

Posted by Fouled Anchor in Homeland Security, Innovation, Navy, Proceedings, Soft Power, Tactics, Uncategorized | read comments (11)
Tags: Cyber, Cyber Defense, Information Dominance, Information Warfare

Disclaimer:  This theory of mine is only mine, and is not the thinking or policy of the US Navy or NATO.  Further more, this is only the second time I’ve even mentioned my thoughts below to anyone.  I am not Public Affairs trained, and so I am probably very, very wrong in all that I say… 

To read the first part of this series click here.

Part four: The People (or, attention is demanded, content is king, and it’s hard to smell roses).

Three people, at the very least, is required to manage a robust and content diverse social media profile.  This requirement is temporality based, with one person focusing on new content, one for posting content and being the person behind the profile(s), and another for gathering and monitoring metrics derived from the effort.

The biggest driver behind this requirement is the amount of attention demanded in participating in social media.  Many simply stop at posting content on social media.  Where as doing so only counts (at most) for ~30% of what can/should be done on social media.  For instance, the last two years have seen a major push by news organizations (namely newspapers) to make their content more social.  Dependent upon the sentiment of the news stories or other variables (e.g., is there anything in the story that was incorrect, is there supplemental information that could be provided to audiences that didn’t otherwise fit into the news story, is there any sentiment worth underscoring) there can be a major benefit to engaging audiences discussing news of your organization.  Such an effort can consume significant amounts of time, which in turn precludes the ability of a single person to additionally create content unique to the organization, or to run metrics which accurately capture and demonstrate what resulted from the effort.

An additional thing worth mentioning is regarding participation in social media. I only wish to touch on it briefly (Though, itself deserves a thousand words).  The person actually participating in social media is a spokesperson on par with, and every bit important as a media spokesperson.  The skill sets for each differ significantly, each demanding in their own ways.  Increasingly a social media spokesperson is becoming as important as the traditional media spokesperson.

If roughly 30% of one’s time is consumed by sharing ‘new’ or original content (more on original content later), and roughly 30% is consumed by participating in commenting on news; the remaning 30-ish percent is spent engaging with audiences at the organization’s social media profiles.  The effort spread across these three areas, is beyond any notion of ‘branding’.  Instead this time is spent establishing the organization’s culture for the audience (I will expand upon this notion in greater detail in a later post).

Lastly, the social media spokesperson is not be a nine-to-five job.  It really should be treated 24/7, especially if your organization spans across time zones and cultures.  With a worldwide audience, part of your audience is awake and talking about things while you sleep.  This is not to say that the spokesperson can’t sleep, or can’t take a break.  Rather, this is to say that a shift in mindset as to what it means to be ‘at work’ is necessary.  Just as those who use social media for personal reason post casually through-out the day and night, regardless if it is the weekend or not; so too must the spokesperson, only with more earnest goals and objectives for their effort.  An additional remedy is to look at who the audience is, and with enough time and though, understanding the rhythm at which the conversation flows.

In consideration of the demands outlined above, another person must be dedicated to original content creation.  It is very easy to be a content aggregator online (also known as sharing on facebook, or retweeting on twitter).  To a certain extent it is necessary to share content relevant to, but not created by, your organization (George Takei has earned himself over 3 million followers by aggregating content created by others).  However, sharing and retweeting of content not created by an organization cannot fully define what the organization is.  Thus, original content is necessary, and should be produced in quantities that adequately compliments the shares and retweets.

Doing this is a fulltime job that can quickly demand a number of disparate skills.  Graphics, videos, stories, and memes (of all varieties) are labor intensive and time sensitive.  But, it is original content that anchors any message on social media to a desired course.  Without original content an organization’s message is dependent on the whims of others that cannot be fully controlled, leaving an organization’s narrative ill defined.

Having a blend of shared and original content, and having participated in the discourse, an organization still needs to know what resulted from the effort.  To adequately measure the effort a third person, not apart of creation or engagement, is necessary.  The amount of data generated on social media is massive and available in near real-time.  Pure numbers are easy–if you want to measure how many ‘likes’ you got in a given amount of time, it’s no problem to look at the graphs provided by facebook, or any third party service.  But, as I said in my previous post, the true power of social media is ‘in between the lines’.

Of all the types of analysis there is for social media one continually defies any attempts to automate:  sentiment analysis, especially when the discourse spans multiple languages.  Sentiment analysis is vital since a profile can increase in popularity for bad reasons as easily as it can for good.  If your organization wishes to be a strong advocate for something, the number of likes, shares, or retweets will not inform you if you have been successful in its advocation.  Think of it this way:  When do you personally talk about something with your friends, or with strangers?  When you really like something, or when you really don’t?  Across society it probably cuts close to 50/50 between those who tend to talk about a topic in a negatively and those who tend towards positive context. Thus any volume metric (numbers of things) does not give the full picture–deeper analysis is demanded. ’Semantic based analysis’ (Not sure if that is a real term or not.  But, it makes sense to term it as such, in my mind at least) is the only way to get a true sense of an organization’s accomplishments on social media.

Such semantic based analysis must include content outside pure social media (i.e. other mediums), and delve into news sources (including newspapers, televised news, magazines), blogs, and conceivably anywhere the organization might be discussed.  Observing the effects in other mediums is vital, because such semantic analysis does not meet the criteria for Godel’s Completeness theorem, but does for his second Incompleteness Theorem–multiple cultures, multiple languages, spread across multiple (if not all) time zones add so many semantic variables that logical deduction, derived from number of likes, shares and the rest, is not possible.  To verify the consistency, validness, and soundness of an organization’s use of social media the effects in mediums other than social media is demanded.

To be honest, even in my professional use of social media, I have not been able to follow the above guidelines exactly.  But, from what I have been able to do as a part of a social media team, I have come to understand the necessity of all I said above.  With social media being as new as it is, with new capabilities to measure an organization’s effects nearly every day, there is always more to be done.  What constantly amazes me is how we as a species are able to do things of our own device and yet hardly understand what we’re doing at all–fascinating and troubling all at the same time.

Again, we’re well past a thousand words.  So, I will leave this post where it is.  More to come later next week. I think some of the comments got lost in the migration to Discus.  Apologies for that, I promise I am reading the comments and will participate in them.

Posted by YN2(SW) H. Lucien Gauthier III in Soft Power, Tactics, Uncategorized | read comments (3)
Tags: Godel, social media

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”

This is what the First Amendment states.  At the root of things the only way for the First Amendment to be “violated” is for the Congress to pass a law that abridges one of these rights.

So where does the recent discussion trend of General Dempsey’s commentary (or lack thereof) on political organizations and activities by veterans fit?  Is he seeking to restrict free speech?  Or is he exercising his own freedom?

How does the current problems with “The Innocence of Muslims” tie in?  Mentor and friend David Kaiser writes that “[An]other American trend is now forty years old, and relates to our changing attitude towards free speech. I remain totally opposed to any restrictions on free speech, include laws against hate speech, but the time has come to face a necessary truth: free speech has to be exercised responsibly to work. Beginning in the 1960s the idea has grown that the purpose of speech is to be outrageous, and that the more outrageous speech might be, the more protection–if not celebration–it deserves. Free speech that, for instance, points out abuses by our own government or calls attention to real dangers overseas has enormous value, but free speech that simply insults millions of Muslims does not.”

I’d been thinking this idea but as usual Dr. Kaiser is better able to explain it than I.

So, as I see it, when General Dempsey said “it’s not helpful to me” he expressed that speech should have some constraints.  Others disagree.  Which they are able to do because of the First Amendment.  However, commanders have another problem that transcends the complaints of the chattering masses.

Let’s start with a clear statement – sexual assault is bad.  It’s illegal, it’s immoral, its counter to every value our government of the people, our culture, and our modernity stand for.  It’s also prevalent in the world and has been and will remain so.

What happens when a well-meaning or intended comment comes from leadership?  Take for example Marine Commandant General Amos’ statements on sexual assault.  In a world tour of Marin bases the general has had some tough talk.

Michael Doyle of McClatchy Newpapers writes:

“Amos used his tour to stress his own strong feelings about the 348 reported sexual assaults in the Marine Corps last year. In a roughly 75-minute talk intended for every Marine non-commissioned officer and officer, the career aviator demanded tougher punishment for those accused of sexual misconduct.

“Why have we become so soft?” Amos asked in a speech April 19 at Parris Island.

He further described himself as “very, very disappointed” in court-martial boards that don’t expel those who misbehave sexually, and he denounced as “bullshit” claims that many sexual assault allegations amount to second thoughts from individuals who initially consented.

“I know fact from fiction,” Amos declared, a transcript of his April 19 speech shows. “The fact of the matter is 80 percent of those are legitimate sexual assaults.”

“My lawyers don’t want me to talk about this, but I’m going to anyway,” he said May 23 at California’s Camp Pendleton, according to a defense legal filing. “The defense lawyers love when I talk about this, because then they can throw me under the bus later on and complain about unlawful command influence.”

These and other comments have led to 20 charges of unlawful command influence by the Commandant in Marine sexual assault cases.  All because the Commandant thought he was talking tough to Marines.

This is where I believe URR and others were concerned about the intent and import of the statement made by General Dempsey regarding veteran politics.  By merely weighing in he inserted command influence, whether he liked it or not.  Once he weighed in he had an opportunity to show how his own ideas of restrained free speech would work when Admiral Nathman and 40 some other former servicemembers stood on the stage at the Democratic National Convention.  The Chairman’s silence has provided other potential lenses to view his original comments.

Some see his actions as toadying to the President and taking a clear partisan stance.  Veterans for Democrats = good.  Veterans against Democrats = bad.  One commenter even went so far as to press the idea that the Chairman is a Hitlerian lackey who would take an oath to serve and defend the President.

Now, I don’t subscribe to that idea.  I firmly believe that if given an illegal order, the Chairman would sooner resign than take an oath to an individual, or choose to violate the Constitution.  However, I think there may be a greater problem here and it falls to the concept of careerism.

Rather than political I believe that the Chairman may have fallen for the old “that which interests my boss, fascinates me” canard.  Same thing happened to the Commandant.

It’s a great rubric for simple minds – and I do not think that General Dempsey or General Amos are simpleminded men.

But I do think the Chairman saw his boss getting pummeled and bothered by criticism.  And the Chairman should have a personal relationship with his boss.  The problem is that when the Chairman made his comments he was speaking from a personal level and forgot that he was commanding and that by making the comment it could be seen as undue command influence.  Just like the Commandant.  Or Admiral Mullen with his comments at the end of DADT.  It is one thing to lead.  It is another to lead in such a way that you illegally, or incorrectly, abrogate someone’s rights under the very Constitution we have sworn to protect and defend.

Finally, there’s a second point to the piece that Dr. Kaiser writes.  Provocative speech, while free or allowable, should not be the only way in which the discourse occurs.  And all too often blogs and commentators fall victim to provocation over prose.  We can, and should, hold leaders, ourselves, and our subordinates accountable for their words and deeds.  But we should also strive to do so in as reasoned and rational a manner as possible.  It’s something I have struggled with for years and will continue to do so.  Sure, our tempers can get away from us.  But when we speak on someone else’s podium we also have an obligation to maintain a standard that fits the professionalism of the organization.

Posted by M. Ittleschmerz in Soft Power | read comments (97)

Because of the broohaha over invective and language a few weeks back I was asked my opinion of the Chairman’s conversation with Pastor Jones.

Simply put, I am confused and disappointed.

I firmly believe that any conversation – direct conversation – mano a mano – from a military officer in the execution of his military duties to a citizen that directly asks for a curtailment of free speech is outside any swim lane.  There is no private citizen or “I’m only a reservist” clause for this.

In the same week I find that I am as bothered that the Chairman hasn’t spoken against Admiral Nathman and the others who stood on the stage at the DNC.  He may be parsing a subtlety as “I have issue with those who are “against” something, but am OK with those who a are “for” something” as some sort of positive pressure indicator.  But since there has been no clarifying language I am forced to recognize that words, and the lack thereof, have meaning.

I still want to believe that the Chairman is not a partisan man…but it is increasingly difficult to do so.  He speaks all around the world to Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines.  Surely someone will ask him about this at some point.  I hope so.  I’d like to hear his answer.

Posted by M. Ittleschmerz in Soft Power, Uncategorized | read comments (53)

Reuters has the story.

Russia has been increasing the reach of its navy in recent years, sending warships further afield as part of an effort to restore pride project power in a world dominated by the U.S. military.

That throws a wrench in our Maritime Strategy, it would seem.  Or does it?   What should our reaction be, militarily?  And what, diplomatically?  Should there be any?

Posted by UltimaRatioReg in Air Force, Army, Aviation, Coast Guard, Foreign Policy, Hard Power, History, Homeland Security, Marine Corps, Maritime Security, Merchant Marine, Naval Institute, Navy, Proceedings, Soft Power, Tactics, Uncategorized | read comments (26)