Archive for the 'Soft Power' Category

Every era has had something that service members came of age with. From the Dreadnaught era to the advent of submarines; the Sailors of the interwar period saw naval aviation come of age; Jets after the close of the second world war, guided missiles and nuclear propulsion.

For my generation, among the first of the 21st Century, we have seen the initial steps towards cyber capabilities and the mass adoption of unmanned systems. But, we’ve seen something more as well tangentially related to cyber: blogging and the online discourse writ large concerning the maritime services.

I am willing to say that at no other time has the discourse been as important for the maritime services as it is today. Certainly, it has never been more well appointed or contributed to. From those with an earnest interest in naval and maritime affairs, to deckplate Sailors and junior officers, to even the most senior admirals and generals. Their voices are present and count towards our understanding of ourselves, profession and the way forward for the Nation and Services.

For five years Information Dissemination has played a vital role in this discourse and enhanced discourse at USNI/USNI blog. To Raymond and the gang at Information Dissemination thanks for five years of great posts and for adding much appreciated voices to the dialog. Cheers!

 



I began writing this during the 11th hour of Joint Warfighter, feeling like I had something of an information hangover. Coffee was having no effect. Concepts and ideas were jumbled into an atemporal mess in my mind–it has been a long couple of conferences.

After the last session a woman walked past me and remarked that the panel was uninformative. I’ve now heard this sentiment twice in the last two days. In terms of this, I can agree that perhaps the actual information given by panelists might not be new, novel, or insightful. But, at best such a reality is decided on a case-by-case basis, since those in the audience have each been privy to different types, amounts, and quality of data. What was not profound to you, could have very well been profound to someone else. In short, the fact that you might not have found anything new in the discussion is irrelevant. But, it does point my thinking towards a new paradigm for conferences is needed.

There is little information that will be given to you in person that could not have been read elsewhere. The volume of data and information availed online is huge–you want to know about the Navy, you can learn most everything online. You can be given nuance from blogs and context from history. However, it is in person is where you learn about what people are thinking, and what they haven’t decided on. You see the person and all those subconscious things that denote what they’re really thinking.

That is the power of panels, that is why it is worth traveling so very far and spending so much: Experience. My Boss says that nothing supplants meeting someone in person, and he’s right. You can share emotion via the Internet, but you cannot truly experience emotion with someone, not even the subtle emotion felt when one is posed with a difficult question–as is often done in panels.

The division between audience and panel needs to be broken down. I struggle to articulate how to do this short of some hippie-esq ‘let’s-circle-our-chairs-and-hold-hands’ nonsense. But, the answer must be in there somewhere between the connectivity enabled by the Internet and being there in person.

*****
AirSea Battle is in trouble. I don’t really know what it is, and even with engaging with the panel today, I still don’t think there is anyone out there who has the whole story. But. What truly troubles me, is that from the question I asked today.

I asked how AirSea Battle Strategy (anyone know what the word ‘battle’ is doing in a strategy?) would affect the tactical level. From what I remember of the answer, almost nothing will change except that there will be more jointness (termed ‘interoperability’ if I remember correctly) and tactical units will be smaller and enabled to mass quickly if a concentration of forces are needed.

Additionally, the design for AirSea is such that it will be layered over the tactical and operational COCOM level. This is where I really get lost–and I need your help to make sense of.

Wasn’t one of the greatest critiques of COIN that it wasn’t a true strategy, but rather a collection of tactics jumbled together and called strategy? If we are overlaying this strategy on top our existing operational and tactical paradigms, aren’t we doing the same thing COIN is accused of? What I understand of strategy is that it is the larger goals and combination of ends, ways and means towards reaching those goals.  In attempting to draft a strategy that does not perturb current tactical paradigms, are we creating a strategy that changes nothing?

I really hope we aren’t, but I will need to be convinced we aren’t.

Another thing is that the crowd drawn to such Conferences are more industry than strategist. The questions routinely posed to the panels concerned acquisition more than they did anything else. There’s nothing wrong with this, but I’m not a contractor and so I am more I am more interested in strategy and tactics. What’s more is that because of the majority of the questions it is now hard for me to separate the future tools for implementing AirSea from the strategy itself.

Is AirSea a collection of new capabilities rather than a strategy in its own right?

While I was told that AirSea was not to have any major impact on the tactical level, there is one area in which I do see it having a major impact.  AirSea seems to support the notion of acquiring 5+ generation fighters, new comms gear, and making everything stealth.  The fielding of such gear will necessarily drive the need for new tactics, and operational models.  From what I understand of the F-22, the logistics and maintenance requirement are quite different from having 15s, 16s and 18s downrange.  In addition, if the services are to specialize further in niche but vital capabilities, interoperability is going to demand another round of relocating units CONUS for training purposes.  If the Army has an Electronic Warfare requirement for a mission the Navy will have to fill that role.  But, odds are that EW Squadron is in Northern Virginia, but the Combat Brigade is located in North Carolina or Georgia.  For these two units to train together to be fully interoperable, they will need to train together almost constantly.  I struggle to see how this will be cost effective, in the age of austerity with sequestration looming.

There is way too much that has gone unsaid regarding AirSea.  I appreciate OPSEC needs as much as the next guy.  But, AirSea is starting to be discussed widely across strategy and military focused blogs.  The Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Chief of Naval Operations are appearing together to present this strategy to the American People, and the message is thus far garbled.  As we’re in the opening stages of the messaging campaign, I can appreciate that there is tweaking that will be done to it towards answering the myriad of questions we all have regarding AirSea.  But, it will be a struggle.  My sense is that many bloggers, strategists, and journalists are suspect of AirSea.  After nearly ten years of coin being vigorously debated, any new strategy will have an uphill battle.

*****

I saw a lot of GOFO’s over the course of Joint Warfighter. Just about as many as are at SHAPE. But, what is important is that I got to listen to them, at some length. General Allen, COMISAF, VTC’d in for an hour (and it was roughly 2100L AFG). Despite weather delays GEN Dempsey was present for an hour. I don’t know how much experience everyone has will trying to get on a GOFO’s schedule. But, average availability is around 15 minutes. An hour is an insane amount of time.

GENs Cartwright, Allen, and Dempsey all spoke without the use of PowerPoint or notes. They were able to navigate through multiple topics, ensuring that key messages were hit and came across as relaxed. They were all polished and impressive. GEN Cartwright had the luxury of no longer being in uniform and so his candor was particularly poignant.

General Cartwright

General Allen

General Dempsey

*****

I asked a lot of questions, and the way I worded a lot of questions was not readily understood. I’m pretty sure I had to rephrase every question I asked. It sucks when you’ve got a minute or seven standing behind the mic, listening to the other questions being asked, answers that touch upon the one you’re about to ask, and you’re thinking of a myriad of permutations of how you could ask your question. It’s like roulette, you don’t know when the moderator is going to call on you, and where ever your mind is at when you’re asked is the question that comes out.

*Remember, identify your self and your affiliation.*

One question got me asked if I wanted to work on the Joint Staff, and the answer to that is still an emphatic yes (if you want to see how that went down, watch the video. I won’t elaborate further).

*****

During one such evening, at the USNI Member Event, I turned a corner, and Mary stopped me and introduced me to John Nagl. Yes, that John Nagl. Amazing, right? I love the Naval Institute… For more than just this one instance.

In 2007 I attended my first conference. It was Joint Warfighter, and the day I attended ADM Stavridis gave the keynote at Lunch.

I became aware of the conference while I was underway, and emailed the Institute asking how I could pay for the lunches.  I was told that the Institute saves a few tickets for Enlisted members, and that I needn’t worry about paying to attend the luncheon keynote.  Because of this, I became aware of ADM Stavridis, and sought out everything I could find of his writing.  Eventually I found him on facebook as well, and in 2010 this all came together in enabling me to come work for him at SHAPE.  It is directly because of the Naval Institute that I am who I am today.

*****

The last keynote of the Conference was from Google’s Chief Technology Advocate.  He presented a number of fascinating things Google does as “hobbies”.  Google is all about gathering real world information and organizing and availing that information through the internet.  I consider this a noble and laudable goal.  What’s more is that they are doing an exceptional job at all of it.

However, such a goal is fraught with challenges and disturbing implications.  Arthur C. Clark has some very good words to this point

The Information Age offers much to mankind, and I would like to think that we will rise to the challenges it presents. But it is vital to remember that information — in the sense of raw data — is not knowledge, that knowledge is not wisdom, and that wisdom is not foresight. But information is the first essential step to all of these.

Google gets this, and they are actively engaged in finding the right answers to such dilemmas. They seek out expert advice from guys like GEN Colin Powell.  They seek to understand the implications of the capabilities and technologies they develop–they seek to build wisdom as much as they compile information.

I think it is important for this conversation to take place, as well as for it to be transparent and done in public.  If Google can develop technologies that have significant security implications, it does us no good to bury this fact, as it denies us the ability to develop the wisdom required to understand our new abilities.  Further more, if Google can do it, then eventually anyone could do it, being quiet about it won’t prevent this from happening.

*****

All Around It was an excellent conference, I was especially pleased to see so many of our Allies stationed at Allied Command Transformation in attendance.  Seeing French, British, German, and Spanish uniforms in the crowd made me feel a little bit like I was back home at SHAPE.  Going forward, I think it would be a good thing to try to engage with our Allies more in such conferences.  With more focus on Asia being demanded, deepening engagement and ties with our European Allies in other ways is important.  An easy, and smart way to do this is with conferences like Joint Warfighter.  Plus, JCWC has a nice ring to it (Joint-Combined Warfighter Conference).



Maybe it won’t be a great day for you–be careful what you wish for… In recognition of the success that Kony2012 had in rasing money for a niche geopolitical cause, students at MIT created a faux webpage “Kick Starter” pretending to raise money for things on the opposite side of use of force continuum – a mobile black site for intensive interrogations, among other things.

The reason for doing this was to demonstrate the ability to crowsource funding for initiatives that are championed by ideologies that are on the hard-power end of foreign policy.

As the last blog I posted demonstrates, the ability for motivated individuals to become active in a conflict exists and is very real.  What amounts to DIY intervention can have an impact upon the course of World events (similar to the warning given to us service members from the SECDEF).  To me, what this says is that citizens no longer only vote for a foreign policy with their ballots, but they can also–directly–do so with their wallets, time and skill-sets.

The conditions are right, and the historical precedent is now set for the ‘memetic stew’ to bring forth a Non-Governmental Organization as a third option that takes elements from Kony2012, private security firms, and Kiva for those who wish to see some sort of change in the World.

What strikes me as ironic, is that the words typically espoused towards supporting World peace, are now the intellectual foundation under which we may see a new method for hard power applied in the World.  This is not to say that the end goals of those who see the utility of hard power is all that different from those who see greater utility in soft power.

Rather, in the long term, I am interested to see if the potential I’ve outlined here coalesces to incorporate both hard and soft power elements.  Such a coalescing would amount to a private sector analog to a nation’s foreign policy.  Which would, arguably, be the tipping point for the replacement of the Westphalian era, where an organizational paradigm like a government is no longer required to bring together the ends, ways and means to execute foreign policy.

 



CDR Salamander and I venture again into the world of live internet radio Sunday, April 15 at 5pm (1700) U.S. Eastern with our Episode 119 Offshore Balancing the Indian Ocean 04/15 by Midrats on Blog Talk Radio:

What is real, and what is a mirage? Can something be a cost effective strategic option, or a fool’s errand?
As outlined by our guests in their lates work in the periodical, Asian Security: An Ocean Too Far: Offshore Balancing in the Indian Ocean; the United States is beset by war weariness after over a decade of war and a half century plus of global committments. We find ourselves with a stagnant economy, and skyrocketing defense procurement costs. It is seductive to think of retiring from continental Eurasia, but if history calls us back – returning in times of systemic conflict would be problematic – even in the relatively accessible rimlands of Western Europe and East Asia.
In a part of the world with the planet’s largest democracy – offshore balancing is close to impossible in the Indian Ocean.
As it turns out, offshore balancing in the Indian Ocean may be no balancing at all.
From “The complex network of global cargo ship movements” by Pablo Kaluza, et al. (oval added)

Our guest for the full hour to discuss their article will be U.S. Naval War College Associate Professors James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara.

Offshore balancing? What the heck is that? Tune in and find out – and, if you can’t make the live show because you are buried in receipts and other paper as you try to reduce your tax burden before April 17 – well, join us in the “not so live” downloads from here or from the Midrats iTune page.



Let’s get this list going.

As an observation and a nod, not a criticism (of course) of our Vice President Joe Biden –  who observed that, “You can go back 500 years. You cannot find a more audacious plan. Never knowing for certain. We never had more than a 48 percent probability that he was there.”

Because this will be a list, compiled into one blog post, whatever you put in the comments (respectfully and to the point of the post) we will incorporate into the post – then delete. Please submit your comments to us here or via blog@usni.org or give us your submissions via Twitter  or Facebook . And when the first 500 hits it, [UPDATE]: WE WILL MAKE A BRACKET COMPETITION.

Give us your best of the best who were audacious – winners or losers – those who dared. We will update the list daily, no repeats – so dig deep when your favorite has already been mentioned.

Listed in order of submission and raw commentary (and without attribution and to protect the innocent):

500. SEAL mission per Vice President Joe Biden: Audacious on the part of our Commander in Chief, President Obama.

499. Japanese attack on Pearl was an Orange/Blue war-gamer exercise 6 or 7 years before 1941.

498. Entebbe, anyone? Or one might even argue that the raid on Bin Laden’s compound would not have been possible without the lessons learned from the even more audacious (if ultimately unsuccessful) plan of Operation Eagle Claw.

497. Lets start early. 1519 Hernan Cortez landed 600 Spaniards and about a dozen horses at Cozumel. He BURNED HIS SHIPS so there was no way to escape, and he and his men had to fight to the death. He led his men to destroy the entire Aztec Empire something that no invader had done in over 6 centuries. In the process he actually convinced the Aztecs that he was THEIR GOD.

496. Henry V at Agincourt – Nope, too early. 

496. (Do-over) ‎”Kedging“- How USS Constitution Sailors evaded 170 guns of HMS Africa, Shannon, Belvidera & Aeolus!

495.

Dare I say George Washington before the Battle of Trenton? Christmas Day 1776.

George Washington Crosses the Delaware in the dark of night to attack the British in Trenton.

For me there is one and only one #1. Without it an army driffs away, an idea dies, a piece of paper signed at the greatest personal risk becomes meaningless. General George Washington’s decision to attack Trenton on the morning after Christmas 1776 with a night march of impossible proportions couples not only audaciousness, but the greatest risk. For me it is the single most important moment without even a close second in American history, and for the idea of freedom as the world knows it today, possibly. My own telling here: http://blog.projectwhitehorse.com/2010/12/christmas-1776-the-crossing/

494, Eben Emael and the raid to free Mussolini

493. CDR “Red” Ramage, USS Parche, Pacific, 1944: as commanding officer of the U.S.S. Parche http://www.homeofheroes.com/moh/citations_1940_wwii/ramage.html

492.  Col Robin Olds, Operation BOLO Mig Sweep, North Vietnam, 1967 http://user.icx.net/~arlisk/bolo.html

491.  Doolittle Raid Doolittle Raid, 1942…(while a japanese radio broadcast stated, almost to the moment of the attack, how Japan would never be attacked, with air raid sirens suddenly going off-a “baghdad bob” moment)…which in turn, caused grave consternation, and thus triggered rash action by the Imperial Japanese Navy, resulting in catastrophic loss at Midway, with which they would lose their offensive initiative for the remainder of the war…despite efforts to regain it at Guadalcanal and others.

490. Admiral David Farragut leads his ships into Mobile Bay, 1864. Approaching the mine field laid by the Confederates the USS Tecumseh (first in the battle line) hit a mine and exploded, shocking the entire fleet. The USS Brooklyn stopped dead in the water, and the Captain asked the Admiral for instructions. Farragut ordered his ship, the Hartford, to steam around the Brooklyn and take the lead, signaling his forces “Damn the Torpedoes…Full speed ahead!” The entire column of 14 ships passed safely through the mine field and took Mobile.

489. April 22, 1778. At 11 p.m. on this day in 1778, Commander John Paul Jones leads a small detachment of two boats from his ship, the USS Ranger, to raid the shallow port at Whitehaven, England, where, by his own account, 400 British merchant ships are anchored.

488. Captain Charles Stewart of USS Constitution taking on two warships simultaneously in February 1815.

487. Though unsuccessful, Desert One was audacious.

486. How USS Constitution Sailors evaded 170 guns of HMS Africa, Shannon, Belvidera & Aeolus!

485. Berlin Airlift

484. Mikawa at Savo

482. Market Garden (for a not-so-successful example)

481.Camp Century Greenland, 1959-1966.http://gombessa.tripod.com/scienceleadstheway/id9.html. A nuclear powered, under-the-ice-camp of about 200 men doing Arctic military research and testing the feasibility of siting ICBMs in the Greenland icecap. Project Iceworm was the code name for a US Army Top Secret proposal during the Cold War (a study was started in 1958), to build a major network of mobile nuclear missile launch sites under the Greenland ice sheet. The ultimate objective of placing medium-range missiles under the ice – close enough to Moscow to strike targets within the Soviet Union – was kept secret from the Danish government.

480. Manstein Plan, France 1940 (replaced the original von Schlieffen plan), bait the allies into the low countries, cut them in half, and take the entire region in 6 weeks.

479. 1588, english channel, England vs Spain. English ships, more maneuverable, chipped away at the snds of the Spanish Armada’s ships (arranged in an arcing format) instead of taking them head-on. Forced the Spanish ships into disorder, and over a few days, whittled them down to near-insignificance…forced the Spaniards into a roundabout route around Scotland back home…but were destroyed in a storm before they could make it back, save 50…out of 130.
Audacious to say the least.

478. 1970, USAF and Army Special operations crash land an HH-3 helicopter in the middle of the Son Tay prison complex in North Vietnam in an attempt to rescue 65 American POWs. The operation is carried out perfectly, but the prisoners were moved a few months earlier to different accommodations.

477. Operation Dynamo, the “miracle of Dunkirk” in WW2

476. Battle of the River Plate, 1939.  One of the greatest psyche-outs in naval annals. Spee literally pulverized UK’s Ajax, Achillies(NZ), and Exeter.  One’s fire control was out, another’s main gunnery was out, the third was mauled but intact.  GS was also damaged, and thinking the UKs 3 were still coming after him (most would’ve broke off by then),  he made for Montevideo…where he was told to leave within 72hours. GS was relatively intact, despite some damage, and could have re-engaged.  Thinking there were more heavies coming (via the radio traffic of the 3, who remained, even though they would have been cut to pieces had the GS came out to face them),  Capt Langsdorf scuttled the Graf Spee without a battle.  3 days later he shot himself. Sheer audacity, and well executed…using nothing but guile.(the truly genius strategist finds ways to war without battle-Sun Tzu)

475. The bayonet charge of Joshua Chamberlain on July 2, 1863 at Little Round Top during the Gettysburg battle.

474. Bridge at Dong Ha

473.  ‎1918 Battle of Belleau Wood

472. June 1995 rescue of Scott O’Grady

471. Battle of the Bulge, with the Germans scraping up enough armor, soldiers and fuel to give the US and Allied Armies a real good scare

470. USS ENGLAND taking the bull by the horns, and sinking 6 Japanese subs in less than 2 weeks.

Read the rest of this entry »



The Navy announced on Feb. 14 that the hospital ship USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) will shift its layberth from Baltimore, Md., to Naval Station (NS) Norfolk to save $1.7 million in the initial year and $2.1 million for following years.  Although this is significant savings to help reduce our defense budget, a larger question is, “is keeping hospital ships still worth it?”  Eventually the Navy will decide this question but here are a few issues for the Navy to consider:

Does medical diplomacy work?  One can argue medical diplomacy improves strategic relations with foreign countries by providing free medical care “to win hearts and minds.”  The most visible medical diplomacy is using hospital ships such as the USNS MERCY and the USNS COMFORT.  In response to the 2004 Tsunami, USNS MERCY deployed and provided medical care to tsunami victims inIndonesia and other affected areas.  A more recent example is the USNS COMFORT deploying toHaiti to help earthquake victims.

In “Let’s have a Fleet of 15 Hospital Ships” LT Jim Dolbow argues the U.S. enjoyed a huge favorable swing in public opinion after MERCY’s 2005 humanitarian mission.  According to Terror Free Tomorrow  following MERCY’s visit, a remarkable 85 percent of Indonesians and 95 percent of the people of Bangladesh were favorable to MERCY’s mission.  Because of such positive response, the United States conducts biannual deployments with its hospital ships for theatre security cooperation missions.  Hospital ships support a larger maritime strategy by enabling the Navy’s expanded core competency of “humanitarian assistance and disaster response.”

On the other hand, in “The Decline of America’s Reputation: Why?” it states following the 2004 tsunami, ratings only increased from 15 to 38 percent.  There was not a similar rise in Pakistan after U.S. earthquake relief in 2005.  This is quite a contrast compared to the Terror Free Tomorrow poll.  In 2007, the Pew Research Center wrote “the impact of this humanitarian assistance should not be overstated – most of the same misgivings aboutAmerica seen throughout the Muslim world can be found inIndonesia andPakistan, and solid majorities in both countries continue to have a negative impression of the U.S.”

What are some costs of hospital ship medical care?  In “Advancing Humanitarian Aid: Infusing the era of hope with a dash of accountability”, Professor Leslie F. Roberts argues much of the aid has little influence.  Roberts notes “between 21 January and 11 March, the [COMFORT] with its 10 surgical theatres served 871 patients. Data presented by a senior USAID official suggested, excluding medical personnel costs, this highly visible relief effort cost >US$30,000 per patient.   While this may be typical of the costs for similar surgeries in Western Europe or North America, it is orders of magnitude over expected surgical costs in humanitarian settings, or hospitals in Port-au-Prince.”  Per the Daily Caller, “The Navy spent 2 million gallons of fuel treating fewer than 1,000 people – if it’s using marine fuel which is roughly $4 a gallon, that’s $8 million in fuel. That’s roughly $9,184 per patient, just to keep fuel in the tanks.”  This seems like a lot of money to spend when theUnited States citizens have difficulty paying their own medical bills.

What if the United States Government got rid of hospital ships?  If there were no hospital ships, other countries would not expect theU.S. to deploy one to give out free medical care.  Warships can conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.  Amphibious ships such as the USS BOXER and aircraft carriers such as the USS NIMITZ have robust medical facilities and have superior boat and helicopter transport.  Money saved by getting rid of hospital ships can be diverted to improving medical facilities on regular warships already forward deployed around the globe.

Do hospital ships provide benefits that a warship cannot?  When the tsunami hit Indonesia in 2004, it took approximately a month for MERCY to arrive in Indonesia.  The arrival was too late to treat initial wounds.  U.S. Navy ships such as the Abraham Lincoln were already on station within days.   In “Developing Soft Power Using Afloat Medical Capability”, CDR Salamander pointed out, “a study conducted by Center for Naval Analyses on host nation impact based on the recent T-AH and LHA/LHD 21 humanitarian assistance deployments reveals that ‘it does not matter whether it was a hospital ship or an amphibious ship as both ships functioned equally well in terms of positive impact to the host nations.’  . . .  Speed of response is the most critical element of a successful humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operation. The ability to move people, equipment, and supplies throughout the operational area determines whether the operation is a success. Both hospital ship and amphibious ship are the right platforms for humanitarian missions, with the latter having an advantage on disaster response due to speed and global forward presence.”

No matter the results of this decision, the Navy will continue its expanded core competency to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief close to our shores and abroad.

Lieutenant Commander Michael Pugh is a Surface Warfare Officer currently attending Command General Staf fCollege at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.  He served on USS GEORGE PHILIP (FFG 12), USS NIMITZ (CVN 68), USNS MERCY (T-AH 19), USNS COMFORT (T-AH 20), USS THACH (FFG 12), and USS BOXER (LHD 4).  The views expressed in this article are the authors’ alone and do not represent the official position of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.



Episode 113 “To be Blunt on Afghanistan 03/04 by Midrats on Blog Talk Radio
CDR Salamander writes:

Where is the line between truth, optimism, spin, happy-talk, and lies?

Those of us who have served in Afghanistan and those serving now all have our stories. Our guest this Sunday has a few as well.

“Over the course of 12 months, I covered more than 9,000 miles and talked, traveled and patrolled with troops in Kandahar, Kunar, Ghazni, Khost, Paktika, Kunduz, Balkh, Nangarhar and other provinces.

What I saw bore no resemblance to rosy official statements by U.S. military leaders about conditions on the ground.

When it comes to deciding what matters are worth plunging our nation into war and which are not, our senior leaders owe it to the nation and to the uniformed members to be candid — graphically, if necessary — in telling them what’s at stake and how expensive potential success is likely to be. U.S. citizens and their elected representatives can decide if the risk to blood and treasure is worth it.

Likewise when having to decide whether to continue a war, alter its aims or to close off a campaign that cannot be won at an acceptable price, our senior leaders have an obligation to tell Congress and American people the unvarnished truth and let the people decide what course of action to choose. That is the very essence of civilian control of the military. The American people deserve better than what they’ve gotten from their senior uniformed leaders over the last number of years. Simply telling the truth would be a good start. “

Using his article in Armed Forces Journal; Truth, Lies, and Afghanistan as a starting point – our guest for the full hour will be Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Davis, US Army.

For those of us who served in earlier wars this might bring back some memories. And the common warrior question: “What is ground truth?”

Join us live at 5pm here or download the show later from the same location or iTunes.



Under Secretary of the Navy Robert O. Work provided the USNI West 2012 Conference with a very good and stirring speech on Thursday morning.   The remarks were covered in a previous post, along with my personal concerns for whether Secretary Work’s perspective represented a too-sanguine assessment of what the budget situation would leave us for the coming decades.   Indeed, over at Information Dissemination, Bryan McGrath summarizes well precisely the balance between the truth of the Secretary’s words, and the operational and tactical realities on the other side of the coin:

News reports and Pentagon statements indicate that the Navy will retire 7 cruisers and 2 LSD’s early, while cutting its shipbuilding totals 28% from the FY12 estimate for 2013-2017 (57 ships) to 41 ships in the same period with this budget.  Retiring assets early from a Fleet already stressed to meet its commitments, and then eating your shipbuilding “seed corn”,  strike me as odd ways to demonstrate an emphasis on Seapower.  I’ve talked to some in the Navy who suggest that under the new plan, we’ll be able to field as many ships in 2020 as we do now, which is put forward as evidence of great progress and victories within the Pentagon bureaucracy. How this reconciles with the fact that the Fleet we have NOW does not meet the needs of the COCOMS–let alone the Fleet some project to be necessary to underwrite East Asian security in the face of Chinese expansion and modernization–evades me.

Mr. McGrath also emphasizes the realities that networking and technical sophistication is not a panacea, or a replacement for PRESENCE.

Clearly, the number of hulls as a measure of Naval power ain’t what it used to be.  However, the suggestion that networks and precision guided munitions make hull counts unimportant points again to the basic physics problem that Naval planners have faced since the Phoenicians–a ship can only be in one place at a time.  Quantity does have a quality all its own, and as I’ve advocated many times on this site, networks and PGM’s are of incalculable value when the Navy is fighting; however they are less important when the Navy is doing what it does the vast majority of the time–deterring and assuring.

Precisely.  And not in the guided munitions sense.

 



Thursday morning, Under Secretary of the Navy (and more importantly, former Marine artilleryman) Robert O. Work skilfully executed his own “pivot”.   Secretary Work had intended to deliver remarks regarding the program choices associated with the recently-released Defense budget.  Well, you go to the podium with the speech you have, not the one you wish you had.   It seems SECNAV was not going to publicly comment until later in the day, so Secretary Work chose not to publicly do so ahead of that, and instead delivered an enthusiastic and decidedly upbeat address on the challenges and opportunities facing the Navy-Marine Corps Team in the coming century.

Secretary Work referenced former CJCS Admiral Mullen’s talk of the previous day, and lived up to his well-deserved reputation for his grasp of history and its relevance to future events.   Diverging from Admiral Mullen’s views of the uniqueness of the path ahead, Secretary Work outlined the challenges faced by President Eisenhower in 1953, an ongoing war far larger than the current and recent conflicts combined, an existential threat from a peer enemy about to detonate a thermonuclear device of their own, faltering allies asking for assistance in remote regions of the globe, and an electorate very tired of war.   Indeed his example speaks to the tendency to consider present challenges as groundbreaking and unprecedented, when in point of fact, they are usually not nearly quite so.

Secretary Work proceeded to provide a Huntington-esque perspective on the history of America’s military eras, as defined by salient policy events.  That perspective is worth summarizing here.

The Continental Era

July 4th 1776 to December 1, 1890

America’s Army was dominant, with an intermittent and largely coastal (with notable exceptions) Navy and small Marine Corps, no overseas bases, and a focus on western expansion across the North American continent.  The era ended with the tragic events at Wounded Knee, which was the last of the frontier fights.   During the Continental Era, for every month the United States was at war, she spends approximately six months at peace.

The Trans-Oceanic Era

December 1, 1890 to March 12, 1947

America becomes a two-ocean Mahanian maritime nation once and for all, and after massive military commitment to winning two world wars, is a world power with overseas bases, with far-flung interests, and security commitments to allies and former adversaries (whom we have to build up from virtual ruin) on almost every continent.   The era ends with the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, and the beginning of the Cold War.   For every month of war during the Trans-Oceanic Era, there are 5.2 months of peace.

The Cold War

March 12, 1947 to May 12, 1989

Containment of the Soviet Union, a peer adversary, which dominates Eastern Europe and makes serious inroads in Asia, southern Europe, and Latin America. Large wars in Korea and Vietnam, the respective growth and contraction of the US Military in the aftermath of those wars, and lots of little wars by proxy, and an existential threat of Soviet first strike.   The Cold War is declared over on May 12, 1989, by President George H W Bush.  Indeed, in 1990-91, forces from Europe are sent to Saudi Arabia for the Gulf War, more than a year before the final collapse of the Soviet Union.  In this increasingly active era, aside from a Cold War for the entirety, for each month of hot war, the United States is only at peace for 2.67 months.

The Global Era

May 12, 1989 to December 31, 2011

Two wars in Iraq, 9/11, the war in Afghanistan, protracted and expensive efforts at nation-building are the events of the most active time for America’s military in her entire history.   For every month at war during this Global Era, America will have just 1.08 months of peace.  The Global Era ends, according to Secretary Work, with the end of the war in Iraq

The beginning of 2012 is the beginning of the “Naval Century”.

This era, says Secretary Work, will be one of global American sea power, focused on the western Pacific, always a maritime region, and the Middle East, which is becoming increasingly so.

Secretary Work asserts that this nation’s military, its people and equipment, are tired out.  They need to be refreshed, revitalized, and allowed to recover from the strain of two protracted wars.  And the military needs to shrink.  Especially in manpower, the single highest cost category.

I reproduce Secretary Work’s perspective in near entirety because I believe it is cogent and well-thought, from someone whose grasp of history is superb, and because it is worthwhile.  It also allows us to put current conditions in context.  Some of his points are excellent, and provide an insight into how Mr. Work thinks of what he calls the Total Force Battle Network and its shape in the coming decades.

This Total Force Battle Network will be characterized by a Navy-Marine Corps team capable of forcible entry and power projection globally, and an ability to keep vital SLOCs open to freedom of navigation.   This Naval force will be characterized by thoroughly networked platforms and weapons, unmanned systems in all three dimensions, with technology-enabled combat power second to none.   An increased emphasis on SOF throughout the services, Navy and Marine Corps included, and a more capable maritime domain awareness using unmanned and manned platforms to cover vital areas nationally and globally.  Forward presence in vital regions will be credibly maintained.  This force will be maintained and sustained by personnel strengths equal to the task, a break from the “optimal manning” experiment that went “too far”.

This will also be a force that is used less frequently than were forces in the Global Era, allowing for time to train and maintain, and to test and experiment with new technologies and new methods of employment.  And, passionately, Mr. Work reminded us that the people who make up our Naval forces, Sailors and Marines, will remain the single greatest asset the Total Force Battle Network can employ.  They will remain the professional, motivated, educated young warriors that are exemplified by CDR Ernest Evans, who told his crew of Johnston (DD- 557) “This is a fighting ship, and I intend to take her into harm’s way!”.   And at Samar, when eight Japanese capital ships appeared on the horizon, turned his destroyer toward the vastly superior force and interject his little ship in between the Japanese and the escort carriers of his task force.   The decision cost him his ship and his life, but helped save the Task Force and possibly the Leyte landings further south.  It also earned CDR Evans a posthumous Medal of Honor.  Our people and our Navy and Marine Corps will do the things that are required to be the best in the world, because, as in the past, they will be “great by choice”.

Secretary Work’s words should be inspirational to any Sailor or Marine who takes pride in his service.  The Navy Undersecretary is definitely on our side.  He is a man who says what he means and means what he says.  The coming cuts, the $480 billion in the next ten years, are challenging but workable.  They represent a drawdown of some 24% of the US Military, which Mr. Work points out is rather less than that of other post-war draw-downs, including the years of the “Peace Dividend” following the Cold War and Desert Storm.   His was definitely a tone of confidence in the future of our Naval forces.

I hope he is correct.  I hope we have a strategy commensurate with our capabilities, and our reach doesn’t exceed our grasp.  And that our focus on SOF and unmanned systems will not require the “Plan B” of conventional forces in great numbers, because they simply will not be there.   Whatever the numbers of ships, systems, and personnel we settle on, that cannot be the starting point for the ill-conceived concept of further pinching of pennies by chasing temporary savings (“Optimal Manning”, deferring maintenance, retiring warships at half their service lives) that result in driving up long-term costs and reducing effectiveness.

And I hope he is right about sequestration.   Because, as upbeat and slightly sanguine as Secretary Work’s words were, even he admits that the cuts that would come in that event will devastate our nation’s defenses and make any meaningful National Military Strategy impossible.



This summer there were two posts here at USNI that grew out of Professor Joan Johnson-Freese’s article “Teach Tough, Think Tough:  Three Ways to Fix War Colleges”.  At the time I paid little attention as the subject was tangential to my own interests.  Days later the subject became directly relevant to me and I have been able to spend the last five months thinking about the article, posts, and comments and propose that it is neither the faculty (alone) or the administration (alone) who bears review…it is the assignment policies in regards to military faculty AND students that need review.  My commentary is geared directly at the Naval War College and should be considered items of discussion and items for improvement.  Should none of what I address be accomplished, the school will not suffer.  It just won’t be as good as I think it could be.

To begin with, Professor Johnson-Freese’s criticism of the Navy faculty “retire-in-place” concept is dead on.  While some of those retired Navy officers provide interesting viewpoint, many of them are inhibiting the hiring of professors with different viewpoints than the ones provided by 20 to 30 years of naval service.  Her comments on hiring practices should be closely reviewed by the War Colleges, and those practices kept in mind when contracts are renewed by the school.

But, aren’t those RIP Navy officers qualified?  Well, yes.  On paper.  They have PhDs.  They are published.  But by and large those PhDs are earned after retirement at local Rhode Island Schools.  Publications are done internal to the War College in either faculty papers for student consumption or in the War College Review.

To my knowledge none were published, had doctoral degrees, or any advanced education outside of the Navy prior to attendance, assignment, and retirement at the War College.  In and of itself that is not unusual for Naval Officers.  But should we be placing “usual” Naval Officers as faculty at the home of Naval thought?

What about active duty faculty?  Well, the same problem resides there.  Of the Navy officers, most have not published.  The one officer who had published prior to assignment at the War College is not a member of the teaching faculty.  Wait?  Not a member of the teaching faculty?  The Naval War College website lists 375 faculty members.  104 are identified as “Military Professor”.  Of those, 70 teach one of the three core courses.  The other 35 are either in the International Law department, Assist and Assess Team Members, or part of the War Gaming Department (there are some other cats and dogs, but these three have the bulk of those 30 officers.  Those 30 are also almost all Navy officers and make up almost half of the 67 Navy officers on faculty as “professors”.

What kind of officers are those who are assigned to the faculty?  The Army sends rockstars who have had both command and possess doctoral degrees.  The Navy?  Frankly?  They are mostly broken careers.  At least three are 2xFOSd Commanders coming up on high year tenure.  There are more reserve officers on Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW) than there are post-command line officers.  Rumor is that the Selective Early Retirement Board hit the College “hard”.  Unpublished.  Non-due course.  No longer upwardly mobile.

There is not a single serving Flag Officer who served as faculty on the Naval War College.

Now, none of this makes these individual faculty members bad people, or bad Naval Officers.  It just limits their ability to work as peers with the civilian faculty – both while on active duty and RIP.

Wait, the critic argues, those officers are there to provide their operational expertise.  Their savvy, their saltiness.  Not their academic credentials.

OK.  Again.  2xFOSd for Captain.  Not upwardly mobile.  No command experience.  But, discounting those data points there are these.

Almost no DC staff experience.  Almost no combatant command or major staff experience outside of DC.  When there are officers who have DC experience, they end up teaching in the Joint Military Operations Department (and teach the planning course).  Operational planner experienced officers are assigned to the National Security Affairs Department (and teach the national strategy and policy course).  The Strategy and Policy Department (think Military History Department) is a mishmash of officers who are hopelessly outclassed academically by their civilian peers and in some cases are ignored in the classroom by those same peers.

But, why does it matter that there be a greater breadth of experience among the faculty?  Because, unlike civilian graduate programs, the Naval War College student body had no choice in course work or faculty.  You can’t wait until next semester to get the “good” professor.  The school determines who will teach you.  That makes the mix and breadth of experience critical.  Or it destroys the credibilty of the faculty in that classroom.

How to fix it?  The President of the War College needs to recruit faculty rather than let them just come to him.  He needs to partner with the local commands in Newport to find upwardly mobile officers to teach for a year or two and then return to the Fleet.  He needs to personally scrutinize every single faculty hire of a retired officer as if that person were to become HIS moderator, instructor, mentor, commander.

If not this, then at the very least end the assignment of billets to the line communities.  When an officer applies for a faculty position the President, Provost, or Dean of Academics should review that officer’s record, a writing sample, and curriculum vitae and from there make a decision on which department the officer would be best suited to teach in.  This alone would go a long way in matching talent to task at the war colleges.

But, the above only addresses the faculty.  The assignment of the student body also needs to be addressed.  While the Junior (officially “Intermediate”) course contains significant numbers of upwardly mobile Navy officers, the Senior course does not.  Resplendent with derailed careers, Reserve recalls and staff corps officers, the due-course officers from the line communities are underrepresented.  Which, of course, they are in the services as a whole.  However this is senior level PME.  Why can’t Navy get better-qualified officers to the Naval War College?

Well, it does; in the form of Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps officers.  Again, it’s the assignment processes for Navy officers that is problemmatic.  And here geography and biology tend to win out.  For Navy officers completing a command tour it is easier to send them to Norfolk to the Joint Forces Staff College for an eight week tour and get them back to staff or operational duty than it is to sacrifice a year of academic study.  Failing that, it is easier to send them to National War College in DC for follow on assignment there (or vice versa) and provide stability for the family.  Absent Surface Warfare Officer School, there are no large commands in Newport to draw due-course officers from to fill the Senior Course, or likewise to send them to afterwards and given a choice, many choose one of the alternate ways to complete JPME II.

There’s no easy fix – and this post is intend to foment discussion, not serve as a blueprint to nirvanah.  The Navy only has so many due course officers and can only send them so many places.  But, what Navy does with its top performing officers tells everyone where Navy’s priorities are.  But when less than a third of Flag Officers are Naval War College graduates, and the last Naval War College graduate CNO was Admiral Mike Boorda, there’s a definite signal being sent of where the priorty isn’t.

 



« Older Entries Newer Entries »

Subscribe

Get blog posts delivered to your inbox
* = required field

video title