Archive for the 'Coast Guard' Category
Chuck Hill joins Matt to talk about design, use, and possibilities of naval corvettes, reflecting on the articles from 2013’s Corvette week. From definitions, to potential employment, to interdiction operations during Vietnam… this podcast runs the gamut. Please enjoy, Sea Control Episode 18: Naval Corvettes (download).
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Well, we had a little trouble with the technical side of live podcasting last week (and, as my old Macintosh computer used to say, “It’s not my fault”) but CDR Salamander and I are, if nothing else, persistent.
So please join us on Sunday, as we fight with electrons and, uh, other things in our presentation of Midrats Episode 210: “John Kuehn & Joint Operations from Cape Fear to the South China Sea”
Though nations for thousands of years have been wrestling with the challenge of Joint operations, as an island nation with significant global interests ashore, the USA has a rich history of doing Joint right, and blind parochialism. (Note by E1: Sal wrote this and your guess is as good as mine in what he meant in that last part there. Or, just maybe the electrons have struck again – Red Lectroids?)
Using this as a starting point, this Sunday for the full hour we will have returning guest, John Kuehn.
Dr. John T. Kuehn is the General William Stofft Chair for Historical Research at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He retired from the U.S. Navy 2004 at the rank of commander after 23 years of service as a naval flight officer in EP-3s and ES-3s. He authored Agents of Innovation (2008) and co-authored Eyewitness Pacific Theater (2008) with D.M. Giangreco, as well as numerous articles and editorials and was awarded a Moncado Prize from the Society for Military History in 2011.
We will also discuss his latest book, just released by Praeger, A military History of Japan: From the Age of the Samurai to the 21st Century.
Please join us live at 5pm Eastern U.S. on 12 January 2014 or pick the show up later by clicking here.
Every listen is a strike against the Lectroids!
By Chap Godbey
This photo sort of looks like a ship, right? It is, but then again it’s also something else.
For this example, the vessel–an Iraqi patrol craft made by an American company and part of a U.S. foreign military sales contract–is not just one of the assets Iraq’s military needs to protect a very crowded and consequential waterspace. It’s also a multi-decade relationship, where both countries get to know each other on an operator-to-operator level as well as on other levels. That relationship can have strategic effects as the lieutenants become admirals, and the relationship builds trust, access, and communications paths outside the formal diplomatic process and regionally as well as bilaterally.
One of the patrol spaces this ship protects drives the entire country’s economy–the oil platforms and pipeline infrastructure–and its shipping. This is recognizable to a military planner, though the economic part takes a bit of wider thinking to understand how U.S. security cooperation fits into it with training and equipment. But let’s add something important on here: U.S. policy is to support Iraq’s reintegration into the region, and it’s a top foreign policy priority for the U.S. with regard to Iraq. The military sphere tends to be a bit easier in reconnection than some other spheres; navies, since they’re mobile sovereign territory in international waters, can be the fastest of those–especially when the U.S. is acting as an honest broker. To pull off that kind of multinational reintegration is not solely a military function, but can utterly depend on the military aspect. If the U.S. really wants a whole-of-Executive-Branch (much less whole-of-government) approach to a policy problem, DoD’s mass has to be subordinated to the overall effort, even when it might not necessarily make short term military sense.
The example above isn’t perfect. Security assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan has been far from the standard situation seen by a security cooperation office, and special authorities in the law made security cooperation in these countries much different than in other countries. A more forceful example would be where the host nation is paying for every penny of the asset, since feelings about “what ‘we’ are giving ‘them'” emotionally colors the discussion, and it’s worthwhile to emphasize that foreign military sales is not necessarily coming from the U.S. taxpayer. On the other hand, the nonmilitary effects of this ship and crew, and the regional effects of what this ship does and the separate bilateral relationships that navy has with regional navies and the U.S., are pretty clear and useful to bring out the challenge of thinking about security cooperation as more than arms sales or exercises.
Many folks seem to miss the nonmilitary and regional effects of the military-to-military relationship built out of security cooperation, or even that the process is heavily structured in U.S. law. This post about security cooperation misses important considerations about what security cooperation is and what it’s supposed to do (this one by the same author is better, though of different focus). A comment of mine on that War On the Rocks post identifies structural problems in the argument, and there are other opportunities for quibbling, but that post proves that it’s worthwhile to outline some basics of SC with a view towards those regional and extramilitary effects.
Security cooperation (SC) is not very familiar to most operators in the Department of Defense. SC’s a difficult skill set. SC can pay off not only as a force multiplier, but also to provide diplomatic effects which can be game-changing. DoD personnel may only experience SC once, as an exercise or engagement event, or by doing a tour that includes a collateral duty associated with foreign military sales (FMS). More experience is in the foreign area officer (FAO) commmunity, whose officers can wind up doing SC from several angles over multiple tours, but there aren’t many FAOs around. Because the skills needed are relatively obscure inside DoD, understanding of what SC is becomes fragmentary and often misses the point. American SC can suffer from that bad understanding. (The way U.S. government agencies in the Executive Branch staff and train for SC missions doesn’t help the problem, either.)
DoD isn’t the agency where SC initially gets defined—because SC is not solely a DoD mission; it’s a State mission for which Defense is the executive agent.
Let’s define some terms here. SC includes
- security assistance (SA), which itself includes
- foreign military sales (FMS) weapons sales,
- International Military Education and Training (IMET),
- a multi-page list of other programs that somehow fit or get shoehorned into the process, and
- security cooperation (Sc), a confusingly named subset of the bigger SC which mainly deals with exercise events with host nation or meetings between military personnel.
The first one, SA, is covered under federal law. (Note: IANAL and doing this off the top of my head.) U.S. Code Title 22 is the main law that covers diplomatic and consular functions and is for the Department of State what Title 10 is for DoD. The second part of security cooperation, the non-FMS part also called security cooperation, has rules under Title 22 but is more under a section of Title 10. That part of title 10 used is different from what you might expect, and it’s administered by personnel working under a different rule set than those under the full operational command of a COCOM. DoD personnel in country doing SC serve under the direction and supervision of the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission to that country (usually the U.S. ambassador to that country). Security cooperation, including security assistance, is a diplomatic function, under the Ambassador’s control in country. FMS cases and IMET and exercises have significant State Department approval and coordination–and additional coordination and approval by other agencies, and in some cases White House/Congressional approval–even though DoD has the mass and the executive agent role. The effect can sometimes be that the poor bureaucrat in the other agency is either like Horatius at the bridge or Niedermeyer in the riot, trying to get the massive influx of DoD people to go a different direction. It also can become counterintuitive, since American businesses might be fighting for the contract, or if one player–even a host nation–decides it’s worth lobbying for their interests more effectively to Congress than another player.
Note here that the Security Assistance Management Manual, the reference used in the War On The Rocks post, isn’t the controlling document. The law both trumps one agency’s manual and also highlights the diplomatic and interagency nature of SC. It also implies that the SC function is something we do as an ongoing and sustaining function of a country team, rather than something switched on once a COCOM has commenced large scale operations.
Since SC is a diplomatic function, one has to consider SC less like a military operation and more like a diplomatic operation. Results will be diffuse. They will have “one step forward two steps back” aspects. Results will be hard to measure in many respects. The effort will be like a coalition effort, with occasionally immense frustration on the ground and in the staff paying off strategically, but in different spheres than expected, or with effects long after the staffer is gone. For a planner looking for consistent positive results with a focused engineering-style goal oriented mindset this is anathema. A DoD planner or operator wants to get from point A to point B in a direct and uncluttered manner. Diplomacy, especially the work performed by Department of State colleagues on the country team on ground in country, is more chaotic and messy. If done right, SC advances the national interest of the United States; builds networks, access and relationships beneficial to the U.S.; eases stresses among and between partners; provides a common operating framework in the field; and provides a useful diplomatic tool as part of an embassy country team.
(Oh, by the way: There’s no Title 10 “command” in security cooperation organizations. There is no sheriff’s badge, no salad fork, no “forces”, even though the responsibility can weigh heavily, and DoD personnel could be in remote and dangerous locations. You’re a part of the embassy country team. There’s not even an organic Article 15 or medal-awarding authority, unless you’re a general for whom a COCOM has specifically delegated it in writing.)
For representatives of either agency to best advance U.S. national interest in the long term, both Defense and State have to be able to restrain some of their agency-level cultural impulses to achieve SC most effectively. Training, both in State’s A100 class for their newly commissioned officers, and at the Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management or similar venues for DoD personnel interacting with a country team, helps introduce the cultural difference to each agency. Other agencies with a hand in SC, such as the Departments of Commerce or Treasury, have a much smaller presence and make do with corporate knowledge and help from the larger groups interacting around them. (Homeland Security mainly interacts through Coast Guard personnel, who are more acquainted with DoD’s foibles and when in theater interact often with country teams with and outside the security cooperation office in the embassy.) Some aspects can cause real friction without planners realizing its source, such as when a J5 officer assumes there’s a J5 in State, or that a Post’s plan is written with the same process as DoD’s, or that the plan is followed as closely as a DoD plan would be. On the ground, people on the country team have to make it work through force of effort and personality.
The benefits of SC have national influence, not just military, from public affairs/public diplomacy to changing policies in a country. SC also has a regional influence: in the ability to use the U.S. effort as a go-between between two partners unhappy with each other, in the ability to build regional ties with the U.S. invited to play, and in the ability to influence regional decisions based on a calculation from a nation that has to deal with what the U.S. has done in the neighborhood. It could well be that host nation has no culture of maintenance and the equipment they paid for is failing. It could be that the country’s using the military to dispense largesse domestically, and the U.S. interest in improving capacity isn’t perfectly aligned with that national desire. It could be that there’s a Red Queen effect, where the security cooperation guys are running as hard as they can to stay in place capacity-wise. It could also be that those frustrating efforts pay off in unusual ways. The military planner will do well to reach out to those other American agencies, to actually listen and adjust planning based on that reaching out, to see the role of SC as more than military capacity building, and to plan for a long and difficult but rewarding SC effort.
For a maritime power with global requirements, what is the role of the small ship in times of peace and war?
What are the tradeoffs between quantity and capability, size and range, survivability and affordable?
Does the US Navy need a high-low mix or a Strike Group-Flotilla mix?
Where do our national requirements influence how we build our Fleet vs. the process other nations build theirs?
Do we have a sustainable path towards a balanced Fleet, or are we sailing on based on outdated charts?
To discuss this and more for the full hour will be returning guest U.S. Naval War College Center for Naval Warfare Studies Dean, Captain Robert C. Rubel, USN (Ret.)
15 Dec 13 at 5pm. Join us live or listen to the show later by clicking here
Senator Kelly Ayotte (R-NH) addresses the attendees of Defense Forum Washington.
Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus speaks at Defense Forum Washington.
Senator Tim Kaine (D-VA) speaks at Defense Forum Washington about the defense budget and the future of the sea services.
Congressman J. Randy Forbes (R-VA) addresses the attendees of Defense Forum Washington.
USCG Mobile Training Branch member, James Daffer, has traveled the world. We talk with him about what he’s seen in the world of capacity building for maritime security abroad, soft power and relationship building, cultural challenges when working amongst different peoples, and stories about his travels. SC Episode 6 – USCG Adventures (Download)
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It was four years ago today that the Coast Guard and the Marine Corps lost some of their Shipmates during a midair collision of Coast Guard Rescue 1705 and a Marine Corps helicopter off the coast of California.
On the night of 29 October 2009 I was standing watch within the LANT Area Command Center as the SAR Controller; I took the Critical Incident Communications (CIC) call as it came in from the West Coast via HQ. I can easily recall the near three hour long conference call and listening to the voice fluctuations of the Search and Rescue Controllers as they were getting the direct communications from those on scene.
The most vivid moment that’s still ground into my skull was hearing- through a radio over the phone- that those on scene had found a “huge tire” with a marking of “Sacto” on it… my heart sank; my stomach hurt. As I rushed to find out who was on that flight I remember going into a cold sweat; the Coast Guard isn’t that large of a service. The aviation community within is even smaller. I was, as many know, a prior Navigator aboard our C-130′s. While most of my time was spent in Kodiak, AK I have a deep appreciation of those who fly in the more traffic-heavy areas of the nation- it’s hard work.
In the end little to nothing was found from the downed aircraft, less immediate debris, nor any bodies recovered. Please take a moment today to remember those who were lost four years ago today;
- Lt. Cmdr. Che J. Barnes was the commander of CG-1705, an HC-130 long-range surveillance aircraft based at Coast Guard Air Station Sacramento, Calif. A 1996 graduate of the Coast Guard Academy, Barnes was awarded the 2009 Cmdr. Elmer F. Stone Aviation Crew Rescue Award. During his 17-year Coast Guard career, Barnes also received the Coast Guard Commendation Medal, three Coast Guard Achievement Medals and two Coast Guard Letter of Commendation
A native of Capay, Calif., Barnes is survived by his father, Martin K. Barnes; twin brother, Noah L. Barnes, brothers; Thaddeus F.M. Barsotti, and Freeman O. Barsotti; and girlfriend, Carrie Reynolds. He is preceded in death by his mother, Kathleen F. Barsotti.
- Lt. Adam W. Bryant was the co-pilot of CG-1705. Bryant was a 2003 graduate of the Coast Guard Academy and was a recipient of the Coast Guard Commandant’s Letter of Commendation ribbon.
A native of Crewe, Va., Bryant is survived by his mother, Nina Bryant; father, Jerry Bryant; and brother, Benjamin Bryant.
- Chief Petty Officer John F. Seidman was the flight engineer of CG-1705, an HC-130 long-range surveillance aircraft based at Coast Guard Air Station Sacramento, Calif. In his 23 years of service, Seidman was awarded the Coast Guard Commendation Medal, Coast Guard Achievement Medal, Coast Guard Commandant’s Letter of Commendation Ribbon, and
seven Coast Guard Good Conduct Medals.
A native of Stockton, Calif., Seidman is survived by his wife, Jennifer Seidman; parents, William (Bill) and Connie Seidman; and brother, Jeffery Seidman.
- Petty Officer 2nd Class Carl P. Grigonis was the navigator of CG-1705. In his nine years of service, Grigonis was awarded the Coast Guard Achievement Medal, Coast Guard Commandant’s Letter of Commendation Ribbon, and three Coast Guard Good Conduct Medals.
A native of Mayfield Heights, Ohio, Grigonis is survived by his wife, Kristen Grigonis; his son, Hayden; the upcoming arrival of their daughter, Kalina; his mother, Janina Grigonis; and brother, George Grigonis.
- Petty Officer 2nd Class Monica L. Beacham was the radio operator of CG-1705. In her nine years of service, Beacham was awarded two Coast Guard good conduct medals.
A native of Decaturville, Tenn., Beacham is survived by her husband, Seaman Travis Beacham; her daughter, Hailey; her mother, Shirl Jean Merrell; brother, Michael Gipson; and sister, Kelly Johnson.
- Petty Officer 2nd Class Jason S. Moletzsky was air crew for CG-1705. In his seven years of service, Moletzky was awarded the Coast Guard Achievement Medal, two Coast Guard Commandant’s Letter of Commendation Ribbons, and two Coast Guard Good Conduct Medals.
A native of Norristown, Pa., Moletzky is survived by his fiancé, Christiana Biscardi; parents, John and Lisa Moletzsky; and sisters, Amanda and Rebecca Moletzsky.
- Petty Officer 3rd Class Danny R. Kreder II was drop master for CG-1705. In his four years of service, Kreder was awarded the Coast Guard Commandant’s Letter of Commendation Ribbon, and the Coast Guard Good Conduct Medal.
A native of Elm Mott, Texas, Kreder is survived by his wife, Victoria (Sovey) Kreder; parents, Jeff and Jodi Woodruff; brothers, Brandon and Cory Kreder; grandmother, Pamela Sue Lyle; grandparents, Wayne and Shirley Sovey; and in-laws, Sam and Tracy Sovey.
Never forget, always remember.
(Cross post from ryanerickson.com)