Archive for the 'Coast Guard' Category
|Strategy is not for amateurs*|
Please join us at 5pm (EST)on 1 March 2015 for our Episode 269: National Strategy and the Navy’s Proper Role in it:
The role of the Navy and Marine Corps should be to provide ready and capable forces to the joint commanders. Outside of that, what is the proper role of the sea services in designing a more national strategy?
What is the state of a national and a maritime strategy, who are the different players in the discussion, and what is the proper way forward?
Our guest to discuss this and more for the full hour will be Captain Robert C. “Barney” Rubel USN, (Ret.), Professor Emeritus, US Naval War College.
Captain Rubel, now retired, was previously the Dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the US Naval War College from 2006 to 2014. Prior to arriving at NWC, he was a thirty-year Navy veteran, with experience as e a light attack naval aviator, flying the A-7 Corsair II and later the F/A-18 Hornet, commanded VFA-131, and also served as the Inspector General at U.S. Southern Command.
He is a graduate of the Spanish Naval War College in Madrid and the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, RI., and has an undergraduate degree in liberal arts from the University of Illinois and a master’s degree in national security and strategic studies from the US Naval War College.
Captain Rubel continues to serve as a member of the CNO Advisory Board and is active in local American Legion activities.
*Upper photo is of Dr. James H. Boren discussing bureaucracy in three dimensions
For those who have seen the Great Carrier Debate between Jerry Hendrix and Bryan McGrath, one thing was clear – both gentlemen had only scratched the surface of their thoughts on the topic.
At about the same time, the concept of “distributed lethality” had seeped its way in to the conversation. To examine both topics and to review the national security issues you should expect to see in 2015 will be returning guest, Bryan McGrath.
Bryan McGrath is the founding Managing Director of The FerryBridge Group LLC (FBG), a niche consultancy specializing in naval and national security issues, including national and military strategy, strategic planning, executive communications, strategic communications and emerging technologies.
Prior to starting FBG, Bryan founded a national security consulting line of business for Delex Systems, where he directly supported a number of senior clients in the Navy and the Army. Additionally, he provided critical insight on Navy policy and acquisition preferences to commercial clients, including major defense contractors and small technology firms negotiating the “post-earmarks” era.
A retired Naval Officer, Bryan spent 21 years on active duty including a tour in command of USS BULKELEY (DDG 84), a guided-missile destroyer homeported in Norfolk, Virginia.
In his spare time, Bryan is a well-published commentator in the fields of national and maritime strategy, with policy papers published at major think tanks, and articles placed in nationally marketed periodicals. He is a frequent panelist at symposia that deal with naval issues and is frequently quoted by major press organizations.
Bryan earned a BA in History from the University of Virginia in 1987, and an MA in Political Science (Congressional Studies) from The Catholic University of America. He is a graduate of the Naval War College.
This Sunday join us for our 5th Anniversary Show. No guests, no agendas – just us talking about what 2014 had to teach us, and looking towards what 2015 may have in store for everyone in the national security arena. This is a great time if you ever wanted to call in to ask either one of us a question on a topic you wish we would address … or just to say “hi.” Just be warned, we might ask you a question back. It’s what we do.
5pm EST. 4 Jan 14.
By Mark Tempest
Believe it or not, this week is our 250th Episode of Midrats.
In celebration, we’re clearing the intellectual table, going to open the mic and see where it takes us.
From Kobane, to Coastal Defense, to Ebola and everything in between and sideways that’s been in the national security news as of late, plus whatever else breaks above the ambient noise – we’ll be covering it.
As with all Midrats Free For Alls, we are also opening the phone lines for our regular listeners who want to throw a topic our way.
Come join us Sunday as we try to figure out how we got to 250.
The Arabian Gulf (AG) has evolved into a proving ground for expeditionary patrol boat operations. In the future, reduced high-end combatant availability, a truncated LCS fleet, and the growing importance of the kinds of littoral and irregular warfare operations that favor patrol craft capabilities will likely sustain or increase demand for patrol craft in overseas contingency operations. Both the Navy and Coast Guard should pause to reflect on some of the enduring lessons-learned from operating patrol craft in the AG for the last twelve years to ensure that future patrol craft crews are well-prepared for operating in politically-sensitive, high-threat environments.
Patrol craft might seem like unlikely instruments of US seapower in a region where Carrier Strike Groups frequently deploy to quell regional saber rattling, but their versatile capabilities actually make them well-suited for supporting Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) missions in the AG.
Using patrol craft in overseas contingency operations added unique dimension to the maritime campaign of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Prior to OIF, the last time the Coast Guard deployed patrol craft out-of-hemisphere to support combat operations was the Vietnam War, when it sent several 82-foot cutters to disrupt Viet Cong maritime supply lines. The Navy also has limited recent experience with forward-deploying patrol craft. Prior to OIF, the Navy ultimately declined to deploy the Cyclone-class PCs for their original purpose as a special operations platforms, and the PCs remained stateside spending much of their time supporting Coast Guard law enforcement patrols. Five of the PCs were even crewed and operated as Coast Guard cutters for several years.
For nearly a decade, the primary mission for Coast Guard and Navy patrol craft was securing Iraq’s maritime domain from terrorism, foreign incursion, and smuggling as part of Combined Task Force-Iraqi Maritime (CTF-IM). The destruction of Saddam’s navy at the outset of OIF created a critical maritime security vacuum in an area with hostile neighbors, a high risk of terrorist attack, and two offshore oil terminals that distribute nearly all of Iraq’s oil (more than 80% of Iraq’s GDP) to the global market. Up to six US patrol craft remained constantly on station in Iraqi waters providing perimeter defense for Iraq’s oil terminals, patrolling along the disputed Iraq/Iran maritime boundary, training the new Iraqi Navy, Marines, and Coastal Border Guard, and boarding vessels suspected of smuggling weapons or other contraband into or out of Iraq. As the Iraqi Navy gained more experience and assets, it gradually assumed responsibility for patrolling its waters. The Iraqi Navy formally took over maritime security duties from CTF-IM on December 31st 2011.
Demand for patrol boats did not diminish with the handoff of the Iraqi Maritime mission. Instead, their stock actually went up, in part due to shrinking budgets and a westward rebalance that reduced US Navy big deck deployments to the AG region.
The Navy recently deployed four more 179-foot Cyclone-class patrol coastals (PCs) to Bahrain, bringing the PC presence there to ten of the total fleet of 13. The Coast Guard continues to operate six 110-foot Island-class patrol boats (110s) from Bahrain, which work alongside and perform many of the same missions as the Navy PCs. Commenting on the recent shift of more PCs to 5th Fleet, a Navy spokesman stated that the PCs were fulfilling several missions previously assigned to destroyers and other large surface combatants to free up the latter for more pressing tasking elsewhere.
Past as prologue
The handover of the Iraqi Maritime mission was the end of an era for AG patrol craft, and the recent arrival of more PCs to the region heralds the beginning of a new one. The present transition period presents a good inflection point to distill some of the lessons-learned from the Iraqi Maritime mission and other AG patrol craft operations, and apply them to anticipate some of the challenges that patrol craft may encounter in the as they assume a more prominent role in NAVCENT operations.
Following are five lessons that can be gleaned from over a decade of AG patrol craft operations. There are many more worth consideration, and hopefully others will contribute their insights to further the discussion.
One of the many memorable quotes by General Mattis is a phrase that he gave his Marines in Iraq to live by: “be polite, be courteous, but have a plan to kill every man you meet.” Ingraining that kind of mindset might seem extreme, but it is a necessary adaptation to the reality of irregular warfare in which combatants and terrorists disguise themselves amongst the civilian population.
Operating in the AG requires a similar mindset. Commanders must have a plan, not necessarily to kill, but certainly to react decisively to a provocation or attack. Dense maritime traffic, a constant terrorism threat, and frequent harassment by irregular Iranian forces compound to make discerning and responding to potential surprise attacks a vexing challenge.
Distinguishing a possible threat from normal maritime traffic is especially difficult in the AG, where dhows are ubiquitous and used for every purpose conceivable. Getting from one place to another invariably involves threading through constellations of dhows that tend to maneuver erratically, ignore radiotelephone calls, rarely display navigation lights, and bear few identifiable characteristics to distinguish them from thousands of others. Further, patrol craft crews do not have the benefit of a combat information center, organic air reconnaissance (at least not yet), or signals intelligence capability that a large combatant tends to employ to assist with maintaining situational awareness. Knowing what to look for and developing an instinctive coup d’oeil to sense when a dhow might not be “just a dhow” takes training and experience that should begin well before arrival in the AG.
ROE decisions: Anticipate early, practice often.
Rules of engagement (ROE) for AG operations were recently the subject of international media attention after a boat crew from the Coast Guard cutter Monomoy fired a warning shot at an armed Iranian dhow. A crewmember on the dhow reportedly trained and readied a crew-served weapon at the Coast Guard crew as they approached in the cutter’s inflatable boat, and a Coast Guardsman in the boat fired the shot in response. The incident was instantly sensationalized with headlines such as “US Coast Guard Fires on Iranian Sailing Vessel.” A flood of comments on several media sites reacted with sentiments that ranged from indignation that the Coast Guard did not respond with more force, to conspiracy theories that insisted that the incident was an attempt to cause a Gulf of Tonkin-like casus belli to precipitate war with Iran. The Monomoy incident provides an excellent opportunity for discussing the challenge of making judicious ROE decisions in the AG.
AG missions require operating in the difficult grey area between combat and peacetime. Maritime infrastructure protection, boardings, freedom of navigation exercises, etc. require close interaction with other vessels, which means limited time to react if attacked. Well-rehearsed response procedures must complement appropriate ROE and weapons postures to enable a unit to defend itself and others in such an environment. However, operating in a hypersensitive political area like the AG means that any action perceived as unjustified or excessive can undermine fragile partnerships or an existing modus vivendi and ultimately compromise mission success. ROE responses must thus strike the right balance between security and restraint.
Patrol craft in the AG often feel the opposing pressures keenly. Interactions with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (aka IRGCN, the maritime arm of Iran’s irregular military force loyal to the Ayatollah) are a frequent occurrence. IRGCN vessels are notorious for trying to provoke US warships into using force in order to inflame anti-Western sentiment, and run-ins with them require a high degree of restraint. Excessive restraint however, can also prove costly. The consequences of either too much aggression or too much caution in a given situation are illustrated by the following scenarios.
On April 25, 2004, the Navy PC USS Firebolt detected a suspicious cargo dhow approaching the security zone around the Khawr al Amaya oil terminal and sent a joint USN-USCG boarding team to investigate. Before the boarding team had a chance to embark and assess the threat, the explosive-laden dhow detonated. Two US Navy sailors and one Coast Guardsman were killed, with four others wounded. The outcome would have been far worse if the dhow had reached its intended target. Had it not sent the boarding team, USS Firebolt and the point defense on the oil platform would have had only a few minutes to determine whether to use deadly force on a vessel that showed no obvious outward signs of hostility. As it turned out, the consequences of a “false negative” (i.e. assuming the vessel was not actually a threat and deciding not to fire on it) would have been catastrophic.
The alternative possibility (false positive)—can also be tragic and diplomatically disastrous. The most notorious example from the AG is the USS Vincennes mistaking Iran Air flight 655 for a hostile aircraft and shooting it down, killing all 290 passengers. More recently, in 2012, the USNS Rappahannock opened fire on a small vessel that continued approaching the ship at high speed despite warnings to steer clear. The Rappahannock’s.50 caliber gunfire killed one Indian fisherman and wounded three others. Both actions were time-critical decisions made with imperfect information, and both resulted in loss of innocent life.
These and other similar examples weigh heavily on commanding officers, who own responsibility for the outcome of every ROE decision. Placing patrol craft on the front lines of AG operations places a heavy burden on junior Commanding Officers and their crews to make the right call in tense, uncertain situations. Rehearsing ROE scenarios in realistic, scenario-based training should be a core component of the pre-deployment workup cycle, and the training should continue on a frequent basis once in-theater.
Lessons 1 and 2 apply with particular emphasis during small boat operations and boarding evolutions
Boarding vessels is a common evolution for patrol craft in the AG. Boardings serve several purposes, from enforcing UN mandates (searching for weapons or contraband), to simply interacting with mariners to “take the pulse” of an area from the local’s perspective. Referring back to lesson 1, however, no boarding in the AG is ever “routine.”
Whatever the mission, boarding teams and boat crews are vulnerable as soon as they launch. Their communications and defensive capabilities are limited, as are their options for exfiltration once the boarding team is onboard another vessel. Large combatants often have the luxury of launching multiple boarding teams simultaneously, and even an armed helicopter or UAV for additional cover. Patrol craft are limited to one boat crew/boarding team and must provide cover with the ship.
Whenever possible, patrol craft need to keep the boarding team close enough to protect them from a surprise attack. If operational necessity requires sending a boarding team beyond that range, it is imperative that they are properly equipped to defend themselves and cognizant of their surroundings. If there was ever any question as to why, the 2007 HMS Cornwall incident removed any lingering uncertainty.
In March of 2007, IRGCN speedboats ambushed a UK boarding team from the HMS Cornwall operating near the Iran-Iraq maritime boundary and demanded their surrender. The Cornwall was miles away at the time, and the Lynx helicopter that had been providing overwatch for the boarding team had returned to the ship to refuel. In accordance with their “de-escalatory” ROE, the UK on-scene commander ordered the team to give up their weapons and allowed the Iranians to apprehend them. Although all 15 personnel were returned unharmed after two weeks in captivity, the kidnapping created a high profile incident that continues to haunt operational commanders conducting boarding operations in the AG. Following the incident, the British First Sea Lord commented that the boarding team had acted appropriately under the circumstances, a view that excited much debate in naval circles.
The HMS Cornwall case contains important lessons on selecting and validating ROE, decisions regarding outfitting and close support requirements for boarding teams, training for contingencies, communications, and vulnerability assessment calculations. All of the above should shape the policy for training for and conducting small boat and boarding operations in the AG, with additional emphasis placed on mitigating the limitations inherent to patrol craft for protecting boat crews and boarding teams operating beyond the vicinity of the ship.
Hone diplomatic skills and cultural understanding
Promoting stability in the Arabian Gulf requires a combination of deterrence and diplomatic engagement. The engagement side involves frequent security cooperation and training exercises with other maritime forces in the region. These exercises are an important dimension of CENTCOM’s strategy, but they are easily undermined by a lack of cultural awareness.
Security cooperation is a delicate mission, with success often measured by a partner nation’s willingness to maintain a cooperative relationship. The cultural peculiarities of the AG demand a high degree of understanding to facilitate positive interactions and avoid embarrassing breaches of decorum.
Cultural awareness training must be a high priority for maritime forces deploying to the AG. This is perhaps even more important for patrol craft crews since they tend to work closely alongside partner nations in a peer-to-peer role. The training must go much deeper than a background lecture on the Koran and overview of NAVCENT policies during Ramadan. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS-21) describes a more comprehensive approach:
“A key to fostering [expanded cooperative] relationships is development of sufficient cultural, historical, and linguistic expertise among our Sailors, Marines and Coast Guardsman to nurture effective interaction with diverse international partners.”
The US military learned the value of cultural awareness training in more than decade of COIN-intensive warfare. However, more of that expertise needs to make its way to maritime operations. Some examples of how we could improve in this area include plugging patrol craft crews in with foreign area officers, training with role players in a variety of likely foreign nation engagement situations, and adding a limited language component to pre-deployment training that builds a basic, area-specific maritime lexicon.
Adapt training to cultural realities.
Improving the security capabilities of partner nations is a necessary Phase IV objective in a campaign plan and an important steady-state mission, as recently reinforced by Presidential Policy Directive-23.
In planning maritime security force assistance missions, let no one doubt what a massive undertaking it can be to build a degraded naval force back to functional capability. Rebuilding the Iraqi Navy was a multi-year effort that required tremendous resources, patience and time. One frustration in the process was working around cultural friction points such as Sunni/Shia integration and officer/enlisted relations. Other norms that a western military might take for granted such as preventive maintenance, personal protective equipment standards, motivation, and punctuality, did not translate directly across cultural boundaries.
A popular passage by T. E. Lawrence, aka “Lawrence of Arabia” attempts to place these challenges into context.
“Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.”
Prescient insight, perhaps, although one wonders how Lawrence would have assessed the Iraqi military’s recent performance.
Returning focus to the tactical level, the takeaway for crews performing training and advisory roles is to anticipate cultural friction points (consistent with lesson four), set expectations accordingly, and determine ways to mitigate them. Success must focus on whether or not the force, once equipped and trained, can adequately secure its maritime domain. How it does so will vary. Setting expectations that do not align with intractable cultural realities will lead to frustration and undermine success.
Closing Thought – A Way Ahead for Patrol Craft in Contingency Operations
The long-term role for patrol craft in overseas contingency operations appears uncertain. They have proven their value in AG missions, but there seems to be no plan to give them a permanent place in the US forward-deployed seapower arsenal. The Navy’s long-term acquisition plan does not include anything to replace the PCs. (The Navy has added patrol vessels such as the Coastal Command Boat and Mark IV, but those vessels are much smaller and designed for nearshore operations.) Once the PCs reach the end of their service life, the Navy will not have a ship in its inventory between an 85-foot nearshore patrol vessel and a 400-foot LCS.
The Coast Guard, meanwhile, recently launched the tenth of its planned fleet of 58 new 154-foot Sentinel-class Fast Response Cutters (FRC). FRCs are a major capability upgrade over the legacy Island class, but so far there are no indications that any of them will be dedicated to an expeditionary or out-of-hemisphere role. That FRC’s potential for expeditionary operations should be closely considered, consistent with the following guidance in the 2010 Naval Operating Concept:
“The Coast Guard inventory must maintain sufficient capacity to support geographic combatant commander TSC plans, expeditionary requirements requested through the Global Force Management process; and overseas contingency operations; in addition to its full suite of statutory domestic missions.”
One potential opportunity for sea-service synergy might be for the Navy to acquire some Sentinel-class ships and create an expeditionary patrol craft squadron based in Mayport (along with the remaining three PCs and proposed eight LCS’). Mayport could serve as a USN-USCG expeditionary patrol craft training facility, focused on developing the skillset required to employ the vessels in overseas contingency operations. When not deployed out-of-hemisphere, the expeditionary patrol craft squadron could hone their skills in the SOUTHCOM AOR where additional maritime assets are sorely needed.
The public opinion pendulum seems to be swinging away from the post-9/11 clamor to enhance our homeland security readiness, even while the threats to the US proliferate and evolve. What does that mean for a service that is both a law enforcement agency and a military service?
The Coast Guard’s dual military/law enforcement status is a rare exception to posse comitatus, which requires the service to balance Title 10 and Title 14 responsibilities. In its law enforcement capacity, the Coast Guard must be judicious in its observance of legal procedures and careful to cultivate the trust of the American public. As a military service that provides critical capabilities to the Joint Force, the Coast Guard must train and equip for defense operations that demand a combat-oriented skillset and ethos. Recent events remind us of why it remains important to keep those roles distinct, even as our enemies make it ever more difficult to distinguish criminals from combatants.
Law enforcement agencies in the United States recently came under national scrutiny as a result of indications that the public is growing alarmed at the “militarization” of US police forces. The civil unrest in Ferguson, Missouri brought the issue to a head when images of local police confronting protestors while outfitted with camouflage uniforms, heavy body armor, and assault rifles streamed across major media outlets with the effect of further escalating the already volatile situation. The controversy over police wielding military-grade equipment elicited a promise for Congressional review by the Senate Armed Services Committee and a personal letter from House Armed Service Committee member Duncan Hunter to Defense Secretary Hagel encouraging a formal review of a federal program that allows DoD to transfer excess military equipment to police forces.
This latest outcry reminds us of an inexorable truth: free societies tend to vacillate about their desire for security. From Athenians condemning Themistocles to exile after the Persian menace waned, to the widespread vilification of the Patriot Act within the US only a few years after its near-unanimous passage, history demonstrates a consistent pattern wherein an existential threat will motivate the populace to demand greater security from their government, only to later denounce those same security measures once the threat appears to dissipate.
For the US Coast Guard, the recent backlash against militarized police is cause for reflection. The Coast Guard relies on a high degree of public confidence to maintain its dual status as both a law enforcement and military organization. Any erosion of that confidence compromises its ability to fulfill its diverse mission set. Yet there can be little doubt that it has adopted a much more overtly military appearance in recent years. The twin catalysts of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina produced major organizational changes in the service’s missions, capabilities, and identity. The most readily-apparent difference is the enhanced security posture the service adopted to mitigate the terrorist threat to the homeland. The Coast Guard added Maritime Safety and Security Teams and a Maritime Security Response Team, and aligned itself closer to the Department of Defense both for Homeland Defense missions and contingency operations abroad. Coast Guard response boats patrol our waterways with crew-served weapons mounted, armed Coast Guard helicopters circle the Capitol daily, and Coast Guardsmen perform a variety of maritime security missions in SWAT-like tactical gear. The result is that the Coast Guard’s public image has evolved from a primarily humanitarian, life-saving and law-enforcement service that performs a combat role in time of war, to one that remains all of those things, but also wields distinctly-military capabilities close to home and in full view of the American public.
So far, the Coast Guard has not been subjected to the condemnation currently being heaped upon other domestic law enforcement agencies. However, with public confidence in government nearing an all-time nadir and many Americans weary of war abroad and enhanced security measures at home, the service must consider how it will continue to balance its domestic security responsibilities with its humanitarian and law enforcement missions.
That balance promises to grow ever more difficult in the future. Once-clear lines separating criminals from terrorists and military forces are blurring into amorphous inter-dependent networks labeled simply “irregular threats.” Confronting irregular threats and irregular warfare (CIC/IW) garners a lot of attention within DoD, but its ambiguous nature frustrates attempts to frame a consistent interpretation of where such threats transition from a law enforcement to a military responsibility. The Coast Guard seems ideally suited for taking a lead role in the CIC/IW mission due to its statutory authority and operational capability to act in both capacities, but there is risk to that approach because American principles have historically required maintaining a bright line between the two. The challenge for the Coast Guard will be determining how best to leverage the authorities and capabilities that make it well-adapted for CIC/IW, while remaining within legal boundaries and out of the crosshairs of public condemnation. Equally challenging will be preserving the service’s humanitarian reputation (critical for gaining access to regions wary of US military presence) while some Coast Guard sub-communities evolve to more closely resemble their DoD brethren.
Relaxing the Coast Guard’s domestic security posture is certainly not the right answer. Doing so would be a gross abdication of its homeland security responsibility. Many will recall that the modal conclusion that emerged from numerous post-9/11 “how did this happen?” tribunals was that the clues were there that should have alerted us to improve our security measures, but for a variety of reasons we choose not to. The universal vow that followed was “never again.” Thirteen years hence, we are perhaps reaping the consequences of our own success (at great cost and sacrifice that few fully comprehend) in preventing another major attack on the homeland. To many, the threat is simply not salient enough anymore to justify remaining loaded for bear on the homefront. Yet compared to the current security environment, the decade leading up to 9/11 seems like a halcyon era of relative tranquility. Bin Laden is dead, but that fact is little solace amidst the unraveling of Iraq and Syria, rampant narco-violence throughout the Western hemisphere, sophisticated horizontal weapons proliferation to non-state actors, and technical accelerators that are producing dangerous new capabilities available for commercial consumption. At no time in the nation’s history has “semper paratus” demanded a higher degree of readiness from its Coast Guard.
So how does the Coast Guard maintain necessary readiness without triggering the ire of a war and security-weary public?
Foremost, it must have a convincing strategic narrative that informs the public why an assertively-postured Coast Guard is in their best interest. That narrative needs to clearly detail the nature and magnitude of the threat, what capabilities the Coast Guard needs to confront that threat, and why the Coast Guard’s enhanced domestic readiness does not undermine American civil liberties or detract from its humanitarian missions.
The Coast Guard has done pretty well in this respect so far. The avuncular “Smokies of the Sea” image from the 80s and 90s evolved into “America’s Maritime Guardian” and the “Shield of Freedom” images after 9/11. Media coverage of the service during the Hurricane Katrina response and on popular television shows such as Coast Guard Alaska and Miami help to educate the public on the breadth of the missions that the Coast Guard performs. But more work remains. Evolving attitudes toward issues that the Coast Guard is directly involved with promise to invite more scrutiny into how and why the Coast Guard performs some missions. For example, how does growing support for legalization of certain drugs affect the cost/benefit calculation of further prosecuting the drug war and the related threats posed by narco-terrorism? Does it continue to justify, for example, employing airborne use of force against non-compliant drug smugglers? What about illegal immigration? Those and other missions will certainly come under scrutiny in the future and the Coast Guard must be ready to justify its policies. The best way to maintain support for robust interdiction capabilities is to reinforce their importance to maritime security and conduct them with irreproachable skill and professionalism.
Communicating a clear strategic narrative is not just for public consumption. The Coast Guard needs to internalize it as well. Coast Guardsmen need to understand the precarious balance that their unique status demands and why that requires going out of their way to avoid any instance of excessive force or unwarranted intimidation. That obligation is nothing new. The same guidance traces back to a passage from a letter written in 1791 by Alexander Hamilton to commanding officers of the Revenue Cutter Service (predecessor to the Coast Guard) that remains required reading for all Coast Guard law enforcement personnel:
“They will always keep in mind that their countrymen are freemen, and, as such, are impatient of everything that bears the least mark of a domineering spirit. They will, therefore, refrain, with the most guarded circumspection, from whatever has the semblance of haughtiness, rudeness, or insult. If obstacles occur, they will remember that they are under the particular protection of the laws and that they can meet with nothing disagreeable in the execution of their duty which these will not severely reprehend. This reflection, and a regard to the good of the service, will prevent, at all times a spirit of irritation or resentment. They will endeavor to overcome difficulties, if any are experienced, by a cool and temperate perseverance in their duty–by address and moderation, rather than by vehemence or violence.”
However simple that passage might appear, it may at times prove difficult in practice. Law enforcement and combat require very different mindsets and training approaches, even if some of the missions and capabilities overlap. The potential conflict between developing a resilient “combat ready” mentality that facilitates effective action under fire and ingraining restraint and humanitarian sensitivity was highlighted in the “Kill Company” case study, and explored in Lt. Col David Grossman’s book On Combat. “Cool and temperate perseverance” is appropriate in the course of normal operations, but reacting to a situation that suddenly changes from law enforcement use of force to rules of engagement (such as happened here and here), or homeland defense such as interdicting an inbound terrorist attack, requires the ability to instantly shift mental gears. Because of the diversity of Coast Guard missions and unpredictability of the threat environment, Coast Guardsmen must be ready to instantly transition from one extreme to the other.
The challenge remains to further refine the Coast Guard’s strategic narrative in what promises to be a tumultuous future. The Coast Guard must remain an outstretched hand that saves and a clenched fist that defends; a conscientious maritime constable and a combat-ready naval force. In looking for an effective narrative to emulate, it would be difficult to find one better than the 2003 “All Hands” that General Mattis sent his Marines on the eve of Operation Iraqi Freedom. His succinct, three-paragraph message concluded with “Demonstrate to the world there is ‘no better friend, no worse enemy’ than a U.S. Marine.” Guided by a similar maxim, the Coast Guard will ensure that the public it protects continues to feel reassured, not threatened by its presence, while those who seek to perpetrate violence or criminality at sea can count on a formidable and ready “maritime guardian” standing by to oppose them.
In the August issue of Proceedings, Commander Darcie Cunningham, USCG complains about the personality traits brought to the naval service by millennials and gives advice on how to better assimilate them into the ranks [For other responses to the article see here and here]. I find the article incredibly condescending and patronizing with a hint of fear of impending irrelevance in a world that the Commander does not want to see change. Unfortunately, we do not have the luxury of remaining stagnant. The world is continuously changing. Our great nation is continuously changing. Our long tradition of citizen soldiers demands that we change with it.
I currently serve on a multi-generational crew with a hearty presence from generation X (those born between the early 1960s to 1980). They have stood a solid watch and I firmly respect how their service strengthened American seapower, but they are less dynamic than the current generation. They cling to inefficient means of communication and are more concerned with “work ethic” than the quality of product produced. This generation has me questioning how they can adapt in today’s rapidly changing world.
Here are some of their behaviors I have noticed:
• While the younger generation is more concerned with quality product, the older generation views a correlation with performance and hours worked. Given the same quality of results, they see laziness and a lack of dedication instead of efficiency.
• Along the same lines as correlating product with hours worked, they also would much rather see a more experienced individual be promoted over one vastly more skilled and qualified. They view accelerated advancement as an affront to their culture of advancement through keeping their head down and staying out of trouble. To them it is much better to be cautious and safe than tenacious and bold.
• They do not understand the need for the younger generation to know the basis behind requirements. The younger generations sees power through knowledge and asks why in hopes of finding a way to improve the status quo. The older generation is more apt to simply accept the way things have always been and can devolve to a frustrated “because I said so,” when asked for an explanation from subordinates.
Whether the older generation likes it or not, millennials are currently leaders within our organization. We are serving with discipline and dedication equal to those who have come before us, but we are doing it our own way. We will continue to preserve the liberties this country enjoys. So how does the structured military culture adapt to our new generation?
First, we must educate them on the benefits of promoting based on merit and not time in grade. The current antiquated system lets more competent individuals await their turn while they watch the less skilled continued to advance once it is their time to promote. If this merit-based promotion idea does not sit well with some members of the older generation, perhaps it is a subtle concern that they needed a time-based system to make it as far as they did. Job satisfaction should be the motivator for retention, not scare tactics of a poor economy and poor unemployment rate.
They need to be “course-corrected” that a desire to understand the basis for requirements and wanting to improve how we do things are NOT insubordination or disrespect. If this does not happen, our best will continue to be driven out and the military will remain a carbon copy of what it looks like now. Once we stop adapting we will most surely become irrelevant. The only way we can improve is if we ask if there is a better way and have an open and honest discussion about it. Progress has always been seen as a threat to the present. It takes courage to move forward as an organization.
I am very appreciative the older generation of senior leaders made sure the United States continues to rule the seas. They did an amazing job and they all deserve our thanks and respect. Their way of doing business worked, but previous performance does not guarantee future success. There are sure to be aspects of the current way of doing business and we should figure out what those are, but blindly maintaining the status quo is a sure way to fail.
Is the profession of arms, as the Navy believes it is, primarily a technical job for officers – or is it something else?
To create the cadre of leaders one needs, do you train them as empty vessels that one only needs to fill up with what you want or an empty checklist to complete – or do you train them by helping them bring out their ability to lead and make decisions through informed critical thinking?
Our guest for the full hour to discuss this and more will be Major Matt Cavanaugh, USA. Matt is currently assigned as an Assistant Professor in military strategy at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.
Prior to this assignment, Matt was a Strategic Planner at the Pentagon, after service with the with Second Squadron, Third Armored Cavalry Regiment with multiple deployments to Iraq from Fallujah, Ramadi, and Tal’Afar.
Matt earned his Master’s in Strategic Studies at Victoria University in Wellington, New Zealand and is currently at work on a PhD dissertation on generalship at the University of Reading (UK). He is a Fellow at the Center for the Study of Civil Military Operations, has been published with several peer-reviewed military and academic journals, and is the Editor at WarCouncil.org, a site dedicated to the study of the use of force. Matt has represented the United States in an official capacity in ten countries, including: Iraq, Kuwait, Norway, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Latvia, and Great Britain.
Matt is the author of the blog essays Ten Questions West Point Does Not Ask Cadets – But Should, Another Ten Questions West Point Does Not Ask Cadets – But Should, and What Cadets Should Study – and Why Military History is Not Enough.
Join us live at 5pm (U.S. EDT) on Sunday, 29 June 2014 or pick up the show later by clicking here.
Since WWII, have we developed an officer corps that has not only developed a record of defeat, but has become comfortable with it?
Is our military leadership structurally unsound?
In his recent article, An Officer Corps That Can’t Score, author William S. Lind makes a scathing indictment of the officer corp of the United States in from the structure is works in, to its cultural and intellectual habits.
We will have the author with us for the full hour to discuss this and more about what problem he sees with our military’s officers, and what recommendations he has to make it better.
Mr Lind is Director of the Center for Cultural Conservatism at the Free Congress Foundation, with degrees from Dartmouth College in 1969 and Princeton University.
He worked as a legislative aide for armed services for Senator Robert Taft, Jr. and Senator Gary Hart until joining the Free Congress Foundation in 1987.
Mr. Lind is author of the Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Westview Press, 1985); co-author, with Gary Hart, of America Can Win: The Case for Military Reform (Adler & Adler, 1986); and co-author, with William H. Marshner, of Cultural Conservatism: Toward a New National Agenda (Free Congress Foundation, 1987).
Mr. Lind co-authored the prescient article, “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” which was published in The Marine Corps Gazette in October, 1989 and which first propounded the concept of “Fourth Generation War.”
Join us live at 5 pm EDT if you can or pick the show up for later listening by clicking here .
The famous polar explorer Richard Byrd once said, “As long as any part of the world remains obscure, the curiosity of man must draw him there, as the lodestone draws the mariner’s needle, until he comprehends its secret.”1
The Coast Guard has a long history of operating in the Arctic spanning from the purchase of Alaska to present day. In 1867 the Revenue Cutter LINCOLN was deployed to Alaskan waters to gain understanding of the newly acquired territory initiating a Coast Guard tradition of Arctic exploration.
Coast Guard icebreakers have supported scientific research in both the Arctic and Antarctic for decades and Coast Guard Cutters HEALY and POLAR STAR proudly continue this legacy. Recently Coast Guard Air Station Kodiak, under the 17th Coast Guard District, came into the fold and began providing a platform of opportunity for various members of the scientific community in the form of the HC-130H Hercules. With the increase in focus on the Arctic, the need to understand this foreboding region and to further the efforts to do so have never been greater. It is in the best interest of the country, in line with national, defense and Coast Guard strategic objectives, and necessary to ensure long term success of the Coast Guard, to support scientific research in the Arctic.
The Beginning of Coast Guard Arctic Domain Awareness Flights
Coast Guard Air Station Kodiak began conducting Arctic Domain Awareness (ADA) missions in 2007. The original intent was to increase U.S. and Coast Guard presence in the Arctic via the HC-130H Hercules while simultaneously exposing aircrews to the challenges and intricacies of operating in this high-latitude environment. The earliest missions were relatively simple, if any operation in the Arctic can be labeled as such, flying the Alaska coastline, noting strategic airfields and geographic points along the way. There were, however, missions of higher visibility such as the October 2007 flight to the North Pole and gradually they evolved to encompass numerous objectives including scientific support.
In 2008, University of Washington scientists, many of whom had worked extensively from Coast Guard icebreakers in the past, reached out to the Coast Guard 17th District and Air Station Kodiak to investigate the feasibility of deploying a series of data collecting buoys from the ADA flights for the interagency-sponsored International Arctic Buoy Program (IABBP). With keen foresight the 17th District supported this request and in 2009 the first delivery of an Airborne eXpendable Ice Beacon (AXIB) by a Coast Guard HC-130H was accomplished.
The deployment of this automated floating weather station, which transmits its data through the Iridium satellite communications system for years at a time, initiated a burgeoning partnership and marked the beginning of a new Arctic exploration opportunity for the scientific community.
The Growing Need for Arctic Accessibility for the Scientific Community
The current National Strategy for the Arctic Region states that, “Vast areas of the Arctic Ocean are unexplored, and we lack much of the basic knowledge necessary to understand and address Arctic issues. The changes in the Arctic cannot be understood in isolation and must be viewed in a global context.”2
Furthermore the Coast Guard’s Arctic Strategy, released in May of 2013 describes the need to “assist government-sponsored scientific exploration to develop a greater understanding of the changing Arctic environment”3
These statements highlight the fact that there is a significant amount about the Arctic that is unknown, and science is working to keep up with this changing environment.
“Every year the Arctic sea ice cover expands during the fall, winter and spring to a maximum extent essentially covering the whole Arctic Ocean. Over the summer, it retracts to a minimum in September. The most remarkable aspect of Arctic environmental change is that the minimum (September) extent has declined faster than climate models predict over the last two decades, reaching a new record minimum in 2012,”4 said Dr. James Morison, principal investigator of the Seasonal Ice Zone Reconnaissance Survey (SIZRS) project.
The explanation for this observed extra-rapid decline is a critical scientific question. The absence or presence of ice in any particular place in the Arctic is controlled by two different factors, thermodynamics and the kinetic effects of wind and sea currents. Measuring these two factors has become increasingly essential for answering that question. The balance of these two factors form the base of much of the scientific exploration of the Arctic, but the way in which they do or do not work together has a great effect on ice extent. If a major storm event forces ice out of the Arctic Basin, the greater amount of exposed, open water present allows more solar radiation to be absorbed into the sea rather than being reflected off a frozen surface. This added heat melts more ice from below creating more open water in a vicious cycle termed ice-albedo feedback. Further, the reduction in ice thickness and coverage makes the ice more responsive to the wind and more wind energy that is converted into wave action, which can further break up the ice. It is also theorized that the increase in ocean heat can affect the growth of ice well into the next year.
The increasing sea ice retreat in the summer increases the potential for ship transport and offshore resource exploitation off the coast of Alaska, and this increases the need for better predictions of ice conditions in the seasonal ice zone. The quality of these model-based predictions is critically dependent on knowing the initial conditions at the beginning of the melt season. However, the vast bulk of measurements are made in late August and September when conditions allow traditional icebreaker operations. This limit precludes surface-based observations in the critical May-June timeframe. According to Dr. Morison,
“Only ocean sections with aircraft expendable probes and buoys beginning in May or June repeated throughout the melt season can give the information we need to understand and ultimately predict the evolution of the seasonal ice zone.”5
Coast Guard Hercs Answer the Call
Building on early successes, ties with the University of Washington and the Coast Guard through Air Station Kodiak have grown increasingly intertwined. The number of missions has expanded dramatically from one or two in the first test years to nine missions in 2013. To date five research sensors are deployed by Kodiak based Hercules crews.
The previously mentioned AXIB and the Upper Temperature of the Ocean (UpTempO) are buoys that are designed to survive for months at a time sending vital data on the atmospheric and ocean via satellite. The Aircraft Expendable Conductivity Temperature Depth (AXCTD) and Aircraft Expendable Current Profiler (AXCP) are probes that are deployed in leads in the ice at strategic stations in the Beaufort Sea and radio back to receivers on the aircraft information on the water’s temperature, salinity and current down to a depth of 1000 meters. The DropSonde measures atmospheric condition as it drops through the air column from an altitude of 10,000 feet.
Concurrently in 2009 Air Station Kodiak began supporting an inter-government partnership with NOAA’s Global Monitoring Division working on their Carbon Cycle Greenhouse Gasses (CCGG) aircraft project. This mission is also supported by the ADA mission flights and consists both real-time measurements of methane, carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide and ozone as well as flask samples that are sent back to Boulder, CO where the NOAA’s CCGG group is based. The primary goal of these aircraft-based measurements is to understand how the large changes observed in the Arctic climate impact emissions of these gases in the Arctic. In particular the NOAA’s CCGG group is most interested in documenting changes in emissions of methane and carbon. As with the ice-albedo feedback, enhanced methane or carbon dioxide emissions with a warmer climate would result in more warming because both methane and carbon dioxide are strong greenhouse gases. Although some studies have suggested methane emissions are increasing with warmer climates current measurements of methane in the Arctic by NOAA have not confirmed this.
By measuring different trace gasses NOAA hopes to link measured gas concentrations to natural and anthropogenic processes. For example if a high concentration of methane is recorded the scientists can use the presence or absence of other gases such propane or ethane to determine if of the release was due to thawing permafrost or thermogic processes like natural gas leaks that will also have large amounts of ethane and propane. There are a plethora of different processes that affect the gas concentrations in the atmosphere. These need to be studied and understood before trends and baselines can be established and before a declaration of change can be made. Air Station Kodiak’s ADA flights are providing the data needed to model these.
“The ADA mission is a great opportunity to monitor what is happening in Alaska. Flights on Coast Guard HC-130H aircraft have given us access to multiple regions of Alaska, all reacting in different ways to the changing climate. Flying from March to November gives us a good snapshot of the entire seasonal cycle for [critical regions that are represented throughout] the Arctic,”6 said Dr. Colm Sweeney, head of the Global Monitoring Division’s CCGG Aircraft Program.
This diversity of measuring equipment provides a large, effectively simultaneous picture of conditions over a desired locale in the Arctic. A typical ADA mission might see the deployment of an ocean going buoy followed by AXCTD, AXCP and DropSonde deliveries along a longitudinal line at up to six different stations along with taking the standard 24 CCGG air samples. Shift this effort 10 degrees of longitude on the following day’s mission and an equivalent amount of data was collected to an entire ship-based expedition requiring weeks. And it can be done months before sea ice conditions allow the first research icebreakers on the scene. Combine this unparalleled collecting ability with the fact that Hercules flights are feasible from early March to November and suddenly the Coast Guard is in a position to facilitate unprecedented understanding of the Arctic environment.
Payoff for the Coast Guard
It is widely accepted that with the retreat of Arctic ice will come increased commercial vessel activity taking opportunity of beneficial sea routes, newly exposed resources and a growing tourism market. September 2012 marked the least extent of sea ice in recorded memory.7 Only four vessels utilized the Northern Sea Route in 2010, but 2012 saw 46 transits.8 Moreover, increased oil exploration drilling is scheduled to begin as early as summer of 2014. The Coast Guard will be required to increase capability and presence in order to respond future operational needs. This need is rapidly approaching and operators are facing unpredictable conditions. As any aviator or mariner knows it will be absolutely vital for crews to have accurate environmental and weather forecasts in order to safely complete a myriad of possible missions.
One of the most vital will be the ability to predict the ice edge. The National Ocean Policy Implementation Plan states:
“Sea ice forecasting is one of the most urgent and timely issues in the Arctic region. To ensure the best tactical and long-term ice forecasts are available for safe operations and planning, Federal agencies will work together to better quantify the rates of sea ice melt and regrowth, understand shifting patterns of distribution of ice, develop better maps of the ice edge, expand participation in the sea ice observation program, and coordinate with international partners to enable better model-based forecasting over larger areas. Improved observations will contribute to improved forecasts, which will better inform Arctic maritime safety and security activities.”9
The ability to understand a shifting ice edge will enable planners to adjust the Coast Guard’s Arctic posture for each season accordingly.
Having accurate forecasts of the weather and sea state will be important in responding to incidents such as search and rescue cases and oil spills. The ability to predict conditions in the marine domain is listed as one of the top research priorities for the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) Joint Subcommittee on Ocean Science and Technology. In its Ocean Research and Implementation Plan this is highlighted: “Enhancing environmental observation, characterization, and forecasting of ocean and waterway conditions (e.g., currents, turbidity, surface waves, sea-ice extent, lake levels, biogeochemical conditions) across the global ocean is necessary for safe and efficient marine operations.”10
With the increase in commercial activity already outpacing the Arctic modelers the Coast Guard is faced with operating in an area without the benefits of these accurate forecasts. Furthermore, increased awareness will not only aid operationally the Coast Guard’s Arctic efforts but will assist in the modernization of Arctic governance, a mainstay of Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Robert Papp’s Arctic strategy.
By providing stalwart support of this scientific effort the Coast Guard is poised to be amongst the first to benefit from the coming revelations, ultimately increasing the service’s effectiveness at carrying out its 11 statutory missions.
The U.S. is an Arctic nation and this is a role that can neither be shirked nor ignored. It is vital that the nation and its agencies embrace this status and become a leading figure as Arctic development takes a frontal position on the international stage. Supporting scientific research in the Arctic is undoubtedly essential and in line with national priorities. The president has outlined in his National Ocean Policy that greater scientific understanding with respect to Arctic environmental conditions must be obtained.11 The National Security Strategy of May 2010 aligns with this policy by directing U.S. support of scientific research in the Arctic.12 Admiral Papp’s vision has clearly placed the Coast Guard as leader in the advancement of U.S. national interests in Arctic waters. Air Station Kodiak and its intrepid Hercules crews are spearheading this effort with support from the 17th District. The relationships and partnerships within the scientific community that Air Station Kodiak has meticulously cultivated could forever change the understanding of the Arctic. Every piece of new data collected will further the nation’s, and by extension the world’s, ability to see with clarity the Arctic environment and the impact it may have on us all.
“HOOVER PRESENTS SPECIAL MEDAL TO BYRD AS CLIMAX OF THE CAPITAL’S WELCOME; CROWDS CHEER HIM, CONGRESS PAYS HONOR” THE NEW YORK TIMES, New York City, June 21, 1930 ↩
Interview with Dr. James Morison, University of Washington, 13 September 2013 ↩
Interview with Dr. James Morison, University of Washington, 13 September 2013 ↩
Interview with Dr. Colm Sweeny,National Oceonographic and Atmospheric Association, 2 October 2013 ↩
National Ocean Council, National Ocean Policy Implementation Plan. Apr. 2013. Pg 27 ↩
“National Security Strategy”, May 2010, The White House, Washington, DC, pg. 50. ↩
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