How did the United States Navy achieve victory at Midway and turn the tide in the Pacific so early in World War II? An anthology from the Naval Institute Press shows the answer: Sailor ingenuity, science and skill blended with Nimitz’s wisdom and determination — along with some luck.

Other factors contributed, including miscalculations and overconfidence of Imperial Japan, whose military leaders were set on taking out “Hawaii’s sentry,” Midway Atoll. But fortune favored many of the U.S. carrier aviators who fatally damaged three enemy carriers, writes John B. Lundstrom in historian Thomas C. Hone’s “The Battle of Midway: The Naval Institute Guide to the U.S. Navy’s Greatest Victory.” Imperial Japan would lose four carriers that attacked Pearl Harbor and more than 100 of its aviators.

Lundstrom notes, “The actual sequence of events was stranger than anyone could have imagined; as [Rear Adm. Murr] Arnold wrote in 1965, it was ‘the most god-awful luckiest coordinated attack.'”

BOMcoverHone-battle-of-midwayIn “The Battle of Midway” editor Hone brings together a gifted roster of writers and leaders including Craig L. Symonds, E.B. Potter, James Schlesinger, Adm. Raymond A. Spruance, Rear Adm. Edwin T. Layton, Elliot Carlson, Mitsuo Fuchida, Masatake Okumiya, Lundstrom and Mark R. Peattie, among others.

Throughout this book of mostly essays written over a span of seven decades, Hone adds context and analysis. In his introduction to Chapter 9, “Prelude to Midway,” he explains Imperial Japan’s motive for the attack.

“The Midway operation had two central objectives. The first and more limited one was the seizure of Midway as an advance air base to facilitate early detection of enemy carrier forces operating toward the homeland from Hawaii, with the attack on the Aleutians as a diversion … The second, much broader objective was to draw out what was left of the United States Pacific Fleet so that it could be engaged and destroyed in decisive battle. Were these objectives achieved, the invasion of Hawaii itself would become possible, if not easy.”

Hone’s “The Battle of Midway” opens with Part I, which explores Nagumo’s kido butai (air fleet), presents Admiral Yamamoto from a Japanese perspective, and shows why Imperial Japan’s carrier pilots were so skilled in the first year of the war with the U.S. Navy; it was because they had already gained experience in the previous decade in China. Part II is titled “Approach to Midway” and includes a brief but powerful piece from Proceedings, “Lest We Forget: Civilian Yard Workers,” by Lt. Cmdr. Thomas J. Cutler, USN (ret.). Cutler is author of “Bluejacket’s Manual,” “A Sailor’s History of the U.S. Navy” and numerous other books.

Part III, “The Battle,” recounts the battle Kurosawa-like, from different angles and viewpoints including several from an Imperial Japanese perspective. “I Sank the Yorktown at Midway,” by Yahachi Tanabe and Joseph D. Harrington, is one provocative title. Parts IV and V deal with the aftermath of the battle, its finale and the official report by Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Part VI of “The Battle of Midway” explores the personalities, strategies and relationships of the commanders: Nimitz, Spruance, Nagumo, Yamato, Fletcher and Mitscher. Part VII shows how code-breaking helped provide some of the “god-awful luck” that gave U.S. Navy the edge against the enemy fleet. Editor Hone leads with an analysis of the complicated state of affairs with regard to code-breaking, and he includes an excerpt from Elliot Carlson’s excellent “Joe Rochefort’s War: The Odyssey of the Codebraker Who Outwitted Yamamoto at Midway.”


Hone’s book concludes with Part VIII “Assessments of the Battle” and appendixes, including the USS Enterprise Action Report and Spruance’s Letter to Fletcher of June 8, 1942.

The source materials, oral histories, chronologies and analysis in “The Battle of Midway” make this book a compelling overview of the heroic battle while leaving some mysteries, fog-of-war questions, and the impact of luck as still part of the story and lessons of Midway.

An extended version of this post appears on Doughty’s Navy Reads blog, along with a recent review of Robert D. Kaplan’s “Revenge of Geography.”

Posted by Bill Doughty in Aviation, Books, Cyber, Hard Power, History, Navy

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  • 203HornetBall

    If the book fails to mention Hornet CAG Ring’s (and Mitscher’s) faulty execution of the initial strike, then it’s a waste of time. USN only won because of VT-8 CO Waldron’s illegal turn to the SW (THANK GOD). If you have to mutiny to win the battle, what does that say about the leaders? Mrazek’s book A Dawn Like Thunder covers it well.

  • 203HornetBall

    Calling it “initiative” was a technique used to cover up CAG Ring’s (and Mitschner’s) culpability afterward. Read the book (and the documented statements). Eyewitnesses said Waldron objected to many aspects of the plan prior to launch. En route CAG ordered him to stay in formation (vertically separated but together). He left anyway, with CAG’s voice ringing in his ears.
    Disobeying a direct verbal order, during combat, is “initiative”? As Inigo Montoya might say; I do not think that word means what you think it means.
    The rump covering afterwards was sad (required reports not submitted, selective editing by staff, etc.) and deadly (pilots down in areas not searched). Waldron’s mutiny changed the war, but they couldn’t admit it. They put their reputation ahead of the facts – again sad.
    Too bad he didn’t have Gay’s luck. That would have been a debrief for the ages!

  • BlackArrow

    I have been researching Midway for a game design, and it seems to me there were unexplored technical and tactical potentials.

    What if at least some of the B-17s hadn’t dumped all their bombs all at once (futilely, from high altitude) and had instead left a 4-plane detachment with the Japanese to monitor their position and disrupt their flight operations by dropping one bomb at a time?

    What if the four B-26s had carried bombs instead and attacked in the 353 mph maximum power dives they were capable of?

    What alternative uses of presentday equipment and differing tactical methods could creative officers come up with, with what they have?

    Lou Coatney