“Let us dare to read, think, speak, and write.”
-President John Adams

If John Adams were a junior officer in the Navy today, his admonition to his fellow officers might read something like this:

Let us [not] dare to read [lest my own beliefs be challenged], think [lest my perceived truths be shown as falsehoods] , speak [lest my commanding officer notice me], and write [lest my FITREP result in an MP].

As junior officers, we recognize this attitude in ourselves, our peers, and our superiors. Yet if today’s junior officer is to have any lasting legacy on the Navy or Marine Corps, it will be by recognizing and acting upon an essential truth:

The health of the service is more important than your career.

We need junior officers willing to stick their necks out and write. Our service and our country are dealing with serious challenges, many of which may have non-traditional solutions. This generation of junior officers will be judged for our courage to stand up and work to solve those problems. The nation can no longer afford our silence.

Our Past

At the turn of the 20th century, a young naval gunnery officer couldn’t get anybody to listen to his revolutionary ideas on gunnery. Unwilling to be silenced, he stuck his neck out. In what he later termed “the rankest kind of insubordination,” he wrote a letter to President Theodore Roosevelt. This young officer, William Sims, would later use the pages of Proceedings to challenge his peers to be wary of the dangers of a lack of innovation or honest introspection, asking, “which of us will be quoted in the future as example of dangerous conservatism?”

In 1894, another author wrote scathingly about the lack of introspection in the British Empire’s naval culture. The parallels to today are striking: the world’s dominant maritime power for three generations, unchallenged in might but facing an increasingly complex and globalized world. Entitled “The Children of Nelson” and reprinted in the pages of Proceedings, the article lambasts British naval leadership, saying:

“The Admiralty … sternly refuses to permit junior officers to write or speak on questions of speculative strategy and other subjects which involve neither criticism of things that are, nor betrayal of official secrets. Junior officers are thus restrained in their usefulness and discouraged in their legitimate professional ambitions; and the impression has taken root amongst them that the man who endeavors to elbow his way out of the crowd, to bring forward a new theory, or to do any kind of serviceable work beyond the minimum which his position requires of him, is a fool for his pains… Thus discouraged on all hands, the British naval officer, with a few brilliant exceptions, resigns himself to living and moving in deep and well-worn grooves. He thinks little; he speculates less; he almost fails to realize, save in a dull and general way, that some day the storm of battle will again rage around him, and that he will be expected, by an unreasonable country, to repeat the triumphs of his ancestors.”

One hundred years later, the US Navy seems to have institutionalized and incentivized intellectual conformity in both strategy and policy through a culture that discourages professional intellectual dissent in favor of promotability. Navy Captain Jay Avella said it best in 1997 when he wrote, again in Proceedings, that the problem, “is about the culture change that seems to be pervading the sea service—a change that says, ‘don’t rock the boat, it will cost you your career.’”

The US Navy is in a perplexing situation: we pay lip service to buzzwords such as “innovation” and “transformation,” but will only act if ideas don’t upset entrenched interests or institutional inertia. Nevertheless, junior officers today are the scions of generations of transformative men and women who came before us—those like Mahan, Sims, and countless others. These officers never accepted the status quo just because “it’s the way we’ve always done things.”

As organizations such as naval aviation’s Tailhook Association prepare to name 2015 the “Year of the Junior Officer,” it is important for the thousands of junior officers in the Navy and Marine Corps to engage in some serious introspection. What will be our enduring mark on our service?

Our Present

From a rank and file perspective, junior officers can drive change in their divisions and departments, and if lucky with supportive commanding officers, within their ships, submarines and squadrons. But what ultimately set Sims apart from many junior officers who have driven innovation on the deckplates was that he wrote about it. Had Sims not put pen to paper, unrelentingly, institutional change might never have happened. Today, we must pick up our tablets and laptops, just as those before picked up their pens and typewriters, and write, regardless of the pressures on our careers.

There is a disturbing trend among some that equates intellectual dissent with outright insubordination and disrespect. One recent Proceedings article went so far as to suggest that today’s millennial generation is derelict in their adherence to time-honored naval customs and courtesies, simply for asking “Why?” This belief blithely ignores examples like William Sims, that show us one of the most time-honored naval traditions is that of innovation driven by the junior officer ranks challenging the status quo.

Again, this sentiment is not new; one need only consult Alfred Thayer Mahan’s FITREPs to appreciate its longevity. CDR Rich LeBron, Commanding Officer of the USS Benfold, put it this way: “In this vertically stratified setting, the boss can find isolation behind the closed door of authority and good ideas can be transmuted, crushed, or simply dismissed on their way to the top as spirits and morale are driven into the ground.” Today’s navy, facing a staggering array of complex geopolitical, fiscal and technical challenges, cannot afford to keep thinking that all the answers reside with senior leadership.

Yet we cannot wholly blame a cessation of intellectual development on this entrenched culture; fault lies within the junior officer corps as well. Writing is hard, and quite often, after a long day aboard ship or in a cockpit, the last thing we wish to embark on is a quest to articulate on paper a problem and solution that we would simply prefer to move past. It forces us to defend our ideas, to take a stand, and perhaps even to be wrong. But it is a duty that lies squarely on our shoulders, and we must rise to the occasion.

At the junior officer level, we have a responsibility not just to put complaints to paper, but to constructively identify issues or highlight positives, defend our views and promulgate solutions. This improves our professional knowledge, and enables senior leadership to take their pens to paper to engage in dialogue where we can actually leverage and learn from their experience. Simultaneously, it is particularly important for naval leadership to closely examine the quality and content of their own writing, because we as junior officers look to them to provide for both context and inspiration.

Some junior officers are already making positive contributions to our great naval debates. Through projects such as the Defense Entrepreneur’s Forum (DEF), Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), and CNO’s Rapid Innovation Cell (CRIC), junior officers write, share ideas, and set the tone on issues from future ship design and innovative apps to geopolitics and strategy. Yet more is required — we must fight to forge a culture of writing without trepidation, establishing a groundswell of professional discussion in our service.

Furthermore, we do not simply need more people writing – we need more people writing about the issues that matter. Somewhere along the line, much of naval writing, even in the pages of Proceedings, has devolved to a bland party line. Writing must incorporate substance.

Importantly, we should not solely focus on writing the “next big article,” but also on inscribing in record the grassroots innovation and effective procedures observed and implemented in our divisions and squadrons. We have nearly ceased discussion of the important, often mundane issues and ideas of daily naval life: strategy, operations, tactics, and procedures. Glancing through the pages of Proceedings and similar journals, a majority of material comes from senior officers who have long since moved beyond the realities of division level maintenance and deckplate challenges. Junior officers should remember our roots and reclaim proclivity in this arena, promulgating instructive tips for our brethren and observations on daily naval operations. In the same Proceedings issue as “The Children of Nelson,” there was also an article on the relationship between barometric pressures and ocean currents, a discussion of rustless coatings, and articles on naval reform. By recording these conversations in printed word, junior officers were able to share solutions from around the fleet.

Ultimately, the Navy must be led by the constant ingenuity and engagement of its junior officers and driven by the strategic thought and innovative perseverance of its seniors. Therefore, officers of all levels must write substantive pieces of all types: the mundane but useful, the transformative, the well-founded, the controversial pieces, and we must write without fear for our careers. The currency of institutional change available to the junior officer today, just as with William Sims and Alfred Mahan, is in writing. And so, regardless of the barriers we face, write we must.

Our Future

Much has been written about the institutionalized pressure on junior officers to “get on board, or get out.” This is manifested in discussions, both in print and in individual counseling sessions, about the narrow, cookie-cutter paths to commanding officer; junior officers that deviate even slightly from “the pipeline” risk abandonment.

Many factors play into the issues of junior officer retention, and for some, the pressures to leave the service are strong. Not surprisingly, few officers want to remain in a service where “ducks pick ducks.” Success in our service often seems to be determined by how well an officer’s career mirrors the prescribed path, while intellectual curiosity gets one a pat on the head or maybe even an adverse FITREP.

Yet these challenges to us as individuals are not insurmountable. It doesn’t matter what we face: we need officers willing to stick their necks out. So what if it’s frowned upon to challenge entrenched ideas that can be improved? So what if your career may be shortened? Most of us joined to sacrifice to serve our country. Perhaps some of us may need to sacrifice our perfect FITREP for the greater good.

The kind of change needed cannot be driven from outside the service. Paradoxically, though we may feel that getting out is best for our individual careers, it is harmful to the service overall. The future of the Navy and Marine Corps will be driven by the strength of the positive insurgency forming in the junior ranks today. We must dare to think, write, and speak–and also to stay in the service, despite the financial and psychological benefits of the private sector. We must join our thoughts and words with the courage required to forge the type of leadership our Navy and Marine Corps deserve.

To be sure, there is a time and a place for opinions and disagreement. Respect must continue to be the rule of the day: respect for rank, experience, and naval culture. Junior officers must continue to master their craft, get qualified, and above all, care for their Sailors and Marines.

Likewise, our generation cannot solve these problems simply by shifting our verbal complaints to paper. We must write with substance, bring forward ideas–even contentious ones–and help each other through the writing process. How and when junior officers write is also important; even William Sims acknowledged the inappropriateness of his letter to the President. Thankfully, the commander-in-chief was able to see past Sims’ youthful follies and identify the intellectual substance present behind his actions.

But these requirements should not preclude junior officers from actively engaging in discussions on the tactics, operations, and strategies they will be called upon to execute, on the culture of the institution that we love, in support of the country that we serve. We should not wait to attend the War College or Postgraduate School to consider who we are, what we are doing, where we are going, and why. We should not allow discouraging leadership and administrative burdens to choke our Navy and muddle our Marine Corps.

Many of our brothers and sisters in arms today and in decades past have paid the ultimate price for protecting our freedoms. They sacrificed their lives in defense of this nation. We can only hope to match their dedication by being willing to put our careers on the line, to “stick our necks out,” to make the service and this country better.

Posted by LT Roger Misso & LTJG Chris O'Keefe in Innovation, Naval Institute, Navy, Proceedings, Strategy, Tactics, Training & Education

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  • David C. Meyers

    LT – LTjg!! B.Z.!! This article is like a candle flickering deep in the recess of a cave. It gives hope that maybe in tomorrow’s Navy, we will value informed dissent, contrary opinions, and a culture of intellectual discussion from all of our Officers – junior and senior. For decades now, it has been our SOP to keep quiet. There are two reasons for this I believe, the first is the fact that we fear being carefully executed on our FITREPS for not toeing the party line or for out-thinking the Boss. Most senior folks know how to make a JO feel great on a FITREP while delivering a message to a board that tells them who not to select. If anyone tells you different, they’re being disingenuous at best. The second is best explained using an old proverb: “Tis better to keep one’s mouth shut and be thought a fool, than open it and remove all doubt.” There are many, many folks who have made it above O5 and O6 by keeping their mouthes shut. Opening them reveals a lack of strategic insight, comprehension of their trade, and a passion for the Service. This is even more insidious than the “One Strike” mentality – and this is why our professional journals have been quite replete with articles citing the lack of leadership…lack of ethics…questions about senior leadership by junior personnel. If you are a hollow shell of an intellectual, you are not going to condone it – encourage it – in those beneath you.
    Please – please – keep up the effort and continue what you two are doing. The decisions being made today – will be the Navy you two live with tomorrow. If you are silent about those decisions today – don’t be moaning about them tomorrow.

    • Roger Misso

      Thanks for the comment, sir!

  • Matthew Hipple

    Word. Mic drop, gents.

  • Evan

    I keep an eye via Facebook on the institute, and am glad at least one person is willing to stand out. Myself a junior enlisted at one time, I can honestly say that officers are given far more leeway than we were. We, as members of the United States Navy past, present and future, are doomed to catastrophic failure unless we return once again to the tradition of adaptation and freedom of thought. Can anyone even tell the difference between legal and illegal orders any longer? Hardly, and for years I worked with hundreds of people at a time. Perhaps my perspective comes from the generation which raised me. Not my place to speculate that field.But as for my own time in the Service, we really need to drop the politics and pick back up the ingenuity. Semper Fortis!

  • Nic DiLeonardo

    Glad to read this. I can assure you that these same kind of pressures exerted on officers exists as well for the civilian workforce.

    • Roger Misso

      Nic…while I might ask you to just lie to me, hopefully your sentiments here will help keep more good folks in the service.

    • Matthew Hipple

      Nic, no they do not – so shut your mouth!

  • ntenghtim

    Well written. There are a lot of great thoughts here that could be explored at length, but I have just a couple of observations on the
    type of author you can be:

    The Critic: For some authors it is fun to just “take on the system.” These authors value the belief that they are in a desperate battle with an ossified bureaucracy that “doesn’t understand them” and this provides part of the motivation to write. This type of writing is always less analytic and usually provides editorial type of commentary on a current topic of interest. Writing this way can be emotionally rewarding. There is no doubt that it can be fun to take rhetorical swings at leadership and the status quo – especially if you need to just get something off your chest. Professionally there is goodness to be found here; the author will feel like they are participating in the conversation and if nothing else it helps to polish writing skills. On the downside, this is the home of oversimplification and generalization. This type of writing frequently exposes an author’s ignorance on a topic and burns bridges that may have been useful in the future. The most frequent mistake for these authors is to make unjustified value judgments about the audience. Blogs are a great place to exercise this style of feedback with little risk. When done frequently in professional forums, this where “gadflies” are born – when pursued to the extreme, this is the bridge that “trolls” live under.

    The Convincer: There are those who thoughtfully and deliberately communicate on a range of topics with the intent of initiating discussion,
    clarifying or expanding a topic, or with the desire to change the course of the Navy by a degree or so. This type of contribution tends to explain how a particular issue is affecting the author’s professional life/mission and makes a recommendation or two for leadership’s consideration. These submissions generally contain a more thorough level of analysis and are at home in professional journals, war colleges, graduate education, etc. What we do poorly as an organization is provide feedback for these authors. With very few exceptions it may seem that these submissions are “shot into the snowbank” and are never heard from again. The truth is more nuanced. Sometimes nothing happens, but frequently these articles result in emails, conversations and the development of staff products used by senior leadership. My editorial observation is that we may have become overly formulaic in the construction of these types of submissions. We constrain the length, format or narrative method because it is the editorial norm – and as a result make it tough for the emotional immediacyof some authors to be communicated. I think that Lieutenants often have a lot to contribute, but haven’t been necessarily trained to communicate effectively in a way that the chain of command recognizes – a barrier we should think about

    The Rebel: These are the authors that are dying to explain the unappreciated value of a game-changing concept that leadership just doesn’t understand. Whether it is Simms, Mitchell, Boyd or any of the other mavericks that fundamentally changed how we think and fight, these authors are the exception, not the rule. I understand that you are using an example of how writing can be effective and “change the world” but I think that you are setting the bar too high. Our military history would suggest that truly game changing concepts are few and far between and the untold story about many such rebels is the frequency with which they storm the castle and “die” in the attempt. Finally, this type of logic tends to undervalue the thousands of compelling articles, staff papers and even emails that incrementally change the organization every day.
    This brings me to my final point; writing doesn’t have to be published in Proceedings in order to change the Navy. Writing is thinking – and if you do it often enough you will find that it improves many facets of your professional life no matter what you do or where you go.

    • Roger Misso

      @ntenghtim, thanks for commenting. Very much agreed that there is a time and place for varying levels of analysis and topics. Hopefully, by encouraging peer review this year, we can ensure that JO writings well-reasoned, -researched, and -argued, regardless of venue.

      I slightly disagree with your characterization of the periodicity of “game changing ideas;” not that I can prove that they happen more frequently, but that we have no way of measuring this.

      As far as setting the bar too high, in my opinion, there is no other way to begin (or re-invigorate) a movement. We’ll go as high as the thrust vs drag allows.

      Excellent insight on learning how to write critically, earlier. Hopefully, this can come together more this year.

  • Michael Chung

    To the authors — can you link us to something you’ve written recently, as an example?

  • rotorhead1871

    1- know who your boss is—2-know what he wants 3- give it to him…until you know more than your boss or more than all your laterals, about a particular element, your written comments are for your edification rather than a thesis on how to do, what to do, when to do it and who to do it to….as a JO, your warfare specialty should be your primary focus..mine was aviation….I spent lots of time at OMD/AIMD as QA officer, and Division officer…reading and learning how actions were performed using the manuals and docs while working with the chiefs and the wrenches, I really never felt I would write a paper on the hows and whys of aircraft maintenance….very seldom did I know more than my chiefs and 1st classes on how to perform a maintenance function….luckily I got to stay in the operational ranks for pretty much my career….never did I feel the need to issue a written thesis on the way i thought things should be done….I retired after 19 yrs in the reserves and 6 active duty….

    NOW…..what are the burning issues that JO’s need to write about to change the NAVY? Please list some subject matter areas…..I am dying to know…..this article is so general in nature it is frustrating…please list the areas. it is also critical of the senior officers, but in such a general manner as to be more whining than factual…PLEASE be specific. very specific.

    • Roger Misso

      Sir, thank you for your service and your comment. This isn’t about us or our particular ideas; it is about helping JOs get published and feel like they have a voice.

      Please see the section of the article where we mention that getting qual’ed and being an expert on your platform is an absolute 100% necessity…in fact, that job never ends!

      • Chris


        For the most part, I think much of our discussion is framed along principles that find common ground with your comments. You rightly highlight some important waypoints upon which junior officers should continue to focus, and in particular bring up a few more that can add substance to the written word but also invaluable guidance for junior officers. I agree with you in many of those comments. Paraphrasing your words a bit, let me go through them: focusing on warfare areas…check. Learning as much as you can… check.

        I appreciated your frank acknowledgement of your skill level, or lack thereof, in certain technical areas. Assuming one knows more about a topic than another, is tragic hubris. Furthermore, I believe your admonition is just as valid at the highest levels of command as it is the lowest levels of the deck plate daily grind, and is one that we should be cognizant of as we go about our lives as leaders, learners, writers, and readers. Humility in thought, word, and deed must be prized and practiced, particularly as a junior officer, in every aspect of our personal and professional lives.

        However, I feel you overlooked some fundamental points about junior officers and writing.

        1) Junior officers are uniquely positioned to write about things because we can ask “why,” and we aren’t beholden to entrenched interests or programs. There are a lot of things we don’t know, and are constantly learning. Thus, we can bring a unique perspective simply by asking this simple question, and proposing new ways of doing business. They don’t have to be ultimately adopted, and I think we were quite clear on that. But an institution that doesn’t constantly question its assumptions and procedures is destined for decay and ultimate failure. That doesn’t mean change for the sake of change, it means real introspection

        2) As division officers, we quite often know more about the technical victories and innovative solutions of our sailors than any other members of the chain of command. Another key point of the article was that we as junior officers can identify positives – namely, things that have worked in our divisions, and cogently articulate them to the broader fleet. I know many sailors who have developed absolutely amazing solutions to problems that have plagued ships for years. it is our responsibility as officers to lead sailors, and part of that involves submitting awards and recognition for a job well done. But I think we should take that a step further, and that we should cogently capture those solutions that have come from the deck plates, and promulgate them to the fleet. You’re right, as a junior officer I’m probably not going to know more about that widget and how it moves than my chief. But I can write about a new way to fix it that my chief developed, particularly if I’ve heard multiple of my JO brethren griping about the same problem. The reason writing this down is important is to allow it to be distributed. The age old mantra “if you don’t write it down, it never happened” is incredibly applicable in the Navy. If it works for one division, why not get it out there to see if it works for everybody.

        3) The number of years in the navy is not necessarily directly proportional to professional competence or professional knowledge. The past and the present are rife with examples.

        Now, to your question, what should we write about? At the risk of being flippant, I say again, everything. Why? Documenting discussion is incredibly valuable to current and future generations to be able to look back and understand where we came from, where we are, and where we are going. First, take a look at the archives of Proceedings – the topics range far and wide, and provide valuable insight across all aspects of war fighting. But to be specific, and not all-inclusive:

        1) Observations on war fighting tactics, techniques and procedures. Example: LT Misso and I recently returned from deployment, and throughout the deployment we had discussions on how best to fuse certain comms circuits and organic aerial assets – information flow was a problem. Its a problem faced by every carrier strike group, and insight from the lower ranks as to how previous groups actually implemented it would have solved a lot of problems. As such, we often reinvent the wheel every deployment cycle.

        2) Technical issues, admin issues, professional issues – navigation, officer of the deck, maintenance. I already discussed the “best way to maintain the widget” example – may or may not warrant an article, but hey, if the same issue is facing a lot of folks in the fleet it just might. Or, one of my outside observations stemming from discussions with some DESRON staff members was that there is still constant churn in the establishment of watch rotations. Anecdotally, I’m pretty sure they rotated their schedule half a dozen times while on deployment. I would be really interested to see somebody tackle in print the various watch schedules, their pros, cons, and observations of effects. Sleep is a big deal, managing your people is a big deal, and a discussion of the most effective way to do that given a certain manning structure would yield huge dividends.

        3) Culture, leadership, and other squishy stuff. This is hugely important. We are not a static force, although many would have us believe so. We are constantly changing and adapting, and we need to discuss these changes. Some are good, some are bad. We need to critique our own personal leadership. I for one learned late in my first division that humility and patience can build incredible bridges. It took mentorship by chiefs, senior officers, peers, and subordinates to get me there. Its now my first piece of advice to anybody in a leadership role, and quite frankly is still need to ruthlessly be aware of. But I hope I’m a better leader for it, and I hope my JO brethren can learn from my mistakes and take this lesson to heart.

        Silence is not the answer. Complacency leads to decay. Writing, framed by humility and a questioning attitude, enables a force to remain healthy and ready for the future.

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