Hard Power

Russia and the Rebalance of Great Power: The U.S. Navy’s Role in Sea Control

With the recent graduation of the U.S. Naval Academy class of 2017, a new feeling among the newly commissioned officers has begun to surface. No longer are we fledgling plebes, unsure of our place at Academy. Nor are we youngsters, counting the days until owning cars and wearing civvies. We are no longer the second class who have just begun to realize that the Academy is only a small bay in an expansive ocean. At first, the change happened gradually throughout firstie year. The world began to seem much larger, and although many wouldn’t admit it, much more threatening. Those who thought reading the news was only a plebe rate could be found in between classes skimming through the headlines on their phones—the world was fast approaching and changing every day.

The presidential election accelerated the realization that soon we would no longer be in the protective bubble of Mother-B. The line between politics and midshipman, one that had felt quite rigid throughout the four years, began to blur. While political discussions were generally confined behind closed doors, opinionated statements began to slip in public. Unlike four years ago, the prospect of electing a new president—and commander-in-chief—had much more significance. Election Day was permeated by an atmosphere of apprehension. We had a class Commandant’s brief that night as the polling data began to come in, and as we all sat together, I thought how our lives would pivot on the outcome of the election.

As the semester progressed, the world began to feel more turbulent. It seemed that while our attention was turned to the Islamic State group, hot spots throughout the world began bubbling up and morphing into major threats. The realization that we likely would be heading into war began to grow as we entered the new year. It seemed that every day presented a new layer to an already complex operational environment. Parts of the world that rarely appeared in the media, began surfacing, and while more issues arose, it seemed resolution was a concept of a simpler past. The world was pressing in from all angles, and just when we thought tension on the global scale could increase no more, the United States launched 59 Tomahawk missiles at an airbase in Syria. The sharp reality of this action shook the country and left us wondering: are we on the brink of World War III?

The greatest threats that the U.S. is facing are often identified as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, as well as non-state actors—specifically jihadi extremist. There is no question that these nations and non-state groups pose a threat to the United States; however, I will narrow in on the threat Russia poses to the United States, specifically analyzing to what extent Russia threatens U.S. naval forces and how the we should respond to these threats. Furthermore, I would like to investigate the use of hard power, soft power, and multinational cooperation as tools to combat these threats.

Unlike the other four threats, there is more uncertainty over the threat that Russia poses. Some see Russia as a country falling from power; its economy is deteriorating, it has no resources for military modernization, and it has engaged itself in conflicts that have no clear bounds or foreseeable ends. However, Russia is a legitimate threat to our naval forces and must be treated as such.

If we consider the geography of Russia from a naval perspective, it seems almost self-evident that attempts at hard power projection would be futile. According to the CIA World Factbook, Russia is ranked third among nations for the largest coastline.[1] Much of that coastline, however, is inaccessible to open ocean, making a powerful naval fleet a challenge to deploy. For the time being, the north of Russia is restrained by the Arctic. Although this is changing, this boundary to the north prevents Russia from easily deploying naval forces via the Arctic. To the west, Russia’s only access to open ocean is through the Baltic Sea. The Baltic Sea is controlled by the Baltic countries, including Denmark, a member of NATO. The Danish Straits are the only three passages that provide access from the Baltic Sea to the North Sea. By way of controlling these chokepoints, Denmark, along with other NATO allies, can restrict Russia’s ability to deploy from its west coast.

To the south, Russia can access the Black Sea with relative ease, but it faces a chokepoint at the Bosphorus Strait. The Bosphorus Strait is controlled on both sides by Turkey, also a member of NATO. Any Russian attempts to utilize the Strait can be limited by Turkey and its allies. To gain access to the Mediterranean, Russia is endeavoring to gain control of Tartus on the coast of Syria. Control of Tartus would allow Russia to deploy to the Mediterranean more easily, and to expand their maritime power projection in Europe and North Africa. While this would produce a stronger Russian force, Russia would still be limited in open ocean transit by the Strait of Gibraltar, bounded by Spain to the north and Morocco to the South. Furthermore, the area is patrolled by Frontex, the European Union’s border and coast guard agency. This would present another chokepoint for the Russian fleet, which would be mostly impermeable should NATO and EU forces choose to make it so.

Russia’s access to open ocean in the east follows this same trend. Its Pacific Fleet is based out of Vladivostok, located on the Sea of Japan. The Sea of Japan largely is controlled by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. Access to open ocean through the southern part of the Sea of Japan could easily be restricted by Japan and South Korea, both U.S. allies. Not to mention, the United States has deployed the USS Carl Vinson (CNV-70), two destroyers, and a cruiser to the Sea of Japan, making any mal-intended attempts by the Russian Navy infeasible.

Although Russia’s navy faces geographic constraints, it is not a dormant threat. Climate change may aid the Russians in breaking through their northern restraint: the Arctic. As the rate of melting of the Arctic glaciers increases, so too does the Russian Navy in its preparation for warfare in that region. Russia currently has 40 operational icebreakers. In addition to naval power in this hostile environment, they also are training land and amphibious forces to fight on the glaciers. Meanwhile, the United States has two ice breakers and only one is operational. Russian control of the Arctic would not only mean the ability for the Russian navy to power project via this northern route, but it also would allow them to control shipping routes in the Arctic, giving them significant economic advantage. This economic edge would result in an overall stronger nation, enabling it to appropriate more money to build a more robust military to take action elsewhere in the world.

Beyond geographic factors, Russia has succeeded in power projection by controlling information and influencing foreign nations. This came to light with the U.S. presidential election, when Russia allegedly released information from the Democratic National Committee. Whether these actions changed the outcome of the election is left to conjecture; however, what is undeniable are the psychological effects this continues to have on U.S. sentiment. It leaves Americans questioning the validity of our political figures and calls us to question the unseen influences at play in our government. This, in turn, plays into a self-fulfilling prophecy that—once a relic of the Cold War—may becoming even truer today. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was the paramount threat to the United States. The “Red Scare” swept through the nation and left many of that generation permanently predisposed to viewing Russia with a level of mistrust. As the following generations grew, influenced by those who lived through the Red Scare, they instinctually viewed Russia as a threat. Now, since Russia has been viewed as a threat by multiple generations, it has developed into a greater threat. Its perceived aggressive demeanor toward the United States will only be exacerbated by cyber warfare in the coming years.

While Americans may feel a residual apprehension of Russia due to its unpredictability, the international community is much more positively engaged with the United States, as it uses soft power more readily and effectively than Russia. Particularly, the United States is much more active in providing humanitarian aid. According to the Global Humanitarian Assistance Project, the United States provided 4.7 billion in aid to other nations, while Russia only contributed 32 million.[2] Providing humanitarian aid is an intrinsic value of the Unites States that the international community can benefit from. Beyond the moral imperative, humanitarian assistance serves as a source of enlightened self-interest, as it gives the United States influence. This soft power is nearly nonexistent for Russia.

While there are mitigating factors to the extent that Russia threatens the United States, such as geography and ability to wield soft power, Russia must be treated as a major threat. In analyzing the U.S. response to Russia, The Center for Strategic and International Studies’ report, “Recalibrating U.S. Strategy Toward Russia,” delineates a three-pillar plan for facing Russia in this new era. First the United States must “Strengthen the health of our democracies, institutions, and defenses”; secondly, it must “Contest Russian attempts to undermine U.S. interests”; and finally, the United States should aim to “Cooperate where advantageous and feasible.”[3] The U.S. Navy could aid in the pursuit of all three pillars. In strengthening our democracies, the Navy’s humanitarian assistance and disaster relief mission will be called into service. The better we can support the living conditions and health of democracies in other nations, the more we can prevent undue influence from Russia. To support the second pillar, we can use hard power to contest Russian forces. Specifically, we can fortify our response by coordinating with NATO. One such example of our coordination and joint power projection can be seen in the Baltic Operations (BALTOPS). Beginning in 1971 these operations serve to “show the flag,” or power project, near Russian waters and support tactical proficiency of U.S. forces. The scope of these operations has increased to include our NATO allies, further expanding the significance of these operations. Working together where advantageous—the third pillar—requires cooperation in nuclear nonproliferation deals and cooperation in the Arctic when feasible.

I’ve explored US-Russian relations from several different angles. While it is evident that Russia is a threat to national security, we are still left to question: where does this leave naval surface warfare? It is irrefutable that the U.S. surface fleet will play a critical role in the relationship between the Unites States and Russia. The future is unknown, but one thing seems certain: the U.S. Navy surface fleet will be relied on to defend, power project, and aid every corner of the world, a feat that will become more complex in a new wave of p

[1]  CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2060.html

[2] http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/country-profiles/

[3] Kathleen Hicks and Lisa Samp, “Recalibrating U.S. Strategy Toward Russia,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, (Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham, MD), 2017.

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