In the May—June 1916 issue of Naval Institute Proceedings, then-Captain William S. Sims, U.S. Navy, wrote an article titled, “Cheer Up!! There is No Naval War College.” Admiral Sims graduated from the Naval War College (NWC) in 1912, was in command of the battleship USS Nevada (BB-36) when he wrote the article in, and went on to become NWC president in February 1917. Admiral Sims’ article was meant to dispel the idea that NWC was “. . . a sort of ‘high brow’ institution that imposes its theoretical ideas upon the fleet in ‘words that had to be looked up in a dictionary.’”1 In other words, NWC had a reputation with some as being completely detached from the needs of the fleet and Sims wanted to disprove that notion. Fast forward 102 years and the NWC still is battling a modernized version of the same issue: Is NWC a “College” as the term is generally understood, or is it a professional institution for the study of warfare in the maritime domain?
The Debate
Today’s debate can be bracketed by looking at two recent articles that focus at either end of the spectrum. In their Joint Force Quarterly article, Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese and Professor Kevin Kelley lament that Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) programs in general, and NWC specifically, need to be more like Ivy League universities and that the NWC should be judged using metrics similar to those used by U.S. News and World Reports or Forbes’ rankings of civilian universities. 2 Johnson-Freese and Kelley argue that NWC’s institutional credibility is suspect because (1) peer review outside of other JPME institutions is not done, (2) it has no academic admission standards leading to high graduation rates, (3) the quality of the faculty is less than superlative—weighed down particularly by retired military officers, most without PhDs from top tier universities, and (4) promotion rates of graduates should be higher. While these metrics may be applicable to civilian liberal-arts schools, they may not be applicable to a professional institution considered part of every officer’s career path.
At the other end of the spectrum, Colonel Gary Anderson, U.S. Marine Corps (retired), wrote an op-ed in the Washington Times blaspheming current NWC President Rear Admiral Jeffrey Harley for announcing reforms he was enacting to enable NWC to “more closely resemble schools such as Brown University or the University of Rhode Island.” 3 Anderson’s article was in response to an interview by Harley that discussed NWC’s new strategic plan and his intent to allow “the academic freedoms that characterize flagship liberal-arts institutions of higher learning.”4 Implying that Harley’s effort was taking NWC too far from a necessary warfighting focus, Anderson facetiously suggested that NWC be renamed the “Naval University for Conflict Avoidance.”5
The correct answer is probably somewhere in the middle of the spectrum.
If we were to analyze this challenge using tenets that are taught at NWC, the first thing we would do is establish a clear and defined objective for NWC’s existence. Simply put, why does the Naval War College exist? Going back to either end of the spectrum, if the objective is to provide a superb liberal arts education related to national security, then there probably is value in tending closer to policies and organization of institutions like Harvard and Tufts. If, however, NWC exists to teach naval officers how to fight in the maritime domain, the course of instruction should be more maritime operational level of war (OLW) wargame-centric with little non-warfighting or theoretical academics.
Given NWC’s joint professional military education (JPME) requirements, a middle ground probably is more analogous to a professional civilian institution like a medical or law school. Faculty at professional schools typically have first-hand experience doing what they teach (not just researching or writing about it) and currency is the key to their relevance. For Navy officers, the most serious and demanding things they will do are to plan, lead, and execute major combat operations. This must be the central focus of NWC’s professional education. Throughout their careers Navy officers also will be required to do other tasks including procurement, budgeting, strategic planning, assessment, and personnel. These tasks always should be judged relative to their support for future warfighting in the maritime domain. Thus these topics should be ancillary to the study of planning, leading, and executing major combat operations.
The Challenge
Looking back at the long, great history of the NWC shows a consistency in the need to prepare officers to conduct operations at the OLW in the maritime domain. The conduct of that task has varied based on leadership priorities, anticipated threats, and the Navy’s mission at the time. The glory period of the NWC was probably the interwar years where Admirals King, Nimitz, Spruance, Halsey, and R.K. Turner studied, wrote about, and war-gamed major conflicts in the maritime domain, often focusing on war in the western Pacific. Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz considered his time as a student at the NWC (1922–23) “one of the truly important assignments of my career” and insisted that “more than any other experience, his eleven months in Newport prepared him for his wartime command.”6 In describing that preparation, Nimitz stated: “The enemy of our games was always Japan, and the courses were so thorough that after the start of WWII—nothing that happened in the Pacific was strange or unexpected. Each student was required to plan logistic support for an advance across the Pacific—and we were well prepared for the fantastic logistic efforts required to support the operations of the war . . . I credit the Naval War College for such success [as] I achieved in strategy & tactics both in peace and war.”7
While president of the Naval War College, Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner made his views known during his first convocation address on 24 August 1972: “Always keep in mind the product the country desperately needs is military leaders with the capability of solving complex problems and of executing their decisions. Scholarship for scholarship’s sake is of no importance to us. You must keep your sights set on decision making or problem solving as your objective.”8 Major curricular changes were made during Turner’s tenure as Naval War College president that form the basis for today’s JPME curriculum. “Intimating that the college had become only a gentlemen’s club where students could relax between demanding assignments”9 Turner wanted changes that “. . . represent a return to our great traditions—to the strategic and historical contributions of men like Mahan; to the tactical and operational studies of men like William Sims, Raymond Spruance, Kelly Turner who were the experts in naval warfare in their day.”10
In July 2016 Rear Admiral Jeffrey Harley began his tenure as the 56th NWC president. At his first all-hands call, Harley stood in Spruance Auditorium and stressed that he wanted NWC curricula to be “navalized,” “operationalized,” and “futurized.” Many viewed this as a shift in emphasis away from being a civilian-like college and tilting toward a professional institution focused on warfighting in the maritime domain; and indeed some strides have been made in the JPME curricula.
In his “Cheer Up!!” article, Sims intended to ensure that doubters of the strength of NWC’s attachment to the fleet and the value of NWC’s direct support to the fleet knew the truth. He discussed how the NWC of 1916 “. . . is at all times essentially a part of the fleet, and that its methods are largely controlled by the fleet.”11 He goes on to say, “The staff of the college, generally fresh from the fleet and a course at the college, presents accepted principles of war, and the accepted manner of writing orders, issues the rules of war games to be played, and helps the pupils play them.”12 The key concepts addressed by Sims that made NWC relevant to the fleet in 1916 are (1) the NWC course is about warfighting; (2) faculty are always current in fleet functions and operations; and (3) graduates immediately employ what they have learned.
Since the advent of joint education requirements, the “NWC experience” has been primarily thought of as the intermediate and senior level courses (ILC/SLC) that provide JPME I and JPME II credit respectively. Sims probably would not be “cheered up” by the high percentage of time in the current JPME curricula that is devoted to joint issues compared to the amount of time teaching warfighting in the maritime domain. Similarly, he might question the preponderance of faculty experience in “jointness” at the expense of expertise and currency in maritime operations at the OLW. Given the exigencies of joint education laid out in the Officer Professional Military Education Program (OPMEP) and being accredited by the New England Association of Schools and Colleges to award master’s degrees, some feel that the NWC is constrained in its ability to dramatically alter curricula toward maritime warfighting.
Today’s Answer
When the U.S. Navy adopted the Maritime Operations Center (MOC) construct approximately nine years ago to better enable its fleet staffs to operate at the operational level of war, the NWC partnered with the fleet commanders and stood up an organization that directly addresses maritime OLW warfighting. That organization, currently titled the College of Maritime Operational Warfare (CMOW), maintains laser focus on educating staff officers and synchronizing concepts concerning fleet staff warfighting efforts. CMOW’s civilian faculty (all retired military officers) and active-duty military faculty teach focused critical thinking in five courses that are concentrated squarely on warfighting in the maritime domain at the OLW. While it took about five years to fully resource and develop all five courses, today CMOW annually educates more than 600 officers (from junior officers to flag officers) in maritime domain warfighting concepts, doctrine, procedures, organization, and leadership of fleet staffs. The courses are: Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) and Combined Force Maritime Component Commander (CFMCC) courses for flag officers, Executive Level OLW Course (ELOC) for staff principals (O-6s), and Maritime Staff Operators Course (MSOC) and Maritime Operational Planners Course (MOPC) for junior to midgrade officers.
When CMOW courses are viewed through the lens of Sims’ three critical aspects that made NWC relevant in 1916, there is remarkable similarity. The first is that the NWC of 1916 and CMOW today were/are predominantly about operational level warfighting in the maritime domain. CMOW education synthesizes lectures, discussions, practical application, and war gaming to make each of its courses relevant to the target audience based on rank and experience level. Practical application and war games replicate the pressure, staff functions, and requirements of a MOC and necessitate that the students work together to solve complex warfighting problems just as they will on a real staff.
The second of Sims’ critical aspects of relevancy is the currency of its faculty. CMOW’s military faculty have recent fleet staff experience and are organized in the Assist and Assess Team (AAT) Directorate under the leadership of an active-duty Navy captain. The military faculty are CMOW’s primary contact with all eight fleet staffs concerning MOC certification and major exercise preparation and assessment. The military faculty spend a significant amount of time on the road at fleet staff locations around the world providing direct support for MOC functions, organization, and OLW planning. Additionally, CMOW military faculty routinely bring their experience and currency into the CMOW classrooms. CMOW’s civilian faculty are similarly organized, along with the military faculty, into Fleet Engagement Teams (FETs) affiliated with every fleet staff. The task of the FETs is to help fleet staffs help themselves, meaning CMOW personnel are reach-back and continuity for current fleet staff priorities. For example, in the recent past FET personnel have assisted fleet staffs with theater security cooperation events, provided operations assessment education, and conducted real world planning support. CMOW civilian faculty routinely visit fleet and task force staffs to provide dedicated support and education. These experiences are brought directly back into CMOW curricula and classrooms. Additionally, many AAT members (military faculty) are MSOC or MOPC alumni who have completed a staff tour and then returned to Newport to teach the next iteration of staff officers. Further, several of CMOW’s best civilian professors were members of the AAT while on active duty and have extensive recent experience serving on multiple fleet staffs.
Sims’ third aspect of relevancy deals with employment of the graduates in applicable billets to provide immediate benefit to the Navy of the education just received. CMOW students are all en route to a fleet staff or sent to Newport on temporary duty from a fleet staff where they have the opportunity to immediately employ what they have learned. CMOW’s two longer courses, MSOC (five intense weeks) and MOPC (12 intense weeks) , are both accredited to award additional qualification designators (AQDs) and each of the eight fleet staffs have approximately 100 billets that require the MOPC or MSOC AQD. This requirement is delineated in Fleet Forces Command’s “MOC Standardization Manual” necessitating the throughput in CMOW courses.
The Navy provided NWC with significant program-of-record monetary and billet resources to stand up, maintain, and deliver the education provided by CMOW. Given the demands on CMOW from all eight fleet staffs, there is more than anecdotal proof of the tremendous value of CMOW’s efforts directly supporting the Fleet – ask any current or former Fleet Commander.
There are additional components of NWC that provide at least partial satisfaction of ADM Sims’ aspects of fleet relevancy. Certainly within NWC’s Center for Naval Warfare Studies, the Wargaming Department and some of the Research Centers have direct connections with and provide direct support to the fleet staffs. In addition, while they must comply with OpMep joint requirements, the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School (MAWS) at least has tangential application of the fleet relevancy aspect.
As the hundred-years-long debate continues on what best constitutes the NWC and its curricula, the answer cannot be simply a replication of Harvard’s Kennedy School or Tuft’s Fetcher School. Nor is the right answer to replicate tactical Navy training that is provided at tactical training groups, Warfighting Development Centers, and elsewhere. The modern day NWC is, as stated by Admiral Harley, “a university with several schools and centers not all directly associated with fighting wars.”13 However, it is important to realize that a part of NWC, CMOW, is dedicated to maritime OLW warfighting. The challenge for the modern day NWC is to meet all joint requirements, all fleet maritime OLW warfighting requirements, and associated peripheral efforts. The difficulty is in prioritizing and balancing resources to achieve the optimal results for today’s Navy. Given the current and near term potential for a peer-level fight in the maritime domain, we must always remember that NWC is educating the generation of Navy officers that will plan, lead, and execute the next major war at sea – whenever and wherever it occurs.
Cheer Up Admiral Sims!! With CMOW, there still is no Naval War College.
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Notes
1 William S. Sims, “Cheer Up!! There is No Naval War College,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May-June 1916, 858.
2 Joan Johnson-Freese and Kevin Kelley, “Meaningful Metrics for Professional Military Education,” Joint Force Quarterly, 84 (1st Quarter 2017), 65-71.
3 Gary Anderson, “The Naval University for Conflict Avoidance (Op-ed),” Washington Times, 5 September 2017, available at: https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/sep/5/navy-war-college-takes-on-gentler-identity/
4 G.Wayne Miller, “Naval War College President Charts New Course for Newport Institution,” Providence Journal, 1 September 2017, available at: http://www.providencejournal.com/news/20170901/naval-war-college-president-charts-new-course-for-newport-institution
5 Anderson, “The Naval University for Conflict Avoidance (Op-ed).”
6 E.B. Potter, Nimitz (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1976), 136.
7 Ibid.
8 John Hattendorf, B. Mitchel Stimson, III, John Wadleigh, Sailors and Scholars, The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War College (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1984), 284.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid, 283.
11 Sims, “Cheer Up!! There is No Naval War College,” 857.
12 Ibid, 857-858.
13 Miller, “Naval War College President Charts New Course for Newport Institution.”
